Party-state System Research Articles

The Paradox of the State-Run Media Promoting Poor Governance in China: Case Studies of a Party Newspaper and an Anticorruption Film

ABSTRACT This essay draws on the analysis of media texts and ethnographic fieldwork to present case studies of the production, distribution, and consumption of two kinds of media products in China that are used for educating cadres about official policies, law and morality, namely, a Party-produced prefectural newspaper and an anticorruption film. Such pedagogic media products merit study because they are consumed by a huge audience of cadres who are entrusted with interpreting and implementing state policy and with carrying out the daily work of the different institutions that make up the Party-state. The case studies show that the internal circulation of pedagogic media products within the Party-state apparatus works in two ways to reinforce “organizational involution,” which causes poor governance. First, the content of the media products and their methods of distribution buttress the norms and institutional practices that entrench unchallenged power, corruption, and official malfeasance within the system. Examples include the role of top-down administrative fiat in determining the content of the media products and the ways in which individuals and institutions are compelled to purchase materials and participate in pedagogic activities to secure their positions. Second, state pedagogy deflects attention away from the structural failings of the Party-state system. The pedagogic products enable the Party-state to portray itself as the leading crusader in the fight against corruption, despite the corrupting consequences of its continuing unsupervised monopoly on power. Meanwhile, self-improvement exhortations in the media texts sidestep the question of systemic political reform.

Party–state systems and their dynamics as networks

The dynamics of expansion and retreat of a network are detailed in the example of the birth and demise of party–state systems. This systemic network is described with the help of the interactive party–state (IPS) model through the interrelationship of individual party–state and economic decision-makers. The model also describes the causes of the internal dynamics of this network: its generators, its self-similarities and differences, as well as the dynamics of its operation and transformation. In view of the IPS model, I elaborate on the specific structure and dynamics of the Chinese party–state.

From comrade to citizen: the struggle for political rights in China

From Comrade to Citizen: The Struggle for Political Rights in China, by Merle Goldman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005. xiv + 286 pp. US$39.95 (hardcover). This book promises to be something of a departure for Merle Goldman. Hitherto, her oeuvre has been largely concerned with China's intellectuals (using expansive Chinese definition thereof)· But both concept and implicit expectation that this social group can constitute backbone of an emerging civil society now seem out of date. After all, intellectuals had their chance in 1980s, and failed. Goldman reviews this history, bringing things up to date with a description of Tiananmen Mothers movement, Peace Charter Movement and activities of former political prisoners. She is especially informative on cyber dissidents. Also good is chapter on China Democratic Party (1998-99), which she describes as the most direct challenge to China's party-state system since 1949 revolution (p. 182). Goldman makes much of distinction between established and intellectuals, latter referring to would-be Communist supporters who were nonetheless rebuffed by Party. Actually, there is a large overlap between two, and both types have become so diverse that one wonders how important such categorization is. Obviously, disestablished intellectuals have been perceived by rulers to have stuck their necks out more than their establishment counterparts but, given paranoia that abounds in Zhongnanhai, one should not put much stock in this judgement. Whether one is an established, disestablished or imprisoned intellectual is largely a matter of rulers' whims. To extent that this distinction is not completely arbitrary, issue seems to be not so much what is said, but how widely it is being said and whether protagonists are perceived as being in any way organized. To put it another way, authorities are not afraid of diversity, so long as they alone make final call. The disestablishment of an intellectual may simply be result of factional politics at center. Even books by establishment intellectuals are sometimes banned and confiscated, while disestablished writers living abroad can sometimes publish in establishment press. Still, all of this is a fascinating subject, and this book provides much insight into intellectual scene and various schools of thought, including Marxist Humanists, Liberals, Neo-Maoists, New Left, Neo-conservatives and Neo-nationalists. But one then expects Goldman to move on and focus on various other types who have been struggling for political rights. …

Brokering power and property in China's townships

This paper concerns the process of power at the periphery of state bureaucracy with a focus on township governments and their land development projects in the last two decades. I argue that townships at the bottom of the state bureaucracy operate like power brokers between the state and the village. When dealing with the formal party–state system above them, the township's delegated power is highly uncertain. Townships choose to maneuver in the unspecified legal and administrative zone to bypass the scrutiny of the supervising government. When it comes to the village below them, the township's power is under-defined, and therefore can be stretched to intensify and centralize the grips over village resources and land. In both cases, township officials strategize to maximize their control of village land and profit from the booming land-lease market in China's fast industrializing and urbanizing areas. Townships' land deals reflect the general power process of decentralization. Their brokerage of power corresponds directly with that of property rights in post-reform China.

