Non-state Groups Research Articles

‘Digging in the water?’ Grassroots urbanism, the Egyptian state, and the politics of heritage-making in post-revolution Cairo

ABSTRACT This article analyzes a week-long workshop held in 2016 in the UNESCO World Heritage Site of ‘Historic Cairo’. Organised by an informal ‘heritage association’ known as the Cairo Heritage School (CHS), the event was part of a broader fluorescence of urban-focused initiatives that spread across the Egyptian capital after the so-called January 25th Revolution of 2011. Focusing on both the workshop, which generated proposals for the adaptive reuse of a fifteenth-century palace, and the government’s regulation of the event, I demonstrate how a symbiotic relationship developed between the CHS organisers and the local authorities. I argue that this relationship complicates analyses of heritage-making activities that dichotomise actors as ‘with’ and ‘without’ power and shows how heritage-work creates spaces for non-state groups to exercise agency in ways that can challenge structures of authority.

Pitfalls of Nationalism in the Middle East and North Africa Region

Nationalism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is a fundamental issue. As long as this fundamental issue is not well discussed, any reforms in the regional system, including integration and state building, would be insufficient in alleviating the challenges faced by Arab nations as they attempt unity in the region. Any understanding of how and why MENA states make political choices towards stability and unity, necessitates the understanding of how they view themselves in terms of representing identity. The objective of this study is to investigate the transformation and the changing nationalism in the modern MENA region. For instance, Arab society has courted several ideologies from Arabism or Arab nationalism and Arab Islamic nationalism, among others. Ideologies do not exist in a vacuum. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the context in which several ideologies interact with each other and affect nationalism in the MENA region. Although Arab nationalism continues to play an ideological role, what is its relation with Islam? Why Arab Islamic nationalism in the MENA region does not unite states or non-state groups like the cases of Iran and the Kurds? It is therefore useful for this article to illustrate firstly, the relation between Arab nationalism and Arab Islamic nationalism, secondly, the case of Iran nationalism and finally, the Kurds and their strive for a separate nationalism.

Self-Determination of Peoples in the Charter of the United Nations

This essay analyses the principle of self-determination of peoples as contained in the Charter of the United Nations. Using the traditional methods of treaty interpretation, it argues that the Charter does not in itself guarantee the right to self-determination of specific entities in a particular way. The Charter merely enshrines a legal principle that has subsequently been translated into particular norms by successive treaties and customary law. On the other hand, the Charter does not limit the scope of self-determination to the colonial context or to entire populations of sovereign states. Therefore, and since the principle does not imply independence, self-determination could well be applied to various non-state groups, as has already happened in the case of indigenous peoples.

Fighting for survival: responding to state capacity and terror group end

ABSTRACT The well-established argument in the literature suggests that the higher state capacity is associatedwith the lower chance of experiencing civil conflict or higherchance of defeating the violent non-state groups. However, theliterature does not sufficiently address how these groups respondto increasing state capacity, and how their responses to that shapethe dynamic of political violence. I investigate the impact of statecapacity on terrorist group termination by exploring the waysterrorist groups respond to increasing state capacity. I argue thatincreasing state capacity might lead to a set of responses fromthe terror group in a way that it might induce the group to producemore terrorist violence to show that the group can still persist. Itmay also encourage the group to provide positive and negativeincentives to its constituents in order to rehabilitate its physicalcapacity to operate, and to prevent a shift of popular support a wayfrom the group towards to the government. Thus, such responsesof the group will decrease the likelihood of its terror campaign. Ialso expect that these arguments are especially relevant for ethnicor religious terror groups. The results of the empirical analysessupport these theoretical expectations.

Emerging Transnational Self-Defense Norms & Unrealized Liberal Values

This Chapter critiques emerging norms regarding the use of alleged defensive force by powerful states against violent non-state groups located in the territory of other, typically weaker states, sometimes called “transnational self-defense.” Although the contemporary international legal system now formally and universally embraces basic liberal values of sovereignty, equality, and liberty/autonomy, emerging transnational self-defense norms effectively perpetuate a system of de facto inequality traceable to an earlier era. The use of armed conflict paradigms and war measures against “terrorist” groups, including targeted killing in what is effectively preemptive or preventive self-defense, perpetuates a discriminatory international system wherein sovereignty and humanity are deemed equal only between so-called “civilized” nations and peoples. Properly understood, the self-defense principles of necessity and proportionality require that states: (1) resort to defensive measures only when necessary to protect lives and property from relatively certain, significant harm and (2) use only the amount of force which is strictly necessary to neutralize the threat that is reasonably believed to exist at the time force is used. Because self-defense principles constrain both the resort to force and the nature of any force used, the alternate norms posited here do not implicate contested issues involving the extraterritorial application of international human rights law.

