Party-state System Research Articles

Chinese State Capitalism and Western Antitrust Policy

Enthused by China’s conversion to the free market system in 1978 and its adoption of Western-style market institutions, the world has spent the last few decades turning a blind eye to China’s real “governance” problem: that a shadow Party-State system permeates all branches of the economy. Whatever Washington-consensus style institutions are put in place, whatever State Owned Enterprise (“SOE”) reform is introduced, corporate and market governance occur under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”). And the CCP’s guidebook is the Leninist command that the whole of society shall be run as “single country-wide State syndicate”. This paper contends that China’s syndicated economic organization is akin to a “supertrust”, and that this creates conditions that are conducive to antitrust problems to which the Western world must awaken. In this context, this paper advances that the antitrust regulators of North America, Europe and elsewhere should take two simple, pragmatic steps under merger control and antitrust rules. In merger review, antitrust agencies should treat all SOEs and Privately Owned Enterprises (POEs) with a CCP cell as one unitary group and undertake a thorough competitive assessment of transactions on this basis. In addition, antitrust cases involving Chinese firms should be investigated on the default assumption that there is an underlying coordination scheme among them.

From manipulation to integration: the strategic transformation of grassroots control in China

How to control local officials is a basic concern among the state governance issues. This problem contains two reciprocally restricted dimensions: how to keep the officials loyal to central authority and accountable to citizens. Election recognized as a powerful method to control local officials has been deployed by many authoritarian governments. Especially, the party-state of China has implemented grassroots election for decades, which attracts a great deal of academic attention. Our field work and research find that compared with the election manipulation in the early stage, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been pushing forward the institutionalization of grassroots election. Meanwhile, several measures have been employed by the CCP to integrate the power-exercising of grassroots self-governance into the party–state system. This paper aims to demonstrate how the tension between loyalty and accountability structures the strategic transformation of grassroots control in China.

TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY ELITE IN THE EARLY SOVIET SOCIETY (ON THE MATERIALS OF THE SOUTH OF RUSSIA)

The article revealed the composition and structure of the Bolshevik party elite of early Soviet society on materials of the South of Russia on the basis of positional analysis revealed trends in the transformation of elite groups, defines the role of transformations in institutionalization of political regime of the 1920s. Merging functions of the ruling Communist Party (bolsheviks) and the state was caused by the rejection of the separation of powers, the suppression of the opposition party control over non-governmental organizations and the media. RCP (B) to the mid-1920s completed the evolution of the voluntary union of likeminded to a centralized hierarchical structure having three functional levels: ordinary members of the implementing bureaucracy (professional functionaries) and the ruling elite. Bolshevik organizations of the North-Caucasian region have diverse social base – “non-resident”, poor peasants, workers, employees and the marginalized stratas. In the South of Russia it is most clearly revealed not only the essence of partystate system of government, but also the outstanding ability of ruling elite use conflict (especially social class inequality, gap in the level of development of area, a request to upgrade) for the sake of absolute power at any cost.

Introduction to the Special Issue

Introduction to the Special Issue

Relations between the professional backgrounds of independent directors in state-owned enterprises and corporate performance

The article analyzes how the professional backgrounds of independent directors (hereinafter IDs) in state-owned enterprises (hereinafter SOEs) influence corporate performance by collecting and analyzing publicly available data on listed companies. After differentiating between the “nominal professional backgrounds” and “real professional backgrounds” of IDs, we find that more than 85% of IDs have backgrounds in “the party-state system”. Based on IDs' “real professional backgrounds”, IDs' proportion of board seats is negatively correlated with corporate performance, indicating that IDs from “the party-state system” background did not play a positive and effective role in helping companies improve their corporate performance. Additional deep, broad analysis shows that the diversification of IDs' backgrounds in SOEs is positively correlated with corporate performance. Additionally, an SOE that has dissenting IDs or IDs with “different voices” achieves better corporate performance. Therefore, reducing the number of IDs from “the party-state system” and focusing more on IDs' professionalism and background diversity should be considered.

