Abstract

The technology of the MIRV, the multiple independently tar- getable reentry vehicle (or warhead), tends to perpetuate a certain degree of ambiguity in any strategic arms limitation agreement, unless a system of verification is adopted to determine the number of warheads each ICBM carries. How verification of warheads on a missile can be carried out without on-site inspection, which the USSR traditionally has rejected, has eluded negotiators for years. Even with a strategic arms limitation agreement on missiles, which can be verified by reconnaissance from the air or from orbit, the MIRV ambiguity will continue to feed the fear of a first-strike. Ralph E. Lapp, a consulting physicist, has written extensively on strategic weapons technology and development.

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