Northern Ireland Peace Process Research Articles

The Role of Civil Society in Conflict Resolution: The Opsahl Commission in Northern Ireland, 1992-93

The Role of Civil Society in Conflict Resolution:The Opsahl Commission in Northern Ireland, 1992-93 Marianne Elliott As a historian, I have spent much of my professional life thinking and writing about the various traditions in Ireland and the historical background to the conflict in Northern Ireland. As such it was my privilege to have served as one of the seven commissioners of the 1993 Opsahl Commission. The others were Lady Lucy Faulkner, the widow of Brian Faulkner (the prime minister of Northern Ireland, 1971-72); Rev. Dr. Eric Gallagher, former president of the Methodist Church in Ireland; Eamonn Gallagher, the former European Community Director General for Fisheries; Professor Padraig O'Malley, a prominent political scientist; and Professor Ruth Lister, a leading academic in social policy. This is my personal recollection and analysis of the process. The Opsahl Commission was an independent public inquiry, entirely separate from government and state authorities. It was headed up by Professor Torkel Opsahl, the highly respected Norwegian human rights lawyer.1 He had retained an interest in the Northern Ireland conflict since he acted as the European Commission of Human Rights rapporteur on the Irish government's case against Britain for the ill-treatment of internees in 1971. In 1991 and 1992, when such a commission was first envisaged, all-party political talks had collapsed for a second time in two years. There seemed to be a vacuum in constructive thinking in Northern Ireland, in the middle of perhaps the worst period of tit-for-tat sectarian killings since the early 1970s. Nearly everybody that we spoke to wanted their politicians to return to the talks table, but there was considerable frustration at the lack of public "ownership" of the process. [End Page 86] It was the first time I had heard that term "ownership" used in the context of the peace process in Northern Ireland and I was bemused by it then. I am not now. What was being said was that the resolution of conflict must involve society as a whole, for if people do not feel that they have played some part in what emerges, their commitment to making it work will be dramatically reduced. These seemingly self-evident concepts are central to the very notion of a civil society. The idea of giving a voice to "ordinary people" had come from a brainstorming session between Robin Wilson (then editor of Fortnight Magazine) and Simon Lee (professor of jurisprudence at Queens University Belfast) late in 1991. They then set up a citizens' inquiry to be called "Initiative '92" to prepare the ground for what would become the Opsahl Commission. Wilson and Lee raised the finance, persuaded 220 patrons and a team of dedicated field researchers to prepare the way and gain the trust of those very people who felt disenfranchised and had "turned off" politics: most notably women, working-class Protestants, republicans, and the young. The idea was to have a totally independent commission, which would seek submissions from any group or person about ways forward in Northern Ireland. Those who felt inhibited by this were to be helped to be heard; confidential focus groups and private sessions were also to be facilitated. Such gathering of information was to be followed up by public sessions all over Northern Ireland (nineteen sessions in eleven different venues), as well as two Schools Assemblies in Derry and Belfast—in addition to a number of confidential sessions with leading figures. The project adapted a logo of a microphone being placed into someone's hand, with the legend, "Your Chance to Speak." By its end, some 3,000 people and groups were involved in submissions. At the outset, the Commission was criticized by a number of politicians, but the northern press welcomed the initiative as something new. In the end every party—including Sinn Féin and the emerging loyalist political parties, the Ulster Democratic Party and Progressive Unionist Party—talked with us. The format of the Opsahl Commission has been followed by every subsequent commission.2 The principle that the public as well as the elected politicians deserve to be consulted is now generally accepted. I think, too, that giving people responsibility for the...

The Northern Ireland Peace Process and “Terroristic” Narratives: A Reply to Edwards and McGrattan

In their article published in this journal, 1 Edwards and McGrattan charge that some of us who have written about the peace process in Northern Ireland “risk complicity in reproducing the terrorist...

