Notion Of Autonomy Research Articles

Hacia una ética de la mirada: Farocki y las imágenes técnicas

El cine ensayo se ha convertido en uno de los géneros fílmicos más significativos de los últimos años al documentar y reflexionar sobre el papel de los medios de representación audiovisual, su injerencia en la percepción que tenemos del mundo que nos rodea o problematizar la noción de autonomía, autoría, acción, la imagen reencontrada. En este artículo se abordan varias de las características centrales del cine-ensayístico al examinar una de sus obras más importantes: Imágenes y epígrafes de guerra (Bilder der Welt und Inschrift des Krieges, 1989) de Harun Farocki. Se analizan algunos de los motivos formales que expresan de manera puntual la estética de este autor como la relación entre la escritura y el cine, el trabajo dialéctico del montaje, la relación entre la industria bélica y los medios de comunicación.

Fully Autonomous AI.

In the fields of artificial intelligence and robotics, the term "autonomy" is generally used to mean the capacity of an artificial agent to operate independently of human guidance. It is thereby assumed that the agent has a fixed goal or "utility function" with respect to which the appropriateness of its actions will be evaluated. From a philosophical perspective, this notion of autonomy seems oddly weak. For, in philosophy, the term is generally used to refer to a stronger capacity, namely the capacity to "give oneself the law," to decide by oneself what one's goal or principle of action will be. The predominant view in the literature on the long-term prospects and risks of artificial intelligence is that an artificial agent cannot exhibit such autonomy because it cannot rationally change its own final goal, since changing the final goal is counterproductive with respect to that goal and hence undesirable. The aim of this paper is to challenge this view by showing that it is based on questionable assumptions about the nature of goals and values. I argue that a general AI may very well come to modify its final goal in the course of developing its understanding of the world. This has important implications for how we are to assess the long-term prospects and risks of artificial intelligence.

Fronteiras e feridas na escrita de Carolina Maria de Jesus

O presente artigo pretende pensar como a obra da escritora Carolina Maria de Jesus pressiona a abertura de uma possibilidade de afirmação da noção de autonomia literária, na qual, paradoxalmente, vida e obra estão irremediavelmente associadas em sua dimensão estética e política em relação com a história e a cultura. A noção de autonomia que aqui se vislumbra resiste, portanto, constantemente ao risco de isolamento, alienação e solidão, atravessamentos que significariam o ponto final da escrita. Para tal, toma como ponto de partida os modos de produção de aberturas de espaço nos diários Quarto de despejo (1960), Casa de Alvenaria (1961) e Onde estaes felicidade (2014) que projetam uma cena literária que permite a (co)existência de elementos postos de fora do espaço da representação.

Understanding Autonomy: An Urgent Intervention.

In this paper, I argue that the principle of respect for autonomy can serve as the basis for laws that significantly limit conduct, including orders mandating isolation and quarantine. This thesis is fundamentally at odds with an overwhelming consensus in contemporary bioethics that the principle of respect for autonomy, while important in everyday clinical encounters, must be ‘curtailed’, ‘constrained’, or ‘overridden’ by other principles in times of crisis. I contend that bioethicists have embraced an indefensibly ‘thin’ notion of autonomy that uproots the concept from its foundations in Kantian ethics. According to this thin conception, respect for autonomy, if unconditioned by competing principles (beneficence, justice, non-maleficence) would give competent adults the right to do anything they desired to do so long as they satisfied certain baseline psychological conditions. I argue that the dominant ‘principlist’ model of bioethical reasoning depends on this thin view of autonomy and show how it deprives us of powerful analytical tools that would help us to think seriously about the foundations of human rights, justice, and law. Then, I offer a brief sketch of a ‘thick’, historically grounded notion of autonomy and show what we could gain by taking it seriously.

