Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime Research Articles

Forum-shifting from above and below: international stratification and the fragmentation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime complex

Forum-shifting from above and below: international stratification and the fragmentation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime complex

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime as a “Failed Promise”: Contestation and Self-Undermining Dynamics in a Liberal Order

Abstract The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) forms the core of the most prominent multilateral security governance regime of the liberal international order (LIO). Despite being a widely supported and remarkably successful security regime to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons, NPT politics have become increasingly polarized. In this article, I analyze contestation and self-undermining dynamics in the nuclear regime. The NPT is a strongly institutionalized but weakly liberal regime. However, it is unevenly institutionalized. Patterns of contestation in the regime derive from these characteristics. The basic source of contestation is the fundamental inequality between the nuclear “haves” and “have-nots.” Specifically, dissatisfied states seek to strengthen the rules and obligations in the less institutionalized domain. I argue that when efforts at order-consistent reform fail, states shift to a more radical strategy of liberal counter-institutionalization to pursue their goal of equality. Nonnuclear states have long been dissatisfied with the uneven distribution of the burdens and benefits of the regime, and especially the nuclear-armed states’ failure to pursue their obligation of disarmament. Most of the contestation in the NPT over the decades has been order-consistent and pursued “liberal reform.” However, when proponents of nuclear disarmament failed to achieve meaningful progress through the NPT, they shifted to a liberal counter-institutionalization strategy and adopted an entirely new legal instrument, the 2017 Nuclear Prohibition Treaty, to pursue disarmament. This was a direct—but liberal—challenge to the existing suborder. This treaty, which prohibits nuclear weapons for all, legalizes the NPT obligation to pursue disarmament.

The Changing Face of Nuclear Proliferation

Abstract A rich literature has identified a number of important drivers of nuclear proliferation. Most of this work, however, treats the determinants of proliferation as constant over the entire nuclear age—the factors leading to proliferation are assumed to be the same in 2010 as they were in 1945. But there are reasons to suspect that the drivers of proliferation have changed over this time: nuclear technology is easier to come by, the global strategic environment has shifted, and the nuclear nonproliferation regime has come into being. To examine changes in the dynamics of nuclear proliferation, I adapt a cross-validation technique frequently used in the machine learning literature. I create a rolling window of training data with which statistical models of proliferation are built, and I then test the predictive power of these models against data from other time periods. The result of this analysis is a temporal map of how the determinants of proliferation have changed over time. My findings suggest that the underlying dynamics of nuclear proliferation have indeed shifted, with important implications both for the literature on nuclear proliferation and for policymakers interested in limiting the future spread of nuclear weapons.

Justifying attacks on nuclear facilities

The recent Russian military attacks on nuclear facilities in Ukraine raise questions about the normalization of kinetic military operations carried out by states against nuclear facilities. Although doubts persist about their practical efficacy, the first and second amendment protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions expressly prohibit kinetic attacks on nuclear facilities. Nonetheless, the practice of targeting nuclear facilities as a tool of statecraft has been gradually normalized. This article seeks to explore the reasons behind this trend through a historical analysis of past instances of attacks on nuclear facilities, with a particular emphasis on the rationale offered by the attacking states and the subsequent political responses of the international community. The analysis reveals that the lax legal regulation of such attacks is not a flaw but rather a feature of the global nuclear-nonproliferation regime. Because these kinds of attacks are seen as playing an important role in that regime, there has been an enduring endeavor to maintain the practice, which has prevented the establishment of a more stringent legal framework. As a consequence, this practice continues to be permissible as a mechanism of coercion inherent in the regime. But it also has been applied outside that context, in Ukraine.