An honourable deception? The Labour government, the Good Friday Agreement and the Northern Ireland peace process

The former Prime Minister Tony Blair and his Chief of Staff and key negotiator on the Province, Jonathan Powell, have admitted that they used deception to advance the peace process in Northern Ireland. This article argues that the Labour government misled the people of Northern Ireland about the implications of the Good Friday Agreement to secure a ‘Yes’ vote in the referendum on the deal. During the referendum campaign British Prime Minister was prominent among those arguing that there would be decommissioning before either paramilitary prisoners were released or Sinn Fein sat in government. Legislation to release paramilitary prisoners without prior decommissioning was introduced into Parliament just 2 weeks after the referendum. In December 1999 Sinn Fein entered government without IRA decommissioning. Tony Blair later acknowledged that the ‘political skills’ that were initially useful in pushing the peace process forward became counterproductive and undermined the moderate powersharing settlement that the GFA was intended to deliver. Powersharing between the hardline parties in 2007 was the fortuitous, if less desirable, outcome.

From Abstentionism to Enthusiasm: Sinn Féin, Nationalist Electors and Support for Devolved Power-sharing in Northern Ireland

The Northern Ireland peace process saw remarkable change in the policies of Sinn Féin. Having pledged to end Northern Ireland as a political entity, Sinn Féin accepted the 1998 Good Friday Agreement and has since been a strong supporter of the political institutions created under that deal. The party's backing for political institutions has amounted to the zeal of converts, the one-time ‘unequivocal support’ for the IRA's ‘armed struggle’ and repudiation of ‘partitionist institutions’ long displaced by participatory politics. This article shows how, in agreeing to work within political institutions, Sinn Féin was following the desires of the nationalist electorate, assisting the party in capturing majority support within that community. Drawing upon electoral survey data from 1998 and beyond, the article illustrates how, controlling for other demographic and socio-economic variables, it is Sinn Féin supporters who are now the most enthusiastic backers, if only marginally more than those of the Social Democratic and Labour Party, of the devolved power-sharing government in Northern Ireland.

Civil Society Leaders’ Perceptions of Hopes and Fears for the Future

Civil society actors such as nongovernmental voluntary community group leaders as well as funding agency development officers have taken a leading role in implementing grassroots-level peacebuilding efforts in post peace accord Northern Ireland. It is important to map these civil society leaders’ direct experience and their perceptions to assess the impact of the funding in the overall peace process in Northern Ireland. This article captures the hopes and fears of 120 civil society leaders and funding agency development officers in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties whose projects are funded by the International Fund for Ireland and/or the European Union Peace III Fund. Many respondents concurred that both funds have genuinely contributed toward achieving the overall goals of peacebuilding (though mostly at the grassroots level) while some were skeptical about the future sustainability of the peace process. Their skepticism was evident, as few tangible changes at the macro political–economic level have occurred since 1998 as the funding draws to an end in 2013. However, the respondents also highlighted the uncertain future that now exists for the younger generation. There is also an absence of effective leadership in the wake of the recent trend of dissident violence, which has a denegrating effect on envisioning a peaceful and just society for all citizens in Northern Ireland.

The Irish Government and Decommissioning in Northern Ireland: Exercising Best Practice for External Ethnonational Guarantors?

The reticence of the IRA to put its weapons beyond use became one of the most intractable obstacles in the Northern Ireland peace process. This article examines the approach of the Irish government to this obstacle. It does so by the application of external ethnonational guarantor (EEG) theory, which effectively captures the government's role in the conflict. It finds that the government's approach was largely in keeping with best practice for EEGs: it cooperated with the British government (the other EEG), did not intervene on behalf of its co-national group and was sensitive to the internal dynamics of the conflict. It also finds that in relation to decommissioning in Northern Ireland, these principles are at times contradictory, and where this arose the government prioritised understanding the internal dynamics of the parties to the conflict.

The Irish Government and Decommissioning in Northern Ireland: Exercising Best Practice for External Ethnonational Guarantors?

The reticence of the IRA to put its weapons beyond use became one of the most intractable obstacles in the Northern Ireland peace process. This article examines the approach of the Irish government to this obstacle. It does so by the application of external ethnonational guarantor (EEG) theory, which effectively captures the government's role in the conflict. It finds that the government's approach was largely in keeping with best practice for EEGs: it cooperated with the British government (the other EEG), did not intervene on behalf of its co-national group and was sensitive to the internal dynamics of the conflict. It also finds that in relation to decommissioning in Northern Ireland, these principles are at times contradictory, and where this arose the government prioritised understanding the internal dynamics of the parties to the conflict.

