Nuclear Crisis Research Articles

Non-State Actors, Sub-Conventional Warfare, and India-Pakistan Nuclear Crisis Stability/Instability

In South Asia, India-Pakistan nuclear equation faces an intricate stability/instability paradox under the shadow of pervasive non-state actors. These actors are exploited by the bellicose nuclear rivals and used as proxies to bleed each other. The terrorist incidents may lead to a crisis that could escalate to the nuclear level. The ambitious belligerents—India and Pakistan—are embroiled in a vicious nuclear and conventional arms race. In conjunction, both lack any effective conflict resolution mechanism. Though, past strategic crises were managed beneath the panic of nuclear escalation and intervention by the international community. What if such a crisis develops again if a spectacular terrorist attack occurs, especially in mainland India. Indian decision-makers could castigate Pakistan by contemplating so-called surgical strikes under the impression that Pakistan has launched terrorists against India. This research paper critically analyzes how non-state actors and their use in sub-conventional warfare pose severe repercussions for nuclear deterrence stability in the absence of credible nuclear escalation control measures between India and Pakistan.

Nuclear Program of Iran and its Repercussions on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries

This study aims to analyze the Iranian nuclear program and its implications for the GCC countries, and in the framework of that, it was addressed three axes; the emergence and development of the Iranian nuclear program, and then the impact of it on the Gulf region, and finally the official positions and visions of the GULF Cooperation Council countries of the Iranian nuclear program. To achieve the objectives of the study, the historical approach has been used in order to track the historical roots of the Iranian nuclear file, and the descriptive analytical approach to analyze information. The study reached several conclusions, the most important of which is that the period of the 1950s was the actual beginning of the adoption of the Iranian nuclear program, and that the Iranian nuclear program negatively affects the Gulf states as it threatens regional stability in the Gulf region and leads to the destabilization of the economic security of the Gulf States of the Arab Gulf, and the official positions on Iran's nuclear program were fragmented, the most important of which was the recognition and affirmation of Iran's right to preserve its nuclear technology for peaceful uses and support a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis. In light of these findings, some recommendations and proposals have been reached, the most important of which is to draw the attention of Arab diplomacy to play an important role against the Iranian nuclear issue.

Iranian nuclear energy :

As Iran rapidly gains toward the establishment of its nuclear arsenal, discomfort and apprehension are escalating in the world. A proof of Iran’s cutting-edge technology is its latest milestone on the nuclear front. Iran has begun testing its uranium-enriching centrifuges, which has allowed Iran to extract, separate and then enrich uranium at a faster pace. Despite renewed attempts to reinstate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal, Iran continues to make headway in the field. This paper aims to objectively report and illustrate the recent advancements in Iran’s nuclear energy. All the while, assessing the political and economic dimension of the nuclear dispute which has brought forth powers from around the world. On one end nations push for Iran’s nuclearisation for their core economic interests, while others, in attempts to further ostracise the pariah, impose economic sanctions. This push and pull of power have materialised into a ‘tug-of-war’, making Iran’s nuclearisation an issue that transcends not only its immediate region but also in the international arena as well. The paper begins by touching upon the historical background of Iran’s nuclear programme that was first pursued in the 1950s, however, it was marked with negligible progress. It was only in the 70s that Iran made progress on this front, along with its ambitious efforts toward the revolution in 1979. This section concludes by discussing the advancements in the 90s and 2000s, with the aim of setting the pace as a prelude to the section that analyses Iran’s nuclear programme today and its implications. The proceeding sections analyse the groundwork that set the pace for the Iran Nuclear Deal. Lastly, the paper discusses Iran’s nuclear technological advancements and the politicaleconomic factors that influence ‘Iran’s Nuclear Crisis.

