THE COMPOSITION of money/bond finance of the government's budget deficit will in general affect the rate of inflation in long run perfect foresight models. It has been shown however that the nature of the analysis depends crucially on the type of deficit which is being held constant while its composition varies. McCallum (1984) has shown, for example, that a policy of pure bond finance of the deficit is not possible if the deficit is defined of interest payments, while this policy is possible, without inflation, if the deficit is gross of (i.e. includes) interest payments. Liviatan (1982) has shown that an increase in money finance of the deficit is deflationary when deficit is held constant and inflationary when gross deficit is held constant. The distinction between the two types of deficit is crucial to almost every problem of monetary policy in long run perfect foresight models. For example, it was brought up recently in relation to the analysis of the effect of tight money on inflation, following the work of Sargent and Wallace (1981). Liviatan has (1984) shown that the result that tight money may have an inflationary effect even in the short run is reversed when the definition of the deficit is changed from net to gross. Although there seems to be, in recent papers, some preference for holding constant deficit [a new example is provided by Calvo (1985)], there is no theoretical justification for this procedure. If we hold constant deficit, we assume implicitly an inflationary attitude by the government, which seems to prefer financing additional interest payments by printing money and selling bonds rather than by additional taxes. If alternatively, we hold gross deficit constant, we assume that the government has an anti-inflationary philosophy which calls for an increase in taxation when interest payments rise. The choice among these approaches should presumably reflect the government's evaluation of the cost of inflation as compared with the cost of raising taxes. In principle, there is no particular reason why we should confine ourselves only to a choice between the extreme attitudes mentioned above. It seems more reasonable to assume that the government can adopt a convex combination of the extreme cases. We shall therefore define a fiscal policy parameter in the form of the proportion (0) of the interest on government bonds which is financed by taxes. The parameter of monetary policy will be defined as the ratio (ar) of money finance to bond finance of the deficit.
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