North Korean Authorities Research Articles

Brothers or not? The failure of Morning of the East, the first joint Soviet–North Korean film

ABSTRACT This paper studies the reasons for the banning of the first joint Soviet–North Korean film in history by North Korean authorities. Morning of the East, released in the Soviet Union as Brothers, was directed by Cheon Sang-in, Yun Yong-kyu, Vasily Losev and Ivan Lukinsky in 1957. Involving cooperation of both countries at each stage of production, it was filmed in the Gorky Film Studio and in natural locations in North Korea. Despite the significant involvement of the Korean intelligentsia and strong promotion of the film in DPRK magazines, the film was banned from distribution inside the country. The article provides historical background to the film production, and argues that the ban of Morning of the East cannot be explained by any political event alone. Rather, the film itself, heavily influenced by new trends in Soviet Thaw cinema, contrasted with the North Korean vision of socialist realism. Based on primary sources, and by providing historical context and film analysis, this article presents the history of an unsuccessful attempt to introduce the cinematic language of de-Stalinization into North Korean cinema.

북한 마약산업의 주요 실행 주체와 생산 시설 연구

The purpose of this study is to examine the main actors and production facilities in the North Korean drug industry and their implications. North Korea's drug production and smuggling are known to have started in the 1970s, but this is a long-standing crime since the division of Korea in August 1945 and continues to serve as its traditional source of income. The North Korean authorities' drug crimes have not been cut off, and the “drug business,” which was relatively small until the 1970s, has expanded to an industrial level from the 1980s that continues to this day. Despite the fact that North Korea's drug problem is an old problem, the current situation is known only in a fragmentary manner. Therefore, this paper is a follow-up on the studies dealing with North Korean drug problems from 1945 to the 1980s, with a focus on unveiling the reality of the development of the North Korean drug industry that began to thrive in the 1990s. Moreover, this is a foundational study to better understand North Korea's drug production capacities (technology and scale), networks and patterns, and the ripple effect it has on the Korean Peninsula and the international community. Unlike the typical criminal syndicate, the actors in North Korea's drug industry are workers and special agencies delegated and entrusted with the authority to operate the drug industry by suryong, or the great leader. In other words, these syndicates are actors that carried out operations in espionage, terrorism, weapons, and trade under the suryong dictatorship and were granted additional authority to operate the drug industry. These actors include Kim Jong Il’s younger sister Kim Kyung Hee and her husband, Jang Song Thaek, Office 39, Reconnaissance General Bureau, Ministry of State Security, Military Security Command, and the Second Economic Committee. The production facilities managed by these syndicates include the Ranam Pharmaceutical Factory, the Mannyon Pharmaceutical Factory, the Hungnam Pharmaceutical Factory, the State Academy of Science, espionage agencies, and third-country production facilities. The actors in North Korea's drug industry can be executed, dismissed, purged, expelled, or replaced at any time at the will of the leader. In addition, production facilities are repeatedly closed, restarted, and relocated due to personnel changes or security reasons. In other words, suryong and the North Korean leadership are unlikely to give up the drug industry as long as they generate huge profits even if temporary changes such as replacing intermediate managers, production facilities, and trafficking routes occur like a typical drug cartel. All North Korean officials under the Kim Jong Un dictatorship are also easily crossing the borders of law, morality, and national borders by any means for the sake of serving Kim Jong Un's interests and goals. Looking only at drug crimes led by North Korean authorities, the use of the term “state” itself may not be appropriate for North Korea as it goes beyond “criminal state” or “mafia state.” The reason is that in North Korea, “private” criminal organizations cannot infiltrate the regime on their own, and the leader and the leadership themselves possess criminal characteristics, making it contradictory to be the subject of punishment for drug crimes committed by themselves.

