Suryong’s Direct Rule and the Political Regime in North Korea under Kim Jong IL

This article will engage in a brief survey of the geopolitical impediments to development in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). One cannot comprehend the present without understanding the thread which runs from the past to the present. Even a perfunctory knowledge of regional geography will highlight that the DPRK lies at the intersection of China–Russia–Japan and US interests. The central issues in the DPRK's developmental strategy are (1) state/regime survival and (2) resource allocation. In its earliest days the administration of Kim Il Sung was bedevilled by two alternative factions within the Workers Party: the Irkutsk faction beholden to the patronage of the USSR, which opted for and lost a leadership struggle in 1955, and the Yan'an faction of Chinese-oriented veterans. Once Kim Il Sung's power was consolidated, the primary adversary was and remains the United States and its ally Japan. Cumulatively both of these historical experiences have resulted in a total distortion of resource allocation; in the first instance because of the need to establish an independent identity, mooting the juche concept as its focus; and in the second, because of military expenditure of Herculean proportions. Reportedly 25 to 30 per cent of the population is either in the Korean People's Army or the Red Militia.

IntroductionThe problem of North Korea today is the problem of the contradiction of inversion, that is, the inverse relation of dictatorial regime capacity and social reform pressures that have been intensified under impoverished and marketizing socioeconomic conditions. Importantly, this contradiction is not an abstract, metaphysical, or speculative principle formulated in the realm of pure logic or pure theory. Instead, the contradiction is a concrete, empirical, and real social involving the actual momentum of millions of people in everyday life and the struggle of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) and Korean People's Army (KPA) elite to maintain its interests, privileges, and survival.While the Soviet-Stalinist-constructed North Korean party-army state-regime had been able to more or less contain the contradiction in the epoch of world Stalinism, with financial aid, fraternal trade, and material assistance from its allies and benefactors in the Soviet Union, Eastern Bloc, and China, the 1989 to 1991 liquidation of the Stalinist states and onset of the post-Soviet and post-COMECON era exacerbated the problems for the regime. North Korea confronted a crisis of compounded proportions: collapse of the bureaucratically planned economy, collapse of faith in Marxism-Leninism, collapse of discipline in the WPK, and, most catastrophically, collapse of the food-ration system.With the great famine of 1996 to 1999, an emergent market economy based on the spontaneous rise of petty trade and small proprietorship became the new social reality. Confronted with these conditions, the ruling group determined to secure its existence by distancing itself from Marxism-Leninism in 1992, emphasizing militaryfirst (songun) populism in 1998, adopting pragmatic socialism (shilli sahoejuui; markets plus planning) in 2002, and relinquishing communism in 2009. What the political-economic adaptations of the regime are indicative of is that the contradiction of inversion is moving North Korea into an alignment that is fundamentally in the interests of global capitalism.Contradiction of InversionHow is the contradiction of inversion constituted? North Korean studies scholars do not presently use the term, but its sense-content is axiomatic in empirical and predictive analyses of the contemporary North Korean socioeconomic and sociopolitical situation. A notable example is Un-Chul Yang's 2012 article Downfall of the North Korean State Economy in International Journal of Korean Studies, which speaks of from the bottom of and the rise of markets as a bottom-up process rather than a top-down process, resulting fundamentally from economic failure, financial bankruptcy, food shortages, and incapability of government to provide for the North Korean people.2As economic poverty is protracted and as markets at the bottom grow, the North Korean state-regime experiences declining political authority and decreasing influence of power.3 Summarizing the social process and its materially conditioned trajectory, Yang says:With constant economic difficulties, the reigning force of the dictatorial regime is, in fact, gradually loosening. The number of North Korean defectors is increasing, and corruption already seems to be out of control. In addition, the steady growth of private business will be an index to producing a new future.The pressure from the bottom of society to provide reform measures continues to increase as the capacity of the North Korean regime decreases. With the slowly shifting paradigm of the North Korean people and elites, the foundation for a market economy should gain strength in the near future.4What this description and prediction reveal is that the contradiction of inversion has four main factors: (1) progression of time, (2) social hierarchy, (3) dictatorial regime capacity, and (4) social reform pressures. The latter two factors, existing in the objective contexts of history and society, manifest a decrease-increase relation as a direct consequence of economic difficulties and a vertical opposition between the people and the elite. …