Влияние Индии на формирование многополярного ядерного порядка

India’s decision not to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has led to its labelling as a state that is not fully aligned with the global nuclear order. This places it in the same category as other nuclear-armed countries outside these agreements, such as Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. India’s nuclear weapons testing in 1998, followed by a similar move by Pakistan, has been viewed as a challenge to international security and the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This article aims to examine India’s stance on these treaties and its choice to become a nuclear-armed state in 1998 within the context of its efforts to influence the establishment of a fair global order that serves the interests of not only the major nuclear powers (USSR/Russia, Great Britain, China, the United States, and France) and their allies, but also the rest of the world. Delhi’s actions in the realm of nuclear arms control highlights the emerging multipolar world. Although India has refrained from actively participating in disarmament negotiations after the end of Cold War, its previous experiences remain relevant today. The breakdown of the U.S. – Russia nuclear arms control as well as crises over the nuclear non-proliferation and testing banning regimes have given weight to the arguments put forth by Indian leaders and diplomats. These arguments emphasize the urgency of reducing nuclear risks and exercising strategic restraint, including maintaining a moratorium on nuclear testing. Since 1998, India has adopted an approach different from its previous policy on various nuclear disarmament issues. This shift is evident in the country’s solidarity with other nuclear powers in opposing the 2021 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. However, India’s longstanding support for multipolarity in international security policy, particularly regarding nuclear weapons, remains unchanged.

UNVEILING DUALITIES: US RHETORIC AND REALITY IN GLOBAL NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION UNDER TRUMP AND BIDEN ADMINISTRATIONS

The image the United States has always projected of itself in the international community is that of a state that is nuclear responsible and bears the responsibility to keep nuclear proliferation in check. To this effect, it uses sanctions, international pressure, and harsh language with states it deems to be in violation of the obligations of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. On the other hand, however, there is doubt about the United States' own dedication to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation. This paper is an attempt to examine the role the US has played vis-à-vis nuclear proliferation. It deals with the question: what role US has played in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and what its probable effects are on the international nuclear non-proliferation landscape. It argues that the US has not only engaged in excessive nuclear proliferation since 1945 but has also damaged the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, thereby reduced restraints, and set dangerous precedence for other states. The paper recommends that US may lead the world towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament by example rather than unfair coercion. Bibliography Entry Rashid, Asma and Aiman Saif Ullah. 2023. "Unveiling Dualities: US Rhetoric and Realty in Global Nuclear Non-Proliferation under Trump and Biden Administrations." Margalla Papers 27 (2): 60-70.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the Global South: Understanding Divergences and Commonalities

ABSTRACT For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the heightened risks of a nuclear catastrophe are being seriously felt around the world. Over the past decade, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – the central instrument of the global non-proliferation regime – has been rife with divisions among its members and has been undermined by the failure of two consecutive Review Conferences (RevCons) to adopt a consensus outcome document. The basic assertion underlying this Special Issue is that there is growing criticism or contestation from countries in the Global South about the role and future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, in particular with regard to the obligations imposed by the NPT and the lack of a reciprocal benefit for these countries. This contestation could hinder the optimal functioning of the NPT, for instance through reduced cooperation in the implementation of its provisions. As such, a serious examination of the Global South’s criticism of the NPT and what this means for the future of the non-proliferation regime is both timely and necessary.

Strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime as a way to reduce the level of radiophobia in society

Strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime as a way to reduce the level of radiophobia in society

Five Decades of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Time to Pass the Baton to the UN Security Council?

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) came into force in 1970. After renouncing its nuclear weapons programme, South Africa became a party to the NPT in 1991. The NPT is the principal international instrument aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The NPT has generated various other treaties with similar aims, which, together with the NPT, constitute the ‘nuclear non-proliferation regime’. The NPT has, for various reasons, not been a success. Whether the NPT has achieved nuclear non-proliferation is a moot point–a concept which implies nuclear disarmament. For example, there is evidence of a network of covert operations marketing nuclear technology; some non-NPT states have clandestinely embarked on nuclear weapons programmes, and some NPT states have threatened to adopt a policy of actual or pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons even against non-nuclear weapons states for its deterrent value. Alarm bells are ringing regarding the interpretation of ‘peaceful’ and ‘non-peaceful’ uses of nuclear energy. Despite the NPT, nothing prohibits the testing and refinement of existing nuclear weapons technology. Certain questions need to be answered. Has the NPT not become an instrument of rhetorical posturing by the five major nuclear weapon states–the ‘Club of Five’? Why has none of the Club of Five given their nuclear weapons up? Where do the Club of Five get the moral authority to declare that introducing new members on the Club is unacceptable? Instead of concentrating on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as the NPT does, should there not rather be an emphasis on the total prohibition of all nuclear weapons? It is submitted that a more active role for the UN in nuclear non-proliferation issues be considered. All UN Secretaries-General have made nuclear non-proliferation one of their top priorities. Kofi Annan concluded that the NPT was the victim of insufficient progress in not only nuclear non-proliferation but also nuclear disarmament and that the world was sleepwalking towards a nuclear disaster. The basis for greater involvement of the UN Security Council in nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament is to be found in the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Statute of the NPT, the UN Charter and in Security Council Relations 1540 of 2004 and 1929 of 2010. The argument is put forward that as the Security Council has the legal authority to determine threats to the peace or acts of aggression and make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken regarding it, utilising that body may be a more meaningful route to follow than the NPT which appears to have reached its sell-by date.

