Party-state System Research Articles

History in party state system China, 1949~2023

History in party state system China, 1949~2023

Vladimir Nikolaevich Kessenikh: Soviet Physicist between Center and Periphery

The name of Vladimir Nikolaevich Kessenikh (1903–1970) is closely related to the history of radio physics research in Tomsk, one of the leading Soviet research and education centers. He was one of the foremost Soviet authorities in radio physics in the 1930s – 1950s. His making as a scientist occurred in the context of formation of Soviet science organization system. One of the last representatives of the prerevolutionary P. N. Lebedev’s scientific school of physics, Kessenikh witnessed in full measure the times of Stalinism. In this connection, we analyze the scientist’s professional strategy in the situation of the ideologized Party-state system and the nature of center – periphery relations within the Soviet physics community in the period under study, as exemplified by a scientific biography of Kessenikh who had been a professor at both Tomsk and Moscow Universities. The article also describes his key role in Tomsk’s radio engineering rising to the level of radio physics as a standalone, autonomous sphere of scientific research, from which a number of promising research fields have stemmed. It is emphasized that Kessenikh’s professional ambitions had a significant impact on the organizational and structural configuration of local research and education space. The trajectory of his moving within the center – periphery coordinate frame in Soviet physics, shown in the article, demonstrates the patterns in the history of science construction in the USSR as well as the traces of ideocratic metanarrative.

Новый труд по истории Тувы (о книге З. Ю. Доржу и О. Ю. Иргит «Политические репрессии в Тувинской Народной Республике (1921–1944 гг.)» – Новосибирск, 2023)

This analytical review focuses on the work of Tuvinian researchers on the causes and consequences of political purges in Tuva during the existence of the Republic as a formally sovereign state. The authors of the book consistently reconstruct the main cycle of socio-political events in the region, figuring out how the experience and practices of revolutionary Russia passed on to Tuvinian soil. The ways and peculiarities of promotion of new leading cadres in the Republic and development of inter-clan struggle for power, formation of unusual party-state system, which allowed its leaders to widely use punitive measures against their opponents are considered. The reviewed work vividly presents historical portraits of major leaders of Tuva, demonstrates methods and ways of their promotion to political avantgarde, as well as the tragic end of careers of many of them. The published book is evaluated as a major contribution to the historiography of Tuva, thanks to new facts and interpretations of socio-political events in Central Asia in the first half of the 20th century.

China’s Zero-COVID Campaign and the Body Politic

China’s leadership has promoted its handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, deploying lockdowns and other aggressive measures to keep cases and deaths low, as a demonstration of the superiority of its Communist party-state system compared with the pandemic performance of other forms of government around the world. But the zero-COVID approach has come with heavy economic and social costs that have become more visible with the spread of more transmissible variants of the virus. These costs, and the party-state’s unyielding approach of turning pandemic control into a militaristic national campaign, culminated in the long lockdown of Shanghai—a veritable siege—in the spring of 2022.

State-enlisted Voluntarism in China: The Role of Public Security Volunteers in Social Stability Maintenance

AbstractThis article explores how the Chinese government aims to maintain social stability by encouraging citizens to become volunteers. We propose that a new type of governance, namely, “state-enlisted voluntarism,” is being deployed in which public security volunteers are mobilized and monitored by the state. Analysis based on ten-year nationwide empirical data gathered from local areas in China suggests that the government intentionally enlists citizens into its hierarchical system to strengthen its administrative capacity and maintain a stable society without the risk of domestic threats. We find that direct enlistment approaches empower citizens as state proxies, and that indirect enlistment approaches ensure that various social stakeholders are comprehensively controlled. In general, the Chinese government has four reasons to institutionalize the state enlistment of voluntarism: to increase human resources at the grassroots; transform social organizations into subordinates; frame policy innovations as political credits; and to avoid blame. Our findings also suggest that China's party-state system mobilizes citizens into implementation-oriented activities rather than engages them in policymaking to maintain social stability at the grassroots.

