政府补贴下考虑利他偏好的供应链扶贫效果

Abstract

This paper studies the influence of government poverty alleviation policy and altruistic preference on supply chain decision-making in a supply chain consisting of one supplier and two manufacturers. The two manufacturers produce poverty alleviation products and non-poverty alleviation products (general products) respectively, which are competing in the same market, and the manufacturer who produces poverty alleviation products chooses a level of investment and receives government subsidies. The dynamic game model is established to analyze the influence of government subsidy rate, supplier altruistic preference and market share of poverty alleviation products on supply chain decision-making. Through numerical analysis, the effectiveness of supply chain in poverty alleviation is analyzed from the perspective of absolute poverty and relative poverty. The results show that enhancing these three factors (government subsidy rate, supplier altruistic preference and market share of poverty alleviation products) can effectively improve the level of poverty alleviation investment, the output of poverty alleviation products, the market price and the profit of poverty alleviation product manufacturers, however the profit of general product manufacturers is decreased. The market share of poverty alleviation products and the intensity of competition between these two products are key factors which are influencing the effect of poverty alleviation. Increasing the market share of government subsidies or poverty-relief products can effectively increase the profit of suppliers and the overall profit of supply chain, which provides a foundation for supply chain members to realize Pareto improvement. The conclusion provides theoretical reference for the stabilization and marketization of poverty-relief products.