Evolutionary Game Perspective Research Articles

An analysis of optimal equilibrium in the carbon trading market - From a tripartite evolutionary game perspective

As the climate crisis intensifies, achieving the global consensus of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality has become imperative. Carbon trading is an important financial measure to address the environmental crisis, and the realization of the dual‑carbon goals requires the cooperation and joint efforts of all parties involved in the carbon emissions trading market. This study constructs a dynamic evolutionary game model involving enterprises, government, and financial institutions while considering consumers' influence. By solving for equilibrium points and conducting numerical simulations, we explore optimal strategy choices for each stakeholder. Our findings reveal that the success of enterprise low-carbon transition is contingent upon market dynamics and requires active cooperation from government, financial institutions, and the public. Furthermore, factors such as financial market efficiency and internal governance capacity significantly impact enterprises' transformation decisions by influencing low-carbon transition costs. Public feedback indirectly affects enterprise decisions through its influence on financial institutions' provision of green services. Additionally, gradual reduction of carbon quotas by government entities facilitates progress toward low-carbon transformation objectives.

Dynamic Research on the Collaborative Governance in Urban and Rural Black-Odorous Water: A Tripartite Stochastic Evolutionary Game Perspective

The issue of black-odorous water (BOW) represents a formidable challenge to the current aquatic ecosystems, and its governance exhibits characteristics of low efficiency, susceptibility to relapse, and fragmented management under the Central Environmental Protection Inspection, thereby emerging as a dynamically complex issue in the ecological governance of urban and rural settings. This study introduces Gaussian white noise to simulate environmental uncertainty and design a stochastic evolutionary game model encompassing the central government, local governments, and societal forces based on evolutionary game theory and classical governance theories and concepts. Numerical simulations are conducted to explore trajectories of the strategic evolution of various subjects influenced by numerous factors. Results indicate that under the environment of random disturbances, the strategies of the game subjects show significant fluctuations, but actively cultivating the subject’s initial willingness facilitates collaboration governance in inspection. Moreover, joint construction of a “belief system” by multi-subjects, the intensity of inspection interventions, the integration of heterogeneous resources, and effective punitive measures all influence the governance of BOW, but the efficiency of resource allocation should be considered throughout the governance process. Recommendations are made finally for collaborative governance of urban and rural BOW, promoting the sustainable development of the ecological environment.

The application of restorative justice in China’s environmental crime: an evolutionary game perspective

The application of restorative justice in China’s environmental crime: an evolutionary game perspective

Synergizing stakeholder collaboration for value co-creation in China's prefabricated decoration diffusion: A tripartite evolutionary game perspective

The emerging prefabricated decoration (PD) sector in China offers a compelling avenue for revolutionizing the construction industry, aligning with the imperatives of sustainability and industrialization. However, the outlook for the diffusion of PD in China's construction industry is less than promising. The development of PD is closely related to its value creation and the intricate interplay of stakeholder strategies and their ramifications on PD's value co-creation necessitates thorough exploration. Based on evolutionary game theory, this study elucidates the dynamic interactions among local governments, developers, and decoration contractors in China's evolving PD landscape. A tripartite evolutionary game model was established, investigating the evolutionary stable equilibriums and the corresponding strategies. Then, an empirical analysis in Chongqing City validates the game models and primary conclusions. Scrutinizing subsidy thresholds, local subsidy biases, PD proportion in prefabrication, and binary innovation allocation, the research unveils nuanced insights pertinent to boosting PD's value co-creation. Findings advocate an assembly rate threshold of subsidy (65%–70 %) and a shift towards incentivizing decoration contractors to catalyze PD adoption. Additionally, excessive PD proportion and immature product investments may hinder industry development, prompting stakeholders to recalibrate strategies dynamically. These findings characterize the mechanisms of stakeholder value co-creation during the PD diffusion, enriching the implications of value co-creation theory in the emerging industry of the construction sector. They also furnish stakeholders committed to promoting the diffusion of PD in the domestic and international construction sectors with practical strategic guidance, particularly tailored for cities in the early stages of PD development.