북한 인권 개선 정책의 과제와 한계

The research purpose of this thesis is to take interest in the recent government's policy on human rights in North Korea and examine the challenges and limitations of policies to improve human rights in North Korea in order to normalize inter-Korean relations and establish peace on the Korean Peninsula. As a research method, the activities of government ministries and literature were analyzed. The content confirmed the government's will to improve human rights for North Korean residents. The North Korean human rights issue requires a change in Kim Jong-un and the North Korean authorities, and the government and international It can be seen that there is room for improvement through cooperation between organizations, private organizations, and citizens. The task of human rights issues is that North and South Korea need more than anything to be interested in, understand, and respect human rights, and a sustainable institutional mechanism must be established to improve human rights. Limitations in improving human rights in North Korea include the lack of access to information on North Korean residents, the conflict between conservatives and progressives in South Korean society regarding human rights in North Korea, the difficulty of resolving the problem if the North Korean authorities do not change, and the human rights issue in North Korea as a negative influence on inter-Korean relations. The point is that it is having an impact.

The Right to Food and Responsibility to Protect in North Korea: In the Face of Food Availability Decline and Food Entitlement Decline*

The North Korean authorities have the responsibility to protect (R2P) their people from starvation. Yet, reports of death from starvation in North Korea have been consistent since the widespread famine during the so‐called “Arduous March.” According to Amartya Sen, in a society with massive starvation and food refugees, famine crises are not merely due to food availability decline (FAD). Instead, the dominant variable in such crises is the food entitlement decline (FED) of vulnerable social groups. Therefore, since the repeated failure of the North Korean government to fulfill its responsibility justifies and obliges the international community to act, the “food entitlement” of the North Korean people needs to be further explored from social, economic, and political perspectives to help clarify and validate such international responsibility. Focusing on Kim Jong‐un's leadership since 2012, this paper explores the substance and causes of FAD and FED in North Korea and monitors any changes. To seek effective commitments from the international community, including South Korea, the current research also analyzes the impact of the persistent violation of the people's right to food on the North Korean economic‐social system and political regime, and the ensuing influence on the human rights situation with reference to the cases of Vietnam, China, and Mongolia in terms of the dichotomic social differentiation, beginnings of the civil society, and political change in the late‐communist stage.

Dreams of Socialism Reflected in a 1947 North Korean School Textbook

In 1945, with the participation of the Soviet Union, which sent naval forces to the northern coast of the Korean peninsula as well as paratroopers to Pyongyang, Korea was liberated from Japanese colonial rule. A limited contingent of Red Army units was dispatched in the northern part of the Korean peninsula to accept Japanese surrender and maintain law and order until the establishment of the national administration. From 1945 to 1948, Soviet citizens who worked in North Korea and the new North Korean authorities both made efforts to propagate a positive image of Soviet socialism. Their efforts would be successful among the lower classes of Korean society. The middle school textbook the “Kugŏ (Native Speech 국어),” published in 1947 in North Korea, provides a clear example of how the positive image of the USSR, when it came to village development, was presented to the Korean younger generation in the framework of traditional dreams about the lives of peasants. In particular, the Korean language textbook broke down the Japanese perception of the socialist village where, according to the former Japanese colonial authorities, peasants have no private property. The “Native Speech” textbook stated that the “peasants who choose socialism will own their land themselves and will be able to have private property.”

북한주민 식량권(Right to Food)에 대한 북한과 국제사회의 책임

This study examines the fulfillment of obligations related to the right to food for the people of North Korea, considering the concept of the right to food and responsibility under international norms. The research aims to determine whether North Korea and the international community are adequately meeting their obligations in guaranteeing the right to food. International norms, such as the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, delineate the individual’s right to food and the corresponding responsibilities of states and the international community.
 North Korea has implemented various policies to enhance food production, including guidelines from the Supreme Leader, initiatives such as the field-respinsibility-system (po-jeon damdangje) that incentivizes farmers, and the upgrading of agricultural institutions. However, these efforts have yielded unsatisfactory results. The North Korean authorities’ emphasis on self-reliance, labor mobilization, and resistance to accepting food aid from the international community have hindered progress. While the presence of markets in North Korea has increased access to food, government control over food purchase and distribution persists, posing challenges in guaranteeing the right to food for those unable to access the market.
 The international community has provided support to address North Korea’s food crisis since the mid-1990s. However, the imposition of UN and US sanctions due to the North Korean nuclear issue, coupled with the COVID-19 pandemic, has hindered the provision of food aid. The combination of sanctions and North Korea’s political blockade further impedes the realization of the people’s right to food. Despite outward appearances, both North Korea and the international community have failed to fulfill their responsibilities in guaranteeing the right to food for North Koreans.
 Consequently, this study offers several policy implications for ensuring the right to food for the North Korean people. Firstly, it proposes resuming humanitarian support from UN organizations and international NGOs, utilizing the UN sanctions waiver with the understanding of the US, and ensuring transparency in aid distribution. Secondly, it recommends urging North Korea to accept external support, such as from the FAO, to strengthen their agricultural base and increase food production, aligning with the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Lastly, it suggests the establishment of a collaborative entity, tentatively named the “Korean Peninsula Agricultural Development Organization” or the “East Asia Humanitarian Cooperation Council,” which would enable accurate assessment of North Korea's food situation and work towards improving long-term food productivity.
 Given that the right to food is a fundamental human right crucial for individual survival and well-being, it is imperative that the responsible parties collaborate to ensure the guarantee of this right for the people of North Korea.

