Pareto Improvement Research Articles

Toward cooperative multi-agent video streaming perception

Video streaming perception ability is critical for AI applications on resource-constrained devices (agents), which prefers to offload video streams from devices to edge servers for real-time inference by deep neural networks (DNNs). Meanwhile, the multi-agent system (MAS) community is attempting to run DNNs on multiple cooperative agents to enable improved swarm intelligence-based tasks (e.g., drone swarm intelligence, self-driving fleet collaboration, and multi-agent robot cooperation). However, transferring video streaming perception capability from single-agent systems to MASs is extremely difficult due to spontaneous competition-induced trade-offs between the desired goals of accuracy, consistency, and capacity, which are three critical but conflicting measuring indexes. In this paper, we present the design and implementation of MASSIVE, an edge-assisted cooperative multi-agent video streaming perception system that simultaneously achieves all three desired goals. In our design, we consider the performance characteristics of video streaming perception and the insight of its periodic offloading pattern. On this basis, we develop a Pareto improvement scheduler to eliminate spontaneous competition among agents, allowing multi-objective optimization to achieve an ideal Pareto optimal state. Finally, we propose a virtual traffic shaper based on the mainstream 802.11 MAC protocol to ensure deterministic periodic video stream offloading in an uncertain wireless network. Our experiments demonstrate that MASSIVE achieves 122.7% accuracy and 1.8x capacity compared to the closest baseline on multiple actual cooperative vision tasks with even better consistency, and achieves an ideal Pareto optimal state in a wireless environment.

政府补贴下考虑利他偏好的供应链扶贫效果

This paper studies the influence of government poverty alleviation policy and altruistic preference on supply chain decision-making in a supply chain consisting of one supplier and two manufacturers. The two manufacturers produce poverty alleviation products and non-poverty alleviation products (general products) respectively, which are competing in the same market, and the manufacturer who produces poverty alleviation products chooses a level of investment and receives government subsidies. The dynamic game model is established to analyze the influence of government subsidy rate, supplier altruistic preference and market share of poverty alleviation products on supply chain decision-making. Through numerical analysis, the effectiveness of supply chain in poverty alleviation is analyzed from the perspective of absolute poverty and relative poverty. The results show that enhancing these three factors (government subsidy rate, supplier altruistic preference and market share of poverty alleviation products) can effectively improve the level of poverty alleviation investment, the output of poverty alleviation products, the market price and the profit of poverty alleviation product manufacturers, however the profit of general product manufacturers is decreased. The market share of poverty alleviation products and the intensity of competition between these two products are key factors which are influencing the effect of poverty alleviation. Increasing the market share of government subsidies or poverty-relief products can effectively increase the profit of suppliers and the overall profit of supply chain, which provides a foundation for supply chain members to realize Pareto improvement. The conclusion provides theoretical reference for the stabilization and marketization of poverty-relief products.

Impact of Subsidy Policy on Remanufacturing Industry’s Donation Strategy

Motivated by the donation subsidy policy, this paper studies a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a remanufacturer. The manufacturer sells new and remanufactured products and can also donate two products. The remanufacturer can only sell and donate remanufactured products. Using the Stackelberg game model, we investigate the optimal production and donation strategies of two competing firms and discuss how the subsidy policy affects these strategies. Our main results include the following: First, the donation strategies of the two firms are not only affected by the subsidies but could also be influenced by the competitor’s donation decision, especially when the subsidy is high. Second, the subsidized products for sale in the market will decline as the subsidy increases. Therefore, a high subsidy always causes insufficient market supply. Third, the first-mover advantage may not make the manufacturer avoid a dilemma; however, when the remanufacturer becomes the leader in the market, the first-mover advantage will help the remanufacturer prevent any competitor donation threats. Lastly, the scenario where the manufacturer donates nothing and the remanufacturer donates seems to be a Pareto improvement for two firms, but this scenario is not stable, and the last equilibrium is that both firms decide to donate remanufactured products.