The aim of this thesis is to look into the structural, ideological and strategic features of the (North) Korean People's Army from its birth in late 1945 to the debacle in late 1950, thereby forming a coherent and up-to-date account of the early KPA, which is essential to a proper enquiry into the origins and character of the Korean War. The cadre members of the KPA were from three origins: the Soviet- affiliated Kim IlSung group; the Yenan group, the returnees from China; and the Soviet-Korean group, a functionary group of the Soviet occupation authorities. Among them, the Kim IlSung group was to play the key role in the making of the KPA. The People's Army started from the founding of the Pyongyang Institute in November 1945. By August 1946 the basic conditions and preparations for building the regular armed forces of North Korea were settled. By February 1948, when the founding of the KPA was proclaimed, the People's Army was well established; though, the actual strength of the KPA remained rather modest until mid-1949. The rapid expansion and modernisation of the KPA took place between July 1949 and May 1950. The quantum leap of the KPA during March to May 1950 was exceptionally clear evidence of the likelihood of the outbreak of war in the near future. The Korean War decision was made among the leaders of North Korea, the Soviet Union, and the PRC, during the winter of 1949-50. Most probably it was initiated by the North Korean leadership who were increasingly confident of their strengthened position over the south which itself was in disarray. The all-out attack against South Korea in June 1950 was only the final phase of the 'Southern Strategy' which the North Korean leadership had been pursuing since late 1945. It was neither the only alternative left nor a pre-emptive strike in a desperate mood. That the North Korean leadership started the invasion in an over-confident mood can be proven through the close examination of KPA preparations for and conduct of the war.

By using many newly available documents and memoirs, this article analyzes a little known but important episode in Sino-Northern Korean relations. By the time the United Nations troops crossed the 38th parallel, the North Korean leader had repeatedly refused direct military assistance from the PRC government. The development of the war demanded unifying the commanding authority of the Sino-Northern Korean army. However, Kim Il-Sung hoped to reserve the commanding authority of the Korean People's army to himself. It was only after the intervention by the Soviet Unionthat North Korea finally delegated military command. When the Sino-North Korean troops occupied Seoul, Peng Dehuai asked for a rest and reorganization of the troops for two or three months. However, the North-Korean leader insisted on moving southward. This caused a serious dispute that was solved only after Stalin supported the Chinese position. As the war dragged on, the conflicts between China and North Korea over the railroad administration system also began to intensify. The Chinese authorities proposed to put the railroad under military control and to give military supplies priority. But the North Korean authorities believed that the management of railroad belonged to the state and should be administrated by North Korea, which was inclined to emphasize the transportation of economic and construction goods over military supplies. Again, Stalin solved the dispute: the headquarters of the Sino-North Korean union troops implemented the military control of railroad. In the second half of 1952 the armistice negotiations of Panmunjom came to a deadlock. North Korea intended to accept the armistice conditions proposed by America. Due to political considerations, Beijing and Moscow insisted on a harder position. Again, Kim Il-Sung had to accept the position of China and Soviet Union. The conflicts between Chinese and North Korean leaders and their final resolutions thus reflected an inner structural imbalance within the relations of socialist countries-i.e., the conflict between the concepts of national sovereignty and socialist leadership, which ultimately determined the inherent instability within the socialist allies.