2020년 전후 북한의 인권정책 분석과 평가

North Korea enacted a Countermeasure Act that could respond by considering the international community’s accountability activities and human rights sanctions as defamation against North Korea and that established a crime of defamation on DPRK in the criminal law. In response to COVID-19, North Korea revised the Law on Prevention of Infectious Disease and enacted the Emergency Quarantine Law. By enforcing these laws, North Korea excessively regulated and punished North Koreans. Also North Korea strengthened controls and rules by tightening discipline within the WPK through punishment and reshuffles of officials. Especially North Korea strengthened ideological, information and culture control through enacting Public Report Act, Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Act, Youth Education Security Act, Pyongyang Standard Language Protection Act and Law on the Administration of Revolutionary Relics. And control and punishment of drugs was strengthened through the revision of the Criminal Law and enactment of the Drug Crime Prevention Act. Meanwhile, North Korean authorities have continuously issued an order to ban human rights violations since COI establishment and then enacted Act on Prevention of Batteries. This indicates that international community’s consistent human rights policy toward North Korea can draw reality change and legislative change. Also in order to drawing North Korea’s change, international community continue information and culture dissemination activities.

Analysis of Dollarization Hysteresis among North Korean Consumers

This paper quantitatively analyzes the current status of North Korean consumer payment instruments through a questionnaire survey of 292 North Korean defectors. In the 2010s, it was found that the payment experience ratio of domestic currency cash and grain decreased, while the payment experience ratio of foreign currency cash increased. The use of foreign currency reached a stage where it was spread not only as a store of value but also as a medium of exchange. However, the most frequently used payment instrument by North Korean consumers was still domestic currency cash. By region, in inland urban areas both domestic currency cash and U.S. dollars are used and in the North Korea-China border region both domestic currency cash and Chinese yuan are used, while in inland rural areas dollarization does not occur because both domestic currency cash and grain are used. Meanwhile, despite the stable price trend during 2013-2019, the dollarization hysteresis effect is appearing, and both the purchasing power risk theory and the network externality theory are considered to have explanatory power for the cause. The results of this paper suggest that as dollarization is intensifying, it is expected that more costs such as shortages of commodities will be incurred than in the past if North Korea’s de-dollarization policy is reimplemented. Also, in the case of domestic currency cards, which the North Korean authorities introduced in 2015 as part of a means of financial reform, this paper suggests that it may continue to be difficult for domestic currency cards to normalize official finance under the dollarization hysteresis.

How to kill a sage: North Korean discourse on Jizi/Kija 箕子

Abstract After liberation in 1945, the new North Korean regime initiated a process to liquidate so-called “old” or “feudal” thought. One prime target of the North Korean authorities was the myth of Jizi 箕子 (kor. Kija) and the story of his migration to the Korean Peninsula. The elimination of Kija and his legacy was a complicated task; the ancient legend of the Shang dynasty sage who brought civilisation and culture to the Korean people was widely known in all strata of Korean society, deeply ingrained in thousands of literary works, and the new North Korean capital, Pyongyang, was the traditional centre of the Kija cult. In spite of censorship, physical destructions of Kija-related relics, or academic conferences, which tried to repudiate the link between Kija and the Chosŏn state on a scientific basis, the North Korean authorities were never able to fully suppress the old narrative. The ancient sage remains, until nowadays, a problematic point for North Korean historiography and cultural memory.