On Incentive and Coordination Mechanism of Service Outsourcing Based on Principal-Agent Theory and Blockchain Technology

To address the issue of information asymmetry between the two parties and moral hazard among service providers in the process of service outsourcing, this paper first builds the Stackelberg game model based on the principal-agent framework, examines the dynamic game situation before the contract being signed, and develops four information models. Second, the analysis reveals a Pareto improvement in the game's Nash equilibrium when comparing the four models from the standpoint of the supply chain. In the complete information scenario, the service level of the service provider, the customer company's incentive effectiveness, and the supply chain system's ultimate profit are all maximized. Once more, a coordinating mechanism for disposable profit is built in this study. The paper then suggests a blockchain-based architecture for the service outsourcing process supervision and a distributed incentive mechanism under the coordination mechanism in response to the inadequacy of the principal-agent theory to address the information asymmetry problem and the moral hazard problem. The experiment's end findings demonstrate that both parties can benefit from the coordination mechanism and that the application of blockchain technology can resolve these issues and effectively encourage service providers.

Municipal food waste recycling as an environmental strategy: a game-theoretical approach.

With the expansion of urbanization, we are witnessing the growing uncertainty in municipal food demand leading to an increase in urban waste. With the motive of producing organic fertilizers and conserving the environment, expired food can be collected and recycled. This study examines the hypothesis that leasing recycling facilities from peri-urban areas, due to the ban on reproduction operations in the city centers, can manage the recycling system participants' relationship and enhance sustainability in urban communities. The problem has been investigated under two separate sources of uncertainty, namely, quality and capacity. In the first scenario, a recycling system consisting of a commercial food service located in urban areas, a food waste collection agency, and a suburban fertilizer factory is optimized, in which the commercial food service leases the fertilizer factory's facilities for recycling operations. In the second scenario, the two factories' relationship, in which the first factory can rent the second factory's facilities in case of capacity shortage, is managed through hybrid contracts and mathematical programming models. The results show that the whole system optimization and Pareto Improvement results for all members are guaranteed under proposed hybrid contracts. These conclusions can help food recycling system managers have a better relationship with other players in their supply chains and enhance their credibility for caring about the environment, social concerns, and government compliance.

Supply chain coordination with strategic customers: Yield uncertainty and replenishment tactic

Supply capability and strategic customer behavior jointly influence the operations management in a supply chain (SC). Few studies have been conducted to reflect such a composite impact from the supply side and the demand side. The aim of our article is to fill this gap by focusing on the SC facing strategic customers under demand and yield uncertainty. Specially, we emphasize the importance of replenishment tactic in keeping a stable supply level, and discuss the corresponding impact on the input quantity decision of the SC under yield uncertainty. Two scenarios are investigated: (i) without the market service-level (MSL) constraint and (ii) with the MSL constraint. The SCs under different scenarios are coordinated by various contracts. Meanwhile, by adjusting corresponding contract parameters, the SC members can achieve Pareto improvement. The numerical analyses are used to examine the validity of the conclusions derived.

Structural optimization of sectoral exports from the perspective of water footprint: A study from Henan Province, China

Abstract Water used for production is the primary consumer of regional water. Water footprint reflects the actual water consumption of each product, which can reflect the intensity of water consumption of each production sector and the flow of water resources implied in the product trade. In this paper, the water footprint of each sector in Henan Province in 2017 was calculated using non-competitive input-output techniques. Furthermore, a dual-objective planning model that minimizes water resource export and maximizes labor compensation was established, based on which the export structure of the sector in the province was optimized. Research findings show that agriculture is the primary consuming sector of water resources from the direct water use perspective. In comparison, the food processing industry is the major consuming sector of water resources from the water footprint perspective. The difference in water resources consumed by sectors from the perspective of water footprint is smaller than that from the perspective of direct water use. Second, most water-intensive sectors have a relatively large water footprint of out-of-province use, which results in 52.75% of Henan Province's produced water being consumed outside the province. Third, the current export structure adjustment of sectors in Henan Province can achieve a Pareto improvement of water conservation and economic development. It is expected to save 14.65% of the province's export water resources and increase Henan Province's total exports by 170.61 billion (170.61 × 109) yuan and increase labor compensation by 39.76 billion yuan. This study can be used to optimize water allocation and improve sustainable water use in water-scarce regions.