The military medical system of the Korean People's Army (KPA) first appeared in August 1946 when a central military hospita was established at the headquarters. Inside the KPA, the military medical and veteran services were first established in February 1948. The military medical officers of the KPA were those who were initially engaged in North Korea's health care sector. Most of the early military medical officers were those who had been trained in the Japanese medical system before liberation and were surgeons. After the establishment of the government in September 1948, Lee Dongwha rapidly introduced the medical system of the Soviet army into the KPA. The KPA military medical system was a mix of Soviet, Japanese and Chinese military medical systems. The medical section of the KPA was similar to that of the Japanese army, and the medical section of the lower army was similar to that of the Soviet army. The stretcher platoon of the KPA were similar to those of the Japanese and Chinese armies. The KPA mainly used Japanese medical equipment at the beginning, and after the establishment of the North Korean regime in September 1948, they were gradually replaced with Soviet products. The military medical office of the KPA were equipped with treatment rooms, laboratories, hospitals, pharmacy, and inpatient rooms. The military medical office purchased medical journals and specimens for medical research and set up a separate research fund. In addition, the military medical office was equipped with a laboratory for medical experiments and raised laboratory animals. The KPA military medical system was specialized in the fields of infectious disease prevention and preventive medicine. At the time, infectious disease in North Korea was mainly caused by bacteria and viruses in unsanitary living environments. The KPA set up a special anti-infectious disease department in consideration of the soldiers living in the collective facilities. The second characteristic of the KPA military medical system is preventive medicine. Since early 1946, North Korea has been interested in preventive medicine and has established various medical facilities and personnel. In line with this history of preventive medicine, the preventive department was installed in the KPA military medical system.

IntroductionNorth Korean (son'gun chongch'i) is known to privilege the Korean People's Army (KPA) as important resource and catalyst for developing the national economy.2 As the role of the KPA in the national economy and national defense has increased, there has been speculation that the military will ascend to power in North Korea under military-first politics. The difficulty of collecting internal information on the political situation in North Korea has made Kim Jongil's reported public appearances a useful source of information for researchers. Many researchers have thus analyzed the public appearances of the North Korean leader to understand military-first politics. The conclusion has been drawn that the KPA has taken priority over all North Korean state affairs, since the number of Kim's public appearances at military installations and the number of military officers among his entourage have increased.3 Still, the question of which factor causes Kim to appear where and when in public, under military-first politics, remains unanswered. Predictors of Kim Jong-il's on-the-spot guidance are thus necessary in an effort to address the question. The application of a predictive model furnishes a meaningful estimate of the frequency of Kim's on-the-spot guidance visits to the military sector and other sectors, with the corresponding implications.Avoiding Circular ReasoningKim Jong-il's on-the-spot guidance is conducted in order to inspect implementation of national policies and to discuss state affairs with his entourage, who have allegedly gained an upper hand in the decision-making process.4 Military-first politics brought about a significant change to Kim's on-the-spot guidance, as his visits to the military sector have increased, as well as the number of military officers among his entourage.5 This change has been interpreted as evidence that military-first prioritizes the KPA over all affairs of state.6 If this interpretation is correct, the number of Kim's on-the-spot guidance visits to the military sector should remain at a relatively high level under military-first politics.Demonstrable statistics, however, are not in favor of that proposition. Figure 1 on page 95 shows that the number of Kim's visits to the military sector has not been constant, but has fluctuated over time. This might indicate that the priority of the KPA rises and falls according to certain variables. If one accepts that Kim's increased visits to the military sector are prioritizing the KPA, it is relevant to ask, What makes Kim Jong-il visit the military sector?Assuming that Kim visits the military because the KPA is a top priority, one needs to inquire as to why prioritization has occurred. Yet if one suggests that the increasing number of visits to the military are in themselves proof of the priority of the KPA, the result is the fallacy of circular reasoning. A cause is simultaneously considered an effect. Avoiding circular reasoning, one must attempt to identify predictors that might correspond to the frequency of Kim Jong-il's on-the-spot guidance to the military sector and other sectors under military-first politics. The first step must begin with an analysis of the origins of military-first in North Korea.Origins of Military-First PoliticsThe origin of military-first can be explained as a response to external and internal factors. On one hand, the priority given to the North Korean military can be seen as a self-defense tactic, reacting to the breakdown and collapse of the Soviet bloc in the period 1989-1991.7 On the other hand, military-first has been interpreted as a way for Kim to consolidate his political power since the sudden death of his father, Kim Il-sung, in 1994.8 Some scholars following these lines of reasoning perceive the role of the military as one of preventing large-scale social disruption derived from the post-Soviet economic crisis of the 1990s. …

Sultanism is a type of autocratic regime in which political power is concentrated in the hands of the ruler and is unbound by political and legal rules. Political authority engulfs social and economic life and follows no elaborate ideology. The regime elicits loyalty through favoritism toward its supporters, reprisals against its opponents, and the repression of civil society. Coined by sociologist Max Weber to describe absolute and highly personalistic authority, the term sultanism was used by political scientists for the purpose of regime classification to refer to a type of nondemocratic political system which is distinct from typical dictatorships and totalitarian regimes.