FACILITATIVE ASPECTS OF LEARNER’S AUTONOMY

In the article it was shown that autonomy, generally, was not seen as a method or a behavior to be taught a learner. On the contrary, it is understood as innate part of human nature which is usually exercised over different areas of life not only in the aspect of language learning. By nature, we are all autonomous from birth since we fully, however, not always consciously, control what we learn during developmental learning stages. Frequently, even young children display their autonomy clearly when they choose to learn particular undesirable behavior, for example, saying inappropriate words. As can be seen, the notion of autonomy is not a recent “fashion”, but it has always been present in a human life.
 We presented facilitative aspects of learner’s autonomy: autonomy is a construct of capacity; autonomy involves a willingness on the part of the learner to take responsibility for their own learning; the capacity and willingness of learners take such a responsibility is not necessarily innate; complete autonomy is an idealistic goal; there are some main degrees of autonomy; the degrees of autonomy are unstable and variable; autonomy is not simply a matter of placing learners in situations where they have to be independent; developing autonomy requires conscious awareness of the learning process – i.e. conscious reflection and decision-making; promoting autonomy is not simply a matter of teaching strategies; autonomy can take place both inside and outside the classroom; autonomy has a social as well as an individual dimension; the promotion of autonomy has a political as well as psychological dimension; autonomy is interpreted differently by different cultures.
 Facilitative aspects of learner’s autonomy amaze us with their results: learners recognize and accept the need to organize the activity in an environment of interpersonal communication, facilitating personal development and providing constructive personal changes; they develop skills of empathic comprehension; they are interested by participants in creating the conditions for the formation of meaningful learning and personal development as a whole as a result of restructuring of personal attitudes in the process of interpersonal interaction; they are aware of their self-sufficiency. All these numerous situations of interaction of people are carried out through four main methods of interaction: persuasion, imitation, suggestion and infection, which are facilitative in their context.
 Persuasion is the process of rationale judgment or inference. Imitation is the reproduction by a person of certain external traits of behavior, manners and actions. Suggestion is the psychological impact of one person on another one, calculated on the uncritical perception of words, thoughts and will expressed by them. Infection is the process of transferring of the emotional state from one individual to another, in addition to semantic effect itself. When all these methods of interaction are brought into action, the educational product, as a rule, is distinguished by a creative, non-standard approach and, what is the most important, they are always in demand by students.

Augmenting autonomy: ‘New Collar’ labor and the future of tech work

This essay maps IBM’s attempts to construct a typology of high-tech ‘New Collar’ work and leverage policymaking outcomes to underwrite IBM corporate ventures capable of materializing this work. Through a discursive analysis of IBM corporate texts, webpages, and the 2017 New Collar Jobs Act, I argue for New Collar work to be understood through the lens of autonomy, as IBM recasts notions of ‘autonomous’ technology onto humans by downplaying dystopic associations of technological autonomy and transferring notions of autonomy to human workers. In doing so, I account for IBM’s use of ‘augmentation’ to situate human intelligence as the cognitive force uplifted by work performed with artificial intelligence. By pairing human augmentation with posthumanist conceptions of ‘distributed cognition’, IBM centers human intelligence through a redistributed cognition that reverses posthumanism’s decentering of human supremacy. Following from this, I unpack ‘New Collar’ as a reinvention of ‘white’ and ‘blue’ collar dichotomies and New Collar work as the grounds for tech workers to reinvent themselves. In this way, by minimizing the necessity of 4-year college degrees as pathways to economic and professional mobility, IBM constructs ‘New Collar’ with embedded notions of enlarged self-determination for applied worker intellect, vocational training, and employability. Under the aegis of creating, training, and employing New Collar workers, IBM pursues policy outcomes to underwrite corporate ventures related to New Collar work and bolster its institutional autonomy amidst marketplaces of cognitive capitalism. By outlining how tax relief provisions of the New Collar Jobs Act correlate with neoliberal ideologies of legislators and IBM investments in public–private vocational models and cybersecurity platforms, I account for IBM’s elongated ‘economy of learning’ that enables the company to more thoroughly capture, underwrite, and commodify New Collar cognition from training to market outputs.