The Political Economy of Xi Jinping’s Political Rollback

When Xi Jinping had just come to power in 2012, the world expected that he would continue the development trajectory of economic liberalization and political institutionalization set in motion by Deng Xiaoping. However, when the National People’s Congress abolished the presidential term limit in the Chinese Constitution in March of 2018, it suddenly became clear that Xi had chosen to “roll back” from Deng’s policy line in nearly every aspect of the Chinese Party-state system. How does one explain Xi’s sudden departure from Deng’s policy line? In comparison with the resurgence of other authoritarian regimes of the 1960s and 1970s in Latin America and East Asia, this paper argues that the cause of Xi’s political rollback lies in the exhaustion of the previous development model. More specifically, the exhaustion of export-led growth in the mid-2000s had made the existing distributive coalition unsustainable. The power struggle within the political coalition therefore intensified and finally led to Xi’s monopoly over political power. The argument of this paper will proceed through four parts. It will begin with a literature review of comparative authoritarianism with a particular focus on the impact of a development crisis on the survival of political coalitions. It is followed by an analysis of the contributions of China’s export-led growth to the sustainability of the political coalition during the eras of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Then, it will explain how the exhaustion of export-led growth led to a power struggle within the political coalition and how through a re-orientation of the development model, Xi has gradually concentrated power into his own hands. Finally, it will discuss the theoretical implications of China’s case.

Strategic responses of NGOs to the new party-building campaign in China

Over the last decade, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has sought to assimilate the third sector – non-governmental organizations (NGOs) – through its party-building campaign. This article examines NGOs’ strategies in response to this campaign, based on in-depth interviews with 64 NGOs and local cadres. We find that NGOs have developed three main strategies to respond to the CCP’s attempts to penetrate their organizations. First, NGOs embedded in the party-state system and those affiliated with private enterprises tend to acquiesce to party building out of habit and for compliance reasons, respectively. Second, those with multiple stakeholders generally compromise in the party-building process, acting as passive compliers if they depend more on non-state resources, or active players if they rely more on state resources. Third, civic NGOs that advocate causes inconsistent with the ruling regime might avoid party building as a resistant strategy, by either disguising their nonconformity or escaping from the control of the ruling regime entirely. NGOs’ strategic responses are contingent on their negotiating power, which results from their resource dependence and the party’s enforcement dilemmas. This article contributes to our understanding of the recent party-building campaign from an institutional perspective, and enriches our knowledge about relations between the party and the third sector.

Estado e mercado na reforma da governança corporativa chinesa

Depois de um longo período de exclusão do debate econômico, o estrondoso sucesso da transformação estrutural da China voltou a colocá-la no centro do debate. Na base de tal sucesso, está o processo de reforma econômica, que teve como um dos seus eixos a modernização da governança corporativa das empresas estatais (SOEs). O objetivo do artigo foi discutir as diretrizes de tal modernização e como esta se articula com o Sistema Partido-Estado. Para atingir o objetivo proposto, discutiu-se instituições, governança corporativa moderna e a reforma da governança das SOEs chinesas. Conclui-se que mesmo considerando a opacidade de certas relações informais na governança das SOEs, algumas evidências parecem apontar para efetividade da reforma na melhoria da performance e atração de capitais delas.

Governance edging out representation? Explaining the imbalanced functions of China’s people’s congress system

