Abstract
Recent years, with the development of China, an incessant springing up of major engineering projects. Based on the characteristics of the decentralization of local governments in China, whether there are local governments competing to set up major engineering projects at the expense of the environment in order to maintain local economic development. From the perspective of evolutionary game, this paper constructs a game model between engineering construction innovation and local government under the influence of local government’s choice of different environmental regulations. Through the dynamic replication equation, the behavior selection path and evolution strategy of local government and engineering construction firms are obtained. The research results show that the strict environmental regulation of local governments and the technological innovation of engineering construction firms can achieve stability at the same time, and the conditions are effective government investment by local governments.
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