International engagement with North Korea: disability, human rights and humanitarian aid

This article examines disability rights in North Korea as an area of shared interest between humanitarian workers (who operate inside, with the consent of North Korean authorities) and human rights actors (who work outside, in defiance of the regime). Disability issues represent a notable deviation from the usual separation evident between these actors when it comes to their work on North Korea, insofar as the issue is one that both groups agree represents a critical area for engagement. Drawing from a small but deep pool of expert interviews, this article argues that international practitioners across these approaches recognise evidence of improvements in the area of disabilities inside North Korea and perceive potential for further meaningful change in a country that can be difficult to understand and challenging to achieve progress within. It further argues that the human rights model of disability provides a conceptual framing rooted in the disability studies literature, which allows for a clearer articulation of the shared meanings embedded in the different approaches to disability in North Korea.

북한 여성 건강자본의 경제적 의미 고찰

After liberation, North Korea used women's labor as a means to establish a socialist state and mobilize the labor force. However, since the economic crisis in the 1990s, North Korean women have been transforming into new subjects of economic activity centering on the market in the process of maintaining their livelihood and seeking economic independence. This study aims to prove the economic value of North Korean women's health capital and provide implications for economic growth through review of existing studies and empirical analysis from the perspective of human capital theory, focusing on women who have been considered for economic growth in North Korea. As a result of analyzing the mediating effect of the female working-age population ratio on the relationship between North Korean female life expectancy and real GDP during 1970-2019, the increase in life expectancy had a significant direct effect to increase the working-age population ratio and real GDP. However, the effect of the increase in the working-age population ratio directly increased real GDP or mediated the relationship between life expectancy and real GDP was not significant. This means that the health of North Korean women is a meaningful capital that has a positive effect on economic growth, but there have been several limitations for the working-age women to have a significant economic growth effect. This suggests that active investment and support from the North Korean authorities should be made to promote women's health for future economic growth, and institutional support is needed for the economic activities of the working-age women.

김정은 정권의 생존전략과 ‘과학·기술·교육’의 역할

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the role of the Kim Jong-un regime's survival strategy as the topic of "science, technology, and education" emphasized by North Korea in its push for the five-year national economic development plan from 2021. Considering that "science, technology, and education" is an important factor in economic growth in the (neo) growth theory, the Kim Jong-un regime's five-year economic development plan must be key factors for the success of the plan. In addition, an analysis of why the North Korean authorities make "science, technology, and education" an important topic through 2,228 pages published by the 『Rodong』 Newspaper in 2021 showed that the Kim Jong-un regime's "science, technology, and education" has a strong political and social propaganda meaning and is used as a kind of political instigation/control tool. “Science, technology, and education” presented by Kim Jong-un are tools to control the thoughts and actions of internal members to maintain the regime by presenting advanced images to residents.

Analysis of Research Trends on North Korean Adult Education

North Korea's adult education is basically oriented to the socialist educational philosophy, and all education is being developed with an emphasis on nurturing socialist human beings. In preparation for the upcoming unification society, the need for a balanced attitude toward North Korean education is being raised by evaluating North Korean education as it is after the Cold War, rather than viewing it unconditionally negatively. Therefore, in this study, for the purpose of objective analysis of North Korean adult education, research on North Korean adult education was classified and analyzed by the period of North Korean rule, research method, and research subject area, and the research direction and progress of North Korean adult education were identified and analyzed. We would like to suggest future tasks. As a result of the research, the research on adult education in North Korea is generally lacking in quantitative terms, and in terms of research methods, it is concentrated on literature research that analyzes and interprets the current situation based on North Korean data. Lastly, North Korea seems to neglect adult education compared to school education, and even that is more of a political ideologicalization rather than an education aimed at promoting the values and behaviors of adults. In particular, North Korea's adult education is far from South Korea's lifelong education, which focuses on the political ideology education required by the North Korean authorities to develop individual adult potential and enjoy life satisfaction. In order to close this gap, South Korean lifelong education should focus on North Korea-related research, and at the same time, North Korea's educational research needs to expand the discussion in terms of lifelong education.