Nigeria, Boko Haram - Cutting Corners and the Illusion of Speedy Conflict Resolution

This paper is a commentary on the recent amnesty initiative by the Nigerian government to the armed extremist Northern Nigeria rebel group, the People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad (Hausa: Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad) widely known in Hausa as Boko Haram. The paper also examines the Northern Ireland peace process as a model for conflict resolution. Furthermore the paper discusses the importance of the rule of law, applicability of international law and the rights of victims as integral to the success of the peace initiatives and conflict resolution in Northern Nigeria.

Lest we remember? Recollection of the Boer War and Great War in Ireland1

Recalled memories are recalled from somewhere, and usually for some specific reason. After a generation of forgetting, Irish history has recalled the First World War and the participation of thousands of Irishmen in the service of the British Army. This recent burst of recollection has played a major role in the choreography of the peace process in Northern Ireland. Newly resurrected memory allows southern nationalists to join with northern unionists in commemorating an all-Ireland sacrifice. Nationalists can broaden their sense of nationhood to include those who fought in the ‘wrong’ war, and unionists can identify common values in their neighbours across the border. Historians, both professional and amateur, recovered this uncomfortable memory from beneath the foundation myth of the southern Irish state. From 1922 to the 1980s, official Irish history had prioritised the quasi-religious sacrifice of the Easter Rising in 1916 and the War of Independence which led to the foundation of the Irish Free State in 1922. The awkward fact that tens of thousands of Irishmen wore British uniforms in Europe, while hundreds of their countrymen fought against that same uniform in Dublin, received little coverage in school history texts. Even less space was given to the bitter Civil War which followed independence, as memories were allowed to cool and hopefully decay. This is not a straightforward account of forgetting and remembering, however, as an earlier conflict involving thousands of Dubliners has almost completely disappeared from popular Irish memory. Despite the existence of major monuments in the centre of Dublin, the memory of the South African or Boer War (1899-1902) has not attracted the same celebrity as the First World War. In relatively recent history, Irish troops in British uniform fought and died on a distant African battlefield. Intense coverage in the contemporary press, widespread public interest and profound grief (especially in Dublin city) marked the conflict out as a significant event, yet today it is forgotten. This article examines the very different forgetting and remembering applied to the South African and First World Wars. It addresses the political and social motivations for remembering. Using submerged memories in the built environment the article reflects on the space between remembering and forgetting; that national attic where histories are stored – just in case they are ever needed.

‘There is Nothing Politically Right that is Morally Wrong’? Beyond Realism and Idealism in the Northern Ireland Peace Process

Deception has played an important role in advancing the Northern Ireland peace process. This article discusses the morality of British Prime Minister Tony Blair's deception to secure a ‘Yes’ vote during the referendum campaign on the Good Friday Agreement 1998. The British Prime Minister misled Northern Irish public opinion by stating that the IRA would have to decommission before either republican prisoners were released or Sinn Féin entered government. This article explores the morality of Blair's deception from a variety of perspectives combining nationalist and unionist positions with realist and idealist approaches to deception. The idealist argues that morality does and should play an important role in politics. The realist approach, by contrast, argues that morality is not, and should not be, influential on politics. A ‘democratic realist’ argument is advanced in this article, which takes from idealism: the inevitability of morality in politics, a commitment to deepen democracy and concern about the corrosive impact of deception. From realism it takes: its ability to unmask power and hypocrisy, its critique of anti-political fundamentalist idealism and moralism, and an acceptance of the inevitability of deception.

A new challenge or a new role? The ICRC in Northern Ireland

AbstractDespite the narrative of success surrounding the Northern Ireland peace process, which culminated in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, there remain significant humanitarian consequences as a result of the violence. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has opened an office in Belfast after its assessments demonstrated a need for intervention. While a two-year ‘dirty protest’ in Northern Ireland's main prison has been recently resolved, paramilitary structures execute punishments, from beatings to forced exile and even death, outside of the legal process and in violation of the criminal code. This article examines the face of modern humanitarianism outside of armed conflict, its dilemmas, and provides analysis as to why the ICRC has a role in the Northern Ireland context.

