Abstract
This paper studies non-state militant group emulation and development of a special operation capability that stands in stark contrast to the normal repertoire of guerilla and terror tactics. Building on evidence of one well-documented Islamic State attack in 2012 that fit many of the criteria of a special operation, we analyzed the mission using concepts from strategic studies to understand the decision-making behind it. We then expanded our search of Islamic State operational claims looking for other examples, in order to understand the scope and frequency of Islamic State special operations since 2006. We found solid evidence of at least three Islamic State special operations over a decade: Ramadi, Iraq (2007), Haditha, Iraq (2012), and Abu Ghraib/Taji, Iraq (2013). Using these insights, we present two key levers – leadership and propaganda - used by the Islamic State in the decision-making and centralized distribution of resources to invest in a special operations capability that produced outsized strategic effects. These findings contest the conventional wisdom of the future of insurgency as decentralized structures made up of loose, leaderless networks.
Published Version
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