Zone Of Peace Research Articles

Establishment of Maritime Peace Zone - Legal Issues, Effects and Countermeasures -

Establishment of Maritime Peace Zone - Legal Issues, Effects and Countermeasures -

The Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: an Outdated Concept or Format for the Future?

The article considers the origins and current perspectives of the concept of the “Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace” (IOZOP). It was formed within the framework of the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1960s and early 1970s. The concept was supported by the countries of the Indian Ocean Region as the opportunity to avoid the transformation of the Indian Ocean into a zone of conflict between the great powers. Initially formulated very vaguely, in the end the IOZOP concept was reduced mainly to the requirement for non-regional powers to stop testing weapons and deployment of military forces and assets on the islands of the Indian Ocean. Despite the proclamation of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace by UNGA in 1971, the Western powers ignored this decision, refusing to withdraw its militaryforces and bases from the region. The subsequent disagreements between the regional actors, some of which feared increasing India’s power, and the dramatic change in the political situation in the world led lto a decline in interest in this idea. However, in 2014, India, and Sri Lanka expressed their readiness to put this issue on the agenda again. The author analyzes the history of origin and attempts to realize the concept of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, the reasons for its failure, highlights the positions of the main countries concerned, key moments that hinder and contribute to the formation of a zone of peace. He concludes that under current conditions, the IOZOP concept can be implemented in an updated form as part of a potential ocean management structure that could be formed on the basis of regional structures such as IORA and IONS.

Whither Non-Alignment? Indian Ocean Zone of Peace and New Delhi’s Selective Alignment with Great Powers during the Cold War, 1964–1979

ABSTRACTFirst proposed in 1964 by the Sri Lankan prime minister, the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace [IOZP] entailed eradication of foreign military bases from the Indian Ocean region as well its denuclearisation. During the Cold War, India was one of the most vehement supporters of IOZP. If some saw India’s interests in the IOZP as another manifestation of Nehruvian idealism, others viewed it as a part of its non-aligned foreign policy. This analysis argues otherwise. India’s record on IOZP reveals a policy of selective alignment with Great Powers and its adaptation to the principles of power politics in international relations. India’s support for the presence of one or the other Great Powers in the Indian Ocean region found premise on balancing those it considered hostile to its national security interests. In public, India supported the call for IOZP as dictated by its non-aligned foreign policy; privately, New Delhi remained highly sceptical and often worked to IZOP’s detriment. Under the cloak of IOZP, India not only pursued diplomatic alignment with Great Powers but also ensured that its own regional ambitions remain unchecked. In this picture, India’s role was not only supportive of the Cold War but to the extent it could use the opportunities provided by superpower rivalry in the region to further its own ends, even determinative of the process.

