Number Of Warheads Research Articles

PROTAC-DB 2.0: an updated database of PROTACs.

Proteolysis targeting chimeras (PROTACs), which harness the ubiquitin-proteasome system to selectively induce targeted protein degradation, represent an emerging therapeutic technology with the potential to modulate traditional undruggable targets. Over the past few years, this technology has moved from academia to industry and more than 10 PROTACs have been advanced into clinical trials. However, designing potent PROTACs with desirable drug-like properties still remains a great challenge. Here, we report an updated online database, PROTAC-DB 2.0, which is a repository of structural and experimental data about PROTACs. In this 2nd release, we expanded the number of PROTACs to 3270, which corresponds to a 96% expansion over the first version. Meanwhile, the numbers of warheads (small molecules targeting the proteins of interest), linkers, and E3 ligands (small molecules recruiting E3 ligases) have increased to over 360, 1500and 80, respectively. In addition, given the importance and the limited number of the crystal target-PROTAC-E3 ternary complex structures, we provide the predicted ternary complex structures for PROTACs with good degradation capability using our PROTAC-Model method. To further facilitate the analysis of PROTAC data, a new filtering strategy based on the E3 ligases is also added. PROTAC-DB 2.0 is available online at http://cadd.zju.edu.cn/protacdb/.

Effectiveness Measurement of UAV Combat in Uncertain Environment

This paper focuses on the combat effectiveness measurement of UAV for reconnaissance and combat. Based on the establishment of typical battlefield scenarios and UAV reconnaissance and strike probability models, it focuses on the analysis and measurement of combat effectiveness when a single UAV performs reconnaissance strikes. The three main factors affecting UAV combat effectiveness—the true target interpretation probability, sensor parameters, and the number of warheads—are subjected to numerical simulation analysis. Finally, the UAV design parameters for reconnaissance and strike integration with optimal combat effectiveness are obtained: number of warheads are 12, interpretation probability of true target is 0.84, Sensor ROC curve parameters are 10.

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF USE OF HEAT STRESS ALLEVIATION IMPOSED ON CATTLE UNDER EGYPTIAN CONDITIONS

Food security is the main objective of all countries that seek through their various economic policies to try to achieve their social and economic security and stability. The agricultural sector is one of the leading sectors of the national economy and one of the main pillars of economic development. The agricultural production in Egypt includes three main activities: plamt production Livestock production fish production, and the value of animal production in Egypt is about 36.5% of the total value of agricultural production. Undoubtedly, the heat stress on livestock under Egyptian conditions is one of the most important constraints for the production of milk In Egypt at various levels of cattle breeding in general and at the level of commercial farms in particular, which requires studying the economic return of the use of this technique and study the impact on the economics of dairy production. the objectives of the study were to study the current status of the development of the number of cattle producing milk in Egypt, as well as the development of the production quantities of dairy cows, the relative importance of each dairy production and the numbers of warheads, and to see the impact of the use of technology has been studying the statistical estimate of the production functions of milk sample study, as well as the statistical estimate of the terms of use of these costs Technology study sample. The most important results of what has resulted in the following: there is a growing trend year for the number of cows wholesale heads in Egypt during the study period, as they have increased by amounted to 104.24 thousand head annually, has been estimated coefficient of determination about 0.266, meaning that 26.6% of the changes occurring to the number due to Factors that reflect the effects of time. It may be shown that the increase in the number of dairy cattle heads in Egypt during the study period as an average is due mainly to the number of mixed cattle heads due to the apparent stability in the numbers of domestic and foreign cattle. It also shows that there is an increasing general trend of milk production for cows Wholesale in Egypt during that For a period, increasing by about 84.597 thousand tons per year. The R2 is estimated to be about 0.324, which means that 32.4% of the changes occurring in the milk production of cows are due to the factors that reflect the time component. Egypt. Scenarios for the statistical estimation of the cow dairy production function were carried out in the sample of 100 cows before using the technique and 100 cows after using the technology. The elasticity of production prior to the use of the technology was about 0.24, after the use of 0.22 technology. Finally, return m Milk production for dairy cows increased by 27.7 kg / day after the use of the technology at an increase rate of about 18.7% with an expected yield of about 97.7 pounds per cow per day for 87.4 pounds per cow before using the technology. the impact of the use of clear technical and increase the expected return of the cows used our farms under study, which requires dissemination of the use of the technology on the rest of the cattle farms in all parts of the country because of its great economic returns.

Chinese nuclear forces, 2015

China is the only one of the five original nuclear weapon states that is quantitatively increasing the size of its nuclear arsenal and it now is estimated to have approximately 260 warheads. The arsenal’s capabilities are also increasing as older missiles are replaced with newer ones. As China assigns a growing portion of its warheads to long-range missiles, the US intelligence community predicts that by the mid-2020s the number of warheads on missiles capable of threatening the United States could increase to well over 100. The nuclear warheads in the Chinese stockpile are intended for delivery mainly by land-based ballistic missile but also by aircraft and submarines. The current force has nearly 150 nuclear-capable land-based missiles, half of which are short-range and medium-range. China has also built two types of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, one developed for a submarine no longer considered operational and the other in the final stages of development.