In theory, representation is the primary function of the people’s congresses. In practice, under China’s party-state system, the ruling party imposes specific governance tasks on the congresses with the effect that the representative function of the People’s Congress System has largely given way to its governance functions. The uneven practice of these functions has left the System facing a serious representation deficit. Based on a careful analysis of historical archives and findings from interviews and observations, this paper examines the causes and repercussions of the imbalanced functions of the People’s Congress System. By proposing a Monitoring and Adaptation Model, we adopt a historical perspective to reexamine the interplay between the people’s congresses and the ruling party, arguing that the imbalanced functions of the People’s Congress System result from the interplay between Party monitoring and the corresponding adaptations of the people’s congresses. The Party, to bolster its governing performance, has introduced an array of institutional arrangements to have the people’s congresses fulfill specific governance tasks. However, the people’s congresses have gained a measure of autonomy thanks to their organizational growth and institutionalization, changes to the makeup of deputies, and significant efforts by certain leaders since the end of the Cultural Revolution. Although they are expected to take on the governance functions assigned by the ruling party, the people’s congresses thus enjoy greater leeway to carry out their functions selectively with an eye to improving their standing and relevance in China’s political system. Ironically, the fact that the people’s congresses prioritize their governance functions and that the overall performance of the party-state system gains consistent improvement may have warded off a potential representation crisis as the weak representativeness of the People’s Congress System would otherwise predict. Abbreviations: PCS: The People's Congress System; CPC: The Communist Party of China; The “M&A model”: The Monitoring and Adaptation Model; NPC: National People's Congress; LPCs: Local People's Congresses; CPPCC: The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference

A Partocracy with Chinese Characteristics: Governance System Reform under Xi Jinping

ABSTRACT Regime resilience is a frequent theme in Chinese political research. This article examines China’s latest effort to enhance the regime’s political stability by modernizing its governance system. It argues that China’s current governance system reform has institutionalized the Chinese party-state and transformed it into a partocracy. Partocracy, as a new analytical model, can be very useful but is still underdeveloped. The case presented in this article will reveal some of the main features of the emerging Chinese partocracy. It shows that the governance system reform undertook by Xi Jinping has begun the process of institutionalizing, rationalizing, and legalizing the old party-state system. By examining these latest developments, the author hopes to stimulate more interest in the study of partocracy as an analytic model.

Temel Dinamikleriyle Çin İşçi Hareketleri: 2008 Krizi Sonrası Dönemin Çok Yönlü Kuramsal Analizi

The Chinese labor market in the post-crisis period; has been shaped by growing employment and GDP, shrinking agriculture and industrial sector, expanding service sector, gradually decreasing growth rates, unchanged unemployment and labor force participation rates. In this context, the main purpose of the study is to analyze the labor movements that gained momentum in the post-crisis period within the framework of determining political, economic, technological, social and GO dynamics. In the analysis process, data from the Chinese Labour Bulletin (CLB) were taken into consideration. The data were compiled from the CLB website and online correspondence was used on ambiguous issues. As a result, the basic dynamics of this process in the post-crisis industrial relations system are as follows: Party-State system to continue its influence, focusing liberal policies, acceleration of robotization both in production and use, continuing labor migration from the rural to the city and the more concentration of this migration in some sectors, the more independently acting NGOs lead the labor movement. The main reason for the workers’ movements is the issue of wage arrears. Movements are most concentrated in the construction and manufacturing sectors. While a significant part of the movements is seen in private enterprises, this is followed by SEEs or companies without ownership. Most of the movements were considered as protests, followed by sit-ins and strikes. The majority of the movements consisted of 1-100 people. The response to the movements realized, primarily police intervention, state intervention management negotiations.

Social Constructionism and the Significance of Political Rumors in Contemporary China

Rumors are a set of collective discussions used by cadres or the masses to attain specific goals. Both political elites and the general public reveal their dissatisfaction or concern with the Chinese Communist Party regime through the dissemination of politically charged rumors, fueled by the party-state system’s habit of withholding information and amplified by traditional Chinese superstition.

5.4운동 100년을 통해서 본 중국 정치제제의 변화: 당국가체제의 ‘승급(昇級)’인가? 민주주의체제로의 전환인가?

5.4운동 100년을 통해서 본 중국 정치제제의 변화: 당국가체제의 ‘승급(昇級)’인가? 민주주의체제로의 전환인가?