Violence amidst Virus: A Game-Theoretic Exploration of Conflict during a Pandemic

This paper explores how the COVID-19 pandemic is affecting conflicts world-wide. On one hand, confrontation would expose both states and violent non-state groups to contamination, potentially causing massive loss of human lives. Moreover, attacks aimed at signalling discontent or making bigger demands, are unlikely to generate media and diplomatic attention at the level it otherwise would have, sans the pandemic. Hence there might be mitigation in the intensity of conflicts. On the other hand, the capacity of the states to retaliate will, to a large extent, be compromised, since huge financial and human resources will have to be dedicated to fighting the widespread health and economic effects of the pandemic. Hence the belligerent groups may have a greater incentive to launch attacks. This paper attempts to game-theoretically study these various issues and incentives facing the conflicting parties, under the threat of COVID-19. We consider the simple conflict model by Hirshleifer (Hirshleifer, 1995) and augment it by introducing possible effects that a raging pandemic might impose on the conflicting parties. Specifically, we introduce positive and negative externalities that a pandemic may impose on an existing conflict and explore parametric conditions under which it is likely to aggravate or mitigate. We find that conflicts are generally likely to lessen but may increase under specific circumstances. We present some narrative evidence on how conflicts seem to have ameliorated in a pandemic-stricken world.

Why Do Armed Nonstate Groups Use Foreign Volunteers? The Case of the Islamic State

Why Do Armed Nonstate Groups Use Foreign Volunteers? The Case of the Islamic State

Once more, with feeling: using sentiment analysis to improve models of relationships between non-state actors

ABSTRACTWe collect an original corpus of official documents released by Hezbollah and use text analysis to create a measure of their relationships with other non-state groups. Despite recent research that demonstrates these types of relationships affect the length and severity of conflict, data limitations hinder efforts by researchers to capture important variation in them over time. Our approach uses fine-grained text data to capture dynamic trends in these relationships. We demonstrate its effectiveness by showing our model is able to reproduce qualitative accounts of Hezbollah’s known alliances and rivalries with other non-state actors with greater accuracy and precision than existing measures. We also compare the approach with event data and demonstrate its ability to provide more granular and complementary information. With further exploration, this technique could assist researchers in improving and developing measures of intrastate cooperation and competition for use in empirical analyses.

Considering the military-media nexus from the perspective of competing groups: the case of ISIS and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

ABSTRACTTo address if and how militant, non-state actors in the online environment react to on-the-ground military pressures facing their competitors, this study explores AQAP’s visual media campaign during the 2016–2017 military operations to retake Mosul and Raqqa from ISIS control. Using chi-square analyses and content analysis, we analyzed 4027 images from Inspire, Jihad Recollections, and al-Masra to reveal how the onset of the ISIS battles corresponded to changes in AQAP’s strategic use of visual content, presentational form, and language-based audience targeting. Significant changes in visual content related to the display of institutional power structures rather than identity markers. Shifts in presentational elements involved image positioning (foreground/background) and viewer distance (intimate/personal vs. social public). Language-based targeting strategies between English and Arabic publications, however, demonstrated the most substantial change from before to during the battles. The study concludes that a complete understanding of the military-media nexus of militant, non-state groups requires consideration of military pressure on competing groups.

Dynamics of insurgent innovation: How Hezbollah and other non-state actors develop new capabilities

Few issues are more important to security-studies scholars than understanding how violent non-state groups innovate. To shed new light on this subject, we examine Hezbollah’s innovations and the underlying processes that produced them. Based on this case, the most successful violent non-state groups are arguably those that systematically pursue incremental innovation. Although less dramatic than their discontinuous counterparts, a commitment to steadily improve an organizations' tactics and techniques can have dramatic effects. Indeed, even Hezbollah’s remarkable performance during the 2006 Lebanon War is attributable to the perfection of techniques utilized since the organization's inception. While innovations were incremental in character, a bottom-up process of learning and experimentation by field commanders was critical to generating most of these innovations. If generalizable to other violent non-state actors, these findings suggest that the most formidable insurgent and terrorist groups will actually be those that relentlessly pursue incremental innovations in a bottom-up fashion.