Chinese nuclear forces, 2011

Today, China is the only one of five original nuclear weapon states that is increasing its nuclear arsenal. According to some estimates, the country could “more than double” the number of warheads on missiles that could threaten the United States by the mid-2020s. Earlier this year, China published a defense white paper, which repeated its nuclear policies of maintaining a minimum deterrent with a no-first-use pledge. Yet China has yet to define what it means by a minimum deterrent posture. This, together with the fact that it is deploying four new nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, invites concern as to the scale and intention of China’s nuclear upgrade. The authors estimate that China has a total inventory of approximately 240 nuclear warheads. Reviewing one of the world’s most opaque nuclear forces, they assess the country’s land-based missiles, submarines and sea-based missiles, and cruise missiles.

Was the Nuclear Arms Race Deterministic?

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union amassed remarkably similar nuclear arsenals. They built roughly the same number of warheads and parallel delivery systems. Can this mean that nuclear weapons were deterministic, forcing the superpowers to pursue the same technological trajectories? Was the evolution of these weapons systems inevitable? Did technology force the two superpowers to embrace a single technological paradigm for their military confrontation? This essay challenges the concept of technological determinism, either in the Cold War or anywhere else in human experience. "Technological determinism" is a rhetorical trope, invoked most often to denigrate either a historical phenomenon or an historical interpretation. Technology may be thought of as having social force that influences its adoption and directional force that shapes its trajectory, but nothing about it is inevitable. Technology shapes history but does not determine it.

Russian Nuclear Forces, 2010

With or without a follow-on agreement to START, the number of warheads in the Russian nuclear arsenal continues to shrink. But that doesn’t mean Moscow has given up modernizing its strategic nuclear forces.

Zero Is the Wrong Number

only one strategic mistake, but it is a major one. It concerns the greatest security threat to the United States, other free nations, and world peace—nuclear arms in the hands of terrorists, as well as rogue and failing regimes. President Obama’s strategy calls for leading by example in dealing with these weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It assumes that after the United States and Russia re-commit themselves to nuclear disarmament, other nations will be inspired either to give up their nuclear arms or refrain from acquiring them. This goal, referred to in short as the “zero strategy” (for zero nuclear weapons), is dangerous if implemented, distracts the international community from more certain and pressing goals, and is extremely unlikely to move those who do need to be inspired, cajoled, or otherwise made to forgo nuclear arms. How did this usually sure-footed president slip on such a vital issue? The strategy that calls for the United States and Russia to lead the parade to nuclear disarmament was formed and then run up the flagpole by four highly regarded statesmen: two Republicans, Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, and two Democrats, Sam Nunn and William Perry. In January 2007, they issued a collective proclamation, subsequently endorsed by a number of leading American specialists in nuclear weapons policy, calling for a world free of nuclear arms. The Quad, as the four authors of the zero strategy are often called, are all senior veterans of the Cold War. But perhaps this anachronistic experience is a hindrance. (Indeed, one critic called them “dinosaurs.”) To move their strategy forward, the Quad outlined their view in a position paper endorsed by 36 experts in the nuclear weapons field. The Quad focused largely on Russia and the United States, and mainly on their strategic nuclear weapons, calling for reductions in the number of warheads arming the two powers’ strategic bombers and missiles. Such a move would effectively extend the principal U.S.-Russian treaty that covers these weapons and that is about to expire. The Quad also favors an increase in the warning and decision time before either country could launch their nuclear warheads. Currently, American and Russian missiles remain on alert at levels equaling the Cold War. This means that large parts of their nuclear arsenals are armed and pre-targeted, and that either country could launch their nuclear weapons within minutes of detecting an attack. The foundations of the Quad’s position date back to a much earlier period in the Amitai Etzioni is university professor and professor of international relations at The George Washington University and the author of Security First: For a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy (Yale University Press, 2007).

FROM NEGOTIATIONS TO COOPERATION

Russia and the United States face an entirely new kind of nuclear threat, in the form of high-tech terrorism. With modern communications technology, it is conceivable terrorists could crack either country’s command and control system and initiate a launch. Both sides must overcome habits of the past and begin to cooperate on making the C3 systems transparent, safe and reliable, through joint modeling, sharing of intelligence, de-alerting missiles, and sharp reductions in numbers of warheads.

A simple model for calculating ballistic missile defense effectiveness

This paper develops a probabilistic model that can be used to determine the technical performance required for a defense to meet specific political/military objectives. The defense objective is stated as a certain probability that no warheads leak through the defense. The technical performance is captured by the interceptor single‐shot probability of kill and the warhead detection, tracking, and classification probability. Attacks are characterized by the number of warheads and undiscriminated decoys. Barrage and shoot‐look‐shoot firing modes are examined, with the optimal interceptor allocation derived for the shoot‐look‐shoot mode. Applications of this model for sizing national and theater missile ballistic missile defenses are discussed.

