In this paper I describe an equilibrium model of job matchings with perfect foresight that has the following property. The number of people looking for work changes temporarily when there is a temporary shock to the value of labour's marginal product; it does not change when the shock is permanent. By contrast, real wages change temporarily by a small amount when the shock is temporary, but change permanently and by a bigger amount when the shock is permanent. Thus the model offers an explanation for the observation that over the cycle small wage changes are associated with changes in unemployment, whereas secularly wage growth does not seem to affect the rate of unemployment. The two most common explanations for this observation in the literature-the Phelps-Lucas misperceptions model and the Lucas-Rapping intertemporal substitution model-are well grounded in equilibrium theory, but they have not stood up well to empirical testing. The misperceptions model requires more ignorance of aggregate changes than can be reasonably assumed, whereas the intertemporal substitution model requires bigger wage elasticities of labour supply than those estimated.! In the model of this paper neither misperceptions nor changes in the supply of labour play a role in generating the unemployment cycle. All agents observe the shocks when they occur and they anticipate correctly the economy's adjustment path. But like the new classical explanations of the cycle the model is an equilibrium one, in the sense that all private gains from trade are fully exploited at all phases of the cycle. Although the social gains from trade may not be fully exploited because of search externalities, the cycle I derive here is not due to externalities. Unlike other related perfect-foresight models, such as Diamond's (1982a), the structure of the model is such that the externalities do not give rise to multiple equilibria. The key element of the model, which is responsible for the transmission of output shocks to unemployment, is the equation for wages. In markets where the allocation of jobs takes place.,through search both firms and workers have some monopoly power (a point emphasised by Mortensen (1970), though he attributed only temporary monopoly power and only to firms). I use the Nash bargaining solution to solve for the equilibrium wage rate and show that the firm's and worker's alternative returns (threat points, or
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