Naval Combat Research Articles

Development of data analysis tool for combat system integration

System integration is an important element for the construction of naval combat ships. In particular, because impeccable combat system integration together with the sensors and weapons can ensure the combat capability and survivability of the ship, the integrated performance of the combat system should be verified and validated whether or not it fulfills the requirements of the end user. In order to conduct systematic verification and validation, a data analysis tool is requisite. This paper suggests the Data Extraction, Recording and Analysis Tool (DERAT) for the data analysis of the integrated performance of the combat system, including the functional definition, architecture and effectiveness of the DERAT by presenting the test results.

Development of data analysis tool for combat system integration

System integration is an important element for the construction of naval combat ships. In particular, because impeccable combat system integration together with the sensors and weapons can ensure the combat capability and survivability of the ship, the integrated performance of the combat system should be verified and validated whether or not it fulfills the requirements of the end user. In order to conduct systematic verification and validation, a data analysis tool is requisite. This paper suggests the Data Extraction, Recording and Analysis Tool (DERAT) for the data analysis of the integrated performance of the combat system, including the functional definition, architecture and effectiveness of the DERAT by presenting the test results.

이기종 분산 환경의 함정전투체계를 위한 정보 모델 기반 통합 관리 및 모니터링 시스템 개발

In the existing naval combat system, integrated management is done based on subsystems that make up the system. The naval combat system, however, is a large-scale distributed system made up of subsystems of diverse heterogeneous environments. Although each of the subsystems can be easily managed because they are on the same platform, it is extremely difficult to integrate and manage as a single entity all subsystems that make up the naval combat system because the heterogeneous environments and distributed systems have to be taken into account. In fact, there hasn`t been a technique available to integrate and manage subsystems that make up the naval combat system, until now. In this paper, the architecture of an integrated management system is designed and implemented to provide the user with various services. Furthermore, a system that can manage subsystems of the naval combat system in an integrated way is developed.

함정 운항에 따른 조명등기구 가진력 비교 연구

According to sailing condition, an exciting force for luminairie of naval vessels was measured and analyzed. A naval combat service support boat and P<TEX>${\bigcirc}{\bigcirc}$</TEX>(patrol killer guided missile) were selected as a target naval vessel. Due to their small size and fast speed, they received excessive vibration than other bigger naval vessels like destroyer. The vibration of luminairie was measured on their cruising and maximum speed. This could analyze exciting force for luminairie of naval vessels. Using this analyzed data, the validity of military standard for naval vessel was verified.

Complex Systems Advanced Modelling

AbstractIntegrated Systems Functional Modelling (ISFM) is a Model Driven system design method, suitable for the complete representation of the dynamic behavior of complex systems, as required by modern Naval Combat Systems (C/S).ISFM captures the whole system behaviour in a single object‐based DataBase, coded in SysML language, integrating the functional Models of each Combat System component (Sensors, Weapons, C4I capabilities), including the complete model of Combat Management System (CMS). ISFM supports the project Team during the whole project life‐cycle from the System Design to the SW definition and development, and the integration team as benchmark during integration and verification phases. The System Functional Design Test and Validation is included in the project life‐cycle at the System Design stage itself, where the early feedback gives an additional benefit to the quality of the product.

3.6.1 Rapid prototyping and validation of Human factors model in a Model Based Naval Systems Engineering Application

AbstractThe Model Based System Engineering (MBSE) approach focuses on building an architecture model which is portable to different platforms, re‐usable and interoperable among different domain models. This allows integrating the Human Machine Interface (HMI) model or the Human Factors domain model with the System architecture model seamlessly.MBSE ensures the separation of user specifications from the way the system utilises the capabilities/technologies of the target application platform. Thus a Platform Independent Model (PIM) of the HMI is developed, mapping the end‐user/operator specifications. This model is then transformed to Platform Specific Model (PSM) meeting the requirements/technologies of the specific platform using rapid prototyping.This paper discusses the generation of HMI Prototype from a PIM for a Naval Combat Management System (CMS) using the application codenamed ModVis. It also addresses the advantages of an early Verification and Validation (V&amp;V) of the system model and visualisation of a preliminary prototype of the system early in the project life cycle.

Hybrid wireless hull monitoring system for naval combat vessels

There is increasing interest by the naval engineering community in permanent monitoring systems that can monitor the structural behaviour of ships during their operation at sea. This study seeks to reduce the cost and installation complexity of hull monitoring systems by introducing wireless sensors into their architectural designs. Wireless sensor networks also provide other advantages over their cable-based counterparts such as adaptability, redundancy, and weight savings. While wireless sensors can enhance functionality and reduce cost, the compartmentalised layout of most ships requires some wired networking to communicate data globally throughout the ship. In this study, 20 wireless sensing nodes are connected to a ship-wide fibre-optic data network to serve as a hybrid wireless hull monitoring system on a high-speed littoral combat vessel (FSF-1 Sea Fighter). The wireless hull monitoring system is used to collect acceleration and strain data during unattended operation during a one-month period at sea. The key findings of this study include that wireless sensors can be effectively used for reliable and accurate hull monitoring. Furthermore, the fact that they are low-cost can lead to higher sensor densities in a hull monitoring system thereby allowing properties, such as hull mode shapes, to be accurately calculated.