Kant's Political Legacy: Human Rights, Peace, Progress by Luigi Caranti

Reviewed by: Kant's Political Legacy: Human Rights, Peace, Progress by Luigi Caranti Frederick Rauscher Luigi Caranti. Kant's Political Legacy: Human Rights, Peace, Progress. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2017. Pp. x + 310. £90.00. In all three areas of Kant's political philosophy that Luigi Caranti covers, he offers compelling and persuasive accounts that sharpen our understanding of Kant and show the value of close study of historical texts for today's philosophy. Recent political philosophy inspired by Kant often draws from his more general moral writings, as exemplified by Rawls's use of the categorical imperative as a procedure. Others, however, cite Kant's works more directly concerned with political philosophy. Caranti assesses these readings in two areas—the foundations for human rights and the conditions for international peace—and adds an assessment of Kant on progress toward a just political order. [End Page 352] The first two topics receive parallel treatment. Caranti devotes one chapter each to reviewing Kant's position, to assessing recent political philosophy on the topic, and to showing how the proper understanding of Kant leads to a better contemporary position. He is clearly at home in both the historical and contemporary worlds and, even better, moves smoothly between them to the benefit of both. Human rights, for Kant, consist in fact of the sole innate right to freedom together with the other rights that it implicitly contains, such as formal equality and being one's own master. While some contemporary theorists would simply base these rights on other goods, or see them as built into the political culture already, or assert without further ground that humans have dignity deserving these rights, Caranti argues that Kant requires that any basis for human rights must show why humanity has value. Caranti sees Kant as insisting that the value of humanity lies not in an end-setting capacity, but in the capacity to have a good will. For contemporary application, he suggests that Kant's own conception of good will as one willing the categorical imperative is too narrow, and that a broader conception of a good will as one that wills some version of a moral law is universal and can serve as the explanation of humanity that grounds human rights. I am skeptical of this solution for two reasons. First, historically, I think that Kant grounded humanity on rational self-governance in general more than on the specifically moral self-governance of the good will. Second, I suspect that broadly acceptable contemporary rights claims must be based on individual value as a basis of moral value rather than moral value, in the guise of the capacity for being moral, as a basis for individual value. Caranti's second main topic, international peace, comprises in my opinion the most successful part of the book. He details the main features of contemporary Democratic Peace Theory (after a thorough assessment of its many variations and critics), which essentially claims that democracies will not war against one another, particularly when they are involved in international institutions with other democracies and are interdependent economically through trade. The resulting "zone of peace" would set these peaceful states off from the remainder of the world; as the zone expands so would overall peace. Kant's explanations of the conditions for peace, however, require not democracy per se but states governed by representatives with a republican (civic) ethos. The international institutions must not be limited to these kinds of states but include all states. Economic interdependence is not alone reflective of the required cosmopolitan conscience that individuals need to develop. Democratic Peace Theory and Kant's actual model offer divergent policy implications. Carenti successfully shows not only that contemporary Democratic Peace Theory has misunderstood Kant's position, but also that what it neglects in Kant would improve its overall position. Since the third main topic, a proof of the inevitability of progress, has not been taken up in contemporary political philosophy, Carenti focuses on a close reading of Kant, with chapters covering Idea for a Universal History and Toward Perpetual Peace. He argues that Kant's history essay provides an empirical argument that stands independently of any regulative or providential claims...

Silences and hierarchies in European Union Public Diplomacy

Abstract This article analyzes the effects of European Union Public Diplomacy (EUPD) discourses, drawing on poststructuralist approaches, which emphasize the productive dimension of discourse. We argue that EUPD helps reproduce a hierarchized identity of the EU, which authorizes particular courses of action while limiting others. Through an analysis of EUPD documents, we identify three descriptors - “EU as a zone of peace, prosperity and democracy”; “United in Diversity”; and “EU as a model” – which, together, form a meaningful narrative about EU’s identity, infused with moral superiority, and constitute a dominant discourse with political effects internally and externally.

Carr goes east: reconsidering power and inequality in a post-liberal Eurasia

ABSTRACTThis paper analyses Western policies towards Russia from the realist perspective of E.H. Carr. His critique of inter-war liberal ‘utopianism’ pointed to the tendency of liberal states to disregard the role of power in shaping an international normative order of their making; their discounting of contingency in favour of a progressive, teleological view of history; and their insensitivity to the structural inequalities reproduced by that order. These predispositions can also be observed in the liberal West’s policies towards Russia since the end of the Cold War. A teleologically expanding ‘Kantian zone of peace’ centred on the EU and NATO – and based on the liberal tripod of institutions, democracy, and free trade – became the core of Europe’s de facto security regime. Uncovering the power-political behind the normative, a Carrian perspective explains the gradual deterioration in relations between the West and Russia through the latter’s exclusion from institutions shaped at a time of its acute weakness, its inability to counter the symbolic power of democracy through political reforms, and its structural consignation to the semi-periphery of the globalised economic system. The article concludes by proposing a realist alternative for future engagement with Moscow.