Black Ops: Islamic State and Innovation in Irregular Warfare

This paper studies non-state militant group emulation and development of a special operation capability that stands in stark contrast to the normal repertoire of guerilla and terror tactics. Building on evidence of one well-documented Islamic State attack in 2012 that fit many of the criteria of a special operation, we analyzed the mission using concepts from strategic studies to understand the decision-making behind it. We then expanded our search of Islamic State operational claims looking for other examples, in order to understand the scope and frequency of Islamic State special operations since 2006. We found solid evidence of at least three Islamic State special operations over a decade: Ramadi, Iraq (2007), Haditha, Iraq (2012), and Abu Ghraib/Taji, Iraq (2013). Using these insights, we present two key levers – leadership and propaganda - used by the Islamic State in the decision-making and centralized distribution of resources to invest in a special operations capability that produced outsized strategic effects. These findings contest the conventional wisdom of the future of insurgency as decentralized structures made up of loose, leaderless networks.

Islamic international law: an emerging branch of law which answers the contentious question of ‘authority to use force’ in Islamic law and politics

ABSTRACT ‘Authority to use force’ has been a subject of contentious debate, not least among the academics, politicians and lawyers, since the oft-occurrence of use of armed forces by non-state actors and terrorist groups in modern world. Since 9/11 terrorist attacks, most use of force by non-state actors and terrorist groups, which occurred primarily in Muslim majority states, have been categorized as acts of terrorism. This categorization has been made without any rational or sound scrutiny of such use of force and accordingly resulted in controversies. This article is a historical, legal and political account of Islamic international law on the use of force. It defines and interprets the fundamental principles of use of force in Islamic international law, such as jihad, and analyses the significance of those principles in scrutinizing legal and political authority to use force at the state level and inter-state level.

Vigilante justice and informal policing in post-Euromaidan Ukraine

ABSTRACTDuring and after the Euromaidan, the Ukrainian society experienced an emergence of non-state groups that combined elements of civic activism and paramilitarism. They operated independently from the state and often used extra-legal violence to restore law and order, deliver justice, and protect Ukraine from external and internal threats. Their conduct closely resembles vigilantism. This article draws on the body of criminological and sociological research on vigilantism in order to understand the diverse landscape of vigilante groups in post-Euromaidan Ukraine. It explores the complex relationship between the most representative vigilante groups, the Ukrainian government, and the political and business elites; analyzes the legal boundaries of vigilantism in Ukraine; and discusses the outcomes of vigilante justice for democratic consolidation, rule of law, and human rights. This article offers a new paradigm for theorizing popular mobilization in Ukraine and sheds light on important dimensions of the formation of an informal system of policing and justice.

Controlling partners and proxies in pro-insurgency paramilitary operations: the case of Syria

ABSTRACT Pro-insurgency paramilitary operations (PMOs) are a rare type of covert action that aim to destabilize or overthrow a hostile government or defeat nonstate groups with no cooperation from a host government. The article analyzes US covert operations in Syria since 2011 by applying Principal–Agent Theory (PAT) to explain the inherent difficulties involved in controlling partner states and proxies. The nature of pro-insurgency PMOs is such that main tasks have to be delegated to partners and proxies, which reduces the ability of the US government to achieve desirable outcomes, especially whenever the goals of the partners and proxies are not well-aligned with US objectives as is the case in Syria.

The concept and types of subjects of countering offenses in the entrepreneurial sphere

Theoretical approaches to the definition of the notion of the subject of counteraction to offenses are described. For this purpose, the notion of the subject of management, the subject of policing was established. The notion of a subject of an offense in the sphere of entrepreneurship is defined: a system of state and non-state bodies, public organizations, social groups and citizens whose activities are focused on eliminating the causes and conditions that give rise to and provoke offenses in the sphere of economic commercial activity (entrepreneurship), preventing these offenses from different stages of incorrect behavior of participants of relations in the field of entrepreneurship, as well as bringing them to the legal first responsibility.
 In addition, the above subjects were systematized in this study and their circle was determined. The main ones were highlighted: President of Ukraine, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine; local governments; Ministry of Finance of Ukraine; Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine; State Fiscal Service and its structural units (except for customs control at the border); State Inspectorate of Ukraine; National Bank of Ukraine; revenue authorities and fees of Ukraine. A special group of subjects has been identified, those who have administrative and jurisdictional powers.
 It has been concluded that most of the subjects of counteracting crimes in the field of entrepreneurial activity in Ukraine are state organizations, and the process of counteraction is directly implemented by carrying out the financial and economic control over the activity of participants of legal relations in the field of entrepreneurship by the overwhelming majority of the mentioned agencies. The implementation of such functions, for the majority of subjects of counteracting crimes in the field of entrepreneurship, is not the main, but the secondary task, along with the main powers that are not directly related to the considered problem.

