Objective Moral Truths Research Articles

Pragmatic naturalism and moral objectivity

Suppose that Darwin is right that human morals or something like them originated and persisted among our remote ancestors as a set of adaptations fashioned through natural selection. Suppose further that in his new book Philip Kitcher (2011) is right that during the past 50 thousand years of cultural evolution our ancestors, living until the past 10 thousand mostly in small groups diversified by age and sex, built on these primitive quasimoral functions to create rules and precepts, in response to the tensions and difficulties of social living, and that they refined these functions and sometimes created new functions, similar enough to the others, to qualify as being moral or moral-like. The process of improving the old functions and creating new ones in response to new problems is iterative on his account, resulting in a long procession of small and large moral changes in diverse and changing populations. As we view them in retrospect, many of us perceive some changes as ‘morally progressive’, others as ‘morally regressive’. Kitcher (2011: 140–1, 145–53, 153–62) gives, as examples of progressive change, the dropping of the idea of exact retribution – eye for eye, tooth for tooth, life for life – from the earliest legal codes, the abolition of slavery in 19th-century America, and important changes in the civil status of women in Western Europe and North America in the past two centuries. To suppose that this kind of story captures the essence of moral evolution is to endorse a type of moral naturalism that Kitcher calls ‘pragmatic naturalism’, since the moral changes in the story are pragmatically motivated as responses to practical difficulties in living together as interdependent humans. The question we address in this article is whether pragmatic naturalism can explain moral change in a way that allows it to be, at least at some later stages of evolution, objectively progressive (or regressive). More exactly, can progressive/regressive moral change as conceived within this theory of moral evolution be normatively objective in a way that is consistent with the theory’s demand that moral change be explained with psychological realism? We will argue that it can, even given a surprisingly robust conception of normative objectivity. Consider the idea articulated by Russ Shafer-Landau (2003: 15) that an objective moral truth (or fact) must be ‘stance-independent’ in that it exists independently of all our evaluative attitudes, taken collectively, whether we have them now or would have them on reflection under ideal conditions. Sharon Street (2006) has argued that this conception of moral objectivity leads to scepticism about moral knowledge when combined with the above assumptions about moral evolution. Kitcher (2011: 178–86) offers an objection to the existence of such ‘external’ moral truths (or facts) that is related to

Pastoral Care of Women based on Women's Development

In traditional developmental theories, the health or goal of human development is based on objective value, independence or individuation. In this view, women who tried to maintain interpersonal relationship often is regarded as unhealthy, because they are not independent. But, many feminist developmental theorists articulate that there is a difference between men and women in terms of psychological growth. For women, interpersonal relationship and connection with others are more important than independency and objective value. Also, women are very diverse and unique beings. Based on this, women needs to be understated in the web of relationship based on intimacy and diversity. Therefore, relationship with others is more than the objective moral ethic or truth to women. This study is to get the information about developmental differences between men and women, using comparing traditional developmental theories and feminist developmental theories which is useful to counsel with women.

Ethics and neuroscience

More than 20 years ago, the late Professor Stuart Sutherland, reviewing Gerald Edelman’s The Remembered Present on the neurobiology of consciousness, wrote the following opinion: It is a characteristic of ageing brain scientists to turn their minds to the problem of consciousness: Sir John Eccles, Roger Sperry and Sir Charles Sherrington are examples. Gerald M. Edelman, who received the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 1972 for his work on immunology and who has more recently been doing research on the brain, has now joined their ranks. While their ambition is admirable, the result is usually lamentable. Yet the intervening decades have seen a proliferation of research programmes in the field of consciousness, with modest advances in some basic areas of cognitive neuroscience: work on vegetative state and post-coma cognitive capacities; explorations of emotions, physical awareness and vision; perception and intentionality, memory and learning. At the same time, many books have flowed from the laptops of ‘neurophilosophers’ proposing explanations for the deeper mysteries of consciousness: the mind–brain relationship, free will; our sense of being ‘selves’ or ‘souls’; the possibility of objective moral truths; the tendency for more than a few of us to be religious and believe in the immortality of our ‘souls’. Are their theories worth the effort of keeping abreast with them; do they constitute anything like a set of agreed qualitative conclusions? The current genre of neuroscientifically informed writings on philosophy of mind, mostly marked by a reductive and eliminative spirit, began in earnest back in the late 1980s and early 1990s with titles such as Roger’s Penrose’s The Emperor’s New Mind (1989), Dan Dennett’s Consciousness Explained (1991) and Francis’s Crick’s The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search For The Soul (1994). The concerted aim at the time was to quash, with the aid of new brain …