Local Government Reform: Is It a Key to a Functional Decentralized Government in Zambia

The decentralization reform process in Zambia has raised citizen expectations towards their participation in local democracy and development. However, a sense of mistrust has arisen among most citizens about the performance of the local governments in Zambia. Local governments are widely criticized and blamed for poor service delivery, even those functions to be performed by central Government. Proponents of decentralization agenda have argued that local government is the frontline of local democracy and development by which citizens must have the greatest opportunity to be engaged actively and directly in decisions affecting their well-being. Opponents of decentralization have contested that with the current institutional capacity of most local governments in Zambia, decentralization by whatever form is an exercise in futility because the local governments have not recovered from the hangover of the one party state system of local government. It is evident that decentralization is a key policy issue for Zambia though is not the panacea for local democracy and local development. Across the globe, many local governments are becoming more responsible for the social service delivery system. Opinion differs as to the type of decentralization reforms and is a matter in which citizens’ appears so skeptic because of the perceived pitfalls of decentralization. However, the dominant view is that the decentralization process is good for citizens’ participation as it enhances local democracy and local development. Of course it is not the answer to resolving the many challenges of institutional reforms because decentralization is a process and not end itself.

Systemic background of local indebtedness and investment overheating during the global crisis in China

This paper focuses on the immediate economic and systemic reasons of steadily increasing local government indebtedness and investment overheating in China despite central efforts to contain them. These two phenomena emerged between 2008 and 2011 as a direct consequence of an external shock caused by the global crisis and the subsequent internal reaction in the form of intensified stimulating state intervention. New opportunities for resource distribution and investments through state intervention mobilized distribution priorities and politically rational economic behavior of actors, which are characteristic of party-state systems. Locations of mobilization were defined by the decentralized Chinese system specifics along the intertwined party-state structure. Systemic characteristics and the Chinese specifics together resulted in investment overheating on a national and local level, causing a steady growth of local indebtedness through large and state-owned enterprises and local governments. This process was further amplified by the characteristics of the transforming economy in China, as actors in the private sphere were mobilized by the increased input demands of those privileged by the systemic priorities of state intervention.

The Cuban Communist Party at the Center of Political and Economic Reform: Current Status and Future Reform in the Shadow of the Chinese Communist Party

Under the leadership of Raul Castro, Cuba has embarked on a series of changes that have focused on internal institutional reforms and their impact on the Cuban economy. These reforms have proven perplexing both for their ambitions and their limits. The usual explanations prove disappointing. This paper suggests that no consideration of these reforms can be complete without a study of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC), especially in comparative perspective. The thesis of this essay is that ideology is decisively important in any discussion of “reform” in Cuba. Western analysts have sought to subsume ideological issues within “transition” arguments — that ideological issues will evaporate once Cuba makes the jump from a Marxist-Leninist planned economy model to a Western oriented free market democracy. This essay argues that the inverse provides a more useful basis of analysis: that transition arguments are necessarily subsumed within ideological arguments. The ideological basis of state organization provides the key to understanding the likelihood of the success and direction of reforms to any of the sectors of state policy. The PCC’s now quite mature ideological framework has helped shape and constrain the organization and operation of the Party. That ideological framework also shapes and constrains all efforts to “reform” or develop Cuba’s economic, social or political model. Yet the tensions created by these contradictions between PCC ideology and the conditions of Cuba need not lead invariably to a choice between Marxist-Leninist and Western style democratic state organization. After the Introduction, Section II, considers the centrality of ideology to the ‘problem’ of Cuba. In Section III, the essay examines the consequences for Cuba of the choice, made by its vanguard party, to follow a distinct path toward the articulation and application of Marxism-Leninism in the organization and exercise of power. Section IV then connects the ideological path of Cuban Marxism-Leninism tio state practice. With a focus on the possibilities and constraints of the reform efforts since Raul Castro assumed power. Section V then focuses on the alternative to ideology and economic reform offered through Chinese Party and state practice. Section VI then unpacks the consequences of ideological possibilities by considering Cuban approaches in the shadow of the Chinese alternative. Lastly, Section VII weighs the consequences of the quality of the transition that is coming to Cuba, one that need not lead Cuba away from Marxist-Leninism and a Party-State system. Each is considered in turn in light of the essay’s thesis: Variations in Marxist ideology matter (no monolithic communist ideology), sustainable economic reform is possible within a Marxist Leninist State-Party system, and that ideological systemic ossification in Cuba, as in the United States, can lead to crisis and paralysis. It is in that context that one considers the questions: does the Chinese model provide a framework for Cuba? Is it too late for reform of the Cuba CP? If reform is possible, what should be its objectives and strategies?