MODERNIZAÇÃO ARMAMENTISTA NA AMÉRICA DO SUL: PRESSÕES EMPÍRICAS E TEÓRICAS SOBRE AS VISÕES DUALISTAS DE SEGURANÇA REGIONAL

Research that focuses on security systems in South America usually identifies the existence of two regional security subsystems: one in the Andean countries of the North, with more traditional characteristics such as militarized tensions at the borders and intense drug trafficking problems; and a second one located in the Southern Cone, with security and integration regimes, which could qualify as a security community. This is what we call a dualistic view of security. This paper challenges this thesis to show that contemporary developments and concerns about the purchase of sophisticated weaponry by some South American countries, especially Chile, Venezuela, and Brazil in the first two decades of this century are critical points for the idea of a permanent (democratic) peace zone located only in the Southern Cone. In fact, arms purchases transform the South American region into a single regional security complex with tensions and militarized representations in both the Andean system and the Southern Cone.

Insurgent Peace: Community-Led Peacebuilding of Indigenous Peoples in Sagada, Philippines

ABSTRACT In a global era when most wars are fought between state and non-state actors, how do people make peace? This article examines the processes through which civilian communities imagine and build peace during a prolonged active armed conflict. It presents a case of a demilitarized community—popularly understood as a peace zone—of the indigenous peoples community of the Municipality of Sagada in the Philippines in the context of 50 years of armed conflict between the Philippine state and the New People’s Army (NPA), a rebel group waging a Maoist-inspired insurgency. For 30 years, the indigenous community of Sagada has effectively regulated military and rebel operations and prevented conflict-related civilian deaths and internal displacement. While existing research identifies Sagada as a pioneer model of the phenomenon of peace zones in the world, we know very little of the community work that sustains this model. Situated within the “local turn” in peacebuilding literature and emergent field of peace geographies, this article examines the kind of work required from a civilian community to protect their lives during conflict, and what this tell us about peace. I use the term insurgent peace to refer to peace as dynamic processes rooted upon a refusal and disruption of the spatial logics of violence imposed by the competing structures of power of state and non-state armed actors upon civilian communities. Further, insurgent peace captures the quotidian work of civilian communities in carving alternative political spaces and enacting peaceful futures during armed conflict.

Community Organizing: A Mechanism for Peacebuilding in Datu Odin Sinsuat, Maguindanao

This study aimed to determine the contribution of community organizing in peacebuilding in armed conflict areas in Maguindanao. The study sought to assess the relevance of community organizing in peacebuilding initiatives of different agencies in the community. Furthermore, the study clarifies the contribution and importance of community organizing as it can be replicated in other areas that may need transformational change. To assess the contribution of community organizing in peacebuilding and its importance in implementing peacebuilding initiatives, the researcher used a descriptive type of research. The data was presented in narrative form. The study was conducted in the five barangays of the Municipality of Datu Odin Sinsuat, Maguindanao, Department of Social Welfare and Development and Community and Family Services International. The response of the respondents and key informants were used as the bases in identifying the contribution of community organizing in peacebuilding. Purposive sampling was used in identifying the target respondents, community organizers and barangay chairmen. Findings show that majority of the community organizers known to the community are working in the government agencies. People only know community organizers are direct service providers. The maximum participation of the people is the key towards a successful community organizing. Both government, non – government and private individuals/volunteers use community organizing as a tool in developing a community. The barangay officials have crucial roles in promoting sustainable development and peace being the front – liners and representatives of the community people. Community organizing contributes in promoting peacebuilding in the zone of peace area. Peacebuilding does not only revolve around initiatives in the macro level but starting in advocacy in responsible parenthood and parent effectiveness could lead to the prevention of peace-related issues and community problems. All sectors in the community are actors in peacebuilding which made them needed to participate in community organizing. It is concluded that community organizing contributed to peacebuilding in the zone of peace.