George Hutchinson's "The Suryong, the Soldier, and Information in the KPA" is the second of three building blocks of a multi-year HRNK project to examine North Korea's information environment. Hutchinson's thoroughly researched and sourced report addresses the circulation of information within the Korean People's Army (KPA). Understanding how KPA soldiers receive their information is needed to prepare information campaigns while taking into account all possible contingencies. The report examines official propaganda and indoctrination delivered to North Korean soldiers, all along the chain of control and command. Hutchinson provides the information, analysis and recommendations needed to inform KPA soldiers on the real situation outside North Korea, the human rights violations affecting them, and the corruption of their leadership.

The 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Poland and the DPRK causes us to take stock of the relationship. The first 40 years of bilateral relations between Poland and DPRK was set against the backdrop of the Cold War reality. During the first 20 years of this period, relations between the two nations were very close. Poland was invited to be a member of the Neutral Countries Supervisory Commission by the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers, while Western countries questioned the neutrality of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Now Polish–North Korean relations are based on realism. The Polish foreign policy toward North Korea is within the EU framework, which supports an evolutionary change in character of the North Korean regime. Poland supports the peaceful reunification of Korea and the goals of the Six‐Party Talks on North Korean denuclearization.

DOES THE OLD SAW-PLUS CA CHANGE, PLUS C'EST LA MEME CHOSE-apply to North Korea? Yes and no. Here are some partial and sometimes conflicting answers suggested by a sampling of recent writings.1Armstrong, Charles K. Tyranny of the Weak: North Korea and the World, 1950-1992. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013.Jager, Sheila Miyoshi. Brothers at War: The Unending Conflict in Korea. New York: W. W. Norton, 2013.Johnson, Adam. The Orphan Master's Son. New York: Random House, 2012.Lim Dong-won. Peacemaker: Twenty Years of Inter-Korean Relations and the North Korean Nuclear Issue. Stanford, CA: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2012.On Korea 2013: Academic Paper Series. Vol. 6. Washington, DC: Korea Economic Institute of America, 2013.Park, Kyung-Ae, ed. Nontraditional Security Issues in North Korea. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2013.Park, Kyung-Ae, and Scott Snyder, eds. North Korea in Transition: Politics, Economy, and Society. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013.Yes, continuity persists. As Sheila Miyoshi Jager underscores, an unending conflict continues more than six decades after the 1953 Korean armistice. Yes, as Charles Armstrong reminds us, North Korea has continued to make the most of a very weak position. Yes, aspiring peacemakers like Lim Dong-won still hope to implement a version of the Sunshine Policy to open up the North. Yes, as the essays in On Korea 2013 make clear, China and other actors concerned with North Korea do not like what they see there but muddle along without taking any decisive action. Yes, as several contributors to North Korea in Transition explain, life in North Korea continues much as it has since 1946. Bruce Cumings goes further: He notes the contemporary parallels with the centralized power and rituals characteristic of Korea for centuries.Yes, as Nicholas Eberstadt argues, economic reforms in the North have been halfhearted. He even contends that foreign economic and humanitarian assistance have put offreal reform. (However, as John Park argues, pressures from economic sanctions may have moved North Korean and Chinese businesspeople to new forms of entrepreneurial activity.) Last but not least, Adam Johnson's novel portrays how concentration camps and perpetual anxiety over one's personal and family security remain constants in North Korea. His narrative comes to life in frequent reports of purges and executions in Pyongyang.But no, things are not always what they seem. To be sure, an entourage of old-timers and family friends escorted the hearse of Kim Jong-il in December 2011. Signs were that his chosen son and appointed successor, Kim Jong-un, would continue the dynastic system, assisted by an older regent, like the young kings Sejong (in 1418), Sunjo (in 1800), and Kojong (in 1864) before him. Within two years, however, many of the old-timers had been purged and the apparent regent executed for treason. While North Korea remains an Orwellian nightmare, the impact of cell phones and greater access to computers and other information sources can only erode the regime's centralized controls.Dynasties, bureaucracies, and political systems may hold fast, but surely the personality of the central dynasty is an important variable-one that can change the game in fundamental ways. Thus, Kim Jong-il seemed introverted but calculated in his decisionmaking. His son appears far more extroverted and-at least to some outsiders-reckless in both internal and foreign affairs. Who knows how important the wild card of personality will prove? As Terrence Roehig points out in the Park and Snyder anthology, Kim Jong-il elevated the Korean People's Army (KPA) to a much greater political role than before. If pushed too far, its leaders might try to oust the last remnant of the Kim dynasty and introduce a more sober form of governance. Alternatively, if the KPA remains obedient, Kim Jong-un might push his generals into actions that cross some red line of South Korean and US forbearance. …

