Opposition Parties Research Articles

The politics of COVID-19: analysis of government strategies and public perception in Nigeria

The study examined the politics of the management of the COVID-19 pandemic in Nigeria with a particular focus on government strategic responses and measures that curtailed the spread of the virus and the citizen's perception of the implementation of these strategies across the Nations. The federal government adopted measures to curtail the spread of the disease through the establishment of the Presidential Task Force on COVID-19 and the Multi-sectored Pandemic Response Plan. The measures include economic and social welfare interventions, and healthcare strategies such as the closure of schools, and borders, the use of face masks, social distancing, lockdowns, and restrictions of travel, testing and contact tracing. The study adopted the historical method of data collection to elicit information and relevant data for the study. It was found that the efforts of the government to slow down and mitigate the rapid spread of COVID-19 were greatly hindered by public negative reactions. The study observed from the findings that corruption and stiff opposition from the opposition Party against the ruling party posed severe challenges to the effective implementation of the strategies and measures put in place by the government at the Centre. On the strength of these findings, the author recommended that in future, national challenges must be viewed and tackled evenly across all the levels of government and parties not along party lines for the benefit of all. In addition, the federal must leverage public sensitization and effective communication strategy for policy achievement and management of public opinion.

Incumbent and opposition popular support and boycotts in authoritarian and hybrid regimes in Africa, the Middle East and beyond

ABSTRACT Variation in election boycotts in Africa and the Middle East raise the question of the factors that influence the likelihood of boycotts. Examining this dynamic in Africa, the Middle East and around the globe, we explore one possible factor influencing national election boycotts: the relative level of popular support between the regime and opposition. Utilising the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset, we find that when the regime has greater popular support than the opposition, the likelihood of major boycotts is low. In contrast, when the opposition has more popular support than the regime at the point of election, the likelihood of boycotts increases. These findings highlight the importance of publicly observable levels of support as a means for opposition parties to gauge the possible payoff for boycotting, particularly in authoritarian and hybrid regimes where lack of transparency creates uncertainty regarding other sources of regime strength or weakness.

The BJP's Drive for Hegemony

ABSTRACT: In 2014, the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party captured national power in the world's largest democracy. Under its controversial new leader, Narendra Modi, the BJP established India's first single-party majority government since 1984 and became the only party besides the Indian National Congress to accomplish this feat since the country won independence, in 1947. In the 2019 general election, despite a disappointing economic record, growing communal strife, and disruptive policy decisions, the BJP increased its vote share and seats in Parliament. The victory emboldened the party to further its longstanding agenda to transform India's secular constitutional democracy into a de facto Hindu nation. Modi remained popular throughout India's terrible pandemic. Now, with a return of high economic growth and the unity of opposition parties in question, most observers expect him to win the 2024 general election, which concludes in June.

The Making of India’s Resilient Opposition in the 1970s

This article seeks to focus on the changing nature of India’s parliamentary opposition in the 1970s. The article argues that, unlike the previous decades, the Opposition in India was resilient, even if not organised in the face of the authoritarian tendencies of Indira Gandhi pre- and during the Emergency. The analytical framework helps to understand the reasons for the growing opposition’s resilience. The manifestation of this resilience can be traced to the programmes and actions of the opposition parties undertaken in the 1970s inside and outside the parliament as the crisis of democratic governance deepened, as explained in this article. This article attempts to make sense of parliamentary opposition in the 1970s, unlike any other existing study that either focused on the Congress, party system, or emergency per se. This article brings the spotlight on the Opposition as a category that lacks constitutional safeguards, thereby missing the ‘equality of conditions’ in a democratic framework. An emphasis is given to analytically understanding the political processes that played a significant role in the government–opposition relationship. The study has been conducted with the help of primary archival materials, newspaper reportings, memoirs, commentaries and governmental records such as parliamentary debates, along with existing academic works (though scarcely) on the making and functioning of the Opposition in India. The analytical approach in studying this particular moment in the political history of India helps us to understand the primacy, effectiveness, limitations and failures of democratic governance from the Opposition’s standpoint.

소의 교환적 변경과 자백의 효력

This case involved a confession by the defendant to the claims asserted by the plaintiff in the first action. The plaintiff filed a new complaint and dismissed the old complaint through an exchangeable change of claim. The key point of the judgment in this case was that the defendant's confession was extinguished by the plaintiff's withdrawal of the complaint. While the main legal reasoning of this case is reasonable, there are a few more points to consider.
 First, the concept of revocation of a confession should be replaced with the concept of lapse of a confession. In this case, the confessing individual is not extinguishing his confession for reasons that would otherwise be attributable to himself. The confession was extinguished because of the exchangeable change of claim, which should be viewed as an effect of lapse of confession.
 Second, if the confessor relied on the confession as a defense in a lawsuit before the exchangeable change of claim, it does not extinguish the prior trial confession. This is because the act of procedure has already been formed based on the trial confession and it is necessary to ensure legal stability. It is also noted that the opposite party's consent to the exchangeable change of claim does not include consent to the revocation of the confession, unless there are special circumstances.