Self-Directedness and the Question of Autonomy: From Counterfeit Education to Critical and Transformative Adult Learning

The aim of this paper is to introduce a correction into the notion of self-directed adult learning by way of conjoining it with philosophically elaborated notions of autonomy, self-reflectiveness, and maturity. The basic premise of this intervention is that in andragogical theorizing, learners’ self-directedness ought not to be thought as obvious and thus beyond question. Since adult selves are not transparent but socially, culturally, and discoursively constructed, adult educators are encouraged to think of themselves as facilitators of adult learners’ self-awareness and self-directedness in their learning processes. Adult learners need to be assisted in developing critical skills that can be used to eliminate distortions in their perception of social reality, in understanding their own personalities, their needs and decisions concerning continuing education. The problematization of the concept of human autonomy amid external influences, is first discussed in Immanuel Kant’s idea of maturity as an ability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another. I then turn to Habermas’s philosophy of communicative action and three knowledge-constitutive interests where the human interest in emancipation comes to the fore. Its significance for critical adult learning is further emphasized in line with Stephen Brookfield’s and Jack Mezirow’s association of self-directed learning with empowerment, understood as freeing consciousness from its dependence on hypostatized powers. Drawing on Foucault’s work, I argue that attaining the state of autonomy requires practice in “the care for oneself” which amounts to the lifelong endeavor to create and govern oneself and to learn how not to be governed. The agenda for adult education for citizenship opted for in this paper attributes essential significance to learnable skills of critical reasoning, deliberation, and self-reflectiveness which all operate within three proposed dimensions of adult education: experiential learning, literacy, and vocationalism.

Measurement, self-tracking and the history of science: An introduction.

This article introduces the papers contained in this special issue and explores a new field of interest in the history of science: that of measurement and self-making. In this special issue, we aim to show that a focus on self-tracking and individualized measurement provides insight into the ways technologies of quantification, when applied to individual bodies and selves, have introduced new notions of autonomy, responsibility, citizenship, and the possibility of self-improvement and life-course decisions. This introduction is an exploratory history of measurement and self-making, and it provides a discussion of self-tracking in the past as part of the genealogy of present-day digital self-tracking technologies. It concludes that a focus on measurement and self-making highlights the relationship between measurement and morality, the making of the ideal of an autonomous self, capable of improvement, and the relationship between autonomy and surveillance.

Autonomy as a disposition to non-domination in the work of Mary Wollstonecraft

ABSTRACTIn this paper I argue that there is a notion of autonomy which can be extrapolated from Wollstonecraft’s work: central to this notion is the need for us all to adopt a disposition to non-domination.Thus, an individual is autonomous when she is not dominated but also, how she behaves towards others is significant, for she is only truly autonomous if she does not dominate others. I argue that such a disposition can be read in Wollstonecraft as something which cuts across the public/private divide. It is based on the notion that individuals are always capable of being rational in both of these spheres. There must be a disposition to non-domination because Wollstonecraft demonstrates how domination is corrupting, and when this disposition is lost we find ourselves faced with myriad concerns from slavery to multiple forms of social oppression. Domination creates relations of dependency. It is arbitrary and contingent and makes us relate to each other with a marked lack of compassion. Instead, Wollstonecraft stresses we have a duty to treat others as equals and key to this duty is the need to not dominate others. Finally, I highlight how Wollstonecraft suggests such a disposition is to be gained through education.

Carrying the Choice Theory of Contracts Further: Transfers, Welfare, and the Size of the Community

Abstract The Choice Theory of Contracts is an ambitious, concise, and largely successful contribution to contract theory. Choice Theory is a liberal theory of contract law, grounded in a rich notion of autonomy, which stresses the obligation of the legal system to enhance our autonomy by ensuring the multiplicity of contractual types within the spheres of family, employment, home, and commerce.This article mitigates three shortcomings in The Choice Theory of Contracts and tries to carry Choice Theory further. A first shortcoming of the book is that the critique of transfer theory fails to acknowledge its analytical value. Second, in Part II of the book, Dagan and Heller overlap two issues: what the goods of contract are, and the compatibility of Choice Theory with the key concepts used by mainstream contract theories. Finally, Dagan and Heller do not fully acknowledge that the value of our autonomy is related to our ability to choose well. These revisions are useful to channelling scholarly attention on the implementation of Choice Theory and to sharpening the conceptual tools needed to do so.To show the potential of Choice Theory, this article carries it further. First, the economic concept of consumer sovereignty extends the programme of autonomy-grounded economic theories of contracts. Second, the size of the communities in which contractual relationships are created helps understand how various doctrines and even entire branches of the law foster the autonomy-enhancing capacity of contracts.The article concludes with a series of suggestions for carrying Choice Theory even further.