The instability of the nuclear nonproliferation regime complex

This article theorizes path-dependent changes in the institutional architecture of the nuclear nonproliferation regime complex; it analyses the effects of different regime-complex structures on institutional contestation and policy adjustment. I first offer a general theory of how the preexisting institutional structures of international regime complexes (IRCs) facilitate and constrain subsequent institutional developments in ways that make IRCs prone to endogenous, path-dependent change. Next, I illustrate how strategies of regime shifting and rival regime creation in the nuclear nonproliferation complex have triggered path-dependent ‘reactive sequencing’, resulting in growing institutional fragmentation. To illustrate endogenous dynamics of IRC evolution, I examine the nuclear nonproliferation complex at three ‘critical junctures’: The mid-1970s, the end of the Cold War, and the early-2000s. During each period, exogenous proliferation shocks interacted with pre-existing institutional structures to produce specific patterns of contestation which set in motion a reactive sequence of growing institutional fragmentation. My argument has relevance for global economic governance broadly and for the growing IPE literature which explores reactive sequencing and institutional decay in global governance institutions.

Ukraine’s nuclear security as a key element of the European security system

Ukraine, as a strategically located territory and an important player in the geopolitical interests of various power blocks, has become a key element of the European nuclear security system, so it is important to study the most important factors shaping the situation around nuclear weapons and take appropriate measures to avoid potential threats. The research aims to outline all aspects and factors of Ukraine’s nuclear security that directly affect the international security system, in particular, the European countries. The methodological basis of the study is a systematic analysis of information and regulatory sources, such as bilateral and multilateral international agreements, documents and materials of international organisations, documents of individual country authorities, speeches, and materials of print and electronic media. The article highlights the historical context, including the transfer of Ukrainian nuclear weapons materials to Russia following the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons. The current stage of development of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime is analysed. Attention is paid to the evolution of the regime under the influence of the confrontation between the two superpowers and the doctrine of mutual deterrence. The situation with nuclear security in Ukraine and its impact on the Black Sea region is analysed. The consequences of military actions in Ukraine and factors that create new dimensions for nuclear security, in particular in the context of control over nuclear materials and the possibilities of their use, are considered. The results of the study of the problem are presented in the description of new threats and risks that require deepening cooperation of international partners and taking effective measures to ensure nuclear safety in the region. The study emphasises the need for joint efforts to counter new challenges and minimise nuclear safety risks. The practical significance of the study is determined by strategies for cooperation with international partners to achieve stability in the field of nuclear safety

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS OVERRIDING THE NON-PROLIFERATION PRIORITIES: AN ANALYSIS OF INDO-US CIVIL NUCLEAR DEAL

The study has reviewed a critical question of how great powers override non-proliferation priorities at times of strategic considerations by creating ease out of their international obligations. In 2008, the Bush Administration entered a strategic understanding with India to enhance cooperation in the nuclear field that paved the way for civilian nuclear trade with New Delhi and carefully crafted the power dynamics favouring India. This study finds out that the so-called ‘Non-proliferation Enhancement Act’ provided an undue advantage to India over Pakistan, thus forcing Islamabad to improve the effectiveness and outreach of her strategic assets to mitigate the apprehensive threshold. Although the nuclearisation of South Asia was implicated in the non-proliferation regime, it ensured strategic balance in the region and shall continue to do so in the national security calculations. The Indo-US nuclear cooperation continues to haunt the dynamics of nuclear parity that concurrently possess serious security implications for Pakistan by allowing India to manipulate the threshold. Therefore, this paper investigates the genesis of the Indo-US deal, the geostrategic and commercial interests of major powers underpinning this deal, implications for Pakistan, steps taken by Pakistan so far and the way forward. The study is deductive and has contested the assumption of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a theoretical framework. Bibliography Entry Sargana, Tauqeer Hussain. 2023. "Strategic Considerations Overriding the Non-Proliferation Priorities: An Analysis of Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal." Margalla Papers 27 (1): 40-52.

