Abstract

This research paper critically examines the intricate relationship between nuclear deterrence and the non-proliferation regime, focusing on India and Pakistan as a case study. It analyzes the role of the non-proliferation regime in preventing nuclear weapons proliferation and evaluates the motivations for states to acquire such arms. The paper also explores the concept of nuclear deterrence as a strategy for preventing aggression, discussing its effectiveness and limitations in maintaining global security. It delves into how possessing nuclear weapons can impact non-proliferation efforts, both strengthening and weakening them.Through the India-Pakistan case study, the research assesses the dynamics of nuclear deterrence in their bilateral relations and its influence on regional stability. The study evaluates the non-proliferation regime's effectiveness in managing their nuclear capabilities and minimizing conflict risk. These insights are valuable for policymakers, scholars, and practitioners working toward nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and global peace.

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