Cross effects of government subsidies and corporate social responsibility on carbon emissions reductions in an omnichannel supply chain system

As online shopping continues to grow, more manufacturers are gradually bracing themselves for both online and traditional marketing, then the omnichannel supply chain (OSC) becomes popular. An OSC has two marketing channels and they may compete with each other for selling the same product. Since emission reduction has become a national consensus and the government may encourage the supply chain to reduce emissions by subsidies and corporate social responsibility (CSR), the OSC members have to change their strategies accordingly. To reveal the interactive effects of subsidies and CSR on emissions in an OSC system, two decentralized decision-making models with/without subsidies are designed to investigate their effects on product prices, profits, and carbon emissions. Then a cost-sharing contract model is developed to coordinate their behaviors to minimize carbon emissions. We find that: (1) a higher cross-price elasticity between two channels can reduce emissions and improve the profits of the OSC members; (2) both subsidy and CSR can reduce emissions and improve the overall supply chain profits; (3) the cost-sharing contract can coordinate the OSC members to reach a Pareto improvement. This paper contributes to revealing the cross effects of subsidies and CSR in an OSC system and designing a cost-sharing contract to achieve a Pareto optimization in reducing carbon emissions.

Supply chain network equilibrium considering coordination between after-sale service and product quality

In a highly integrated supply chain system, the trade-off between after-sale service and product quality becomes an important consideration in establishing and maintaining a sustainable supply chain partnership. To this end, we proposed an underlying decentralized supply chain network (DSCN) equilibrium model for service-quality coordination under capacity constraints and demand uncertainty. The proposed DSCN model is compared with centralized supply chain network (CSCN). Then, the buyback contract is introduced to coordinate the DSCN. After the implementation of supply chain network equilibrium (SCNE) in numerical examples, we obtain the equilibrium solution of the proposed model. The result shows that, compared with DSCN, CSCN does not always provide better service or product quality. Moreover, by introducing the buyback contract, the equilibrium profits of DSCN are improved, so that the Pareto improvement occurs. Our findings can provide useful analytical frameworks and implications for how to coordinate after-sale service, product quality, selling price, and product ordering decisions in the supply chain network simultaneously.

How should river embankments be spatially developed, from the upstream section or the downstream section?

AbstractUsing an economic model of how river embankments affect local residents, we explore the efficiency of embankment construction from two viewpoints: (1) which section of a river should be constructed first, the upstream or downstream section, and (2) how tall the embankments should be constructed depending on the section. For this purpose, we first develop a model to determine efficient construction of embankments using a hydraulic model. Then, we perform numerical simulations, which are calibrated with recorded ground data for the Kitakami and Abukuma Rivers. The results reveal that the construction from the upstream section can be efficient if the upstream section has a much larger population than the downstream section. We show that constructing higher embankments in the upstream section generates negative externalities in the downstream section because it increases the possibility of flooding in the downstream section. In addition, when the amount of inflow from tributaries into the downstream section is sufficiently large compared to that into the upstream section, embankments with efficient heights bring about Pareto improvements, giving benefit to residents in the downstream section as well as the upstream section. Moreover, we show that the efficient embankment heights depend on which section the construction starts from.

Dynamic Cooperation of the O2O Supply Chain Based on Time Delays and Bidirectional Free-Riding

Advertising and service investment can enhance brand goodwill to increase the sales of branded goods. However, the impact of advertising and services on brand goodwill is not immediate but delayed. At the same time, due to the different service characteristics provided by various channels, the phenomenon of bidirectional free-riding occurs. Therefore, this paper studies the dynamic cooperation between service and advertising in the O2O (online to offline) supply chain dominated by brand owners and explores the impacts of advertising, service delay and service free-riding among channels on the dynamic cooperation decisions of the O2O supply chain. A differential game model between brands and retailers is constructed by incorporating the delay effect and the bidirectional free-riding phenomenon. The optimal advertising and service strategies and performance problems of O2O supply chain enterprises under a centralized decision, brand cost-sharing decision and bilateral cost-sharing decision are compared and analyzed. The influence of delay time, showrooming and webrooming effects on the profit of each firm is investigated by example. The results show that the service strategy, advertising strategy and brand goodwill of the O2O supply chain members are optimal under a centralized decision. Still, the supply chain profit is not necessarily optimal under the delay time, showrooming and webrooming effect coefficients. Bilateral cost-sharing contracts can achieve Pareto improvement of supply chain performance. Appropriate setting of a bilateral cost-sharing ratio can adjust the adverse effects of delay and bidirectional free-riding. The long-term strategies to deal with the delay and bidirectional free-riding phenomena are as follows: the bilateral cost-sharing contract can improve corporate profits. Setting the wholesale price, online direct-selling price and service-sharing ratio by brand owners can effectively promote retailers’ investment in service, achieving a win-win situation. Retailers maintain high pricing and service levels to enhance the brand premium ability of physical stores and achieve long-term development.