Between Law and Politics: Nuclear Non Proliferation and State-Induced Compliance in International Trade

The US economic sanctions (including sweeping export restrictions) against Iran and Russia, while presented as aiming at non-proliferation, appear to have ineluctably undermined the negotiations to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, an agreement meant to deter Iran from pursuing nuclear status. The present paper approaches this situation as a telling example of how unrestrained export control can come into tension with international security, in this case within the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Drawing on this illustrative case, this article seeks to formulate more general conclusions as regards the potential side-effects of broad export restrictions, their necessary limits under WTO law, and the significance of the WTO system in the non-proliferation process. First, this paper contextualises export controls as part of this regime, and then addresses the causal implications of the above situation, concluding that it does demonstrate the involvement of a foreign policy element that is ultimately at odds with the stated goals of nuclear non-proliferation. Finally, the paper examines the substance of Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which the sanctioning State will most likely use to justify its trade restrictions in a WTO dispute. It finds that a good faith interpretation and available practice indicate that the exceptions of Article XXI involve demanding standards and are to be interpreted so as to screen out, as far as possible, measures that covertly pursue other (e.g. foreign policy) interests. Meanwhile, non-WTO Member States could try to advance cases through friendly Members if they could establish a breach of WTO law that concerns the latter, though the chances are admittedly very thin. Ultimately, the WTO system is revealed as a valuable element in ensuring and maintaining international security and non-proliferation.

Nuclear Deterrence and Non-proliferation Regime: A Critical Analysis

This research paper critically examines the intricate relationship between nuclear deterrence and the non-proliferation regime, focusing on India and Pakistan as a case study. It analyzes the role of the non-proliferation regime in preventing nuclear weapons proliferation and evaluates the motivations for states to acquire such arms. The paper also explores the concept of nuclear deterrence as a strategy for preventing aggression, discussing its effectiveness and limitations in maintaining global security. It delves into how possessing nuclear weapons can impact non-proliferation efforts, both strengthening and weakening them.Through the India-Pakistan case study, the research assesses the dynamics of nuclear deterrence in their bilateral relations and its influence on regional stability. The study evaluates the non-proliferation regime's effectiveness in managing their nuclear capabilities and minimizing conflict risk. These insights are valuable for policymakers, scholars, and practitioners working toward nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and global peace.

The hegemon's tool kit: US leadership and the politics of the nuclear nonproliferation regime; Atomic friends: how America deals with nuclear-armed allies

The hegemon's tool kit: US leadership and the politics of the nuclear nonproliferation regime; Atomic friends: how America deals with nuclear-armed allies

The regional confrontation between Israel and Iran as a challenge to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

The regional confrontation between Israel and Iran as a challenge to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

Mainstreaming South Asian nuclear rivals for nuclear suppliers group: Imperatives for strengthening the nonproliferation regime

There is a need for mainstreaming South Asian Non-NPT Nuclear Weapon States. India is an emerging market and Pakistan has the potential to become a future market for nuclear energy. Furthermore, they have nuclear weapons, making it important to take them on board in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime (NPR). Given the reality that they are not ready to roll back their nuclear program, there is a need to explore options for mainstreaming them especially in nuclear export control mechanisms. This article investigates the policy imperatives for the international community to address the South Asian Non-NPT-NWSs in the NSG.

External drivers of EU differentiated cooperation: How change in the nuclear nonproliferation regime affects member states alignment

ABSTRACT Since its establishment, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has strived to increase convergence among EU member states. Yet, convergence remains elusive and scholars have started to explain the emergence of differentiated cooperation resulting from multiple internal EU crises. We posit that the convergence in the EU member states with respect to nuclear weapons has been fundamentally altered by the humanitarian turn to nuclear disarmament. This has led to a crystallization of differentiated subgroups among the member states, whose membership coincides with that of informal groupings active in the broader nuclear nonproliferation regime. Combining quantitative data on resolution sponsorship at the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process and voting at the UN General Assembly, we show that significant change in the international nuclear nonproliferation regime led to differentiated cooperation within the CFSP, resulting in two cohesive subgroups of member states.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR INTIMIDATION IN RUSSIA’S POLICY