An exploration of omni‐channel retail from a three‐party evolutionary game perspective: Brand strength vs. platform stream

AbstractThis study builds a three‐party evolutionary game to study the contributing factors of commission rate, productivity expansion, cooperation subsidy, brand strength, and platform stream. The proposed model investigates the diverse paths the three parties are motivated to pursue at different phases of omni‐channel integration and further explores which party, the band owner with strong brand strength, or the platform with a mass consumer stream, dominates omni‐channel negotiation regarding profit distribution arrangements.

How to Promote the Development of Cultural and Creative Industries from an Evolutionary Game Perspective: Policy Mechanisms for Certification + Incentives

Existing studies need to pay more attention to the policy mechanisms of how to promote the development of cultural and creative industries through coordinating multi-stakeholder participation. Based on evolutionary game theory, this study constructs a three-party evolutionary game model to analyze the behavioral patterns of the government, cultural and creative enterprises, and consumers under different support policies. In addition, it takes the Chinese intangible cultural heritage of “Huaihe willow weaving” as a typical case for simulation. The results show that the probability of the system converging to the expected equilibrium point is low after implementing the certification policy, but the probability of the system converging to the expected equilibrium is significantly increased after implementing the incentive policy. Producer subsidies have significant advantages over consumer subsidies. At this stage, the government should consider jointly implementing the “certification + incentives” policy in phases to promote the development of cultural and creative industries.

Government subsidy and benefit distribution mechanisms for transportation PPP projects: An evolutionary game perspective

Public-private partnerships (PPP), as an important model for collaboration between the public and private sectors, is an urgent and critical topic due to the serious financial losses of governments involved in transportation PPP projects in recent years. Current research focuses on the government subsidy model, in which the effective implementation of government subsidies relies on the design of incentives for stakeholder behavior. Although the positive externalities are strong, they are prone to the problem of “free riding,” which leads to low project performance and challenges in compensating for the government's financial losses. Therefore, this study proposes a novel dynamic subsidy mechanism that can be adjusted based on actual changes in transportation demand and that is linked to project performance. We use evolutionary game theory to construct a two-party evolutionary game model of the government and social capital, focusing on the stability and influencing factors of these interactions. Our research unveils that reaching specific thresholds in both the incentive coefficient and benefit distribution ratio induces an “positive management–negative management” shift in the behavior of involved parties, leading to enhanced project outcomes. Notably, fluctuations in operational quality substantially enhance the efficiency of the active management of private sector, with no discernible impact on the subsidy efficiency of the government. Therefore, our study provides a theoretical framework for improving the revenue allocation and government subsidy mechanism, which has theoretical and practical implications for enhancing the effect of government incentives and improving the quality of operational social capital.

Research on the "multi-agent co-governance" system of unfair competition on internet platforms: Based on the perspective of evolutionary game.

Unfair competition on internet platforms (UCIP) has become a critical issue restricting the platform economy's healthy development. This paper applies evolutionary game theory to study how to utilize multiple subjects' synergy to supervise UCIP effectively. First, the "multi-agent co-governance" mode of UCIP is constructed based on the traditional "unitary supervision" mode. Second, the government and internet platform evolutionary game models are built under two supervision modes. Finally, MATLAB is used to simulate and analyze the evolutionary stage and parameter sensitivity. In addition, we match the model's evolutionary stage with China's supervisory process. The results show that (1) the Chinese government's supervision of UCIP is in the transitional stage from "campaign-style" to "normalization." (2) Moderate government supervision intensity is essential to guide the game system to evolve toward the ideal state. If the supervision intensity is too high, it will inhibit the enthusiasm for supervision. If the supervision intensity is too low, it cannot form an effective deterrent to the internet platforms. (3) When the participation of industry associations and platform users is low, it can only slow down the evolutionary speed of the game system's convergence to the unfavorable state. Nevertheless, it cannot reverse the evolutionary result. (4) Maintaining the participation level of industry associations and platform users above a specific threshold value while increasing punishment intensity will promote the transition of government supervision from the "campaign-style" to the "normalization" stage. This paper provides ideas and references for the Chinese government to design a supervision mechanism for UCIP.