Social Changes And Conflicts In Orang Sekaum In The North Halmahera Peace Zone

The civilization of orang sekaum (ethnic Tobelo) in its development, follows the dynamics of social change that leads to social conflict. Conflict and violence between brothers in orang sekaum gave birth to two different poles in a vulgar way (Islam vs. Christian). The process of social change and the development of orang sekaum is characterized by a climate of social life that previously lived in a harmonious and peaceful state, turned into conflict between brothers in the peace zone. Communities are provoked and powerless over the presence of migration in North Halmahera, from various regions as victims of previous conflicts and violence. The impact of this violent incident is directly proportional to the instability of the social control castle embodied in the cultural values of Hibua Lamo as the social glue and kinship of “orang sekaum” Therefore, horizontal riots soon take place with the same reason and language, each maintaining self-esteem on the basis of beliefs and religions it embraces

Presentación del monográfico. Diagnósticos sobre seguridad en y desde el Cono Sur de América Latina

Latin America is a zone of peace that reaches its maximum expression in South America. The acute levels of intra-state and transnational violence registered in certain areas do not overshadow the sustained absence of high-intensity interstate conflicts and the existence of prolific mechanisms for building mutual trust. This represents a global singularity that awakens the recurrent academic interest of epistemic communities from different parts of the world, being the Spanish one of the most prolific. In effect, we start from the premise that the Ibero-American exchange of best practices and lessons learned is particularly fruitful for the public administration of these issues on both sides of the Atlantic.

ARCTIC GEOPOLITICS FROM CLASSICAL TO CRITICAL APPROACH – IMPORTANCE OF IMMATERIAL FACTORS

Despite different perceptions, discourses and approaches, the post-Cold War Arctic is with a high geopolitical stability based on institutional, international cooperation started by the Arctic states and supported by Arctic indigenous peoples, non- governmental organizations and sub-national governments. As a result, there are neither armed conflicts nor serious disputes on national borders. Behind the high geopolitical stability are on the one hand, common interests of the Arctic states to decrease military tension and increase political stability by causing a transformation from confrontation to environmental cooperation. On the other hand, there are certain features of Arctic geopolitics as prerequisites for a transformation, such as firm state sovereignty, high degree of legal certainty, and flexibility in agenda setting. When assessing a state of Arctic geopolitics and IR of the post-Cold War era, there is an ambivalence on how ‘geopolitics’ is defined. Behind are the dualism of military presence based on the nuclear weapons’ systems and the high stability based on international, institutional cooperation between the eight Arctic states. As well as, that there are two major competing discourses: first, the Arctic as a ’zone of peace’ and exceptional in world politics, and second, that there is a race of resources and the consequent emerging conflicts in theArctic. In addition, there are fresh reminders that Arctic geopolitics is impacted by (grand) environmental challenges and ‘wicked problems’, in particular climate change; and that new multi- dimensional dynamics has made Arctic geopolitics global. The article aims to draw up a holistic picture of the post-Cold War Arctic, and discuss what might be special features of Arctic geopolitics in globalization. The article examines and discusses the transformation of approach from classical geopolitics to critical geopolitics by applying main approaches of geopolitics to the Arctic/Arctic geopolitics.

Liberalism and the End of International Law?

