Optimal Control of False Information Clarification System under Major Emergencies Based on Differential Game Theory.

Abstract

To further study the issue of false information classification on social platforms after major emergencies, this study regards opinion leaders and Internet users as a false-information classification system and constructs three differential game models of decentralized, centralized, and subsidized decision-making based on optimal control and differential game theory. Comparison analyses and numerical simulations of optimal equilibrium strategies and the optimal benefit between opinion leaders and Internet users, the optimal trajectory and the steady-state value of the total volume of real information, and the optimal benefit of the false information clarification system are carried out. It is found that under centralized decision-making, equilibrium strategy and total benefit of opinion leaders and Internet users, system total benefit, and total volume of real information can achieve Pareto optimality. Although subsidized decision-making fails to achieve Pareto optimality, with opinion leaders providing cost subsidies for Internet users, it is possible to reach relative Pareto improvement compared with decentralized decision-making.