Under the Umbrella: Nuclear Crises, Extended Deterrence, and Public Opinion

How robust is public support for extended nuclear deterrence in patron and client states? Recent studies have improved scholarly understanding of US public opinion about nuclear weapon use against non-nuclear adversaries. Yet, there is limited knowledge of public attitudes regarding retaliation for nuclear strikes against US allies. We develop a theoretical typology of nuclear crises and investigate this phenomenon with a novel survey experiment ( n = 6,623). Americans, Japanese, and South Koreans viewed realistic emergency alert messages about a most-likely case for nuclear retaliation: a North Korean missile attack on a US ally protected by the nuclear umbrella. Support for nuclear retaliation is low in all three countries, with important cross-national differences. Favorability increases with North Korean nuclear first-use, but it remains limited nonetheless. Surprisingly, US “tripwire” troop casualties do not increase Americans’ demands for nuclear retaliation. These findings have important implications for the study of nuclear crises and practice of extended deterrence.

Nuclear balance and the initiation of nuclear crises: Does superiority matter?

The nuclear competition school, an emerging theoretical perspective on the political effect of nuclear weapons, argues that a favorable nuclear balance can significantly reduce one’s expected costs of nuclear war and therefore affect the interaction between nuclear-armed states, such as deterrence and crisis outcomes. This new perspective also presents a wide array of empirical evidence demonstrating the significant effect of the nuclear balance of power on political outcomes, thereby challenging the theory of the nuclear revolution, which argues that the nuclear balance of power produces no meaningful effects on political outcomes because no state can escape costly nuclear destruction. Little attention, however, has been paid to systematically exploring the effect of the nuclear balance on the initiation of nuclear crises. This is surprising, given that observable factors, such as the nuclear balance, should have a powerful effect at the crisis initiation stage because countries can observe military balance and assess the costs and benefits of entering a crisis. This article tests a core argument of the nuclear competition school regarding the effect of the nuclear balance on the initiation of nuclear crises. With original data on strategic nuclear balance, my statistical analysis shows that having a superior nuclear arsenal than another nuclear-armed opponent does not lead to a reduced likelihood of nuclear crisis initiated by the opponent. These core findings hold after conducting a series of robustness tests with various measures of the balance of nuclear forces. They encourage us to reconsider the persuasiveness of the nuclear competition school and offer implications for US nuclear policy and force size.

The Nuclear Balance Is What States Make of It

Abstract Does nuclear superiority offer states political or military benefits? And do those benefits accrue beyond acquiring a secure second-strike capability? International relations theory has long held that nuclear superiority does not confer significant advantages, a conclusion supported by much of the qualitative literature on bargaining and crisis interactions between nuclear-armed states. New work by scholars using statistical methods to analyze data on nuclear crises, interstate disputes, and compellent threats has sought to answer these questions, producing conflicting results. Despite the contributions of these recent works, this line of research has assumed that warhead counts are an appropriate measure of nuclear capabilities and that states possess accurate information about the material balance. Instead, states use multiple quantitative and qualitative characteristics to evaluate the nuclear balance, and they often have inaccurate or incomplete information about the size, composition, and configuration of other states' nuclear forces. Using new data, replications of two prominent recent works show that results are sensitive to how the nuclear balance is operationalized. Drawing on archival and interview data from the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, findings show how states and leaders often understand and respond to the nuclear balance in inconsistent, asymmetric, and subjective ways.

Development of Iranian-German Relations in 2010-2020 (Problems and Prospects)

The subject of the study is Iranian-German relations in 2010-2020. The object of the research is the development of relations between Iran and Germany. The author of the work examines in detail such aspects of the topic as the history of the development of relations between Iran and Germany, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which directly affects Iran's relations with the world community, in particular with the European Union. Particular attention is paid to the role of Germany as a strategic partner of Iran. Germany has traditionally been seen as Iran's closest partner in Europe, although its policy towards Iran during the so-called nuclear crisis of the 2000s largely followed the example of Washington due to Germany joining the latter's power diplomacy. The main conclusions of the study are: The future of German-Iranian relations will depend on a number of international, regional and domestic factors, the development of which is difficult to predict with any certainty; besides Germany, the positions of Great Britain and France in relation to Iran matter to a lesser extent; Iran's geopolitical attractiveness, along with Iran's willingness to welcome Germany as an active player in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, as well as pressure from the country's economic groups to develop trade relations with Iran, encourage Germany to take the lead in European foreign policy towards Iran ; With the start of nuclear talks in 2013, Berlin played a positive role in the negotiations that culminated in the nuclear deal in July 2015. Since then, close cooperation has been established both in industry and in the field of education; The scientific novelty of the study lies in the fact that the results of the study can be applied in the strategic planning of international relations with Iran.