The Problem with Northern Ireland's Peace Walls

Despite the successes of the Northern Ireland peace process, many Protestant and Catholic communities are still physically divided from one another. Cathy Gormley-Heenan and Jonny Byrne report on attitudes towards the ‘peace walls’ and assess the prospects for their eventual removal.

The USA and the Northern Ireland Peace Process

This article traces the role of the US in Northern Ireland, from the 1970s onwards. By examining the role of various US administrations, as well as the evolution of the peace process and the British–Irish relationship, it is concluded that the US, although important, was not a causal factor in the peace process. Intervention is defined in the first part of the article and US administrations from President Carter to President Obama are examined so as to determine their role in Northern Ireland.

The (Soft) Power of Commitment: The EU and Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland

This paper examines the potential of international actors to contribute to conflict resolution by analysing the evolving role of the European Union (EU) in embedding Northern Ireland's peace process. Scrutiny of the EU's approach to conflict resolution in Northern Ireland offers useful insights into the scope and potential of soft power for facilitating behavioural change from governmental to grass-roots levels. This paper traces the development of the EU's approach to conflict resolution in Northern Ireland from one concentrated on encouraging state-level agreement, to nurturing peace through multilevel funding, through now to consolidating the peace by facilitating regional-level empowerment. The core argument is that, in sum, the most critical element of the EU's contribution to peace in Northern Ireland has been, quite simply, that of enduring commitment.

Problem, Process and Product: Implementing Key Reforms in Local Government in Northern Ireland Since the Belfast Agreement

This article maps the key findings from empirical research on how local government mainstreamed new statutory duties to promote equality and good relations in a change implementation process emerging from reform introduced in 1998 to embed the Northern Ireland peace process. It departs from the elite political focus of much of the international literature on peace building and addresses organisational change developments in a context that was intensely politicised, highly contentious and required radical organisational change. Newry and Mourne District Council addressed their problem of perceived inequality in employment, by engaging in a lengthy process of change and development to achieve ‘product’ in the form of a more balanced workforce, power sharing in the Chamber and more participative democratic arrangements for decision-making, both inside the organisation and in external relations. The key factors that facilitated this change process included the availability of political will, change champions, appropriate resources and structural adaptation.

Political dialogue workshops: Deepening the peace process in Northern Ireland

AbstractBetween 1994 and 2007, the author facilitated over fifty residential three‐day political dialogue workshops at the Glencree Centre for Reconciliation outside Dublin during the negotiation phase of the Northern Ireland peace process. This article describes the structure and methodology of the workshops at second track level and how politicians from all the political parties in Ireland and Britain arrived at new intergroup understandings and forged new political relationships. It identifies four layers of the interactive dialogue space and the role of the facilitator in shaping the dialogue over multiple encounters.

Public relations and the Northern Ireland peace process: Dissemination, reconciliation and the ‘Good Friday Agreement’ referendum campaign

This study analyses the public relations strategies employed by the mainstream political parties during the ‘Good Friday Agreement’ referendum campaign in Northern Ireland in April/May 1998. Using data from elite interviews, triangulated with content analysis from campaign literature, we assess the communication strategies of the pro- and anti-Agreement parties who were attempting to persuade the people of Northern Ireland to vote Yes or No to the Agreement. Key findings of the research include: first, in comparison to the ‘normal’ political culture in Northern Ireland, there was a significant increase in the deployment of public relations expertise in the referendum campaign; indeed, for many of the political parties it represented their first major investment in political public relations. A second key finding pertains to the communicative model adopted by the key actors. All parties, in different ways, adopted a ‘dissemination’ model rather than a ‘dialogic’ one to communicate with allies, rivals and the general public. In our view this is an entirely appropriate approach to political public relations and we suggest that the communication model of the Social Democratic and Labour Party is particularly noteworthy because it was an approach underpinned, we argue, by dissemination and reconciliation. Moreover, we also suggest that public relations based on dissemination and reconciliation to difference offers a more realistic and appropriate approach, than the currently fashionable dialogic model, for the kinds of communication and information exchange required in contemporary democratic societies.