Fineman and vulnerability

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to argue that the work of the American feminist political and legal philosopher, Martha Fineman can be the basis for a shift away from the proceduralism and managerialism that has come to dominate social work practice. Design/methodology/approach This paper’s work is based on the application of Fineman’s work to social welfare settings. Findings Fineman’s work calls for a radical rethinking of our notions of autonomy and vulnerability. Originality/value This paper applies Fineman’s work to this field.

Supporting Choice and Control—An Analysis of the Approach Taken to Legal Capacity in Australia’s National Disability Insurance Scheme

In mid-2013, the Australian federal government introduced the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS), a ground-breaking reform of disability support services, encapsulated by the mantra of increasing “choice and control”. The scheme provides eligible persons with disabilities a legislated entitlement to supports they may require to increase their independence and social and economic participation. The NDIS has been hailed as a major step forward in Australia’s efforts to realize the human rights of persons with disabilities, in accordance with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). A core aspect of the CRPD is guaranteeing persons with disabilities their civil and political right to equality before the law, including their right to enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others, as provided by Article 12 of the CRPD. The purpose of this paper is to examine how the concept of choice and control has been operationalized within the NDIS and to critically analyze the extent to which it accords with the requirements of Article 12. It will be argued that even though the NDIS expressly seeks to implement the CRPD as one of its key objectives, it ultimately falls short in fully embracing the obligations of Article 12 and the notions of autonomy and personhood underlying it.

Kant, Rawls, and the Possibility of Autonomy

One feature of John Rawls’s well-ordered society in both A Theory of Justice (TJ) and Political Liberalism (PL) is that citizens in the well-ordered society, when adhering to the principles of justice governing that society, realize their full autonomy. This notion of full autonomy is explicitly Kantian. This constancy, I shall argue, raises problems. Though the model of the well-ordered society presented in TJ is arguably consistent with Kant’s notion of autonomy, the model of the well-ordered society presented in PL is not. The problem is that in the well-ordered society of PL people’s reasons for complying with the principles of justice are overdetermined in a problematic way. This raises the interesting question of acting from overdetermined motives in Kant’s system of ethics. In this paper I argue that regardless of which plausible interpretation of acting from overdetermined motives we adopt, the prospect of citizens realizing their full autonomy in Rawls’s PL are small. This is a serious defect of the theory.

Od predmetne ka sistemskojumetnosti

Unlike standard approaches to the interpretation of neo-avant-garde practices mainly based on Birger's interpretation, which has avant-garde as the starting point and institutionalization of avantgarde practices and loss of critical potential as the outcome, the aim of this research is to show that these practices are results of changes that can be identified in different registers and related to Kuhn's notion of the paradigm shift. The thesis of this research is that neoavant-garde practices are an introduction of a new mode of operation of artistic works, which basically represents a system. Such systemic way of functioning represents a critical departure from the notion of autonomy which is of key importance for the modernistic conception of art and for the introduction of a relational way of functioning of artistic works based on the connection of various elements, artistic and non artistic, as well as establishing of connections with non artistic systems. The systematic mode of operation of artistic works is, at the same time, an outcome of the post-war social context, strengthening of the consumerist society, dominance of the media of mass communication and mass culture whose effects are the mass production of images and their dominance in the visual register previously reserved for art. The conclusion of this research is that the system, viewed from today's point of view, is a transition period between dual (world vs. picture, abstraction vs. representation, high vs. mass art ...) and networked mode of operation, which is a key feature of art at the beginning of the 21st century.

