North Korean Society Research Articles

Kim Takes Control: The "Great Purge" in North Korea, 1956-1960

The unsuccessful attempt to oust Kim Il Sung in 1956 triggered signiÞcant changes in North Korean politics and society. North Korea began to drift away from the Soviet patterns, slowly developing its own brand of "national Stalinism." North Korean relations with the Soviet Union and China also underwent deep transformation. These changes met resistance, but all dissenters were wiped out during large-scale purges, reminiscent ofStalin's "Great Purge" of 1937. This article, based on previously unknown material from Soviet archives, traces the history ofthis purge as well as the social, political, and cultural changes ofthe late 1950s.

Is Peaceful Unification Possible?

S 219 Is Peaceful Unification Possible? William Taylor, Jr. and Abraham Kim Peaceful unification under the current DPRK leadership or any leadership under the juche system is a pipedream. For decades, the juche ideology has been institutionalized and entrenched into the North Korean society. Kim Jong-il’s legitimacy as Kim I1 Sung’s successor is based upon his ability to perpetuate this ideology and its socio-political system. To ensure that he is committed to his mandate, the leaders of the Korea Worker’s Party, who also depend on juche for their livelihood and authority, hold Kim Jong-il accountable. However, saving the country from its current economic crisis would necessitate dismantling the intrusive bureaucratic party system and heavy-handed control of the economy required under the juche system. Without addressing North Korea’s economic problems, the plight of the country, not to mention the regime, looks dim. Thus, Kim Jong-il is faced with a Catch-22 situation in which the two pillars of his legitimacy are mutually destabilizing. Ultimately, this dilemma will lead to the erosion of his authority. In the meantime, Pyongyang is pursuing a three-pronged strategy to address its economic crisis while maintaining its juche system: mobilizing its people to endure economic hardship; promoting the Rajin-Sonbong special economic Zone, and soliciting international humanitarian aid to feed its starving population. But, all these efforts have failed to bring any substantive change or improvement to North Korea’s economic situation. And, it is unlikely that North Korea’s predicament can ever improve under the juche system. The United States, South Korea and Japan all prefer a soft landing for the DPRK and peaceful unification. South Korea especially understands that the financial costs of a DPRK hard landing would be staggering. But a soft landing requires North-South dialogue based, for 220 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS example, on the fundamental principles of the 1992 Agreement on Nonaggression, Reconciliation, Cooperation and Exchanges. A straight line projection of conditions in the North, where almost everything that can go wrong is going wrong, leads to the conclusion that the juche system will implode by coup d’etat, revolution or anarchy. As present conditions proceed tensions will mount on both sides of the DMZ, and at times of high tension, wars can start by accident or miscalculation. There is also the possibility that North Korea could make a limited attack south to envelop Seoul, stop, and sue for peace. This would be more likely if the DPRK leadership were to consider South Korea’s political system and economy to be in serious trouble and the resolve of the Clinton administration weak. Whatever the scenario, Washington, Seoul and Tokyo must prepare for the eventuality of war by taking immediate steps to better defend Seoul and much of Japan against North Korean surface-to-surface missiles, and to improve the air defense and counter-artillery capabilities around Seoul. Defending or significantly limiting damage to Seoul not only prepares for an unwanted war, but also removes Pyongyang’s diplomatic “ace in the hole,” that is, its capability to destroy Seoul. WILLIAM TAYLOR, JR. and ABRAHAM KIM 51 Is Peaceful Unification Possible? William Taylor, Jr. and Abraham Kim Here is yet another paper about Korean unification. There are thousands of them. The bottom line of this paper is that peaceful unification involving the present North Korean leadership or any leadership under thejuche system is a very low-probability event. The logic chain is: (1 ) peaceful unification requires a “soft landing,” (2) a soft landing requires rd economic reform, (3) real economic reform would quickly undermine the juche system, (4) the juche system is the fundamental basis (the sine qua non) of power for the present or foreseeable DPRK leadership, ( 5 ) the present North Korean system will either implode (a hard landing) or the DPRK leadership will order an attack south-or both simultaneously.

North Korea in 1989: Touched by Winds of Change?