The Dynamics of Cameroon’s Major National Dialogue and Attempts at Resolving the Anglophone Crisis since 2016: Understanding National and International Responses

The Dynamics of Cameroon’s Major National Dialogue and Attempts at Resolving the Anglophone Crisis since 2016: Understanding National and International Responses

Wybory Prezydenta Republiki Czeskiej w 2023 roku

The election of the President of the Czech republic has only been held directly since 2013. this system of holding them allows a wide range of diverse candidates to run and promotes greater democratisation of the political system. In the final run-off in 2023, nine people were in the running, with three counting until the end: Petr Pavel, andrej babiš and Danuše Nerudová. Pavel won strongly in the second round, defeating former Prime Minister babiš. the turnout was over 70%, a figure never before recorded in an election of a Czech head of state.the election was a clash of two visions of what foreign policy the Czech republic should pursue. Pavel is a strong advocate of rapprochement with the West, advocating support for Ukraine in its war with russia. babiš took a different position on these issues and his unfortunate statements before the decisive vote decided his defeat. The elections highlighted once again and confirmed the political division in society. Pavel enjoyed the greatest support in the capital, large cities (except ostrava), and generally among supporters of the ruling coalition. the former prime minister, on the other hand, was supported by voters from regions negatively affected by the political transition and by opposition parties.

The electoral system and political parties in the municipal council elections of St. Petersburg

ABSTRACT This paper deals with an important and insufficiently studied problem relating to the ways in which Russia’s authorities use electoral process rules in order to enhance their political advantage at the local level. The well-established Duvergerian framework of electoral system analysis applies to a new context: municipal elections in Putin-era St. Petersburg. One of the effects of the “block vote” electoral system, which is currently the most common method used in the St. Petersburg municipal elections, is the sweep effect, wherein a party with a weak majority of support nevertheless is able to win a large number of seats. From the data on election results in St. Petersburg it can be interpreted that the electoral system used gave a significant bonus to the leading party. It is noteworthy that the leading position in some cases was occupied by the opposition parties, which used the bonus provided by the electoral system.

State Pride and the Quality of Democracy in the American States

Abstract We evaluate whether feelings of state pride in the USA are linked to the quality of democracy in one’s state. Using two original surveys, we find no relationship between an objective measure of the quality of state democracy and feelings of state pride. In contrast, we find a consistent positive relationship between subjective evaluations and state pride such that citizens with more positive evaluations of the quality of democracy in their state report higher levels of state pride. Interestingly, feelings of state pride are not linked to the objective measure of democracy even when citizens are informed of where their state ranks in a survey experiment. However, subsample analyses reveal that there is a relationship between the objective measure and state pride among Democrats and political “losers” (citizens living in states where the government is controlled by the opposite party). We conclude by discussing implications for citizenship and state pride in an era of democratic erosion.

Does executive autonomy reduce second-order election effects?

The second-order election (SOE) model expects voters to punish parties in national government and reward opposition, small and new parties because there is ‘less at stake’ in an SOE. One key assumption that is rarely studied is whether SOE-effects depend on the extent to which voters can impact the selection of the executive in an SOE. This article argues that executive ­autonomy – i.e. the extent to which executives are independent from the parliament regarding their formation, termination and execution of their competences – increases the impact of authority. Executive autonomy reduces SOE-effects when authority is high but increases SOE-effects when authority is low. An empirical analysis of 41,603 vote share swings for 4733 parties competing in 2665 elections held in 282 regions in 14 European countries between 1945 and 2019 confirms the hypotheses. These results have important implications for electoral democracy and party competition at the regional, national and European level.

India National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA) and BJP: A Comparative Study

This article focusses on the formation of a new alliance, namely the India National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA). The Indian National Congress, which has long dominated Indian politics, leads the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance. Opposition parties formed the India National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA) to challenge the BJP in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections. The coalition contends that the BJP is endangering India’s multiparty democracy and secular principles. The “Collective Resolve” campaign includes a pledge to preserve and uphold the idea of India as it is expressed in the Constitution of India. Efforts are being done to resist the claimed systemic conspiracy by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to target, punish, and suppress specific Indians and address polarization. Findings of the reveal that there have been instances of Hindu extremist groups initiating anti-Muslim operations, resulting in numerous casualties and injuries among the Muslim community, as well as other minority groups within the region. The BJP challenged the Indian National Congress, the Nehruvian state, and secular democracy. The policies implemented by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) from 2014 to 2019 were highly detrimental to society, as they strategically employed the Hindutva ideology for political gain and suppressed minority groups through their uncompromising ideological stance. Contrarily, the policies implemented by Congress subsequent to 2009 exhibited a greater emphasis on principles such as freedom, economic growth, liberalism, and prioritization of the welfare of the populace.