Research on false information clarification mechanism among government, opinion leaders, and Internet users - Based on differential game theory.

This article considers the government, opinion leaders, and Internet users to be a system for correcting false information, and it considers the problem of correcting false information that arises in the aftermath of major emergencies. We use optimal control theory and differential game theory to construct differential game models of decentralized decision-making, centralized decision-making, and subsidized decision-making. The solutions to these models and their numerical simulations show that the government, opinion leaders, and Internet users exercise cost-subsidized decision-making instead of decentralized decision-making. The equilibrium strategies, local optimal benefits, and overall optimal benefits of the system achieve Pareto improvement. Given the goal of maximizing the benefits to the system under centralized decision-making, the equilibrium results are Pareto-optimal. The research here provides a theoretical basis for dealing with the mechanism of correcting false information arising from major emergencies, and our conclusions provide methodological support for the government to effectively deal with such scenarios.

Blockchain adoption in serial logistics service chain: value and challenge

ABSTRACT Inefficient practices in the logistics industry cause huge losses in social resources. Addressing the quality control issues is challenging in multi-stage transport. Due to the structural characteristics of the serial logistics service chains, the real delivery quality of each Third Party Logistics (3PL) is invisible to the Lead Logistics Provider (LLP), and the defects of a single 3PL’s delivery quality will be covered up. Thus, unobservable delivery quality triggers the moral hazard action of 3PL, and strengthens the inequities in a serial logistics service chain. Blockchain technology can be an effective tool to resolve the moral hazard problem. We employ game theory-based models to investigate the blockchain adoption issue in serial logistics service chains. Adopting blockchain technology might bring Pareto improvement in delivery quality and total profit of the service chain. However, 3PL’s profit may be hurt because of blockchain adoption. Therefore, successful blockchain implementation depends on whether the initiator of a blockchain programme can properly incentivise 3PLs.

Green Investment Decision and Coordination in a Retailer-Dominated Supply Chain Considering Risk Aversion

With the sustainable development of the global economy, environmental problems and the green economy are increasingly becoming points of concern for the community. However, the large amount of capital invested in green technology and the high price of green products have become the key problems hindering the development of a risk-averse green supply chain. In order to promote the supply chain to increase green investment level, improve the green degree of products, and reduce the impact of risk aversion on green investment, this paper studies a two-echelon green supply chain composed of a risk-averse manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer, in which the retailer is the leader and the manufacturer is the follower. We construct the wholesale price contract model, cost-sharing contract model, and two-part contract model, respectively, and use the Optimization Theory and Methods to discuss the impact of the three contracts on the green degree, expected utility of supply chain, retail price, consumer surplus, and social welfare. The results show that in the cost-sharing contract, compared with the wholesale price contract, the green degree of the product has been significantly improved, but the expected utility of the supply chain enterprises cannot achieve Pareto improvement, and the higher consumer environmental awareness will cause the manufacturer’s expected utility to decline. In the two-part tariff contract, compared with the wholesale price contract, the expected utility of supply chain enterprises achieves Pareto improvement, and the green degree of products is the highest in the three contracts; more importantly, in the two-part contract, the product green degree, the retail price, and the expected utility of the supply chain are not related to the manufacturer’s risk aversion; meanwhile, the retail price in the two-part tariff is the lowest among the three contracts, and the consumer surplus and social welfare are the highest. Our main contribution is that the two-part contract eliminates the influence of the manufacturer’s risk aversion on the above decision variable and realizes the unification of manufacturers, retailers, consumers, and social benefits. Finally, this paper uses numerical examples to verify the above conclusions and then analyzes the sensitivity of the supply chain system.