IntroductionThe People of the Fighting Village by Chon Se Bong (1915-1986) is a socialist realist heroic epic dressed up as a novelette that has apparently withstood the test of time in North Korea. It is a sentimental, stereotyped, and disturbing story set around October to December 1950 during the Korean War. The plot centers on two North Korean villages, Kaean and Kaebak, where peasant dwellers, in coordination with guerrilla partisans, struggle to oust an American occupation force. Notably, the original Korean edition, Ssaunun Maul ui Saramdul, was awarded third prize for the best prose work in 1953 at the Festival of the Fifth Anniversary of the Founding of the Korean People's Army (Chun, 1955). Yet, despite the availability of two Englishlanguage editions published in 1955 and 1986, Chon's narrative has been neglected for half a century in the United States. This, however, does not represent a unique case-it is the fate of all North Korean literature accessible in North America. Having undergone arguably minor alterations and omissions, the translations of The People of the Fighting Village are important political-cultural documents. As both editions suggest, the work has evidently endured several decades of bureaucratic expediencies that condition the Stalinist arts doctrine of socialist realism, which North Korean sources describe as the only valid creative method and style in the country (Korean, 1959, p. 160; Chai and Hyon, 1980, p. 23). That doctrine is now termed Juche or Juche-oriented realism. The apparent longevity and success of Chon's The People of the Fighting Village may be due in part to the characterization of the protagonist Kwon Yong Pil. Central to the tale, he is an ascetic partisan youth and archetypal positive hero molded as an exemplary representative of North Korean nationalist Stalinist ideals, and one who is to be emulated for his uncompromising perseverance, fortitude, and devotion to the North Korean fatherland/motherland.Socialist RealismBefore exploring those qualities that define Kwon Yong Pil as a positive hero, it is necessary to address the question of socialist realism, which underlies his development. In brief, the Bonapartist aesthetic doctrine emerged in Soviet-Stalinist cultural discussion when Ivan Gronsky, chairman of the Organization Committee of the Soviet Writers' Union, introduced the term in 1932. The concept subsequently found its way into colonial-era Korea in 1933. Soon thereafter, it was promulgated and defined by Stalin's cultural lieutenant Andrei Zhdanov at the First Soviet Writers' Congress in 1934. And following the U.S.-Soviet agreements at Yalta and Potsdam, culminating in the occupation and division of the Korean peninsula with the defeat of fascist Japan in i945, socialist realism became the veritable cultural law of the Sovietsponsored northern regime in 1946. (That is also when the North Korean Federation of Literature and Art was established.) To be sure, North Korean literary control policy was thoroughly pervaded by Soviet-Stalinist influence from 1946 to 1950 and formed within the cultural-political structures of Zhadnovism and socialist realism (Lim, 1989). Other scholars such as Gabroussenko (2004), Howard (1996), Kwon (1991; 2003), Pihl (1977), and Pucek (1996) have confirmed the tradition of socialist realism in North Korea. Founded as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 1948, North Korea was formed during the height of Zhdanovism (Stalinist cul- tural nationalism) in the Soviet Union, that is, during the blackout of Soviet art and letters that lasted from 1946 to 1953. This was a period that ushered in the notorious anticosmopolitan campaign (a euphemism for anti-Westernism and, to some extent, anti-Semitism) as well as the theory of conflictlessness. Both policies proved especially detrimental in cultural production, cutting off Soviet literature from international influences and rejecting conflict as an integral component of drama and character (Vickery, 1963, pp. …