NEGOTIATIONS ON THE DENUCLEARISATION OF NORTH KOREA: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF SUMMIT DIPLOMACY

This article analyzes a series of summit diplomacy efforts by the former United States President Donald Trump, and South Korea's President Moon Jae-in, to persuade North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to give up the country's nuclear weapons program. Through critical evaluation of the summits between Trump and Kim as well as Moon and Kim, the paper provides several important lessons on how to deal with North Korea. Kim Jong Un's mindset and strategic calculation of a denuclearization deal with Trump, amid the recent progress of North Korea's nuclear weapons and ICBMs programs, are investigated. Given the failure to reach a denuclearization agreement at the Hanoi Summit, Pyongyang is not expected readily to give up its nuclear weapons. North Korea had temporarily refrained from severe military provocations, such as test-firing ICBMs or conducting another round of nuclear weapon experiments by self-moratorium since April 2018. However, Pyongyang reversed direction with this policy in 2022 and resumed coercive diplomacy in order to achieve its desired goals. As North Korea's incessant efforts to advance its nuclear weapons and ICBMs programs brings with a dismal outlook for peace building both on the Korean Peninsula and the world, this paper investigates a series of policy lessons to manage the North Korean nuclear crisis.

To Be or Not to Be: Great Power Dilemmas and the Iranian Nuclear Programme

Mark Fitzpatrick, Michael Elleman and Paulina Izewicz. 2019. Uncertain Future: The JCPOA and Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programmes. Routledge. 168 pp. ISBN: 9780367197056. Dennis C. Jett. 2018. The Iran Nuclear Deal: Bombs, Bureaucrats, and Billionaires. Palgrave Macmillan. 481 pp. ISBN: 9783319598222. Moritz. Pieper. 2018. Hegemony and Resistance around the Iranian Nuclear Programme. Routledge. 190 pp. ISBN: 9780367173807. Farhad Rezaei. 2017. Iran’s Nuclear Program: A Study in Proliferation and Rollback. Palgrave Macmillan. 272 pp. ISBN: 9783319441191. Trita Parsi. 2017. Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy. Yale University Press. 472 pp. ISBN: 9780300218169. This article looks at the competing dilemmas faced by the great powers and the reasons for their eventual cooperation concerning Iran’s nuclear programme. The great powers were divided between those who wanted a total roll back and those who supported meaningful and verifiable limits. Using the levels of analysis framework, the article looks at individual actors, structural factors and the domestic interconnections that sustained the Iranian nuclear crisis and propelled its eventual resolution in the form of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

The Role of Mongolia in Multilateral Security Cooperation in Twenty-First Century Northeast Asia: Relevance of the 'Ulaanbaatar Dialogue (UBD)' Initiative