Jindai Guangdong de zhengdang shehui guojia--Zhongguo Guomindang jiqi dangguotizhi de xingchengguocheng (Party, Society, and State in Modern Guangdong: The Evolution of the Chinese Nationalist Party and its Party-State System) (review)

Reviewed by: Jindai Guangdong de zhengdang shehui guojia—Zhongguo Guomindang jiqi dangguotizhi de xingchengguocheng [inline-graphic xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="01i" /] [inline-graphic xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="02i" /] (Party, society, and state in modern Guangdong: The evolution of the Chinese Nationalist Party and its party-state system) Patrick Fuliang Shan (bio) Fukamachi Hideo [inline-graphic xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="03i" /] . Jindai Guangdong de zhengdang shehui guojia—Zhongguo Guomindang jiqi dangguotizhi de xingchengguocheng [inline-graphic xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="04i" /] [inline-graphic xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="05i" /] (Party, society, and state in modern Guangdong: The evolution of the Chinese Nationalist Party and its party-state system). Beijing: Shehuikexue Wenxian Chubanshe [inline-graphic xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="06i" /] (Social Science and Literature Press), 2003. 358 pp. Paperback RMB ¥25.00, ISBN 7-80149-991-3 Fukamachi Hideo's heroic effort in writing Chinese history in the Chinese language rather than in his native Japanese deserves high praise. In this adventurous work, Fukamachi offers new interpretations of the early history of the Nationalist Party (KMT) and the formation of China's party-state political system through an examination of one particular province: Guangdong. The time span covered by Fukamachi's study ranges from the 1890s to the 1920s, a vital period during which China experienced dramatic change. The curtain was raised with the Revolution of 1911: a dynasty collapsed, a parliamentary democracy failed, and a party-state system was finally consolidated. The whole of China experienced the first two developments, but the creation of the party-state system, which had a long-lasting impact on China in the twentieth century, was initially a unique product of Guangdong. In seven core chapters, Fukamachi stresses the extraordinary importance of Guangdong as a base for revolutionary activity in China, first against the Manchu dynasty and then against the warlords, and finally as a stronghold from which the KMT launched the new movement. By examining revolutionary organizations, local society, and changing regimes in Guangdong, Fukamachi offers a panoramic view that enables the reader to see how the party-state system evolved there. The establishment of the party-state system took decades, and the people of Guangdong played a key role. In the late Qing, frequent contact with the outside world along with their special local circumstances enabled the Cantonese to become the chief organizers for the China Revival Society (Xingzhonghui) in 1894 and the Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmenghui) in 1905. After 1911 the KMT emerged, but it soon lost influence when it was suppressed by Yuan Shikai. Subsequently, in 1914, Sun Yat-sen established the Chinese Revolutionary Party (Zhonghua Gemingdang), and in 1919 he reorganized the Nationalist Party. Sun always saw Guangdong as an exceptional base for his activities and endeavored to penetrate into the province by recruiting locals into his party. While engaged in his experiment in Guangdong, Sun clashed with local elites such as Chen Jiongming, who was more interested in maintaining provincial [End Page 82] autonomy. However, Sun moved ahead with his aim to establish a national republic. By the time Sun assumed the presidency of the republic in Guangdong in 1921, the Nationalist Party was playing a vital role in the new regime since more than half of its officials were Party members. In the ensuing years, the Nationalist Party further consolidated its power in Guangdong by requiring Party membership for those in important government positions. At the county level, non-Party members were not even allowed to fill vacant positions. Nationalist rule thus received its empowerment not from legislative enactment but rather from the Party apparatus. After Sun's death, Chiang Kai-shek further solidified the position of the Nationalist Party, which in turn assisted Chiang in monopolizing political activity and in completing the process of formation of the party-state system. Some features of this book deserve attention. The author has made extensive use of numerous types of historical materials, such as Party archives, provincial and county annals, memoirs and biographies, newspapers and magazines, and other...

Developmental lessons of the Vietnamese transitional economy

The emergence of the transitional economies (TEs) in Eastern Europe and Pacific Asia have brought a new dimension to the development debate. Initially, events in Eastern Europe were depicted as confirming that there was no viable alternative to the market economy and the neoliberal perspective on development. However, the transition in Eastern Europe has proved to be a complex and problematic process, with recurrent economic and political crises and a wide range of situations and trajectories. More significantly, in Pacific Asia the Asian transitional economies (ATEs) of Vietnam and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have experienced high rates of economic growth and large-scale inflows of investment with programmes of limited and gradual reform. These have taken place in the context of the continuation of single party rule, high levels of state intervention and significant direct control of production through the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Economic growth has been heavily concentrated in and around the state sectors. It is argued that a significant proportion of the growth has resulted from the party-states’ promotion of growth, establishment of incentives and encouragement of more localized activity. However, the changes set in motion by rapid growth and reform have started to undermine the developmental effectiveness of the party-state systems.

