Abstract

To North Korea's big disappointment, President Bush was re-elected and started his second term on January 20, 2005. On February 10, a few weeks after President Bush's second inauguration, North Korea said it would not attend 6-Party talks aimed at ending its nuclear weapons program unless the United States dropped its “hostile” policy toward the North. Pyongyang also confirmed that it has manufactured an undisclosed number of nuclear weapons to counter this U.S. policy. Considering the conflicting interests between the United States and North Korea, it will be difficult to anticipate how the North Korean nuclear crisis will be resolved. However, the relations between the United States and North Korea seem to remain in a state of tense stagnation rather than falling into a catastrophic phase. North Korea does not expect any concessions from the United States in the 6-Party talks, which only serve as a means of putting pressure on North Korea. North Korea seems convinced that a military option is not likely. North Korea may want to close the door on the United States and concentrate on the stability of its internal affairs. In the meantime, it wants to strengthen its position by extracting more plutonium. The stagnation may continue until the U.S. has enough power to keep the North from continuing to develop its nuclear program, or North Korea has enough leverage to force the United States to make substantial concession to North Korea.

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