The Role of Mongolia in Multilateral Security Cooperation in Twenty-First Century Northeast Asia:Relevance of the 'Ulaanbaatar Dialogue (UBD)' Initiative Jaehyuk Jang (bio) and Kisun Kim (bio) Factors for geopolitical conflict and power balance still exist potently in intra-regional politics in Northeast Asia. The role of a third country that could increase the possibility of creating an international regime as an institution is important. In the past, Mongolia did not receive a lot of attention in intra-regional or regional political affairs, as its military and economy were weak compared to other countries in the region. However, despite being a landlocked country surrounded by both China and Russia, Mongolia has used its geographical position strategically as a neutral state that can contribute positively to regional cooperation in Northeast Asia and proactively has proposed a constructive role and function for itself. As Mongolia aligns itself to the national interests of its regional neighbors and creates possibilities for regional cooperation, it is seeking a new role in Northeast Asia. Keywords Northeast Asia, multilateral security cooperation, Mongolia, Korean Peninsula, Ulaanbaatar Dialogue (UBD) Although almost 30 years has passed since the end of the Cold War, Northeast Asia, and especially the Korean Peninsula, is still virtually in a state of cold war. Confrontational rhetoric, intimidating war games, nuclear weapons, and missile tests add to rising historical and territorial disputes. There is no institutional mechanism and a weak multilateral tradition to address these regional security challenges (Enkhsaikhan 2016). The dictionary definition of East Asia is the eastern region of Asia and the countries within the region, particularly China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and Mongolia (Dictionary.com). As this definition [End Page 377] implies, Northeast Asia is not a concept that is rigorously defined. At the end of the global Cold War in 1990, Northeast Asia was left without a clear path forward for at least two reasons. First, the four assertive great powers—the United States, China, Japan, and Russia—harbored clashing aspirations for the regional security order, especially with regard to the two intractable problems of divided nations—the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait—which stood little prospect of resolution without further exacerbation as the weaker side (North Korea and Taiwan) grew more important within the region as a result of the four great powers' clashing interests (Rozman 2004). Second, economic integration at breakneck pace not only came without answers for regional institutions and trust but actually fueled nationalism as some states turned confidence into pride while others found dependence tinged with anxiety (Rozman 2007). Over the last three decades, regionalism in Northeast Asia has been championed first by Japan, then by South Korea, and finally by China, with the United States often wary that this approach would become an exclusive framework. In 2005, opposition to East Asian regionalism reached its peak amid reports that the United States feared China would dominate any such grouping.1 Yet, after Southeast Asian states orchestrated the entries of India, Australia, and New Zealand into the new East Asia Summit (EAS), this danger seemed to fade. Recognition that the South Korean public was neither rife with anti-Americanism nor ready to sustain the South Korean government's assertive foreign policies also quieted the alarm regarding a strategic shift toward China. Missing, however, was a forward-looking regional strategy that made clear the US support for regionalism consistent with globalization and in equilibrium, without any dominator. The challenge of finding a balanced approach to national interests in the handling of the North Korean nuclear crisis overlapped with that of working first of all with China and Japan and then South Korea as well as Russia, and possibly some day North Korea, in making Northeast Asia the nucleus of regionalism (Rozman 2007). Another challenge in this connection is the lack of a regional security mechanism. The political, strategic, and military interests of the region's great powers and the two Koreas intersect with each one's economic interests. Bilateral alliances play a dominant role in diplomacy because multilateralism is weak. Hence, there is a high risk of strategic misunderstanding, especially in times of crisis. Establishing a Northeast Asian security mechanism would, like in...

From Conflict Avoidance to Peaceful Path: The US-DPRK Denuclearization Interaction under the Frame of Incomplete Information Game

The North Korean nuclear crisis is not only a major security issue but also a defense strategic issue as well. Whatever future U.S. policy toward North Korea, the game between the two countries will have to figure out what kind of Pyongyang Washington is dealing with. Starting from the extreme hypothesis that the United States may take a military strike against the DPRK, this article creatively constructs the game model of incomplete information between the U.S. and the DPRK, and establishes the payoff matrix for two types of the DPRK: tough and weak. Then, the article tries to answer why the United States does not have the conditions for military strikes against North Korea through the analysis of different payoffs of the United States towards the DPRK. Also, North Korea s tactics at the negotiating table, as well as the trends of US-DPRK relations, are important and will be analyzed in the article.

Arm, to disarm: North Korea’s Cold War anti-nuclearism

North Korea is a de facto nuclear weapon state, having undertaken six tests between 2006 and 2017. Throughout a series of nuclear crises, since the early 1990s, Pyongyang has not only emphasised its sovereign right to explore nuclear options as an inevitable response to a hostile United States, but has at the same time consistently embraced an anti-nuclear stance, maintaining a commitment to the ‘denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula’. This nuclear posture – ‘arm, to disarm’ – stressing the inevitability of nuclear-arming while at the same time pledging a normative anti-nuclear commitment to denuclearisation, contains seemingly irreconcilable elements. This challenges rationalist IR theories, which are unable adequately to explain the DPRK’s position, characterising it as either a tactical diversion to disguise realist motivations or a negotiation leverage to induce economic and strategic concessions. This article offers an alternative analysis, seeking to decode the DPRK’s seemingly contradictory nuclear posture by arguing that its anti-nuclear posture has deep Cold War roots aimed at hedging its security inferiority vis-à-vis nuclear-armed enemies. It focuses on the Cold War security nexus in East Asia and examines how Pyongyang’s engagement in the anti-nuclear movement evolved to shape its seemingly irreconcilable ‘arm, to disarm’ nuclearism.