공포와 관용 : 한국전쟁기 부역자 처벌의 이중성과 그 유산

During the Korean war, and after the Seoul city was retrieved from North Korean troops, the South Korean government began exacting punishments on collaborators who cooperated with the North Korean troops. In the Seoul area, not only open but also very public mass executions called ‘wholesale slaughters’ served as a fearful display for the population. At the time many reporters affiliated with foreign press, as well as the United Nations force, were present in the Seoul area, and the news of a mass execution would instantly be treated as international reports, but they were summarily silenced by South Korean authorities. In the meantime, throughout local areas, swift judgments and summary executions -accompanied by private and harsh punishments- were commonly occurring practices for known collaborators. In the wake of searching for and eliminating DPKR’s remnants, local left-wing supporters and partisan guerrillas, a lot of civilians were killed as well.BR Meanwhile, the South Korean government’s treatment of social elites or leaders in private and public sectors, such as national representatives(members of the national assembly), academic professors, literature authors and cultural figures, who all collaborated with North Korean authorities or troops in several capacities, were so tolerant and benevolent compared to the treatment ordinary citizens received from the government. Some of them were indeed judged or executed, but most of them were pardoned without any clear explanation. BR The punishment of collaborators by the South Korean government was triggered by many reasons. First, there was not only an administrative need for public punishment but also a practical necessity to ensure public security, as well as a sense of anger and revenge. Secondly, such punishments were also a continuation from overly excessive violence and tendency to suppress any kind of social disturbance that had continued since the year 1948. And finally, there was an ultimate political need to have the public turn a blind eye to the administration’s glaring political failures.BR There were differences in the South Korean government’s punishment of collaborators, not only between celebrities and ordinary people but between residents of the capital city and other local regions. Such polarity was caused by a series of elements. According to the nature of certain cases, some of them were opened to the public while some cases even involved foreign countries’ troops, media and governments. How the war was progressing also had to do with certain cases which unfolded as they did. And there was the issue of wartime propaganda, and the need to win over certain portions of the public, that also contributed to the eventual culmination of some cases. The overall polarity between cases did leave a long lasting legacy and repercussions on the post-war Korean society.

The path forward for the housing lease system of reunified Korea

South and North Korea have diametrically opposite property systems, the disparity of which is most evident in respect of immovables. While South Korea, a capitalist market economy, adopts an open market approach, North Korea under communist rule favors a heavily centralized and strictly regulated approach towards immovable property. Such a stark contrast will prove be very challenging in harmonizing the two systems if the time comes for reunification on the Korean peninsula. Although it is virtually impossible to predict the form and process by which reunification may occur, it is vital that we prepare for such an event. The objective of this paper is to do just that by considering some of the critical questions that are likely to arise in the process of harmonizing the property and housing systems of South and North Korea. One such question regards the matter of privatization. Given the general lack of housing in North Korea, we need to introduce special legislation in the Northern part of the Korean peninsula allowing for, as a rule, one house per household, at least during the initial stages of the reunification. Also, only those who are officially registered by the North Korean authorities as the lawful possessors of these houses should be recognized as being viable for acquiring house ownership. The other critical question addressed in the paper is the direction of reorganizing the housing lease system in post-reunification Korea. The current Housing Lease Protection Act of South Korea will be inadequate for applying in the North. The matters of its scope of application, the opposing power of the lessee, duration of lease, regulation of rent and the right to demand renewal of the lease contract are all dealt with in the paper.

Russia’s Relations with North and South Korea in the New Reality

Despite Asian countries’ usually keeping at distance from European conflicts, Russian special military operation in Ukraine that started in February 2022 has influenced Russia’s ties with the DPRK and the Republic of Korea. Whereas the DPRK openly supported Moscow, Seoul joined the West in condemning Russian actions. Still, a lot of finer details come to light when assessing real prospects of our bilateral relations with Korean neighbors. Although Moscow and Pyongyang are en rapport politically, practical cooperation is negligible due to UNSC sanctions and strict restrictions North Korean authorities introduced to combat COVID-19. Seoul had introduced sanctions against Russia which resulted in Russia listing the Republic of Korea as an ‘unfriendly state.’ Still, South Korea is reluctant to dismantle their relations with Russia which would mean losing Russian market, assets and the country and access to Russian supplies. So, South Korean authorities and businesses have started a complex balancing act trying to reconcile increasing pressure from their ‘senior ally’ with own interests. Russia should build relations with North and South Korea proceeding from our national interests and an understanding of objective factors that limit our interaction. It is important to identify and use new opportunities to work with our close neighbors and protect our ties amidst the crisis, since the new reality requires we use all means and assets to protect our interests.