The National People's Congress Oversight Power and the Role of the CCP

The urbanization and the structural and institutional changes that have taken
 place in China in the past two decades have resulted in the collapse of the old
 system and the germination of a tremendous number of irregularities. To redress
 the malfeasance brought about by the new decentralization of economic resources,
 the People's Congresses (PCs) are taking the lead in another round of incremental
 political reforms. The combination of specialization and centralization of
 leadership has led to an augmentation of legislative oversight. Measures
 developed by the legislative institutions, such as pingyi (evaluation) and zhifa
 jiancha (inspection of implementation of laws), have enlivened a lethargic local
 political scene and given rise to the committee autonomy. These political reforms
 have transformed local politics forever, forcing the central government to follow
 suit. The urgent need for institutional mechanisms to counter the vices associated
 with socialist market reform has prompted the Party to turn its attention to the
 People's Congresses. Consequently, a Leninist party-state system has been
 transformed into a new system in which the Party is allied simultaneously with
 the executive and the legislative branches. A preliminary and limited balance of
 power is now emerging in which the Party is not totally immune. The newly
 accrued legislative powers have not only redefined the tenets of Party leadership,
 but also rewritten its relations with the executive branch. Although the PCs are
 still often barred from vital decision-making, new devices such as pingyi and zhifa
 jiancha are forcing some local officials to have second thoughts before straying
 too far from legal boundaries.

Recollections from a Country Where Freedom was Simulated

The creation and use of simulation and gaming in the former USSR, unlike of countries in the free world, was hampered and gamers had to struggle against deception and lethargy, which were endemic to the Communist party-state system. Under these unfavorable conditions, gaming developed with a sharp break in its acceptability before and after the mid-i 980s. New gaming movement problems have arisen since the overthrow of totalitarianism and the splitting of the Soviet empire into numerous republics. Former Communist-bloc scientists need help to create or adapt for CIS business games, which simulate the modern market-based economy and thereby improve the implementation of the country's complicated economic reforms. Also needed are games which help to conserve the environment and develop the human personality.

Neural network formalization of the hungarian party-state system

A description of the decision-making structure of the Hungarian Party-state system, based on empirical studies, is offered. The structure is divided into three parts: the formal hierarchies, the interlinking threads, and the feedback connections. The working mechanism, the sources of cohesion, and the maintenance of the system are explained. The working mechanism of the structure reveals pattern-recognition-type decision making and close similarity to the adaptive resonance theory (ART) of competitive learning. The observed analogy is followed throughout the structure. Based on the ART model, we offer a mathematical description of the properties of the structure that could, in principle, be quantified if the model parameters were to be determined by further empirical studies. Properties of the structure are qualitatively analyzed with the help of this mathematical model. The self-similar or fractal property of the structure makes it possible to analyze some features of other Party-state systems.

The diary of decline: A case‐study of the disintegration of the party in one district in Hungary

THE PARTY-STATE SYSTEM in Hungary has collapsed. The disintegration process itself was not short. It began in 1978 or 1979, but its first stages were hidden, as the process took place behind closed doors, that is, within the channels of a politically monopolised structure. Only the last two years, and especially the last one, were spectacular, producing an avalanche-like disintegration: all the interlinking dependency threads between party and state were broken, the dependencies within the party hierarchy vanished, and all the hidden tensions and former distortions came to the surface. The avalanche-like disintegration swept away 90% of the party apparatus and almost 70% of the party members and spread them among several political parties. The former all-encompassing power disappeared. Indeed, the representatives of the communist party (MSzMP) formed from the conservative wing of the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party could not obtain a single mandate in the new Parliament in March-April 1990. Even the reformist wing of the former party (MSzP) is represented by a small parliamentary opposition. This period was so turbulent and full of conflict, both within and outside the party elite, and also so short, that there was no time to keep the formal rhythm and repertoire of party congresses. This means that the few statistical data usually available about the number and structure of party members are not available for this period. Regular reports about the number, structure and turnover of the apparatus were always secret, kept in the local party organisations and collected by one of the departments of the Central Commitee apparatus; now they are buried somewhere in the party archives, and are inaccessible to researchers, if not vanished. The data on the given district were mostly acquired during the interviews.

Li Jingquan and the South-west Region, 1958—66: The Life and “Crimes” of a “Local Emperor”

This article is concerned with one aspect of the spatial distribution of power in the People's Republicof China – the relationship between Centre and region during 1958–66. During the past decade or so several different interpretations of the spatial distribution of power have emerged amongst western analysts of China, polarizing between centralized and decentralized models of the Chinese decision-making process. The recordof the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution certainly suggests that political power was not only decentralized but also misused in the preceding period. Between 1966 and 1968 the impact of the attack on the Party-State system fell disproportionately on the provincial level, and most first secretaries of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) provincial committees and regional bureaus were criticized and removed from office. Moreover, many ofthese were accused of having created “independent kingdoms” in the areas under their leadership.

The Provincial First Party Secretary in the People's Republic of China, 1949–78: A Profile

The position of first secretary of a provincial committee of the Chinese Communist Party – the highest ranking cadre at provincial level – was not originally one of major importance within the leadership in 1949 when the People's Republic of China was established. However, it has become so since largely as a result of the increase in the importance of the provincial level in the party–state system. The increased political significance of the first secretary was demonstrated most dramatically during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–69) when the provincial level was severely affected by the attack on the party–state system. Unlike their counterparts at the centre or sub-provincial levels almost all the provincial first party secretaries in office on the eve of the Cultural Revolution lost their positions as the attempt was made to completely reorganize the provincial level.