Kim's Shock: Nuclear Crisis and Corporate Investment

Kim's Shock: Nuclear Crisis and Corporate Investment

Jaderné, radiologické a chemické zbraně, radiační a chemické havárie

In addition to the professional description of the history of development and use of nuclear, radiological weapons, chemical weapons and radiation and chemical accident cases, their destructive effects and principles of protection against them the e-book also contains original case studies on the consequences of nuclear accidents and incidents such as Jaslovské Bohunice (Slovakia, 1971), Tree Mile Island (USA, 1979), Chernobyl (Ukraine, 1986), Fukushima (Japan, 2011) and also oncerning hitherto known and potential scenarios of so-called CBRN terrorism using radioactive materials. In the field of nuclear and radiological weapons, the e-book also contains a historical excursion into past nuclear crises and the subsequent period of nuclear disarmament efforts in the world. In their e-book, the authors also address the secondary effects of depleted uranium munitions on both the population and soldiers at the sites of use of these munitions in the war in the states of the former ugoslavia in the 1990s. In the field of chemical weapons and chemical accidents, the e-book contains case studies of the misuse of neuroparalytic substances such as "Novičok" from the Russian military chemical project "Foliant".

The Land of Hope: Border, Evacuation, and Rejection During a Nuclear Crisis

Film review of Land of Hope (2012)

Dynamics of Normative Change for International Nuclear Export Controls

Abstract Like other normative systems, the international nuclear export control norms are incomplete and at times contradictory. Thus, contestations to the international nuclear export control norms inevitably emerge, as they did in the wake of the 1974 Indian nuclear test and the 1991 discovery of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. These two nuclear crises prompted intense debates regarding the adequacy of the existing norms. The outcome of the debates generated overwhelming agreement and action among nuclear suppliers that they required strengthening. Drawing on Wayne Sandholtz’s theory of normative change, which argues that events trigger disputes whose outcomes modify norms, this article illustrates how the nuclear export control norms have evolved in a cyclical fashion. The article aims to contribute to the constructivist literature on normative change and discusses policy implications.

Rewards Versus Sanctions in International Relations: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Bluffing

ABSTRACT I use game-theoretic models to compare a sender's expected payoff across two methods of wielding influence under asymmetric information: offering rewards and threatening sanctions. Attempts to influence the actions of another can have the perverse effect of actually encouraging the behavior that one is trying to discourage by creating incentives to bluff, which may differ across foreign policy regimes. Under a reward regime, targets can bluff to extort larger inducements. Under a sanction regime, targets can bluff to deter coercion attempts. I find that while sanctions are a weakly dominant tool of influence under complete information, rewards can be preferable under incomplete information. Specifically, the sender finds promises more beneficial than threats if she expects that (i) coercion would likely fail and (ii) her willingness to offer bribes would not get exploited by the target. I examine the United States' foreign policy reversal from punishments to inducements towards North Korea during the nuclear crisis of 1993--4 to illustrate these theoretical propositions.

A New Case for the Study of Individual Events in Political Science

Abstract Despite significant advances in both quantitative and qualitative methods over the last few years, the discipline of political science has yet to explicitly address the special challenges and benefits of studying specific historical events marked by high levels of contingency. The field of security studies, where concrete historical cases have always played a major role in the development of the subfield, should place special focus on the specific challenges and benefits to the study of such events. Taking full advantage of what event-specific research can teach us, however, will require thinking about generalizability, evidence, the role of contingency, and falsifiability in ways that are not yet fully understood in the discipline. More clarity on such questions will benefit our understanding of like nuclear crises in particular.