Crafting a Theory of Socialist Democracy for China in the 21st Century: Considering Hu Angang's (((() Theory of Collective Presidency in the Context of the Emerging Chinese Constitutional State

In the West democratic constitutionalism is grounded on the premise that democracy occurs outside of the organs of state, through elections and discourse. Chinese constitutional theorists have begun to elaborate a distinct view — that democratic constitutionalism may also be grounded on the premise that democracy occurs within the organs of state and the political apparatus of the nation, through collective and representational decision making. Hu Angang has most recently expressed a theory of socialist democracy around the notion of a collective presidency. This essay considers Hu Angang’s theory and defense of the role of the CCP in China’s constitutional system, with particular focus on the evolution of the premises of collective action merged with democratic theory and applied to the operations of a party-state system. Its object is to theorize internal democratic structures of the CCP, and through them, of the government as a whole. Its focus is on the development of collective leadership. Part I first considers the theoretical underpinning of the theory of collective presidency — grounded in China’s history, context and its political ideology. The object is to better situate the history and utility of a collective presidency within the political structures and ideological premises of Chinese constitutionalism, and then to consider the connection between that construction and global principles of constitutional democracy. Part II then considers the arguments advanced for the efficiency and representation-reinforcing elements of the collective presidency — collective succession, collective labor division and cooperation, collective learning, collective research, and collective decision-making. Part III briefly considers the work that remains to be done as the CCP continues to scientifically develop the theory of democratic socialism and attends to the harder task, not of drawing theory form facts, but of living theory through practice. The essential insight of the Chinese move toward a distinct socialist democracy is not that that there can only be one best approach, but its opposite — that it is not which state is more democratic in accordance with a singular formula, but whether every state develops democratic structures effectively responsive to its own conditions. It is only in this context that comparison becomes useful.

Állami beavatkozás, lokális eladósodás, túlfűtöttség és ezek rendszerbeli okai a globális válság alatt Kínában

E cikk azzal foglalkozik, hogy hogyan hatott a globális válság a kínai gazdaságra, milyen központi és helyi kormányzati válaszokat és preferenciákat váltott ki s ezek milyen következményekkel jártak nemzeti és regionális szinten. Kiemelten elemzi a helyi kormányzatok eladósodása és a beruházások által generált túlfűtöttség közvetlen gazdasági okait, ezek intézményi és rendszerbeli hátterét. Rávilágít arra, hogy bár a kínai gazdasági átalakulás jelentősen előrehaladt a piacgazdaság irányába, a válságot ellensúlyozó állami beavatkozások felerősítik a pártállami rendszer sajátosságait s ezek kínai specifikumait. E sajátosságok meghatározzák az erőforrások politikai racionalitású elosztási szempontjait és a szereplők hasonló motivációjú beruházási magatartását, ami túlfűtöttséghez vezet. Meghatározzák továbbá a rendszerszerű túlfűtöttség kínai sajátosságait: a decentralizált kínai hatalmi szerkezetből következő lokális túlfűtöttséget és eladósodást.

Chinese-Style Constitutionalism

Currently, besides traditional national constitutionalism, there are three general approaches to constitutionalism in the world: transnational constitutionalism, theocratic constitutionalism, and party-state constitu-tionalism. The focus of this article is on Larry Backer’s research concerning China’s party-state system. Party-state constitutionalism is rooted in Marxism-Leninism, and was initially put into practice by the former Soviet Union. The People’s Republic of China in its early years largely followed in the USSR’s footsteps and developed its constitutional system under the traditional Soviet framework. However, since 1982, the Chinese party-state constitutional system has undergone several major reforms, and China has been gradually transforming into a “single-party constitutional state.” Grounded in the separation of powers between the party and the state, this new constitutional model serves to further the rule of law, reaffirm the paramount authority of the constitution, and dynamically balance the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) leadership position with the rule of law. The CCP, being an articulator of social norms and values, provides the substantive norms and values that form the basis of the rule-of-law constitution. The constitution, in turn, serves to limit the behavior of the party, so that the CCP will be subject to the constraints of the constitution and the rule of law.