The problem of depoliticization of the Russian army in the crisis of the 1990s.

The object of the study is the policy of the Russian authorities aimed at leveling protest activity in the Armed Forces in the context of the protracted crisis of the 1990s. After the fall of the one-party dictatorship that subordinated the security forces, Russian legislation provided for a rigid model of de-partization and depoliticization of the Armed Forces. However, in the post-Soviet years, this strategy lost its relevance both due to the weakness of the parties themselves and the apolitical nature of the officer corps, tired of years of pressure from political organizations (CPSU). The problem was something else: the huge "Soviet-Russian" army, being a vestige of the previous system, did not fit into the paradigm of the new statehood, and therefore was subject to radical and painful reform, which threatened to put the Armed Forces on the brink of disaster. For thousands of military personnel and their family members, the most acute problem has become the elementary problem of survival. Historical, sociological, formal legal, institutional and systemic approaches are used as the main research methods. In the second half of the 1990s, against the background of chronic underfunding in the army, cases of spontaneous protest became more frequent. These actions were nonviolent, spontaneous and scattered in nature, and therefore did not pose a serious threat to the authorities. Among the main factors that restrained open rebellion, one can name the lack of an all-Army protest coordination center, the lack of independent political thinking among senior officers, and the lack of a constructive program. This also includes army discipline, as well as the availability of sufficient means for the regime to pre-empt and suppress individual pockets of protest. At the same time, the authorities, realizing that by condemning their military to a miserable existence, they themselves act outside the legal framework, tried to resolve the conflicts that arose cautiously, trying not to resort to harsh measures. The question of how long this delicate balance could have been maintained remains open. At the end of the 1990s, there were faint signs of a revival of the army. The military was one of the first to catch these trends: exhausted by the "five-year plans" of liberal reforms, after all the temptations offered to them by opposition parties, they regained faith in the state. The scientific novelty of the work lies in the application of an interdisciplinary approach to the study of a complex problem related to the restructuring of the Russian army during the years of unstable internal political instability.

Political polarization may affect attitudes towards vaccination. An analysis based on the European Social Survey data from 23 countries.

Political polarization may result in increased confirmation bias, strengthening of disinformation mechanisms or policy distortion. This raises the question whether it may influence the vaccination programmes. This study investigates the relationship between the level of political polarization and coronavirus disease 2019 vaccine behaviour and vaccine acceptance. In our study, we use the Partisan Polarization Index (PPI). The PPI aims to measure the gap between satisfaction with the government expressed by supporters of the ruling parties and that expressed by supporters of the opposition parties. We use the data from the latest round of the European Social Service from 23 countries. The effect of the PPI on the variability of vaccination declarations and intent across countries was verified based on a linear regression model. The linear regression score for 23 countries revealed a statistically significant relationship between the vaccination variable and the level of political polarization. The model explains the variability in the vaccination levels based on the PPI in a given country at 38.6%. Political polarization can contribute to shaping negative attitudes towards vaccination through policy distortion, undermining the effectiveness of compliance against regulation, undermining trust in science and increasing the public's susceptibility to conspiracy theories.

Party system institutionalization and the durability of competitive authoritarian regimes

AbstractParty system institutionalization (PSI) is regarded as a critical underpinning of democracies, but its role in non‐democratic systems has been understudied. In this paper, we evaluate whether the concept has meaningful and perhaps unique implications for the durability of competitive authoritarian regimes. We argue that a modified version of electoral volatility – the most common measure of PSI in democracies – conveys useful information about PSI in competitive authoritarian contexts by signalling the ability of the ruling party to manage the opposition. To this end, we construct an original data set that disaggregates electoral volatility into ruling party seat change and opposition party seat volatility and further divides opposition party volatility into Type‐A and Type‐B volatility. We find robust results that democratization becomes more likely when decreases in the ruling party's seat share coincide with an increase in opposition party Type‐B volatility. This paper demonstrates that the concept of PSI has utility for understanding regime dynamics in competitive authoritarian contexts.