As globalisation and Pax Americana replaced the cold war as a framework for thinking about things international, explicitly liberal ideas of international relations developed and gained momentum. Liberalism puts great emphasis on law, and it is therefore no coincidence that there has also emerged a liberal theory of international law (LiTIL). Liberal ideas can be traced to many writers of international law, but the articulated liberal theory of international law is associated with Anne-Marie Slaughter, professor of international, foreign and comparative law at Harvard Law School. Besides her law degree, Slaughter has a PhD in IR, and she started publishing at the time of the break-up of the Soviet empire, which does not seem coincidental. Slaughter’s writing builds on a few distinct ideas: International law should be based on developments in IR, i.e., on liberal IR, where the individual is the fundamental actor. There is a liberal zone of peace and law and a non-liberal zone of (potential) wars and politics, and legal relations in the liberal zone are different from relations with or within the non-liberal zone; In the liberal zone, international relations have changed fundamentally from the old Westphalian paradigm, to relations on three levels: the transnational level between individuals, the transgovernmental between governmental institutions – what she calls disaggregation of sovereignty - and the traditional inter-state level. This theory has been critiqued from several points of view: Andreas Behnke will deal with the IR underpinnings of her theory and their political implications, Outi Korhonen has analysed the epistomological theory implicit in liberal international law, Martti Koskenniemi has written about the relation between law and politics in liberal international law, the political theory implicit in liberal international law has been questioned by Susan Marks and the political implications of her legal theory will be covered in Linda Bishai’s presentation. My intention with this paper is to deal with the liberal theory of international law as a legal theory. That is, I want to see what it has to say about the foundation of law, the nature of law, and how we can determine what is valid law, all of which are questions which legal theories usually aim to answer. I will first present Slaughter’s theory, and then deal with the different implications of that theory from the perspective of whether it produces sound international legal theory.

JOAQUIM NABUCO, A BRAZILIAN LIGHT IN WASHINGTON

Throughout the 19th century, Brazil and the United States had little intense bilateral relations. This picture changed when the Baron of Rio Branco decided that his country should privilege relations with the United States. As part of his plan the Baron named Joaquim Nabuco as Brazil's first ambassador to Washington. However, Nabuco had an Americanism distinct from that of the Baron. He believed in the possibility of transforming the American continent into a zone of peace. This Americanism was linked to Nabuco's liberal world view, already evident in his struggle against slavery and in his pre-diplomatic intellectual trajectory.

Democratic Peace: Progress and Crisis

When work on the democratic peace first emerged it contributed to the revitalization of liberal thought and represented an important contribution to International Relations (IR). Yet innovation has been replaced by stagnation. Coding and correlation are debatedad infinitum, while little attention is given to growing economic inequality, voter alienation, a decline in traditional parties, rising populism and a wide array of related trends that raise serious doubts about the health of democracies at the center of the zone of peace. Yet if democratic institutions are not functioning as they are meant to, and norms of compromise are disappearing domestically, what hope can there be that these will facilitate cooperative behavior between democracies? Rather than promoting peace, could it be that capitalism in its contemporary neoliberal form is undermining or hollowing out democracy? The static understanding of democracy adopted by this research means that such questions have been largely overlooked. In response, I focus on two major changes impacting established democracies and consider their significance for democratic peace arguments: the decline of democratic institutions and culture, as well as how neoliberalism is reshaping the relationship between democracy and capitalism. In developing this argument, I propose that the template that the democratic peace research program offers for studying the world is emblematic of—and contributing to—a troubling contracting of our political vision. An excessive concern with methodological rigor, combined with a narrow understanding of what qualifies as valid research, has resulted in a body of scholarship that is remarkably sophisticated but has surprisingly little to say about democracy and its place in the world.

Maritime Regions and the South Atlantic

This special issue addresses questions related to the definition and construction of regions and focuses on the case of the South Atlantic. Discussing the concept of regions and their role in international politics is of special relevance in the current context of instability and contestation of the international order and of institutions of global governance. The discussion about the role of the South Atlantic is also relevant for the Brazilian policy environment as several administrations have supported the idea of the South Atlantic as a Zone of Peace and Cooperation (

Brazilian Policy and the Creation of a Regional Security Complex in the South Atlantic: Pax Brasiliana?

Abstract: Over the past five years, the South Atlantic region has become a central element of Brazil-ian security policy, with Brazil actively supporting the notion of a trans-oceanic security conscious-ness involving African littoral states. It has invested in diplomatic initiatives such as the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZPCSA, or ZOPACAS), and extensive military co-op-eration with West African states such as Sao Tome e Principe, Namibia and Cape Verde. Its internal security and defence policy documents have repeatedly been updated to reflect this dimension, and now provide the foundation for advancing these initiatives. This policy thrust is directed at securing Brazil’s offshore oil assets, and limiting the influence of what it has termed ‘extra-regional powers’ such as the P-5. This article highlights these initiatives and reviews the prospects for this policy by examining the plausibility of the South Atlantic region as a regional security complex in the sense coined by Buzan and Waever. The analysis is based on the role of geographical and linguistic proxim-ity in international relations, and the impact of multilateral bodies on building support for a regional approach to security governance.