Implications of CSR Practices for a Development Supply Chain in Alleviating Farmers’ Poverty

To alleviate farmer poverty, this paper investigates the effect of a retailer’s different socially responsible practices on a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one rural (poor) farmer, one suburban farmer, and one common retailer. Different from a commercial supply chain (whose members’ objectives are to maximize their profits) and a humanitarian supply chain (whose objective is to save more people, rather than to prioritize profits), the paper aims to study a development supply chain where the CSR-conscious retailer aims to lift the poor farmer out of poverty through cost sharing, altruistic practices, or fairness practices. Can the CSR-conscious retailer (and the development supply chain) do well by doing good? To answer the above question, four models of potential CSR investment are established and analyzed. Considering the different influences of the retailer’s CSR practices, this paper uses a Stackelberg game to analyze the decisions and profits of the farmers and the retailer in these four models. Our study finds that, first, the retailer’s CSR practices can improve the whole supply chain’s performance, which means that the supply chain has the potential to achieve the Pareto improvement for both the farmers and the retailer. Second, the retailer’s CSR practices yield benefits while implementing cost-sharing or fairness practices. Third, the rural farmer always benefits from the retailer’s CSR practices and may prefer the altruistic practice from which they can benefit the most. In addition, to benefit their profit more, the rural farmer should grow high- or low-value-added crops rather than medium-value-added ones. Fourth, from the suburban farmer’s perspective, the retailer’s CSR practices are not beneficial for their performance. However, the extent to which the suburban farmer’s performance decreases is much lower than the extent to which the rural farmer’s performance improves. The results of this paper might be used by stakeholders to alleviate poverty.

Optimal pricing strategy considering consumer sensitivity to water-saving and advertising in the apparel supply chains

PurposeMotivated by consumers' concerns about water resources, this paper studies the interactive impact of advertising efforts and water-saving on corporate profits in apparel supply chains. Moreover, this study attempts to find an effective way to improve the profit of supply chain members under different game scenarios. Therefore, this study explores the game scenarios with considering the cost-sharing contract.Design/methodology/approachThis paper constructs two basic game models considering different market power in the apparel supply chains, and explores the Pareto improvement combined with cost-sharing contracts based on the basic models. Furthermore, this study extends the models by considering cost-saving and non-linear demand.FindingsIn this paper, it can be found that advertising efforts and water-saving have complex interactive relationships. Counter-intuitively, the increase in advertising efforts may increase water savings. Furthermore, it presents a Pareto improvement when considering cost-sharing contracts, and both the manufacturer and the retailer's profits may improve simultaneously. Moreover, it does not affect the main conclusions when consider the effects of cost-saving and non-linear demand.Research limitations/implicationsAlthough some important findings have been reached, this paper can be extended in many ways in the future. For example, the coordination mechanism among supply chain members can be considered and the fair distribution of profits can be studied. Moreover, the influence of the government policies on the optimal strategy, as well as changes in social welfare can be considered.Practical implicationsThis study offers supply chain members the guidelines on coordinating water-saving investment and advertising efforts which provided new insight into the interaction of these two factors in the apparel supply chains. Moreover, it can provide a coordination mechanism for the supply chain members to improve their profits.Social implicationsThis paper explores the interactive relationship between water-saving and advertising efforts. It can not only save more water resources but also enable consumers to enjoy more environmentally friendly apparel products.Originality/valueThe current literature mainly focuses on the impact of advertising efforts on firm profit. However, this paper studies the interaction between advertising efforts and water-saving in apparel supply chains. Furthermore, this study explores the optimal pricing strategies and Pareto improvement by considering cost-sharing contracts. It can provide theoretical and practical guidance for the decision-maker in deciding on advertising and water-saving investment.

Environmental regulation, R&D investment, and green technology innovation in China: Based on the PVAR model.

The unreasonable economic development model of human beings has caused the environmental pollution problem to become increasingly serious. In order to achieve a positive relationship and interaction between environmental regulation, research and development (R&D) investment, and green technology innovation, and effectively solve the “strange circle” problem between high-quality economic development and environmental pollution in China and even the world, this paper takes the panel data of industrial enterprises above designated size in Chinese mainland 31 provinces from 2009 to 2019 as a research sample. The comprehensive index of R&D investment and green technology innovation was established by the entropy method, and the panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) model was constructed from the dynamic endogenous perspective, and the dynamic interaction and regional heterogeneity between environmental regulation, R&D investment, and green technology innovation were empirically analyzed by using impulse response function and variance decomposition. We obtain the following findings: (1) Environmental regulation has a two-way interaction relationship with R&D investment and green technology innovation, and R&D investment has a promotion effect on the “green degree” of technological innovation, but its role is still weak and has lagging characteristics. (2) There is significant regional heterogeneity in the dynamic responses of the eastern, central and western parts of China. (3) In the long run, environmental regulation has a “negative crowding out effect” on R&D investment in the central region, and the phenomenon of “central collapse” still exists but will gradually weaken. Environmental regulation has a “positive innovation compensation effect” on green technology innovation. Green technology innovation and R&D investment have an obvious “Pareto improvement” effect on environmental regulation, especially in the eastern region. The conclusions of this study help to clarify the dynamic interaction between environmental regulation, R&D investment, and green technology innovation, further improve environmental regulatory policies and green technology innovation R&D decision-making, and provide an effective way to achieve green and sustainable development in China and other parts of the world.