Nuclear weapons play a key role in Russia’s security thinking. Concepts of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by the Russian Federation include both doctrinally defined nuclear deterrence and doctrinally indefinite nuclear intimidation. The latter has become a central element of the hybrid war waged by Russia. The failure to achieve the initial goals of Russian large-scale military aggression against Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, has affected Russia’s nuclear policy. The criteria for the use of nuclear weapons in conventional warfare and the forms of nuclear intimidation have changed.
 The effectiveness of Russia’s nuclear policy depends on the degree of compliance of its components with established international norms, formed within the framework of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. These norms can be defined as the global nuclear order. Russia’s policy of nuclear intimidation falls out of this order and creates a “nuclear disorder”. Currently, it is losing effectiveness for the Russian leadership, since it is increasingly seen as a “nuclear bluff”. Russia is trying to hide its nuclear intimidation behind the doctrinal provisions of nuclear deterrence, which generally remains effective.
 In the war against Ukraine, Russia is actively trying to artificially create criteria for the use of nuclear weapons that would formally correspond to the global nuclear order, while leaving room for nuclear intimidation. In particular, this may explain accusations against Ukraine of developing weapons of mass destruction and Russia’s attempts to annex the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories as soon as possible.
 The creation of a postwar architecture of international security will require bringing Russian nuclear policy to the norms of the global nuclear order.

Fifty years of nuclear nonproliferation: results, problems, prospects

The article analyzes the preparation and conduct of the last six Review Conferences on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) since 1995. At the same time, some historical aspects of the development of the NPT, the most important articles of this treaty are considered fi rst, and the merits of Soviet diplomacy in the formation of the most important provisions of this treaty are particularly noted. The Review Conferences of 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2022 are considered sequentially. For each conference, a brief analysis is given of the international situation that had developed by the beginning of the conference, the positions of States on the eve and during the conferences, as well as what was achieved during each of them. Thus, according to the 1995 conference, it is concluded that this conference was of particular importance for the nuclear nonproliferation regime (NWFZ), since the unconditional achievement of the 1995 conference was the indefi nite extension of the NPT, although the fi nal document was not adopted at this conference. Considering the 2000 Review Conference, it is concluded that, despite all the contradictions between the participating countries of the conference, it ended successfully. The OK participants were able to adopt the fi nal document. The statement adopted at the conference was aimed at the practical implementation of the provisions of article VI of the NPT, which contained 13 practical steps for the implementation of this article. With regard to the 2005 OK, a conclusion is made about a signifi cant deterioration of the international situation on the eve of its holding. The analysis of the events that had a negative impact on compliance with the NPT and led to the emergence of new threats is carried out. Ultimately, it is concluded that the 2005 conference ended in failure because States failed to adopt the fi nal document. On the eve of the 2010 conference, a landmark event was the conclusion of the START III Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States. At the same time, new threats emerged from the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea. As a result of the conference, no measures were taken to suspend the nuclear programs of Iran and the DPRK, but the participants of the OK managed to form the fi nal document of the conference, which was adopted unanimously. According to the 2015 conference, it is stated that it was considered unsuccessful, since the participants of this conference failed to agree and adopt an IT document. It is noted that the main reasons for this were acute contradictions between Russia and the United States, as well as the tense international situation against the background of the Ukrainian and Syrian military-political crises. According to the tenth Review Conference, which nevertheless took place in August 2022 after its postponement due to the coronavirus pandemic, it is concluded that it also ended in failure, since States could not agree and adopt the fi nal document at it. At the same time, the responsibility for the absence of a fi nal document at the tenth OK lies entirely with the United States and its allies, since the agenda of the NPT Review Conference was interrupted by the Ukrainian issue. In conclusion, the article summarizes some results of the state of the nuclear nonproliferation regime after 50 years of its existence. The forecast estimates of changes in the international situation in the fi eld of nuclear nonproliferation in the period between the last tenth Review Conference and the next one, which will be held in 2026, are given. At the same time, it is predicted that in the next fi ve years, the situation in the fi eld of international relations and nuclear nonproliferation is likely to only become more complicated.