접경지대에 남겨진 조선어 - 소비에트 시대 사할린 코리언들의 언어 문제

This paper deals with Sakhalin’s Korean community, which primarily consisted of Koreans recruited to work in Sakhalin from Japan’s Korean colony. The paper focuses on their efforts to preserve Korean language as a link to the motherland to which the Soviet authorities did not allow them to return, forcing them instead into the integration in Soviet life. Unlike the Koreans mobilized for the Battle of Okinawa, Sakhalin Koreans were not permitted to return home, owing to the change in Sakhalin’s position from the Soviet-Japanese borderland into a part of Cold War-era border zones between Soviet and US-controlled worlds. Despite that, Koreans were clinging to their language in hope for an eventual repatriation. Soviet authorities allowed them until 1963 to use a national school system managed as an extension of the Soviet ‘indigenization’ policy vis-à-vis Soviet Union’s minorities. As the Soviet-North Korean relations deteriorated after 1960, however, the Sakhalin Korean community developed into a Soviet-North Korean contact zone where Soviet and North Korean authorities competed for Sakhalin Koreans’ loyalty. As part of the contention, Soviet authorities switched the Korean schools into Russian in 1963, forcing Sakhalin Koreans to accelerate the tempo of their linguistic Russification. This process bears semblance to the closing of the Yiddish schools in 1948~50, on the understanding that they could fan up interest in emigration to Israel. However, Koreans’ latent interest in their native tongue and eventual repatriation remained huge. It was demonstrated by explosive growth in Korean education during and after the late 1980s perestroika reforms.

시장화 초기 북한에서의 반시장화 담론 ―1990년대~2000년대 초를 중심으로

Since the beginning of marketization in the 1990s, the North Korean authorities have pursued market-friendly policies in limited terms. However, contrary to this policy direction, North Korea produced and disseminated anti-market and anti-reform discourse. This study examines the contradictory coexistence of North Korean policies and discourses in the 1990s. Basically, it is necessary to pay attention to the strategic aspects for achieving political and economic goals. The anti-marketing discourse has the following characteristics. First, it has the characteristics of a struggle against marketization discourse that is generated and developed with the progress of marketization, and the struggle of the ruling class to prevent the marketization discourse from becoming the dominant discourse. Second, it is the pursuit of marketization in which groups, not individuals, take the lead. Anti-marketization discourse has the character of anti- marketization discourse of individualism rather than anti-market. Third, it has the character of a check against open marketization, that is, it is not anti-market but anti-‘open’ marketization discourse.

북한지역 토지자산 추정에 관한 연구: 프레임워크 개발 및 탐색적 적용 (Estimating Land Assets in North Korea: Framework Development & Exploratory Application)