When North Korea adopted 'our-style socialism' in its constitution in 1992, it explicitly stated that it would strengthen 'socialist legal life', and granted the title of 'exemplary law compliance unit' to enterprises that practiced law-abiding life to realize socialist legal life. In addition, the legal commentator system emphasizes compliance with the law. And in North Korea, through the democratic centralization system, state institutions with the Supreme People's Assembly as the apex guide all the lives of the people, and the order of the market economy is being denied. Therefore, it is difficult to find a judicial realm in North Korea's legal order, and most of the legal order is a public legal realm, and it can be seen that it is composed of statutes corresponding to administrative law with the constitution as the apex. However, this principle, called democratic centralism or democratic centralism, is that the will of the citizens is democratically converged to the center and power is concentrated in the Supreme People's Assembly, and this principle is shown in the North Korean Constitution as it is. Therefore, the concept of administration, which started from the theory of separation of powers, which separates state power into three powers, legislative, judicial, and administrative, cannot be harmonized with democratic centralism. is also a contradictory ideology. In addition, looking at the types and names of administrative laws in North Korea, the statutes and decisions of the Supreme People's Assembly, the orders of the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission, the decrees, decisions and directives of the State Affairs Commission, the decrees, decisions and directives of the Supreme People's Committee Standing Committee, and the decisions and directives of the Cabinet And there are decisions and instructions of the provincial People's Committee. In addition, since 1998, there are ‘Sector Act’ and ‘Regulation’ that have been used instead of statutes. Among these regulations, the highest regulation would be the order of the chairperson, and this order sometimes functions as a superordinate norm of the constitution. In addition, there are statutes and ordinances that can be considered sectoral laws as sub-norms of orders, and regulations including decisions and instructions can be considered as sub-norms of sectoral laws. The administrative executive body in North Korea is the Cabinet, which also serves as the overall state management body, and the local People's Committee is the administrative executive body of local sovereignty. These administrative executive bodies are structured in a hierarchical structure with the Supreme People's Assembly, and furthermore, there is a restriction that they must operate under the leadership of the Workers' Party of Korea. These central administrative agencies are conducting administrative activities including administrative acts, and local administrative agencies are developing various resident administrative projects. In order to strengthen social rule of law in North Korea, declaring ‘socialist legal life’, explaining the law to North Koreans and emphasizing compliance is similar to South Korea’s rule of law. In accordance with the ‘Law Enactment Law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ enacted and adopted in 2012, North Korea continues to carry out legislative reform, and is actively engaged in enactment and amendment of laws, claiming to aim for a ‘normal state’. This phenomenon can be seen as an activity close to South Korea's rule of law. This phenomenon can be seen positively in terms of the integration of the South and North Korean laws. However, North Korea's Administrative Law has improved a lot compared to the past, but the intentions of the Labor Party and the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission still have a superior effect. Therefore,

