Abstract

The article examines the relationship between the United States and the DPRK during the first North Korean nuclear crisis. It discusses the events leading up to the crisis and the behavior of both sides and international organizations before and during the crisis. The article draws up the role of South Korea during the escalation of the crisis, as well as influence of other countries interested in resolving the crisis. It analyzes the U.S.-North Korea relationship and the impact of the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the international situation at that time. In this aspect, the study of the Korean nuclear program and the role of the United States has not previously been carried out in Russian historiography. The discussion leads to the design and stages of the KEDO creation with attention to the documents on this international consortium. The situation demonstrates different visions on the USA foreign policy strategy chosen in relation to the DPRK nuclear problem in 1990s, namely the opinion of the United States diplomats working on relations with the DPRK, and American researchers in humanities and technology. The paper concludes with the reasons of the Framework Agreements’ failure that led to the crises.

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