Korean Abstract: 본 연구는 북한당국이 발표하는 지역별 토지가격이나 토지의 특성에 관한 자료들이 없는 조건에서 북한지역의 토지가격과 토지자산의 규모를 추정하는 방법론과 모형을 제시하고 이를 이용하여 북한 시가화지역 전체를 대상으로 시장가격 기준의 토지자산 규모를 실험적으로 추정하였다. 우선 관련 사회경제적 변수를 이용가능하면서 최근의 북한과 소득수준의 격차가 상대적으로 크지 않았던 것으로 평가되는 남한의 1970년대 중후반, 그리고 도시화 수준이 유사했던 1980년대 초반 남한의 시, 군, 구별 실거래가격을 기준으로 시가화지역 토지에 대한 지가결정함수를 도출하였다. 다음으로 북한지역에 대한 지리정보분석을 통해 도출되는 지가결정요인의 대리변수들을 대입하여 2015년경 북한 시가화지역 토지의 시, 군, 구역별 상대가격비율을 산출하였다. 더 나아가서 최근 북한지역 일부 도시들을 대상으로 조사된 주택거래가격과 본고에서 추정한 상대가격비율을 결합하여 북한전역을 대상으로 시가화지역의 토지자산 규모를 추정하였다. 추정결과 북한 시가화지역의 토지가격은 시, 군, 구역별 상대가격비율로 볼 때 평양시 동대원구역이 100으로 제일 높고 양강도 풍서군이 1.70으로 가장 낮은 것으로 평가되었다. 한편 시가화지역의 토지자산 규모는 2015년 기준 216억 달러로 추정되었는데, 이는 동년 북한GDP의 0.72~1.33배에 달하는 규모이다. 이 비율은 남한의 1974~1978년 또는 중국의 2016년과 비슷한 데, 해당시기의 경제성장률이 남한은 평균 10.8%, 중국은 6.7%인데 반해 북한은 1%대 수준인 것을 고려하면 상당히 높은 것으로 보인다. 본 연구는 제한된 정보와 강한 가정에 근거하여 북한의 토지자산을 추정한 것으로 향후 전력, 용수 등 주거환경요인이나 도시개발계획 같은 정책요인들이 반영되도록 보완할 필요가 있으며 또한 본고의 추정결과를 활용함에 있어서 유의할 필요가 있음을 밝힌다. English Abstract: In this study, we present a methodology and model to estimate land prices and the value of land assets in North Korea in the absence of any data about land characteristics from North Korean authorities. Using this framework, we experimentally make market price-based estimates for land assets across the entire urban area of North Korea. First, we estimate the determinants of land prices in South Korea using data on market prices of land from the late 1970s, when it was estimated that the income level gap between South Korea and North Korea wasn’t relatively large, and from the early 1980s, when urbanization levels in both of them were similar. Second, we calculate land prices and their relative ratios for each city and urban area in North Korea around 2015 by substituting proxy variables of determinants of land prices derived through a geographic information analysis of North Korea into the function of land prices that we have already estimated. Finally, we estimate the value of land assets in urban areas across North Korea by combining the ratio of housing transaction prices surveyed in several cities in North Korea with the relative prices estimated in this research. As a result, land prices in urban areas in North Korea, looking at the relative ratio of price by city, are estimated to be the highest, at 100.00, in the Dongdaewon district of Pyongyang, and to be the lowest, at 1.70, in Poongseo County, Yanggang-do Province. Meanwhile, the value of land assets in urbanized areas was estimated at $21.6 billion in 2015, which was 0.72 to 1.33 times the GDP of North Korea that year. This ratio is similar to South Korea's in the 1974-1978 period or to China's in 2016, with an average economic growth rate of 10.8% in South Korea and 6.7% in China. Considering about a 1% economic growth rate, the land assets to GDP ratio in North Korea seems to be very high.

해류, 명태 그리고 NLL - 동해 명태 회유로의 이동과 남북한 냉전 -

Examined in this article is how the change in East sea’s pollack fishing ground’s location, caused by shifting sea currents during the Cold war period, actually affected South and North Koreas’ relationship and even aggravated their conflicts with each other. In the 1970s, North Korean fishers engaged in active pollack fishing in the area, while the South also did so later in the 1980s. According to North Korean research, this was due to the relocation of the winter pollack fishing ground, which was because of the warm current in the sea east to the Korean peninsula that shifts every ten years. BR As a related incident, North Korean authorities’ frequent capturing of South Korean fishing boats in the 1960s may be worth discussing. In the 1960s, South Korean fishing boats would often cross the border to gain access to the golden fishing ground in front of the Goseong area. As tension between the two Koreas was high during that period, North Korea oftentimes captured such South Korean boats. Kidnapped South Korean fishermen would receive secret training in North Korean state propaganda, and then return to South Korea. Later they were accused of being North Korean spies by the South Korean state, whenever such accusation would meet the needs of the South Korean authorities.BR We can see the East sea pollacks, which are nowhere to be seen nowadays, were able to play a certain role in a Cold war setting, and brought tragic results to the lives of some Korean fishermen. Also, it should be noted that all the South and North Korean fishermen who caught even the fries(young fish) with dragnets were the ones who contributed to the extinction of East sea pollacks, which was another ecological disaster in itself.