Folk Moral Relativism

It has often been suggested that people's ordinary understanding of morality involves a belief in objective moral truths and a rejection of moral relativism. The results of six studies call this claim into question. Participants did offer apparently objectivist moral intuitions when considering individuals from their own culture, but they offered increasingly relativist intuitions considering individuals from increasingly different cultures or ways of life. The authors hypothesize that people do not have a fixed commitment to moral objectivism but instead tend to adopt different views depending on the degree to which they consider radically different perspectives on moral questions.

Montaigne's Moral Objectivism

Montaigne is almost certainly a skeptic, and it is often thought that his skepticism leads him to subscribe to moral relativism. Indeed, there are passages in the Essais that seem to support this widespread interpretation. However, in this essay the author argues that Montaigne's skepticism does not lead to moral relativism. In fact, not only does it not lead him to abandon the notion of objective moral truth, but it is precisely his skepticism that allows Montaigne to see how despite the fact that his moral objectivism is unjustifiable, it is nonetheless defensible.

Editorial: Psychology and Experimental Philosophy

Recent years have seen an explosion of new work at the intersection of philosophy and experimental psychology. This work takes the concerns with moral and conceptual issues that have so long been associated with philosophy and connects them with the use of systematic and well-controlled empirical investigations that one more typically finds in psychology. Work in this new field often goes under the name “experimental philosophy”. The aim of the present volume is to bring together some important new papers that demonstrate the promise and potential of this emerging field. The work collected here spans a wide range of philosophical topics—from ethics to epistemology to the philosophy of mind—and examines the ways in which empirical data can inform research in all of these fields. In addition, we have included a number of papers that offer critiques of contemporary experimental philosophy, suggesting ways in which existing studies might fail to address the philosophical questions they are supposed to be helping us to resolve. Geoffrey Goodwin and John Darley present a series of experimental studies investigating people’s ordinary intuitions in metaethics. Their research provides some tantalizing initial evidence that moral relativism is associated with a kind of “open” attitude toward ethical issues while a belief in objective moral truths is associated with a more “closed” attitude. Strikingly, the Goodwin and Darley studies show that relativism is more common among subjects who are high in an ability to Rev.Phil.Psych. (2010) 1:157–160 DOI 10.1007/s13164-009-0012-5

