The Irish Government and Decommissioning in Northern Ireland: Exercising Best Practice for External Ethnonational Guarantors?

Abstract

The reticence of the IRA to put its weapons beyond use became one of the most intractable obstacles in the Northern Ireland peace process. This article examines the approach of the Irish government to this obstacle. It does so by the application of external ethnonational guarantor (EEG) theory, which effectively captures the government's role in the conflict. It finds that the government's approach was largely in keeping with best practice for EEGs: it cooperated with the British government (the other EEG), did not intervene on behalf of its co-national group and was sensitive to the internal dynamics of the conflict. It also finds that in relation to decommissioning in Northern Ireland, these principles are at times contradictory, and where this arose the government prioritised understanding the internal dynamics of the parties to the conflict.