Russia is facing significant rise of economic sanctions since the beginning of the military operation in Ukraine in February 2022. The list of restrictions includes financial, trade, visa, transport and other types of sanctions. There are few precedents of similar scope of sanctions since at least the end of the Cold War. In recent 30 years there has been a transition from “economic carpet bombing” to “smart sanctions”. Sanctions against Russia after February 2022 seem to deviate from this trend. Such a deviation raises research questions about the ways of the “smart” sanctions combination with more comprehensive restrictions and about the evidence of a new paradigm of sanctions policy. Key assumption implies that these are the intensity and the scope of sanctions, rather than the change of the restrictions’ instruments which mark a new paradigm, provided by the Russian case. “Smart sanctions” remain a key instrument, however, their quality and quantity make them similar to the “economic carpet bombing”. The only meaningful obstacle for the initiators to abstain from a wider use of sanctions is a threat of a damage to their own economies. They have to use “smart sanctions” to avoid greater losses for themselves. The article relies on the analysis of key decisions on sanctions as well as their legal substance to test this assumption.