Explaining Russell’s Views on Ethics

92 Reviews EXPLAINING RUSSELL’S VIEWS ON ETHICS Gülberk Koç Philosophy / McMaster U. Hamilton, on, Canada, l8s 4k1 kocg@univmail.cis.mcmaster.ca Osman Elmalı. Bertrand Russell’da Ahlak Felsefesi [Bertrand Russell’s Moral Phi­ losophy]. İstanbul: Ataç Yayınları, 2005. In Turkish. Pp. 204. Price 10 try (us$6.90). December 2, 2009 (5:28 pm) E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE2901\russell 29,1 060 red.wpd E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE2901\russell 29,1 060 red.wpd Reviews 93 Osman Elmalı’s book on Russell’s ethics is a well-structured, faithful expo­ sition of Russell’s views; however, it is not a critical one. Elmalı’s book is divided into two sections. The Wrst section is an exposition of the theoretical foundations of Russell’s ethics; the second, an overview of Russell’s views on various issues of applied ethics, such as the family, marriage, children, sex, hap­ piness, population, and war. The author has divided Russell’s work on metaethics into three periods, more or less in line with how the literature on Russell’s ethics does.1 The Wrst period up until the First World War is the intuitionist period. Elmalı explains Russell’s view that there are objective moral truths, as presented in his “The Elements of Ethics”.2 The second period, the emotivist period, starts around 1914.3 Emo­ tivism is the view that moral judgments are mere expressions of our emotions. The end of the Second World War marks the start of the third period, according to Elmalı. The main work representative of this period of Russell’s ethics is Human Society in Ethics and Politics.4 Following Pigden, Elmalı notes that this work is characterized with an objective stand, even though the belief that ethics is based on feelings and emotions is retained. In his early intuitionist period, Russell holds that the good must be indeWnable ; it must not be deWned in terms of its consequences or the happiness it brings about. If an action is good it should be good in itself. Russell gives several arguments for this view in the “Elements” (pp. 19–20; Papers 6: 221–2). Elmalı explains these arguments, but he does not discuss how, if at all, Russell refuted or could have refuted these arguments in his later period when he abandoned intuitionism. Elmalı, nevertheless, explains the reasons that Russell gives against intuition as a source of knowledge in Mysticism and Logic (1918) and Our Knowl­ edge of the External World (1914). When discussing the alleged relationship between what exists and what is good or bad, Russell argues that nothing can be inferred as to what is good or bad from what exists and what does not exist. And nor are there any self-evident propositions about the goodness or badness of what does and what does not exist (“Elements”, Papers 6: 223). But Elmalı mistakes Russell, and even Moore, to mean there are no self-evident propositions at all (Elmalı, p. 67). In fact, Moore claims that fundamental ethical principles are self-evident, not in the 1 Charles R. Pigden, ed., Russell on Ethics: Selections from the Writings of Bertrand Russell (London: Routledge, 1999); Michael K. Potter, Bertrand Russell’s Ethics (London: Continuum, 2006). 2 “The Elements of Ethics”, in Philosophical Essays (London: Routledge, 2003 (1910)); Papers 6: 217–50. 3 This period is divided into two by Pigden and Potter, as early emotivism and mature emotivism; the latter is best formulated in Religion and Science (1935). 4 London: George Allen and Unwin, 1954. December 2, 2009 (5:28 pm) E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE2901\russell 29,1 060 red.wpd E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE2901\russell 29,1 060 red.wpd 94 Reviews sense that they are true because they are evident to you or to me, but in the sense that they are true on their own, that is, not deduced or inferred from any other propositions.5 As for Russell’s views on normative ethics, Elmalı observes that in both the Wrst and third periods of his ethical thought, Russell factored in the conse­ quences of an action in determining what is good (p. 114). First, Russell in the Wrst period claims that consequences...

Darwinian Ethics and Moral Realism

Is taking the moral stance an adaptation? Can we explain being moral biologically or evolutionarily? Some say no. Others say yes, believing that only an evolutionary perspective can ground moral judgments. And still others (Ruse) believe that taking the evolutionary perspective undermines objective foundations for moral realism. Mizzoni defends the view that an evolutionary perspective on morality does not undermine moral realism. Mizzoni looks at arguments to the contrary by Michael Ruse and defends, against Ruse, the view that objective moral truths are compatible with a contingent human evolved nature in which those truths are based. Not unlike a linguist who argues for a shared, innate grammar, Mizzoni argues for a shared universal human nature in which could be grounded a deep structure to morality.