Research on the optimization of cooperative advertising strategy in the promotion of water-saving products based on differential game

Abstract The promotion of water-saving products is one of the vital ways to implement water conservation action, and advertising is a significant way to promote water-saving products. Taking the two-level Supply Chain consisting of a leading manufacturer and a retailer as an example and considering the advertising cost-sharing ratio of the two, as well as the government's R&D subsidies to manufacturers and product subsidies to consumers, this study establishes differential game models in three cases, that is, non-cooperative contract without cost sharing, cooperative contract with cost sharing, and collaborative cooperation contract. Also, numerical simulation is adopted to analyze the sensitivity of important parameters. The results show that the product goodwill and market demand for water-saving products can achieve Pareto optimality under the collaborative cooperation contract. In addition, the cooperative contract with cost sharing can realize Pareto improvement of the optimal benefit of the Supply Chain under certain conditions. Moreover, in the absence of the government's R&D subsidies, the overall benefits can achieve Pareto optimality under the collaborative cooperation contract. This study provides theoretical guidance and reference for the advertising cooperation strategy for the main bodies in the Supply Chain.

Cost-sharing contract design between manufacturer and dealership considering the customer low-carbon preferences

Manufacturers and dealerships usually have a long-term cooperation in selling low-carbon products produced by signing a contract without considering the dynamic changes in consumer’s low-carbon preferences. Consumers’ low-carbon awareness and the low-carbon reputation of those low-carbon products occasionally alternate affected by the market circumstances, which will influence the selling of low-carbon products. This paper focuses on the contract design between a manufacturer and a dealership using Stackelberg differential game models to formulate the long-term contract between a manufacturer and a dealership. To promote the low-carbon reputation of low-carbon products, two cost-sharing contracts, including a one-way cost-sharing contract (OWC) and a two-way cost-sharing contract (TWC), are proposed. The manufacturer in the OWC contract provides a certain amount of subsidies to incentivize the dealership. The manufacturer and the dealership share costs in the TWC contract. Besides, dual-channel models are also analyzed as an extension of the proposed model. Several findings were obtained by solving and analyzing the proposed game models. The manufacturer’s emission reduction efforts and the dealership’s low-carbon promotion efforts are influenced by dealership’s cost coefficient related to the promotion of low-carbon product, low carbon reputation sensitivity coefficient of consumers, influence coefficient of manufacturer’s emission reduction efforts on low-carbon reputation and etc. The proposed cost-sharing contracts improve the manufacturer and the dealership’s efforts by changing the factors. The OWC contract can achieve Pareto improvement, and the TWC contract can realize the coordination between the manufacturer and the dealership. The optimal conditions for its contract choice are also proposed from the manufacturer’s point of view. This paper also provides valuable insights for companies in the supply chain to design suitable contracts to coordinate the supply chain stakeholders’ activities, especially in promoting low-carbon efforts in a long-term cooperation.

Optimal Control of False Information Clarification System under Major Emergencies Based on Differential Game Theory.

To further study the issue of false information classification on social platforms after major emergencies, this study regards opinion leaders and Internet users as a false-information classification system and constructs three differential game models of decentralized, centralized, and subsidized decision-making based on optimal control and differential game theory. Comparison analyses and numerical simulations of optimal equilibrium strategies and the optimal benefit between opinion leaders and Internet users, the optimal trajectory and the steady-state value of the total volume of real information, and the optimal benefit of the false information clarification system are carried out. It is found that under centralized decision-making, equilibrium strategy and total benefit of opinion leaders and Internet users, system total benefit, and total volume of real information can achieve Pareto optimality. Although subsidized decision-making fails to achieve Pareto optimality, with opinion leaders providing cost subsidies for Internet users, it is possible to reach relative Pareto improvement compared with decentralized decision-making.