Toward a Robust Theory of the Chinese Constitutional State

The state of constitutional theory is in flux. What was once the preserve of those who organized the state became the expression of mass democracy and the popular will, one that has been increasingly constrained by international consensus on the limits of political will within national borders. The stakes are high—constitutional legitimacy is fundamental to internal political stability and to international acceptance. Among the most contested forms of modern constitutional states are party-state systems grounded in Marxist-Leninist theory. This article considers Jiang Shigong’s development of a coherent and legitimating constitutionalist theory of China’s party-state system. It considers Jiang’s argument that constitutionalism must start with values and structure and then considers the mechanics through which it is institutionalized—either in writing or through structuralist approaches. It also examines Jiang’s construction of a formal-functional theory of Chinese constitutionalism that acknowledges the democratic basis and the representative character of the Chinese Communist Party within the party-state system. Jiang’s theoretical developments point to the deepening of an understanding of the legitimacy of Chinese constitutionalism. Jiang Shigong is part of a small group of Chinese academics who are working along distinct paths to move beyond the “legitimacy” issue of Chinese constitutionalism and tackle the much harder but more important question of the continued development of Chinese constitutionalism along the lines of its own logic. Critical to that project are notions of civic education and the consequences of the separation of powers at the heart of Chinese constitutionalism—one that distinguishes between the administrative power of the government, including the administration and rule of law, and the political power of the Chinese Communist Party, including the nation’s constitutional norms.

Towards a Robust Theory of the Chinese Constitutional State: Between Formalism and Legitimacy in Jiang Shigong's Constitutionalism

The state of constitutional theory is in flux. What was once the preserve of those who organized the state became the expression of mass democracy and the popular will, one that has been increasingly constrained by international consensus on the limits of political will within national borders. The stakes are high — constitutional legitimacy is fundamental to internal political stability and to international acceptance. Among the most contested forms of modern constitutional states are Party-State systems grounded in Marxist-Leninist theory. This essay considers Jiang Shigong’s development of a coherent and legitimating constitutionalist theory of China’s Party-State system. The essay considers Jiang’s argument that constitutionalism must start with values and structure and then consider the mechanics through which it is institutionalized — either in writing or through structuralist approaches. It also examines Jiang’s construction a formal-functional theory of Chinese constitutionalism that acknowledges the democratic basis of framework and the representative character of the Party within the Party-State system. Jiang’s theoretical developments point to the deepening of an understanding of the legitimacy of Chinese constitutionalism. Jiang Shigong is part of a small group of Chinese academics who are working along distinct paths to move beyond the “legitimacy” issue of Chinese constitutionalism and tackle the much harder but more important questions of the continued development of Chinese constitutionalism along the lines of its own logic. Critical to that project are notions of civic education and the consequences of the separation of powers at the heart of Chinese constitutionalism — one that distinguishes between the administrative power of the government, including the administration and rule of law, and the political power of the CCP, including the nation’s constitutional norms.

New local state power through administrative restructuring – A case study of post-Mao China county-level urban entrepreneurialism in Kunshan

By focusing on Kunshan, an economically advanced county-level city in the Yangtze River Delta, this paper aims to answer how, why, and under what circumstances the territorial power of Chinese urban entrepreneurial states is created in response to the dynamics of spatial economic development in the context of market transition and globalization. Although Kunshan is merely a county-level authority administratively, its economic performance in 2011 was better than that of several poor provinces, such as Hainan, Tibet, Qinghai, and Ningxia. Kunshan’s successful urban entrepreneurialism presents a unique ‘mismatch’ between ‘low’ administrative rank and ‘great’ economic performance (a big foot in a small shoe, dajiao chuan xiaoxie). I argue that Kunshan has developed several new local state powers through flexible administrative restructuring that explains the ‘mismatch’ puzzle and includes the following characteristics: (1) reclassification of Kunshan from county to county-level city, (2) relational adjustment by officially or informally raising Kunshan’s place rank and the cadre rank, and (3) boundary revision by virtual enclave enlargement. I conclude that the Chinese party-state system plays a role in Chinese county-level urban entrepreneurialism.

Public Nomination and Direct Election in China

Abstract This research takes the case of Public Nomination and Direct Election, currently being rolled out in the People's Republic of China, to explain the function of elections in China. We believe that the goal of implementing this election system is to increase the governing ability of the Chinese Communist Party, thus sustaining the survival of the party-state system.