Common Sense Professional Ethics: A Christian Appraisal

Christian organizations have joined the secular professions in spelling out detailed ethical codes. Yet what basis can be provided for the supposition that these ethical codes truly inform us about what is objectively right or wrong? Frequently, modern ethicists have argued that we must derive our moral judgments by the application some specific ‘ethical theory’ to ensure that we are arriving at moral truth. The lack of success in this modern project has contributed to post-modern skepticism about the possibility of arriving at objective moral truth. The modern moral project, and its post-modern skeptics, share a set of mistaken assumptions Plantinga has summarized under the term “internalism.” These assumptions are contrasted with the common sense moral realism advocated by the Christian thinker Thomas Reid. It is argued that common sense moral realism provides a practical and rich basis for professional ethics that is informed by a Christian world-view, one that does not leave us with the forced choice of either first justifying our ethical beliefs on some special grounds or doubting the reality of objective moral truth. The implications of this approach for ethical training are briefly considered.

Common Sense is not Consensus: Professional Ethics as Marksmanship

Tjeltveit's response to Hathaway's proposal to ground ethics on natural moral sense raises several significant issues and extends the discussion in important directions. Yet some of these issues arise from a misunderstanding of subtle but vital aspects of common sense ethics. Despite the cogent concerns raised by Tjeltveit, the central value of common sense ethics as a foundation for ethical practice remains. More importantly, no feasible alternative is readily apparent. The one promised by Tjeltveit either is unclear or does not fare as well as the common sense alternative suggested in Hathaway's proposal. Contrary to his claim that common sense ethics is unlikely to produce moral excellence, a grounding of ethical judgment in the moral sense provides concrete resources for superlative ethical judgment and inspiration. Treating moral judgment as, at least in part, a sense opens the door for a vision of moral discernment as marksmanship. The fundamental assumption that one is aiming at ‘hitting’ objective moral truth motivates serious ethical concern. An emphasis on the natural moral sense in the context of moral realism also results in a commitment to precision under varied conditions of practice. Such a view does not inadequately consider the role of sin. Rather it takes literally and seriously the deep meaning behind the most common biblical term for sin: hamartia.

Objectivity and Illusion in Evolutionary Ethics: Comments on Waller

In this paper I argue that any adequate evolutionary ethical theory needs to account for moral belief as well as for dispositions to behave altruistically. It also needs to be clear whether it is offering us an account of the motivating reasons behind human behaviour or whether it is giving justifying reasons for a particular set of behaviours or, if both, to distinguish them clearly. I also argue that, unless there are some objective moral truths, the evolutionary ethicist cannot offer justifying reasons for a set of behaviours. I use these points to refute Waller's claims that the illusion of objectivity plays a dispensable role in Ruse's theory, that my critique of Ruse's Darwinian metaethics is built on a false dilemma, that there is nothing to be distressed about if morality is not objective, and that ethical beliefs are subject to a kind of causal explanation that undermines their objectivity in a way that scientific beliefs are not.