Building future coexistence or keeping people apart

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to explore the importance of cross‐communal cooperation and its contribution to peacebuilding and reconciliation in Northern Ireland through the opinions of 752 respondents.Design/methodology/approachA multivariate analysis of the respondents' opinions was gathered through a Public Opinion Survey (MBU 2006), which addresses the issue of physical separation of the Catholic and Protestant communities in the context of the Northern Ireland peace process.FindingsFindings indicate that religion is a key variable in any discussion of the sustainability of the Northern Ireland peace process in relation to cross‐community initiatives, social and economic integration as well as existing divisions between both communities. Moreover, professional and skilled worker respondents disagreed that the impacts of physical separation between both communities supports the peace process. Catholic Nationalists and respondents from Belfast city and the Western region of Northern Ireland were less likely to perceive the physical separation of both communities as negatively impacting the peace process.Practical implicationsThe implication for practice necessitates that the liberal peacebuilding model includes hybrid approaches to harness external economic aid in post‐accord societies that are inclusive of local people, ideas and concerns.Originality/valueThe value of the paper to practitioners and policymakers is that the research on the impact of external economic aid on cross community conflict must include the triangulation of both qualitative and quantitative methods to fully grasp its complexity.

Brokering Peace: Networks, Legitimacy, and the Northern Ireland Peace Process1

Goddard, Stacie E. (2012) Brokering Peace: Networks, Legitimacy, and the Northern Ireland Peace Process. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00737.x © 2012 International Studies Association After over 20 years of fighting in Northern Ireland, the Belfast Agreement of 1998 has successfully implemented a power-sharing agreement. Belfast was not the first attempt at a peaceful settlement; indeed, some scholars count as many as seven prior peace attempts in Northern Ireland, the most significant being the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973. Why was it that politicians successfully negotiated the peace in 1998, while these prior attempts failed? Drawing from social network theory, I argue that the Belfast Agreement succeeded, not because of a change of interests or disappearance of spoilers, but because of the presence of brokers at the bargaining table. Brokers, in particular, have the capacity to legitimate settlements—to frame settlements in such a way that they appear consistent with principles held by multiple coalitions. As a result, brokers are both more likely to build a winning coalition for a settlement, as well as marginalize spoilers who seek to undermine the peace.

‘Don't mention the war!’ Debating Notion of a ‘Stalemate’ in Northern Ireland (and a Response to Dr Paul Dixon)

The Northern Ireland peace process is often celebrated as a model for conflict resolution, yet our understanding of exactly what occurred is still only at a formative stage. Many details, particularly concerning the counter-terrorist operations of the British government, remain buried within official archives, available only up until 1981. Some aspects of that campaign—variously called an ‘intelligence’, ‘secret’ or ‘dirty’ war—may never be uncovered because of a lack of official documentation. Nonetheless, attempts can be made to analyse the use of ‘harder’ forms of state power. Scholars should not be shy to offer reasoned historical judgements on the basis of available evidence. In seeking to understand why the conflict followed the path it did and ultimately came to an end, ‘hard power’ cannot be written out of the story. However, some seem more inclined to a position best characterised by Basil Fawlty's famous mantra: ‘Don't mention the war!’ An exaggerated example of this was provided by Dr Paul Dixon of Kingston University in an article in a previous issue of this journal, which made a number of criticisms of our book, Talking to Terrorists; Making Peace in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country. In this article, we respond to Dixon's criticisms and offer broader reflections on what transpired in Northern Ireland. In some instances, the deployment of ‘hard power’ by the British state exacerbated the conflict and proved counter-productive. Ultimately, however, we conclude that intelligence-led counter-terrorism operations did make a significant contribution to ending the situation. This is not to advocate the use of such methods or to play down the ‘soft power’ successes which are undoubtedly part of the Northern Ireland story; it is simply to acknowledge that such tactics were deployed in the past and form part of a complex historical picture.