Regional peace in Latin America a multifaceted explanation

Since the 19th century, Latin America has progressively become a zone of peace. Between 1800 and 2007, the region has been affected by only fourteen inter-state wars. In addition, the frequency of inter-state wars has rapidly declined over the decades, generating a consolidated zone of peace. This paper examines the reasons behind regional peace in Latin America, reviewing the main theories of war and peace and assessing their validity in explaining the absence of inter-state wars in the region. The study finds that each one of the theories considered addresses only a single aspect of this phenomenon. Based on that, a multifaceted explanation of regional peace in Latin America is proposed, combining different theories to provide a more complete analysis of the phenomenon. This explanation presents peace in Latina America as the result of two interacting elements: countries’ satisfaction with their borders and the presence of weak states in the region. While recognizing that political regimes can influence countries’ war-proneness (and that democratic regimes tend to be less war-prone than authoritarian regimes), this study shows that democracy is not the ultimate cause of regional peace in Latin America. Indeed, the presence of authoritarian regimes in the region did not hinder the creation of a zone of peace between the 19th and 20th century. However, the study highlights that the spread of democracy in the region helped consolidating the zone of peace and determined its evolution from mere absence of war to institutionalized security community.

Managing Security in a Zone of Peace: Brazil´s Soft Approach to Regional Governance

Abstract Given Brazil’s regional prevalence, its low, late and soft investment in regional security governance appears puzzling. We approach the puzzle through an analysis of contextual features, institutional overlap and policy networks, especially regarding nuclear energy and the environment. Our findings show that Brazil’s behavior is explained by a combination of low regional risks, scarce domestic resources, a legalistic regional culture of dispute settlement, and transgovernmental networks that substitute for formal interstate cooperation and deep regional institutions.Keywords: Brazilian foreign policy; Latin American regionalism; Regional Security Governance; Regional Powers; Policy Networks. Received: October 16, 2016Accepted: November 21, 2016 Introduction B razil is the largest Latin American country and represents half of South America, whether regarding area, population, the economy or overall national capabilities. Its rise has led many to expect it to become a regional leader, as both its defensive and offensive foreign interests spill over onto its neighbors (Arnson and Sotero 2009; Bethell 2010; Stuenkel 2013a; Trinkunas 2014). Yet, this expectation has not come to pass (Malamud 2011; Schirm 2010). Neither has Brazil shown the ambition or capacity to impose itself, nor have its neighbors felt the need to balance its power (Gardini and Almeida 2016; Schenoni 2015). Still, regional exchanges have increased substantially over the last three decades. In this article, we focus on the most crucial dimension of these interactions, namely security, in order to understand Brazil’s role in building regional governance.Brazil’s home region has two central peculiarities: first, its boundaries are fuzzy, second, its inner core has been characterized

POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC COORDINATION AND COOPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT: THE CASES OF ZPCSA AND GGC

The creation of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZPCSA) in 1986 and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) in 2001 was about changes in the distribution of world power. This article argues that though they emerged at different times, their strategic orientation converges in a number of areas related to the significant interests in the South Atlantic as an area of stability in the region to be marked by strong political, economic and military ties. They also converge on the ideal for development, security and greater projection of power and influence in international affairs. The South Atlantic being a route of passage and trade, as a means of access and flow of energy products, the region became a site for new calculations of regional strategic powers about world affairs. The article also argues that ZPCSA and GGC are therefore crucial for the regional order and the development of higher capacities for cooperation on strategic issues. The actual point of convergence extends to ensuring the sovereignty through dialogue between the states in the region that are involved.