Modus Ponens and Moral Realism

Previous articleNext article No AccessModus Ponens and Moral RealismG. F. SchuelerG. F. Schueler Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 98, Number 3Apr., 1988 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/292967 Views: 28Total views on this site Citations: 33Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1988 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Malte Willer, Christopher Kennedy Assertion, expression, experience, Inquiry 34 (Dec 2020): 1–37.https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2020.1850338Neil Sinclair The Naturalistic Fallacy, 14 (Nov 2018).https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316717578Derek Baker Expression and Guidance in Schroeder’s Expressivist Semantics, Erkenntnis 83, no.44 (Jul 2017): 829–852.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9916-0John Eriksson Noncognitivism: From the Vienna Circle to the Present Day, (Dec 2017): 591–606.https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139519267.046Malte Willer Advice for Noncognitivists, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (Jul 2016): 174–207.https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12160Caj Strandberg Can the Embedding Problem Be Generalized?, Acta Analytica 30, no.11 (Jul 2014): 1–15.https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-014-0232-xDerek Baker and Jack Woods How Expressivists Can and Should Explain Inconsistency, Ethics 125, no.22 (Jun 2015): 391–424.https://doi.org/10.1086/678371Mark Douglas Warren , Philosophical Studies 172, no.1111 ( 2015): 2859.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0447-8John Cantwell Unity and Autonomy in Expressivist Logic, Dialectica 68, no.33 (Sep 2014): 443–457.https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12072Nicholas Smyth Resolute Expressivism, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17, no.44 (Feb 2014): 607–618.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9495-yZed Adams Against Moral Intellectualism, Philosophical Investigations 37, no.11 (Jul 2013): 37–56.https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12025Robert Mabrito Are expressivists guilty of wishful thinking?, Philosophical Studies 165, no.33 (Aug 2012): 1069–1081.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0003-8Michael Ridge Non-Cognitivism, (Feb 2013).https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee137Ruth Weintraub Logic For Expressivists, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89, no.44 (Dec 2011): 601–616.https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2010.525517Neil Sinclair Moral expressivism and sentential negation, Philosophical Studies 152, no.33 (Nov 2009): 385–411.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9484-5MICHAEL PENDLEBURY How to be a Normative Expressivist, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80, no.11 (Jan 2010): 182–207.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00315.xJeff Wisdom A Defense of Descriptive Moral Content, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 47, no.33 (Sep 2009): 285–300.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2009.tb00095.xPatricia Marino ON ESSENTIALLY CONFLICTING DESIRES, The Philosophical Quarterly 59, no.235235 (Apr 2009): 274–291.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.570.xMark Schroeder How Expressivists Can and Should Solve Their Problem with Negation, Noûs 42, no.44 (Nov 2008): 573–599.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00693.xMark Schroeder What is the Frege-Geach Problem?, Philosophy Compass 3, no.44 (Jul 2008): 703–720.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00155.x Bibliography, (Jan 2008): 411–440.https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470757031.biblioAndy Egan Quasi-realism and fundamental moral error1, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85, no.22 (Jun 2007): 205–219.https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400701342988DAVID ALM Non-Cognitivism and Validity, Theoria 73, no.22 (Oct 2008): 121–147.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.2007.tb01194.xPatricia Marino Expressivism, Logic, Consistency, and Moral Dilemmas, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9, no.55 (Nov 2006): 517–533.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9034-6James Gordon Finlayson Habermas's Moral Cognitivism and the Frege-Geach Challenge, European Journal of Philosophy 13, no.33 (Dec 2005): 319–344.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2005.00232.xDaniel Nolan, Greg Restall, Caroline West Moral fictionalism versus the rest, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83, no.33 (Sep 2005): 307–330.https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400500191917Mark van Roojen EXPRESSIVISM, SUPERVENIENCE AND LOGIC, Ratio 18, no.22 (Jun 2005): 190–205.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2005.00283.x by Sophia R. 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Truth and Explanation in Ethics

In the last half century, moral philosophers who oppose the idea of objective moral truth have tended to rely on two kinds of argument: the internalist charge that no objective judgment (other than a report of one's existing motivations) could have the kind of guaranteed relevance to decision that moral judgments have; and the relativist charge that basic moral disagreement is unresolvable. But both of these objections have, by now, been made and answered in so many ways that it is hard to assess their force. To remind us of a different, and perhaps more decisive, challenge to the possibility of objective moral truth could therefore be a service. And that is why the opening two chapters of Gilbert Harman's The Nature of Morality deserve our serious attention. Harman develops there a forceful empiricist argument. He holds that moral claims must remain problematic and open to skeptical doubt unless they can be observationally confirmed or unless moral facts can be reduced to facts that are observationally confirmable. He also holds that hypotheses, moral or nonmoral, are observationally confirmed only if they help explain the occurrence of the observations that confirm them. But it seems clear to him that moral hypotheses never help explain why we observe anything. And he finds it far from obvious that this failure could be set aside by finding some reduction of so-called moral facts to observationally confirmable facts.