Popular Participation in the Constitution of the Illiberal State — An Empirical Study of Popular Engagement and Constitutional Reform in Cuba and the Contours of Cuban Socialist Democracy 2.0

This article seeks to consider the issues of democratic self-constitution in illiberal states. To that end it focuses on the current process of constitutional revision in Cuba, a traditional Marxist-Leninist State in the process of self-transformation. For the last several years Cuba has been in the midst of a quite public national effort at reform. Those reforms to the organizing political and economic theory of the state then produced a move to restructure the 1976 national constitution (last revised in 2002) to reflect these reforms. In both cases, the PCC and the state apparatus attempted to invoke the core mechanics of popular participation even as it sought to manage that participation under the leadership of the PCC and popular representatives in national institutions. The Cuban experiment in constitutional reformation presents some unique elements. It may also point to the development of the collectivist premises on which the Cuban political order is might be used to structure democratic mechanisms that might have application in other in Party-State systems. Popular participation in the 2019 Cuban constitutional reform efforts actually takes three forms. Two of them are formal and Party-State driven. These consisted of the formal system to deliver comments and reactions to the drafts of the revised constitution circulated to the general population after review and revision by PCC and State (Asamblea Nacional) organs. The third of them, and the object of this article, was both informal and popularly driven. Perhaps the most important element of popular participation in the 2019 Cuban constitutional reform debate, the quite vigorous popular debates about Cuban constitutional reform occurred outside the structures of the Party and State organs. These debates took place in cyber space and among an active and politically engaged segment of the population, one with strong connections to the Cuban diaspora community. This article suggests that it may be possible to begin to understand the form, practice, character and influence of these new and emerging modalities of popular participation through a close empirical study. Part II provides a brief conceptual and historical context. That context is necessary for several reasons. Parts III and IV then move from the examination of the transforming contours of the normative structures of the Cuban system to an empirical analysis of the expression of normative change on that ground. Part III introduces the study and its methodology. We use data from government web sites, the official reports, and social media sites to examine the contours of participation, its constitution, and its limitations. We intend to develop from the analysis of four distinct data sets a clearer understanding of the nature of popular participation. Part IV then considers consequences and applications both within Cuba and beyond.

About the Role of Political Agitator in the Period of the Development of Soviet Authority (1917—1920)

The article is devoted to the role of political agitator in the early period of Soviet authority (1917—1920). The following aspects of the problem are considered: agitator activity, his professional duties, powers, rights — that is, the role of the agitator and his status in the eyes of the authorities; perception of the agitator by the population; "self-evaluation" of the agitator; subjective features of the personality of the agitator, who played a certain role in his professional activity. The functions performed by the agitator in the emerging party-state system were singled out, among them: representation function (presentation function); a whole series of pragmatic functions that concerned not so much the ideological influence as much as the solution of the pressing practical tasks of "Soviet construction"; function of socialization (political education) of the population; communicative function; mobilization function. The study was prepared on the archival materials of the Kaluga and Tula provinces.

Is Nationalism Crucial in China-US Relations? <br/>—Evidence from a Comparative Analysis

Due to China’s assertive diplomacy in maritime space, nationalism, de-scribed as an element of a “newly assertive China”, arouses concern among Americans. With Donald Trump, who caters to both the far left and the far right, becoming the 45th US president, China-US relations have entered a period of historic uncertainty. There has been speculation that nationalism is rising in both China and the United States, which will have a profound effect on bilateral relations. Does nationalism play an essential role in China-US relations? In order to respond to this question, this essay explains the different meanings of democracy in China and the United States, and then analyzes these two different kinds of democracy how to influence the nationalism of those two countries. This essay also clarifies the relationship between nationalism and interests. We can find that international politics is inseparable from domestic politics. China’s nationalism tends to be a political appeal from top leaders to the public, which can be guided by power. Although Chinese nationalism may play a small role in bilateral diplomatic activities, Chinese foreign policy is interest-oriented. By comparison, checks and balances are a cornerstone of the power structure in America. Even with “uncertain Trump” as the leader of America, policy making in the US will not materially change a lot. Thus, we find that interests, China’s party-state system, checks and balances in America make both sides prudent and rational, and nationalism cannot play a decisive role in China-US relations.