U.S. strategic nuclear forces, end of 1998

Quantitative data on operational nuclear weapons is tabulated and described in some detail in the article. Nuclear weapons categories reported include intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers and weapons. The total number of warheads in the U.S. arsenal is approximately 7150, slightly lower than last year`s level of almost 8000 warheads. There are 1085 launchers and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.

Quantifying Counterforce and Active Defense in Countering Theater Ballistic Missiles

This paper contains the formulation and analysis of a model to measure, compare, and contrast the effects of counterforce (pre-launch attack) and active defense (post-launch attack) against tactical ballistic missiles (TBM's). It is shown that without counterforce an active defense system could require an impractical number of weapons to counter incoming missiles and/or their warheads. This number is shown to decrease geometrically as effective counterforce is used, so that the expected number of warheads killed increases dramatically with counterforce that is only modestly effective. Actual distributions of warheads reaching the target area are shown to be complex mixtures of binomial distributions. It is shown that normal approximations to these distributions based on the easily-calculated means and variances often agree poorly with the actual distributions. This is especially true when using effective counterforce.

The UK and the non‐proliferation treaty

The Nuclear Non‐Proliferation Treaty has partially succeeded in controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but is now mainly seen as controlling proliferation in Third World countries and thus discriminatory. Non‐signatories have or are on the verge of having nuclear weapons, and some signatories are in breach of their obligations. While the US and Russia are now reducing their stockpiles, China, France and the UK (in the form of Trident) are increasing theirs in breach of Article VI. If the treaty is to be worth extending, the five nuclear weapon states must negotiate further far‐reaching reductions in number of warheads, negotiating a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, banning fissile material, and placing all plutonium under international control.

Nuclear weapons safety: The case of trident

An accidental detonation or ignition of propellant in a Trident missile, or of explosive material in one of the warheads, could lead to dispersal of toxic plutonium into a populated area. We examine the details of Trident nuclear weapons safety and assess the feasibility, cost and consequences of safety‐enhancing modifications to the missiles and warheads. We find that the operational impacts of such modifications would be minor, especially if the number of warheads per missile is decreased as a result of START II. Several billion dollars, and a small number of nuclear tests, would be needed to enhance safety for Trident.

Mobile Missile Design Generates Controversy

Mobile Missile Design Generates Controversy

Deceptive Basing Modes for Strategic Missiles: An Exercise in the Politics of an Ambiguous Nuclear Balance

F THE SALT II agreements are ratified, the United States (and probably also the Soviet Union) will proceed to build a new generation of land-based strategic intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). If SALT II does not go forward, the new missiles most likely will still be built, despite the fact that they will be perceived as excessively vulnerable to a disarming first strike. What do these apparently paradoxical conclusions tell us about the politics of the SALT process and its interactions with the weapons acquisition process? SALT and weapons acquisitions interact in a far-reaching and complex political/military process with consequences often difficult to foresee. Both political and military considerations have dictated that programs already under way not be severely curtailed; and since only some programs have been constrained under the SALT agreements, the normal dynamics of arms races have not been altered, but simply rerouted into intense competition through programs not constrained. A SALT agreement may thus alter priorities and options, and the complex blend of political desires and technological constraints often makes the consequences of the altered priorities and options difficult to predict. Fortunately, however, there are some simplifying analytical techniques, and in this case they lead in a natural way to the predictions which initially appeared paradoxical. The focus of this article is the interaction between the SALT process and the problem of vulnerability, including the proposed solution to that problem through the dispersal of missiles in deceptive basing modes such as multiple aim points (MAP) or multiple protective shelters (MPS), coupled with limitations on the numbers of warheads per missile. The discussion which follows covers (a) the origin of the problem and its proposed solution; (b) consideration of the theoretical nuclear balance in the 1980s, based on a quantitative analysis of the expected outcomes of possible attacks under several alternative scenarios; (c) evaluation of a number of claims that have been made regarding ICBM vulnerability and solutions for it, drawing on the results of the quantitative analysis; and (d) some reflections upon the politics of the SALT process in the light of this case.

Damage calculations for unreliable warheads

AbstractFor large numbers of perfectly reliable, optimally targeted warheads the square‐root law approximates the expected fraction damage achieved on an area target. In this paper a more exact expression is derived for this damage fraction which Holds for all numbers of warheads. This expression is shown to converge to the square‐root law when a large number of warheads are fired. The more exact expression is used in a procedure to calculate expected damage when warheads are unreliable, and this procedure is shown to be superior to a modified square‐root approximation which has been used previously.

IV. Salt, Mirv and First-Strike

The technology of the MIRV, the multiple independently tar- getable reentry vehicle (or warhead), tends to perpetuate a certain degree of ambiguity in any strategic arms limitation agreement, unless a system of verification is adopted to determine the number of warheads each ICBM carries. How verification of warheads on a missile can be carried out without on-site inspection, which the USSR traditionally has rejected, has eluded negotiators for years. Even with a strategic arms limitation agreement on missiles, which can be verified by reconnaissance from the air or from orbit, the MIRV ambiguity will continue to feed the fear of a first-strike. Ralph E. Lapp, a consulting physicist, has written extensively on strategic weapons technology and development.