How to promote the digital business model innovation of high‐tech SMEs through government venture capital? An evolutionary game perspective

AbstractDigital business model innovation plays a crucial role in the growth of high‐tech small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs). In this research, we introduced tripartite evolutionary game models that include the government, venture capital (VC) institutions, and high‐tech SMEs, operating within the context of government venture capital. Within the scenarios of government revenue and loss compensation, we assess the evolutionary stable strategies of each stakeholder and analyze variations in the evolution results. Using numerical simulation, we investigate how factors impact players' strategic choices and the evolution of the system. The findings indicate the presence of an indirect transmission mechanism among players' strategic choices, which collaboratively stabilizes the game system. Furthermore, we investigate the policy consequences of various compensation mechanisms and find that high‐tech SMEs' strategic choices are not influenced by these compensation approaches. However, the incentive effects of different compensation on the government and VCs' investment strategies vary. Revenue compensation is more favorable for VC institutions but places a greater financial burden on the government. In contrast, loss compensation is a more efficient approach for the government. This study offers valuable insights for the management and operation of government venture capital funds, and the advancement of digital business model innovation for high‐tech SMEs.

Green credit and transformation to enhance the plastic supply chain in China: A three-player evolutionary game perspective approach under dynamic green awareness

This study explores green credit to promote the green transformation of the plastic supply chain under carbon neutral and plastic ban policies in China. The relationship and strategy among commercial banks, suppliers, and manufacturers are analyzed using a supply chain structure and evolutionary game theory. Incorporate dynamic consumer willingness to recycle and cost-sharing mechanisms for green innovation. The stability and dynamic probability of participants' strategy selection are calculated using empirical data, including financial situation and carbon emission. A genetic algorithm is used to optimize the game parameters for sensitivity analysis. The results suggest that green credit can facilitate the green transformation of the plastics supply chain, but its effectiveness is affected by consumers' willingness to recycle. The effect of green credit has a marginal effect, with higher interest rates reducing the rate of green innovation and manufacturing choices. Suppliers are not able to share the costs of the transition, and only manufacturers bearing or co-bearing the costs are conducive to a green transition. Lower green input costs favor transition but are constrained by market demand. Environmental penalties are too low to create financial pressure, and environmental uncertainty discourages green transformation.

Strategic Analysis of the Parameter Servers and Participants in Federated Learning: An Evolutionary Game Perspective

Federated learning (FL) is a new decentralized deep learning paradigm developed for collaborative model training and solving the problem of data privacy and has received extensive attention from both the academic and business worlds. However, FL still faces challenges in encouraging participants to contribute private data and computational resources. Although many studies have applied game theory models to improve the incentive mechanism design of FL, they assume that the players are absolutely rational and that the game models are static. In this study, a mathematical model based on evolutionary game theory (EGT) is established to analyze the interaction between parameter servers and participants, considering that the participants are not completely rational in the long-term dynamic decision-making process. The evolutionarily stable status of the FL system and the strategies of the parameter servers and participants were analyzed under eight different scenarios. Based on the model analysis and results of the numerical experiments, managerial insights for maintaining a sustainable FL system are summarized.

Strategies selection for building e-commerce platforms for agricultural wholesale markets: A tripartite evolutionary game perspective.

The rapid advancement and widespread implementation of digital technology have created opportunities for the e-commerce transformation of agricultural wholesale markets. The building of e-commerce platforms in this process is of utmost importance and should be approached methodically. This article analyzes the interests and behavioral choices of the agricultural wholesale markets, local government, and wholesalers by establishing a tripartite evolutionary game model. It applies replicator dynamics equations to describe the evolutionary strategies of each party. The findings of the study indicate that the behavioral choices of agricultural wholesale markets, local government, and wholesalers are influenced by their initial intentions. Furthermore, there exists a degree of alignment between the choices made by agricultural wholesale markets and wholesalers. The building of e-commerce platforms by agricultural wholesale markets can be facilitated through direct and indirect government subsidies; this also motivates wholesalers to adopt and utilize these platforms. Agricultural wholesale markets may further incentivize wholesalers to utilize their own e-commerce platforms by offering additional benefits. On the other hand, if the agricultural wholesale markets demonstrate strong initial inclinations toward using third-party e-commerce platforms. In this scenario, the local government has the potential to promote the widespread use of these platforms by providing both direct and indirect financial incentives to these markets, as well as actively encouraging wholesalers to participate in them. This study presents policy recommendations for agricultural wholesale markets and local government to support the effective implementation of e-commerce platforms in the agricultural wholesaler markets and facilitate a smooth transition to e-commerce in agricultural wholesale markets.