Conceptualising Party-State Governance and Rule in Laos

ABSTRACTThis article develops a framework for conceptualising authoritarian governance and rule in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. After introducing the national and academic context, which go a significant way towards understanding the paucity of comparative political work on Laos, we propose an approach to studying post-socialist authoritarian and single-party rule that highlights the key political-institutional, cultural-historical and spatial-environmental sources of party-state power and authority. In adopting this approach, we seek to redirect attention to the centralising structures of rule under the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, illustrating how authoritarian institutions of the “party-state” operate in and through multiple scales, from the central to the local level. At a time when the country is garnering greater attention than at any time since the Vietnam War, we argue that this examination of critical transitions in Laos under conditions of resource-intensive development, intensifying regional and global integration, and durable one-party authoritarian rule, establishes a framework for future research on the party-state system in Laos, and for understanding and contextualising the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party regime in regional comparative perspective.

중국의 당정체제와 국유기업: 정치적 지배논리와 공공선택의 한계

중국의 당정체제와 국유기업: 정치적 지배논리와 공공선택의 한계

Between the Judge and the LawwJudicial Independence and Authority with Chinese Characteristics

What is the scope and nature of judicial reform? To what extent does borrowing from Western models also suggest an embrace of the underlying ideologies that frame those models? It is a common place in the West, whether in Common Law or Civil Law states, that the integrity of the judiciary depends on their authority to interpret law and to apply that interpretation to individual cases and the litigants that appear before the courts. That presumption, however, embeds premises about the organization of political and administrative authority that may be incompatible with those of states developing Socialist Rule of Law structures within Party-State systems. In Common law states those deep presumptions touch on the disciplinary role of judicial opinions as a constraint on judicial interpretation. In civil law states that discipline arises from the constraining principles of the legal codes themselves. In both the legislatures serve as the ultimate check in a complex dialogue with courts in three respects. First, judges serve a political role in their relation to law. Second, cases themselves serve an important political role as well. Third, courts begin to serve as the place where societal narratives are forged and popular expression is constructed and applied. In Socialist rule of law systems, the disciplinary systems are quite different and ought to produce a different relationship between courts, law, and the cases they are bound to apply fairly and consistently under law. This paper considers the way that the logic and grounding principles of Chinese Marxist Leninism may provide guidance in the construction of a judicial enterprise that is both true to its organizational logic and which enhances the authority of judges to serve litigants fairly. It suggests the points of compatibility and incompatibility in the ideologies of these distinct systems of judging and what it may mean for judicial reform in China. That consideration, in turn is based on a fundamental difference, in Socialist Rule of Law systems, between the authority to interpret law and the authority to apply law to an individual case. For Chinese judicial reform it is in the perfectibility of the judge that lies the perfectibility of law that in turn ensures the perfectibility of the judge. Part II considers in very broad strokes the relationship between the judge and law in the West. Part III then considers Chinese reforms touching on the relationship between the judge and the law, and the evolution of normative structures within which one can speak to judicial independence. Part IV then considers the project from the perspective of the grounding ideology of the Chinese state. From that fundamental distinction, the paper will propose a Socialist approach to the judicial function compatible with its own logic and legitimacy enhancing under global consensus principles for a well-organized and functioning judiciary.

Varieties of communist system transformation and their common systemic grounds: a comparative study of China and East European countries

This paper analyzes the similarities and differences in the structure and dynamics of party–state systems and their different metamorphosis from a comparative perspective. This approach allows interpretation of the Chinese system specifics and its transformation within this framework. Theoretical findings are based on empirical research carried out in Hungary, Romania, and China by the author between 1975 and 2014. Empirical research revealed a politically monopolized interactive and intertwined network of dependency and interest promotion among actors in the party, the state, and the economy during decision-making. This network possesses similar elements and connecting and operating principles whatever the time, the space, and the level of its aggregation. It renders the structural background of power distribution and that of the politically rational behavior of economic actors in the selective distribution of resources and in the overall drive for growth, resulting in frequent investment overheating and overcapacity. The comparative framework also defines the structural varieties of power distribution in the network that are responsible for the differences in the operation and the sequence, speed, and conditions of system transformation.