Violent Conflict and Hostility Towards Ethnoreligious Outgroups in Nigeria

ABSTRACT This study examined the effect of exposure to violent conflict on hostility towards ethnic and religious outgroups among Nigeria’s population and among its two major religious groups (i.e., Christians and Muslims). Violent conflict had a robust positive effect on outgroup hostility among the Nigerian population and among Christians. A plausible mechanism behind this finding is that the threat posed by violent conflict strengthens ingroup cohesion, erodes trust in outgroup members, and makes intergroup boundaries salient. This is especially so when the opposite party to the conflict constitutes a distinct cultural outgroup. The main conflict affecting Christians involves nomadic pastoralists of Fulani ethnicity, who are Muslims. Among Muslims, violent conflict rather had a weak positive effect on outgroup hostility that was not robust to alternative operationalizations of outgroup hostility. The null effect might be because the main conflict affecting Muslims—the Boko Haram insurgency—does not involve Christians. A significant number of Muslims are also affected by conflicts involving nomadic Fulani pastoralists.

Psychological Biases and Democratic Anxiety: A Comment on Little and Meng (2023)

In their timely article, Andrew Little and Anne Meng make an important point. Despite widespread alarm over democratic backsliding, objective evidence suggests that the scale of the phenomenon is much more limited than many seem to think. Recent power holders around the world have not been entrenching themselves more effectively than in the past. Incumbents continue to lose elections about as often as they used to, and those who win have not been doing so by larger margins. Opposition parties are allowed to compete about as frequently today as 10 or 20 years ago. Moreover, there has been no increase in leaders’ ability to evade term limits.

Commissioned Book Review: Patrick Diamond, The British Labour Party in Opposition and Power, 1979–2019: Forward March Halted?

Commissioned Book Review: Patrick Diamond, <i>The British Labour Party in Opposition and Power, 1979–2019: Forward March Halted?</i>

Analysis of the 2024 Taiwan Presidential Election

In the 2024 Taiwan presidential election, Lai Ching-te, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate calling for the continuation of the Tsai Ing-wen administration’s line, won the election, while the DPP lost its majority in the legislative elections held at the same time. The opposition Kuomintang (KMT) became the leading party in the Legislative Yuan, and the third largest party, the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), although a small party, held the casting vote. The election campaign revolved around the pros and cons of “change in government,” and the DPP, already in power for eight years, had an uphill battle. In the end, however, neither of the opposition parties was able to raise expectations higher than those of the DPP. For the next four years, Taiwan’s political landscape is now under a “divided government,” with the Executive Yuan led by the ruling party but the Legislative Yuan dominated by the opposition parties. This situation shows a fine balancing act, but it could also lead to a paralysis of Taiwanese politics. The election results carry a degree of uncertainty.

The effect of crime on South Africans’ voting behaviour

ABSTRACT What effect does crime have on South Africans' electoral behaviour? Do crime victims and citizens who fear crime enter or exit the electoral arena? If they do vote, do they sanction the ruling African National Congress (ANC)? We use two rounds of Afrobarometer data to provide answers. We corroborate earlier findings that crime victimisation does not appear to shape electoral behaviour. Further, we find that sociotropic perceptions of crime do influence vote choice, although not always in the predicted direction. We explore who tend to be South African crime victims to cast light on these results. We find that opposition parties, specifically the Democratic Alliance (DA), have benefitted electorally from citizens' crime perceptions. We contend that the party's significant focus on crime help account for their ownership of the issue. Lastly, relative to other government performance evaluations, crime does matter, and its salience and importance have increased over time.

The Concept and Practice of Democracy in Zimbabwe: A Call for Consensual Democracy

With the coming of independence, a new form of governance: majoritarian democracy was adopted in Zimbabwe just as it was suggested as the best in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. The British rule that influenced the adoption of majoritarian democracy in Zimbabwe argued that it enables transparency and fosters checks and balances on corruption. We argue that, in a democratic system, functioning from a majoritarian perspective, there ought to be space of enjoying freedoms and rights. There ought to be sufficient representation and contribution of citizens in democratic procedures and organisations. For many, a good democratic system should speak to their bread and butter issues: their socio-economic well-being. However, these have not been enjoyed by the masses in Zimbabwe. The political atmosphere is a sad one; politics is practised for the sake of gaining power and controlboth in the ruling and opposition parties, something that is immanent in multiparty under majoritarian democracy. This study seeks to outline these ills and address them with a suggestion of embracing consensual democracy as it was conceptualised by Kwasi Wiredu. The central argument is that democratisation has failed due to a well curated system that seem to prioritise rivalry in politics as opposed to nation building. The study suggests that consensual democracy can address persistent political ills in contemporary Zimbabwe and build a unified and prosperous nation. The essential tenets that can enable this emanate from a historical record of political thought in indigenous Zimbabwe, characterised by the conceptualisation of rational deliberation in decision-making and inclusiveness: a consensual system in politics.