The Structure and Roles of China's Party-state System in Industrial Relations: An Updated Review

The Structure and Roles of China's Party-state System in Industrial RelationsAn Updated Review Zhining Ma (bio) China's late leader, Deng Xiaoping reaffirmed his determination to clear the ideological obstacles to market-oriented economic reform during his "southern tour" in 1992. China's reforms have been substantial since then. To name but a few, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) began to be privatised in the mid/late 1990s, China finally entered the World Trade Organisation in 2001 after years of hesitation and negotiation, the Communist Party of China (CPC) revised the Party Constitution to accommodate private business owners in 2002 and the state revised its Constitution to provide legal protection for private properties in 2004.1 This series of reforms profoundly affected not only China but also the rest of the world as China's influence in the global economy increased significantly. Among various changes during China's reform era, the newly developed labour market and a subsequent series of labour issues captured much attention. The unique characteristics of China's industrial relations system, however, confuse many people. The biggest difference between China and western countries in their industrial relations systems lies in the "party-state" system. In modern liberal democratic systems, state power is usually separated into three major areas of power — the executive, legislature and judiciary — to prevent the possible abuse of power. The concept and structure of the state in China, however, are completely different. Nominally, China also has its own divisions among the executive system (the People's Government), the legislature system (the People's Congress) and the judiciary system (the People's Court and People's Procuratorate), but there is hardly any balance [End Page 370] or "separation of powers" among them. Instead, as we will see later, the party-state system penetrates every aspect of the political, social and economic life of the whole country. As a sub-system of the broader social system, the industrial relations system is of course no exception. The question arises then: What are the structure and roles of China's Party-state system, particularly in regard to industrial relations in China's reform era? This topic is important, but relatively less studied. Though some scholars discuss the roles of the party-state in China's industrial relations, most do not analyse the matter in depth.2 For example, Zhang discussed the role of the party-state in the union development of China, but did not look at how the party-state, as a whole, fits into the industrial relations system and functions.3 This paper provides an updated review of recent official documents as well as academic literature in an attempt to provide answers to the above question. A different view of the function (or dysfunction) of China's party-state in industrial relations is presented here which may act as a starting point to explore the topic in more depth in the future. Structure of the Party-state in Industrial Relations After the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the party-state system went through numerous major restructurings. Especially after the launch of the "reform and open-door" policy in 1979, the roles and functions of the party-state changed significantly.4 In particular, the party-state's control over and interference in purely economic or personal areas declined greatly. The roles [End Page 371] of the party-state in industrial relations changed accordingly. Taylor et al undertook the first attempt to provide a chart to explain the party-state's position in industrial relations (see Figure 1). The diagram and analyses that followed it, however, contain some problems: Click for larger view View full resolution Figure 1. Party-state in Industrial Relations Source: B. Taylor, K. Chang and Q. Li, "Industrial Relations in China" (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2003), p. 19. 1. They did not clarify the difference between nominal and actual leadership. This problem is reflected in the lines between the people's congresses and governments. Whereas Figure 1 seems to indicate that the people's congresses have direct power over the governments, they are usually referred to as "rubber stamps" in China, meaning that they have little real influence over the operation of...

The Structure and Roles of China's Party-state System in Industrial Relations: An Updated Review

