Deceptive Basing Modes for Strategic Missiles: An Exercise in the Politics of an Ambiguous Nuclear Balance

Abstract

F THE SALT II agreements are ratified, the United States (and probably also the Soviet Union) will proceed to build a new generation of land-based strategic intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). If SALT II does not go forward, the new missiles most likely will still be built, despite the fact that they will be perceived as excessively vulnerable to a disarming first strike. What do these apparently paradoxical conclusions tell us about the politics of the SALT process and its interactions with the weapons acquisition process? SALT and weapons acquisitions interact in a far-reaching and complex political/military process with consequences often difficult to foresee. Both political and military considerations have dictated that programs already under way not be severely curtailed; and since only some programs have been constrained under the SALT agreements, the normal dynamics of arms races have not been altered, but simply rerouted into intense competition through programs not constrained. A SALT agreement may thus alter priorities and options, and the complex blend of political desires and technological constraints often makes the consequences of the altered priorities and options difficult to predict. Fortunately, however, there are some simplifying analytical techniques, and in this case they lead in a natural way to the predictions which initially appeared paradoxical. The focus of this article is the interaction between the SALT process and the problem of vulnerability, including the proposed solution to that problem through the dispersal of missiles in deceptive basing modes such as multiple aim points (MAP) or multiple protective shelters (MPS), coupled with limitations on the numbers of warheads per missile. The discussion which follows covers (a) the origin of the problem and its proposed solution; (b) consideration of the theoretical nuclear balance in the 1980s, based on a quantitative analysis of the expected outcomes of possible attacks under several alternative scenarios; (c) evaluation of a number of claims that have been made regarding ICBM vulnerability and solutions for it, drawing on the results of the quantitative analysis; and (d) some reflections upon the politics of the SALT process in the light of this case.