How to use BAPV to alleviate the urban heat island effect: An evolutionary game perspective.

In recent years, the phenomenon of the urban heat island caused by the rapid development of cities is very serious. To solve the problem of the urban heat island, this study proposed a PPP project consisting of the government (GOVT), photovoltaic investment company (PVIC), and residential customers (RS). Based on an evolutionary game model and combined with current policies and industry regulations in China, the evolution process and stable evolution strategies were studied. The result shows that more government subsidies, higher carbon trading prices, and feed-in tariffs will promote the development of the PPP project. For relatively suitable reference value ranges, the installation tilt angle of the BAPV system is 30°, the photovoltaic grid electricity price is 0.1096∼0.1296 $/kWh, the carbon trading is 8.92∼9.42 $/t.

Improving Prefix Hijacking Defense of RPKI from an Evolutionary Game Perspective

Improving Prefix Hijacking Defense of RPKI from an Evolutionary Game Perspective

How does autonomous vehicles affect taxi industry? A two-stage Van Damme based tripartite evolutionary game perspective

As urban passenger transportation focuses more on economic efficiency and road safety, autonomous driving technology is being introduced in the taxi industry. Interests differ among automobile manufacturers, taxi companies, and the government in promoting the adoption of autonomous taxis (ATs). This paper investigates the impact of multiple factors in the mixed traffic operation mode on the tripartite game using the two-stage Van Damme model. It also analyzes the game-breaking key to automobile manufactures' decision in the dual stable situation. The findings are as follows: (1) Under government non-promotion, independent R&D guides taxi companies to adopt ATs more effectively. Under government promotion, the social acceptance and loss of technology dominance have varying impacts on the game results. (2) Adjusting infrastructure cost and subsidy intensity can lead to a single stable situation when taxi companies and the government adopt a wait-and-see approach. (3) The loss of technology dominance shifts game leader from automobile manufacturers to the government. (4) Taxi companies would only adopt ATs when the social acceptance is moderate, as it exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship. These findings provide valuable insights for how to better promote the adoption of ATs under both promotion and non-promotion by the government.

Promoting the resource utilization of agricultural wastes in China with public-private-partnership mode: An evolutionary game perspective

The agricultural waste is large in number and the utilization rate is extremely low in China, requiring remediated. Formatting the project system and introducing the Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) mode are inevitable to realize the specialization and socialization in resource utilization of agricultural wastes. However, the confusion of financing, management, responsibilities of participants and difficulties in coordinating interests limit the expected effect of the resource utilization of agricultural wastes (RUAW). To this end, combined with the examination of actual cases, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of RUAW PPP projects among local government, social capital and farmers, then conducts simulation and case study. We find that the local government does not supervise, social capital acts opportunistically, and farmers choose to cooperate is the evolutionary stable situation, and the cost of supervision for local government and the reward and punishment mechanism of local government to social capital will largely influence the strategy choice of the stakeholders. Strengthening the local government's sense of responsibility and regulatory capacity, optimizing the reward and punishment system, vigorously making technological innovations, and improving the operational capacity of the special purpose vehicle can effectively improve the efficiency of cooperation. The results of the study have some guiding significance for further improving the level of circular agriculture in China even in developing countries and forming a more complete system of resource utilization of agricultural wastes.