When North Korea adopted 'our-style socialism' in its constitution in 1992, it explicitly stated that it would strengthen 'socialist legal life', and granted the title of 'exemplary law compliance unit' to enterprises that practiced law-abiding life to realize socialist legal life. In addition, the legal commentator system emphasizes compliance with the law. And in North Korea, through the democratic centralization system, state institutions with the Supreme People's Assembly as the apex guide all the lives of the people, and the order of the market economy is being denied. Therefore, it is difficult to find a judicial realm in North Korea's legal order, and most of the legal order is a public legal realm, and it can be seen that it is composed of statutes corresponding to administrative law with the constitution as the apex. However, this principle, called democratic centralism or democratic centralism, is that the will of the citizens is democratically converged to the center and power is concentrated in the Supreme People's Assembly, and this principle is shown in the North Korean Constitution as it is. Therefore, the concept of administration, which started from the theory of separation of powers, which separates state power into three powers, legislative, judicial, and administrative, cannot be harmonized with democratic centralism. is also a contradictory ideology. In addition, looking at the types and names of administrative laws in North Korea, the statutes and decisions of the Supreme People's Assembly, the orders of the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission, the decrees, decisions and directives of the State Affairs Commission, the decrees, decisions and directives of the Supreme People's Committee Standing Committee, and the decisions and directives of the Cabinet And there are decisions and instructions of the provincial People's Committee. In addition, since 1998, there are ‘Sector Act’ and ‘Regulation’ that have been used instead of statutes. Among these regulations, the highest regulation would be the order of the chairperson, and this order sometimes functions as a superordinate norm of the constitution. In addition, there are statutes and ordinances that can be considered sectoral laws as sub-norms of orders, and regulations including decisions and instructions can be considered as sub-norms of sectoral laws. The administrative executive body in North Korea is the Cabinet, which also serves as the overall state management body, and the local People's Committee is the administrative executive body of local sovereignty. These administrative executive bodies are structured in a hierarchical structure with the Supreme People's Assembly, and furthermore, there is a restriction that they must operate under the leadership of the Workers' Party of Korea. These central administrative agencies are conducting administrative activities including administrative acts, and local administrative agencies are developing various resident administrative projects. In order to strengthen social rule of law in North Korea, declaring ‘socialist legal life’, explaining the law to North Koreans and emphasizing compliance is similar to South Korea’s rule of law. In accordance with the ‘Law Enactment Law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ enacted and adopted in 2012, North Korea continues to carry out legislative reform, and is actively engaged in enactment and amendment of laws, claiming to aim for a ‘normal state’. This phenomenon can be seen as an activity close to South Korea's rule of law. This phenomenon can be seen positively in terms of the integration of the South and North Korean laws. However, North Korea's Administrative Law has improved a lot compared to the past, but the intentions of the Labor Party and the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission still have a superior effect. Therefore,

The quest to regularize US-DPRK relations has proved extremely complex and time-consuming. Initially the effort, which dates from 1992, centered on the road map spelled out in the October 1994 bilateral Agreed Framework. One of the most successful undertakings in building co-operation and mutual trust was the US Army-Korean People's Army Joint Recovery Operations of 1996- 2005. This chapter reviews the history of the US Army's effort in North Korea between 1996 and 2005, and assesses its diplomatic, political and military consequences as they relate to the normalization of US-DPRK relations. Finding Corporal LeBoeuf was part of a complex US-DPRK effort to erase the legacy of mutual hatred and mistrust lingering from the Korean War (1950-53), with the aim of normalizing relations. The United Nations Command (UNC) and North Korean People's Army (KPA) signed a new Agreement on Remains-related Matters on 24 August 1993. Keywords: 1994 bilateral Agreed Framework; Corporal LeBoeuf; North Korea; North Korean People's Army (KPA); United Nations Command (UNC); US Army; US-DPRK relations

The fortieth anniversary of Korean liberation was celebrated by North Korea on August 15, 1985. For this memorable occasion, the Soviet Union sent a government and military delegation headed by G. A. Aliyev, a member of the Politburo and first vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Marshal V. I. Petrov, the first deputy minister of defense, to Pyongyang to commemorate the anniversary. This was the first such celebration in twenty years. North Korea suspended the observation of the August 15 anniversary in 1965, trying to remain neutral in the SinoSoviet dispute and to minimize the Soviet role in the liberation of Korea. Over the past twenty years, North Korea has also advanced the claim that Kim II Sung, rather than the Soviet Union, had played a dominant role in the liberation of Korea, and to commemorate Kim's triumphant return to Korea, his son built him an Arch of Triumph in Pyongyang that is slightly larger than the one in Paris. In contrast to all those years prior to 1965, when Kim made salutatory remarks to the Soviet Union and showered Stalin with effusive praise for his role in the liberation of Korea, on this occasion Kim did not speak, and Premier Kang Song-san and Aliyev of the Soviet Union each made a report to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the Korean liberation. Times have indeed changed. During the year, North Korea also celebrated the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the Workers' Party of Korea, claiming that the party was created on October 10, 1945. This claim is a bit misleading and needs explanation. The Workers' Party of North Korea was founded, and its first congress held, on August 28-30, 1946, by merging the North Korean Branch Bureau of the Korean Communist Party and the New Democratic Party. A similar merger took place in South Korea, creating the Workers' Party of South Korea on November 23-24, 1946. It was not until June 11,