“The Courtroom of World Opinion”: Bringing the International Audience into Nuclear Crises

AbstractWhat role does the international audience play in nuclear crises? Scholars of nuclear crises and deterrence have treated nuclear crises as dyadic interactions between two sides. However, states do not only interact with each other during a nuclear crisis. They also signal to a third actor—the international audience. There are two reasons for this. First, states care about their international social reputation and want to be perceived as responsible and legitimate actors. Second, there are material benefits to states maintaining a good social reputation with the international audience, which possesses the leverage to reward, condemn, and sanction. States thus attempt to leverage this power of the international audience to apply diplomatic pressure on their adversary during nuclear crises. They also engage in costly signaling and strategic restraint to ensure that the international audience considers their actions legitimate during the crisis. I use original qualitative evidence from the Kargil War (1999) between India and Pakistan to demonstrate this dynamic. Incorporating the international audience as a critical third actor during nuclear crises has important academic and policy implications for the study of nuclear crises and their management.¿Qué función cumple el público internacional en las crisis nucleares? Los estudiosos de la disuasión y las crisis nucleares han tratado dichas crisis como interacciones diádicas entre dos lados. No obstante, los Estados no solo interactúan entre sí durante una crisis nuclear. También hacen señas a un tercer actor: el público internacional. Esto se debe a dos motivos. En primer lugar, los Estados se preocupan por su reputación social internacional y desean que se los perciba como actores responsables y legítimos. En segundo lugar, existen beneficios materiales para los Estados que mantienen una buena reputación social con el público internacional, el cual tiene influencia en la recompensación, la condena y la sanción. Por tanto, los Estados intentan aprovechar este poder del público internacional para aplicar presión diplomática en su adversario durante las crisis nucleares. También emplean un envío de señas costoso y restricciones estratégicas para garantizar que el público internacional considere sus acciones como legítimas durante la crisis. Utilizo pruebas cualitativas originales de la guerra de Kargil (1999) entre India y Pakistán para demostrar esta dinámica. La incorporación del público internacional como un tercer actor fundamental durante las crisis nucleares presenta importantes implicaciones académicas y políticas para el estudio de las crisis nucleares y su manejo.Quel rôle le public international joue-t-il dans les crises nucléaires? Les chercheurs se consacrant à la dissuasion et aux crises nucléaires ont traité les crises nucléaires comme étant des interactions dyadiques entre deux camps. Cependant, les États ne se contentent pas d'interagir l'un avec l'autre lors d'une crise nucléaire. Ils émettent également un signal à l'attention d'un acteur tiers, le public international. Il y a deux raisons à cela. D'une part, les États se soucient de leur réputation sociale internationale et souhaitent être perçus comme des acteurs responsables et légitimes. Et d'autre part, le maintien d'une bonne réputation sociale auprès du public international présente des avantages matériels pour les États puisque ce public dispose de l'influence nécessaire pour récompenser, condamner et sanctionner. Les États tentent donc de tirer parti de ce pouvoir du public international pour exercer une pression diplomatique sur leur adversaire lors de crises nucléaires. Ils s'engagent également dans un signal coûteux et dans une retenue stratégique pour veiller à ce que le public international considère leurs actions comme légitimes durant la crise. Je m'appuie sur des preuves qualitatives originales issues du conflit de Kargil (1999) entre l'Inde et le Pakistan pour démontrer cette dynamique. L'intégration du public international comme troisième acteur essentiel lors de crises nucléaires a d'importantes implications politiques et de recherche pour l’étude des crises nucléaires et de leur gestion.

РОЛЬ США В РАЗРЕШЕНИИ ПЕРВОГО СЕВЕРОКОРЕЙСКОГО ЯДЕРНОГО КРИЗИСА

The article examines the relationship between the United States and the DPRK during the first North Korean nuclear crisis. It discusses the events leading up to the crisis and the behavior of both sides and international organizations before and during the crisis. The article draws up the role of South Korea during the escalation of the crisis, as well as influence of other countries interested in resolving the crisis. It analyzes the U.S.-North Korea relationship and the impact of the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the international situation at that time. In this aspect, the study of the Korean nuclear program and the role of the United States has not previously been carried out in Russian historiography. The discussion leads to the design and stages of the KEDO creation with attention to the documents on this international consortium. The situation demonstrates different visions on the USA foreign policy strategy chosen in relation to the DPRK nuclear problem in 1990s, namely the opinion of the United States diplomats working on relations with the DPRK, and American researchers in humanities and technology. The paper concludes with the reasons of the Framework Agreements’ failure that led to the crises.