Farmers’ Cognition of and Satisfaction with Policy Affect Willingness of Returning Straw to Field: Based on Evolutionary Game Perspective

As an important measure to promote the black soil protection strategy, returning straw to the fields is the choice of government policy to affect the decision-making behavior of farmers, and the policy implementation process is a dynamic game equilibrium process between farmers and the government. In order to explore the influence of policies on farmers’ straw-returning decision-making and stability processes, this paper used a logit model to analyze the influencing factors on farmers’ straw-returning decision-making behavior based on the survey data of 397 farmers in Hailun City, Heilongjiang Province. This study also constructs the evolutionary game model between farmers and government, carrying out a stability strategy analysis and numerical simulation. The results evidence that farmers’ cognition of fertilization technology, ecological protection, policy satisfaction and cognition of straw returning recipients have a significant negative influence on their willingness to return to the field, and the effect intensity decreases successively. What is more, cognition of crop disease resistance has a positive effect on the willingness of returning straw to the field. It is found that the game balancing process of farmers’ behavior and government straw returning policy evolution can be divided into three stages. At present, China’s straw returning policy is in the intermediate stage, and government needs to provide comprehensive compensation for returning straw to the field according to local conditions such as farmers’ willingness, crop conditions and so on.

How to promote the adoption of intelligent spray technology in farmers’ cooperatives? ——Based on the perspective of evolutionary game

In order to accelerate the development of smart agriculture and realize the green transformation of agriculture, the coupling of prospect theory and evolutionary game theory is introduced. Construct a two-party evolutionary game model for the adoption of intelligent spray technology in farmers' cooperatives, analyze the evolution of farmers' cooperatives and government strategy selection and its influencing factors according to the replication dynamic equation, and conduct numerical simulation experiments through Matlab software. The results show that the adoption of intelligent spray technology by farmers' cooperatives and the government's choice of subsidies are the two optimal stable states of the evolutionary system. The government's subsidy policy can effectively stimulate farmers' cooperatives to adopt intelligent spray technology, but when the government subsidy coefficient is greater than or equal to 70%, the decision-making evolution of the government and farmers' cooperatives is unstable. The increase in farmers' awareness of pesticide hazards, the scale of operation of farmers' cooperatives, the price of high-quality agricultural products, and the sensitivity of farmers' cooperatives to profits and losses contribute to the promotion of intelligent spray technology, and the damage probability of intelligent spray technology has a restraining effect.

Dose blockchain-based agri-food supply chain guarantee the initial information authenticity? An evolutionary game perspective.

Guarantee the initial information of the agri-food supply chain (AFSC) authenticity based on the blockchain is a complex problem. This paper develops an evolutionary game model of AFSC participants based on the blockchain and discusses the impacts of the key parameters on the dynamic evolution process of participants. To verify the theoretical results, simulation experiments and sensitivity analysis were conducted through Matlab 2022b. The study results show that: (1) Guaranteeing the initial information authenticity could become the common belief of all AFSC participants, with the scientific design of parameters; (2) Higher reward and synergistic effect, lower information cost and risk contribute to improving the probability of initial true information sharing. (3) when the default penalty is too severe, the enterprise will evolve into not sharing the initial true information. Finally, this study could provide some suggestions and countermeasures for the leading enterprise in the agricultural supply chain and local governments to guarantee initial information authenticity in China. That is the way to realize the sustainability of AFSC in the long run.

Protecting Innovation Sustainability: R&D Manipulation and Effective Regulation Based on a Two-Scenario Evolutionary Game Perspective

Enterprise innovation is the core content of national innovation and an important issue for sustainable development. Therefore, this paper focuses on the phenomenon of R&D manipulation in the declaration of high-tech enterprises, constructs a two-scenario two-party evolutionary game model in which central governments do or do not join in the supervision of local governments and the declaration enterprises and simulates and analyzes the direction of each key variable on the strategy selection of the game subject and degree of impact. The study finds that reducing tax rates is beneficial to avoid enterprise R&D manipulation, while innovation performance and regulatory costs drive local governments to reduce regulation. Further analysis shows that central government’s participation in supervision reduces enterprise R&D manipulation and strengthens local government regulation. The research results could promote the standardization of enterprise innovation behavior and mitigate local government slack, thereby fostering sustainable innovation and development.