From Conflict Avoidance to Peaceful Path: The US-DPRK Denuclearization Interaction under the Frame of Incomplete Information Game

Abstract

The North Korean nuclear crisis is not only a major security issue but also a defense strategic issue as well. Whatever future U.S. policy toward North Korea, the game between the two countries will have to figure out what kind of Pyongyang Washington is dealing with. Starting from the extreme hypothesis that the United States may take a military strike against the DPRK, this article creatively constructs the game model of incomplete information between the U.S. and the DPRK, and establishes the payoff matrix for two types of the DPRK: tough and weak. Then, the article tries to answer why the United States does not have the conditions for military strikes against North Korea through the analysis of different payoffs of the United States towards the DPRK. Also, North Korea s tactics at the negotiating table, as well as the trends of US-DPRK relations, are important and will be analyzed in the article.