Кант о человеческом достоинстве: автономия, человечность и права человека

This paper explores the new frontier within Kantian scholarship which suggests that Kant places so much special importance on the value of rational nature that the supreme principle of morality and the concept of human dignity are both grounded on it. Advocates of this reading argue that the notion of autonomy and dignity should now be considered as the central claim of Kant’s ethics, rather than the universalisation of maxims. Kant’s ethics are termed as repugnant for they place a high demand on the universalisation of maxims as a universal moral principle. As a result, they argue that there is an urgent need to rescue Kant’s ethics from the controversies surrounding maxims and universalisability, and the best way to rescue his ethics is by “leaving deontology behind”. It must be left behind because the categorical imperative is not needed in order to rescue Kant’s ethics, as deontology is often overrated. Consequently, the highest duties of the human being are to ensure that his fellow human beings enjoy unhindered autonomy and receive the honour that their dignity duly deserves, as well as to look after their welfare and treat them with respect, regardless of their dispositions. I review recent literature to appraise this new frontier within Kantian scholarship. I also explore the works of philosophers, such as Herman, Korsgaard, Wood, Höffe, and, specifically, Hill, on Kant’s conception of human dignity in relation to its conception as autonomy, humanity, and the source of human rights.

The Restricted Autonomy of Journalism and Cinema

This text brings together reflections on how Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of autonomy, which he drew on in the context of his theory of fields, can be used in research on journalism and cinema. Journalism and cinema cannot easily be compared with pure specialist activities, but their essential traits fit the model and analysis that Bourdieu developed mainly on the basis of the French literary field. At the same time, these two universes seem to present less autonomy than the literary field, and unlike poetry, for example, they have continued to represent economic and political stakes. Finally, comparing the development of the two in France since the end of the nineteenth century shows that there have been rather long-term trends towards autonomization in both these social spaces. Over the past three or four decades, this movement has been characterized by dominant dynamics that, in certain regards, constitute a break with those trends.

The “Principle of Autonomy” in Contract under the Civil Code of Ethiopian: Is It an Absolute Principle?

Many legal systems consider the role of contract law as enforcing the agreement of the parties. The conception of autonomy or freedom of contract during the classical period of contract law suggests that the law should enforce any agreement that was “freely made” between the parties provided that it has no adverse effect on others. The contemporary trend (after 1980 G.C), inspired by the concern for fairness and justice, challenges the classical notion of autonomy of contract. While contract law emphasizes the autonomy of the parties to choose their own terms, there are some sets of restrictions, i.e. mandatory rules. These are the “rules of the game” which the parties have not chosen, and most of which are not within the powers of the parties to disregard or waive by agreement. The autonomy of contract is among the founding principles of the concept of “contract” under the Civil Code of Ethiopia (CCE). This paper examined the scope of the principle of autonomy as adopted under Book IV Title XII of the Civil Code of Ethiopia. To this end, as a doctrinal research, qualitative research method is applied to explore and understand the principle of autonomy under the Ethiopian law of contract.

The adaptation of society to ageing today

Living at home as long as possible, adapting 'old age' policies to dependent elderly people, using new technologies to enable elderly people to remain at home and funding dependence are just some of the challenges facing today's society. The law relating to the adaptation of society to ageing was constructed around the notion of autonomy. This article presents an overview of this complex patient management.

The adaptation of society to ageing today

Living at home as long as possible, adapting 'old age' policies to dependent elderly people, using new technologies to enable elderly people to remain at home and funding dependence are just some of the challenges facing today's society. The law relating to the adaptation of society to ageing was constructed around the notion of autonomy. This article presents an overview of this complex patient management.

Creativity, coevolution, and computerized coproduction: reframing creativity from a nonanthropocentric approach

This article proposes a philosophical foundation for a new understanding of natural and artificial creativity based on a notion of relational creativity that encompasses both human and nonhuman creativity. We combine the inspiration from computational creativity with proposals from philosophy of technology and philosophy of organisms and discuss the ideas presented through an imaginary scenario based on the interaction between a creative machine and a locked-in syndrome patient. By doing so, we attempt to discuss why it is valuable to incorporate Gilbert Simondon’s notions of autonomy, integration, and amplification, as creativity features that can be candidates to substitute categories as hard to assess as novelty, surprise, and value.