Abstract
This article discusses the strategic shifts that the Islamic State (IS) has implemented in orderto survive, especially in what regards its propaganda and military tactics. We argue that – fora long time now and in both domains – the IS and its predecessors have been flexible andresilient enough to adapt to new realities on the ground being able to shape and reshape itsstrategy and tactics towards its enemies’ capabilities and policies. In terms of propaganda,despite a decrease of its online presence, the IS has struggled to adapt some of its mainnarratives to the new reality brought about by the beginning of the international coalition attacks. However, evidence seems to suggest that the group will likely be able to maintainits online relevance yet for some time. Regarding its military tactics in Syria and Iraq, historyand current evidence points to a return to its insurgent roots. This seems to be corroboratedby the group’s current increasing resort to terrorism and guerrilla tactics. Lastly, we arguethat it is still premature to either claim the rebirth of the IS or to declare its demise.
Highlights
Over the last three and a half years, the Islamic State4 (IS) has been suffering uncountable defeats
We have consciously attempted to balance our secondary sources by leveraging publications by academics from the global North whose research focusses upon monitoring the publications and/or strategic shifts of the Islamic State
While this article clearly demonstrates that IS’s propaganda structure is flexible enough to guarantee a degree of relevance in the near future, it is further stressed that the key problem with the idea of a “Virtual Caliphate” is that it falls into the trap of believing that the organization is already permanently defeated on the ground
Summary
Over the last three and a half years, the Islamic State (IS) has been suffering uncountable defeats. Amongst the secondary sources used, we opted for working mainly with material produced by local and/or on-the-ground researchers such as consultants of the Iraqi government (e.g. Renad Mansour and Hisham Al-Hashimi) as well as Syrian academics (e.g. Hassan Hassan and Aymenn al Tamimi) This was in part a deliberate choice and in part a decision incentivised by the content of this piece. While this article clearly demonstrates that IS’s propaganda structure is flexible enough to guarantee a degree of relevance in the near future, it is further stressed that the key problem with the idea of a “Virtual Caliphate” is that it falls into the trap of believing that the organization is already permanently defeated on the ground In light of this assertion, we analyze how the IS has been adapting
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