Protecting Innovation Sustainability: R&D Manipulation and Effective Regulation Based on a Two-Scenario Evolutionary Game Perspective

Abstract

Enterprise innovation is the core content of national innovation and an important issue for sustainable development. Therefore, this paper focuses on the phenomenon of R&D manipulation in the declaration of high-tech enterprises, constructs a two-scenario two-party evolutionary game model in which central governments do or do not join in the supervision of local governments and the declaration enterprises and simulates and analyzes the direction of each key variable on the strategy selection of the game subject and degree of impact. The study finds that reducing tax rates is beneficial to avoid enterprise R&D manipulation, while innovation performance and regulatory costs drive local governments to reduce regulation. Further analysis shows that central government’s participation in supervision reduces enterprise R&D manipulation and strengthens local government regulation. The research results could promote the standardization of enterprise innovation behavior and mitigate local government slack, thereby fostering sustainable innovation and development.