Structure and content of administrative and legal status of the subjects counteracting offenses in the field of entrepreneurial activity

Theoretical approaches to the definitions of “legal status”, “administrative and legal status” have been established. The elements of administrative and legal status of the subject counteracting offense in the sphere of entrepreneurial activity have been determined and analyzed. The main powers of the state agencies that accomplish control activity over the subjects of entrepreneurial activity have been characterized. The notion of a subject of an offense in the sphere of entrepreneurship has been defined: a system of state and non-state agencies, public organizations, social groups and citizens whose activities are focused on eliminating the causes and conditions that give rise to and provoke offenses in the sphere of economic commercial activity (entrepreneurship), preventing these offenses at different stages of incorrect behavior of the participants of relations in the field of entrepreneurship, as well as bringing them to legal liability. Besides, the above subjects have been systematized in this study and their range has been determined. The main ones have been highlighted: the President of Ukraine, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine; local governments; Ministry of Finance of Ukraine; Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine; State Fiscal Service and its structural units (except customs control at the border); State Inspectorate of Ukraine; National Bank of Ukraine; revenue and fees authorities of Ukraine. The author has defined a special group of subjects, those who have administrative and jurisdictional powers.

Blame the victims? Refugees, state capacity, and non-state actor violence

Existing research argues that refugee inflows may increase the risk of domestic conflict, particularly civil war that, by definition, involves the state as an actor. However, many of the postulated mechanisms linking refugees to a higher risk of such conflict pertain to tensions with locals, which do not necessarily involve any grievances against government authorities. We contend that it is more likely to identify an association between refugees and non-state actor violence, that is, armed violence between organized non-state groups, neither of which pertains to the state. We also claim that the extent to which refugees are associated with a higher likelihood of non-state conflict depends on the capacity of governments to manage and mitigate risks. We report evidence that refugee populations can be linked to an increased risk of non-state conflict, as well as for a mitigating effect of state capacity on the risk of non-state conflicts in the presence of refugees. We do not find a clear effect of refugee populations on civil war, suggesting that the link depends on existing conflict cleavages relevant to mobilizing refugees or locals. Our research helps to shed light on the relevant security consequences of managing refugee populations. Despite the common arguments portraying refugees as security risks in developed countries, the risk of non-state conflict applies primarily to weak states that have been forced to shoulder a disproportionate burden in hosting refugees.

Ethnic Conflict and Economic Cooperation in the Borderlands: Burma, Thailand, and the Karen

Since 1949, the Karen ethnic minority has been engaged in an armed uprising against the Burmese government, and this uprising has defined Thai-Burmese border relations. Despite its length and impact, this conflict is easily overlooked, and has been willfully ignored by Thailand, Burma, and the international community in the optimism surrounding the start of the ASEAN Economic Community. Documentary research and interviews with participants in the conflict demonstrate that the Karen, and the armed nonstate groups which represent them, maintain the ability to end any sustained cross-border cooperation between Thailand and Burma. As such, a resolution to the conflict is necessary if the ASEAN Economic Community, and the various other projects that Thailand and Burma have envisioned for the border region, is to succeed.

The classification of armed conflicts between occupying states and non-state armed groups in cases of belligerent occupation

The topic of classification of armed conflicts between non-state groups and occupying states in cases of belligerent occupation has not received enough scholarly attention despite its possible practical importance and the fact that this issue still requires further normative clarification. This paper seeks to fill this gap. The paper focuses on the different possible ways that such armed conflicts can be classified. Among other things, the paper analyses Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I (API) and examines its customary status. The paper also analyses how to determine which armed groups should be regarded as acting on behalf of the occupied people and suggests a novel way to interpret the ‘belonging’ requirement of Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention. Finally, the paper provides an in-depth analysis of the argument that non-state armed groups, in the context of belligerent occupation, should be considered parties to an international armed conflict even when the occupying state is not a party to API and/or refuses to acknowledge the non-state group as a party to an international armed conflict.

Of terrorism types and countermeasures: In need of a new framework

Since 2001, the focus of U.S. policymakers has been on Jihadi terrorism: Al Qaeda, its various affiliates, and, more recently, the challenges posed by ISIS/ISIL. Against this backdrop, it is easy to neglect other types of terrorism that exist, commonly referred to as ethno-separatist, left-wing, right-wing, or single-issue. Many Jihadi groups share similarities with or are influenced by some of these other types. This article expands on Bard O’Neill’s insurgency framework to distinguish between nine types of non-state terrorist groups. This more detailed categorization illustrates important overlaps between groups as well as differences and should help tailor counterterrorism strategies.