China's late leader, Deng Xiaoping reaffirmed his determination to clear the ideological obstacles to market-oriented economic during his southern tour in 1992. China's reforms have been substantial since then. To name but a few, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) began to be privatised in the mid/late 1990s, China finally entered the World Trade Organisation in 2001 after years of hesitation and negotiation, the Communist Party of China (CPC) revised the Party Constitution to accommodate private business owners in 2002 and the state revised its Constitution to provide legal protection for private properties in 2004. (1) This series of reforms profoundly affected not only China but also the rest of the world as China's influence in the global economy increased significantly. Among various changes during China's era, the newly developed labour market and a subsequent series of labour issues captured much attention. The unique characteristics of China's industrial relations system, however, confuse many people. The biggest difference between China and western countries in their industrial relations systems lies in the system. In modern liberal democratic systems, state power is usually separated into three major areas of power--the executive, legislature and judiciary--to prevent the possible abuse of power. The concept and structure of the state in China, however, are completely different. Nominally, China also has its own divisions among the executive system (the People's Government), the legislature system (the People's Congress) and the judiciary system (the People's Court and People's Procuratorate), but there is hardly any balance or separation of powers among them. Instead, as we will see later, the party-state system penetrates every aspect of the political, social and economic life of the whole country. As a sub-system of the broader social system, the industrial relations system is of course no exception. The question arises then: What are the structure and roles of China's Party-state system, particularly in regard to industrial relations in China's era? This topic is important, but relatively less studied. Though some scholars discuss the roles of the party-state in China's industrial relations, most do not analyse the matter in depth. (2) For example, Zhang discussed the role of the party-state in the union development of China, but did not look at how the party-state, as a whole, fits into the industrial relations system and functions. (3) This paper provides an updated review of recent official documents as well as academic literature in an attempt to provide answers to the above question. A different view of the function (or dysfunction) of China's party-state in industrial relations is presented here which may act as a starting point to explore the topic in more depth in the future. Structure of the Party-state in Industrial Relations After the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the party-state system went through numerous major restructurings. Especially after the launch of the reform and open-door policy in 1979, the roles and functions of the party-state changed significantly. (4) In particular, the party-state's control over and interference in purely economic or personal areas declined greatly. The roles of the party-state in industrial relations changed accordingly. Taylor et al undertook the first attempt to provide a chart to explain the party-state's position in industrial relations (see Figure 1). The diagram and analyses that followed it, however, contain some problems: 1. They did not clarify the difference between nominal and actual leadership. This problem is reflected in the lines between the people's congresses and governments. Whereas Figure 1 seems to indicate that the people's congresses have direct power over the governments, they are usually referred to as rubber stamps in China, meaning that they have little real influence over the operation of the government. …

Democratic reform in Africa: Its impact on governance and poverty alleviation (review)

Reviewed by: Democratic reform in Africa: Its impact on governance and poverty alleviation Percyslage Chigora (bio) Muna Ndulo (ed). Democratic reform in Africa: Its impact on governance and poverty alleviation. James Currey, Oxford, 2006, pp.304. Issues of democratic reform are critical in enhancing development particularly in the developing world. The book has been well set and formulated to raise these issues in an attempt to illuminate and drive the agenda for development in Africa. The introduction that makes the first chapter, by Muna Ndulo brought to fore the concept of the rule of law and how it is directly related to development particularly as it pertains to governance and poverty reduction. The second chapter by Johann Kriegler offers an overview of the African situation in terms of democratic reform. He made quiet interesting observations about African countries noting "most African countries are not developing but regressing" (p.11). This presents the need for democratic reform and calling upon the outside world The United States and the European Union to play a critical role in ending poverty in Africa not through handouts or acts of kindliness but making sure that the markets are accessible. The author demonstrated how democracy entrenches development especially through creating a responsive government that implements developmental projects. He rounded up by discussing the role of NEPAD and local government in fostering development. Joel D. Barkan in third chapter examined Africa's experience with democracy through phases, the past, the present and the future. From the past the issues of liberation and struggle for independence were cited as moves towards democratisation only to be stalled by the new majoritarian government's moves towards one party state systems, neo-patrimonialisation of the state and creation of military regimes. The present begins with the end of the cold war where politics featured three groups, i.e. incumbent authoritarians, insurgents and reformers. On what is happening on the continent the author identified two worldviews that are emerging, on one-hand optimists and on the other realists. The author went on to examine the factors that are inhibiting democratisation. Finally he suggested scenarios for the future and what can be done to consolidate democracy. [End Page 79] The fourth chapter by Ann Seidman and Robert B. Seidman deals with law as an instrument for development. To them development lagged behind since independence because governors "did not understand that, to carry out development, institutional transformation constituted their principal task, and partly because those leaders who occasionally did try to transform institutions had no theory to guide them in their use of law" (p.27). The authors analysed 'Africa's multiple agonies' i.e. poverty, vulnerability and poor governance and went on to explain the role of law in promoting development. They also explained factors behind populist leaders failing to enhance development and providing an in depth exposition of how the use of law drives and shapes development. Penelope Andrews using South Africa as a case study analysed how the constitution has been a mechanism for redressing poverty. She provided cases on how social and economic rights have been enforced. The author cited the structural and extra-constitutional impediments to redressing poverty. She concluded by providing extra-legal strategies for reducing poverty. Of importance the author noted, "the national and provincial governments have inherited an enormous backlog of economic needs and inequalities; they have an unenviable task in addressing these needs and redressing the inequalities. Addressing these problems require fortitude, foresight, good planning, effective administration and a clear commitment to success" (p.65). Peter N. Takirambudde and Kate K. Fletcher using a human rights perspective analysed the place of civil society in governance and poverty alleviation. They stated categorically that the "development community has increasingly come to recognise the links between civil and political rights, good governance, and economic development" (p.68). Issues of governance and civil society were clarified in so far as they contribute to development. The authors concluded by justifying civil society as contributing to poverty reduction. In chapter seven Muna Ndulo examines the concept of decentralization and how it directly linked to governance and development. He analysed the concept of devolution and stated political and economic benefits as well...