The Festival The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) missed the excitement of the 1988 Summer Olympic Games in Seoul, but its day in the sun came 10 months later when Pyongyang hosted the thirteenth World Festival of Youth and Students (WFYS), a gathering of people from 180 nations. On July 1 the grand opening ceremony was held in the newly renamed May Day Stadium under the festival theme of antiimperialism solidarity, peace, and friendship. By all accounts the festival was staged successfully. Pyongyang had been preparing for four years, reportedly spending $4.5 billion on construction of facilities, some of which were originally intended for the Olympic Games. The Koreans reportedly received a grant of $33 million from Moscow to help pay the costs, but on seeing the many imposing buildings and the lavish entertainments staged by North Korea, the Soviets questioned the wisdom of a developing country spending so much money to stage such an exhibition. Moscow's dissatisfaction with lavish spending was not the only criticism directed at the festival. According to an Associated Press dispatch from Pyongyang, the Danish and Finnish delegations embarrassed North Korean authorities during the opening ceremony by unfurling banners that criticized Pyongyang's human rights abuses. And as might be expected, some Western journalists returned to their countries to report on the regimentation they had witnessed in North Korean society. But all in all the festival was impressive in scale and execution. Despite the closed and secret nature of North Korean society, Pyongyang found the means to open its arms to welcome foreign guests. The effects of this opening on local citizens (i.e., those relatively few who were exposed to foreigners) can be

North Korea under Kim chong-Il

Winston Churchill once described the Soviet Union as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." But in the years since Stalin's demise, the Soviet Union has become much less mysterious: foreigners are allowed to enter the country with relative ease, and the Western press is able to report openly from there on Soviet affairs; a considerable number of Soviet citizens have been permitted to emigrate. Churchill's remark can be applied with equal accuracy to mainland China, but since the early 1970's, China has been an active member of the international community. Policy changes in favor of moderation, internal and external, became possible after the deaths of the dictators, Stalin and Mao Zedung, who wielded enormous personal power over their Communist parties and state institutions. Could a similar situation arise in North Korea with the death of President Kim II-sung, who is now seventy years old? If so, can we look forward to more peaceful relations between North and South Korea, as we see, for instance, in the case of the two Germanys? A change in North Korea's "enigmatic" nature in the coming decade would have a great impact on the security interests not only of South Korea but also of the major powers concerned, including the United States. North Korea faces several problems. First, it must carry out the hereditary succession of power from Kim II-sung to his son, Kim Chong-il. This has been a gradual and laborious process. Secondly, North Korea must deal with its economic problems. Many believe it is becoming more difficult for them to maintain the highly centralized command system that has existed for thirty-seven years without any fundamental reform. Sooner or later North Korea must decide whether to relax and decentralize economic control so as to overcome the economic stagnation, in which case it will risk losing political control. The third major problem centers on North Korea's relationship with the outside world, including South Korea. For ten years now there have been cautious attempts to open North Korean society to a very limited extent, in line with political demands. Is North Korea going to open up on a larger scale, following the examples set by the USSR and China or will North Korea remain the "hermit kingdom" it has been in the past? The analysis that follows examines some of these issues and options.

Ideology and Indoctrination in the Development of North Korean Education

Changes in the educational system in North Korea during the last twenty years reflect an educational policy aimed at shifting institutional arrangements and instructional content to keep a balance between general and technical education. Ideologically committed to implementing the principles of polytechnical education expounded by Marx, Engels and Lenin, the North Korean Communists attempted to introduce into their educational institutions the principle and practice of with The execution of polytechnical education, however, was influenced more by the social realities of postwar North Korean society than by the ideology it was to follow. During the years of the Three-Year and Five-Year Economic Plans (1953-56 and 1957-60), which were carried out in the midst of a labor shortage, the precarious balance between learning and labor was often tripped in favor of labor. The pedagogical problem of balancing general and technical education in accordance with the educational ideology maintained by the North Korean Communists persisted until nearly the end of 1966, when the P'yongyang leaders introduced their fourth major educational reform in the hope of bringing schools closer to the socialist society and learning closer to laboring for the socialist fatherland. Although the leaders claimed that the 1966 reform would expand the scope of technical education in their educational institutions, in reality it was an attempt to reduce the content of technical education, which had received undue emphasis in the past, thus allowing more time for subject matter in the area of general education.