Self-Consuming Evolutions: A Model on the Structure, Self-Reproduction, Self-Destruction and Transformation of Party-State Systems Tested in Romania, Hungary and China. By Maria Csanádi. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 2006. xiv, 341 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Chronology. Index. Figures. Tables. $55.00, hard bound.

Self-Consuming Evolutions: A Model on the Structure, Self-Reproduction, Self-Destruction and Transformation of Party-State Systems Tested in Romania, Hungary and China. By Maria Csanádi. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 2006. xiv, 341 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Chronology. Index. Figures. Tables. $55.00, hard bound. - Volume 67 Issue 3

Suryong’s Direct Rule and the Political Regime in North Korea under Kim Jong IL

The political in North Korea has been characterized as a Dominant Party-State System. Since mid-1980s, however, its political has displayed two interesting aspects. Formally, broad System has been maintained; in practice, however, Workers' Party of Korea, Korean People's Army, and government have come to acquire respectively different and considerably strengthened roles. Under this new regime, Kim Jong Il (Suryong) directly rules over party, government, and military. Meanwhile, political-ideological base, military base, and economic base are administered respectively by party, army, and government. Interestingly, while power of party still overwhelms that of military and government, party's means of influence has changed from giving direct orders to providing provisions or encouraging policy outlines. Key words: North Korea, Communist parties, East Asian politics Introduction The political in Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) has experienced significant changes since death of its longstanding leader, Kim Il Sung, in 1994. No plenary meeting of party's Central Committee (PCC), highest leadership body of North Korea, has been held since December 1993. In addition, two significant political institutions, presidency and Central People's Committee (CPC), were abolished by constitutional revision that took place in 1998. Specifically, abolishment of CPC weakened consulting channel between Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) and government. These changes, in turn, reinforced roles of cabinet and Korean People's Army (KPA), both previously controlled by WPK. In other words, under rule of Kim Jong Il, the cabinet responsibility system on which administrative-economic apparatus is concentrated, is actively operating, and politics, or Songun policy, has become central theme of North Korean politics. This makes KPA driving force of economic development and national security. Previous literature on political in North Korea has shown different findings regarding Suryong (great leader) system, Suryong's direct rule, party-government relations and party-military relations in eras of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. Specifically, most studies are divided into two perspectives regarding core issue of socialist political systems, party control. Some scholars argue that similar to era of Kim Il Sung's rule, WPK under Kim Jong Il exercises guidance and leadership over government and KPA. This is so even though he has bolstered status of KPA and autonomy of cabinet.1 Meanwhile, other scholars point out that because of development of military-first politics and cabinet responsibility system, previous relations among party, government, and KPA have significantly changed, or at very least, formerly direct control WPK once had has been weakened during Kim Jong Il era.2 If so, why were previous studies on socialist political systems concentrated on relations between communist party, government, and military? According to Schurmann's seminal study,3 socialist political systems, especially Chinese communist in 1960s, can be analyzed by focusing on hierarchical structure among Chinese Communist Party, People's Liberation Army, and government. That is, power structure in socialist countries is characterized by communistparty dominant pattern within a strict power triangle that consists of communist party, government, and military.4 Thus, Schurmann's study implies that for analysis of socialist political systems, we need to scrutinize identity of supreme power and its relations with other actors. In this regard, North Korea is not so different from other socialist political systems. …