3.1.2 Machine Learning technologies for the Requirements Analysis in Complex Systems

AbstractRequirement Analysis is a relevant application area for a variety of Semantic Technologies related to the extraction, disambiguation and exploitation of the knowledge derived from technical requirement documents. Most methods rely on shallow language processing technologies for the automatic extraction of core concepts (e.g. components/devices, their parts and functionalities) and norms (e.g. constraints on the use of components). Few works have been devoted to study paraphrasing (i.e. textual equivalence between requirement definitions) for consistency checking and redundancy elimination. We propose here a distributional method to train a kernel‐based learning algorithm (i.e. SVM), as a cost‐effective approach to validate requirements from text in support of Requirement Analysis in the design of a Complex Systems, i.e. Naval Combat Systems. These latter are complex systems based on software components able to manage all the Combat System Equipment in different mission scenarios. We will describe the application of Recognition of Textual Entailment (RTE) techniques based on data‐driven learning methods to this scenario. While modeling the asymmetric logical relation of entailment between two textual descriptions (i.e. an hypothesis and its thesis), RTE can be here applied to the validation step of compositions between system functionalities described in the requirement specification texts. Early evidences are here discussed, as a proof of the strong applicability of the method to the general case and to other realistic scenarios in System Engineering.

함포 사격통제시스템 검증을 위한 시뮬레이션 환경 구축 및 개발진행단계에 따른 적용 방안 연구

함포 사격통제시스템은 수상함 전투체계에서 가장 사용빈도가 높은 무장 시스템으로 탄도 계산의 연산과정이 복잡할 뿐만 아니라 각종 레이더 및 센서등 자함에 탑재된 대부분의 장비로부터 정보를 수신하여 탄도계산을 수행하기 때문에 시뮬레이션을 통해 사전에 검증을 하는 것이 필요하다. 본 논문에서는 함포 사격통제시스템을 검증하기 위한 시뮬레이션 환경 구축 기법을 제안하였으며, 구축된 시뮬레이션 환경을 통해 무기체계의 개발진행단계별로 주어진 데이터를 최대한 활용하는 효율적이며 실용적인 시뮬레이션 방법을 제시하였다. 시뮬레이션을 통해 검증된 사격통제시스템은 실제 수상함 전투체계에 탑재되어 함포사격에서 우수한 결과를 얻었으며, 이를 통해 제안된 시뮬레이션 방법의 정확성 또한 입증되었다. Naval Gun FCS(Fire Control System) is the most fundamental weapon system in Naval Combat System. Simulationbased verification of FCS is mandatory before sea trial since ballistic solution needs complicated process and uses almost all information produced by own ship sensors. The FCS simulation method is proposed for verification of naval gun FCS and applicable to the FCS design depending on combat system development phase based on available data in each design phase. Verified FCS through proposed simulation method is adapted in real naval combat system and the performance has been proven by sea trial.

Red star over the Pacific: China's rise and the challenge to U.S. maritime strategy

Combining a close knowledge of Asia and an ability to tap Chinese-language sources with naval combat experience and expertise in sea-power theory, the authors assess how the rise of Chinese sea power will affect U.S. maritime strategy in Asia. They argue that China is laying the groundwork for a sustained challenge to American primacy in maritime Asia, and to defend this hypothesis they look back to Alfred Thayer Mahan's sea-power theories, now popular with the Chinese. The book considers how strategic thought about the sea shapes Beijing's deliberations and compares China's geostrategic predicament to that of the Kaiser's Germany a century ago. It examines the Chinese navy's operational concepts, tactics, and capabilities and appraises China's ballistic-missile submarine fleet. The authors conclude that unless Washington adapts, China will present a challenge to America's strategic position. Selected: For the Chief of Naval Operation's Reading List By The Atlantic as one of the Best Books of the Year on foreign affairs in 2010 By Proceedings magazine as a Notable Naval book in 2010.

Is Mahan Dead?

Is Mahan Dead? John T. Kuehn (bio) A major debate is raging in the American policy and defense communities about what form the navy of the future should take to best serve the national interests of the United States. There are differing views about the security challenges the fleet of the future will face and how these should shape the composition, mission, and disposition of the fleet and the number and types of ships, aircraft, and other forces attached to it. This is no small matter. Billions of dollars are at stake as security experts and politicians look into an always cloudy crystal ball and guess—there is no other word for it—the general outlines of the future security environment. Guessing wrong can have expensive and even disastrous consequences. There is nothing terribly new about debating force levels, appropriations, and even the navy's primary mission. But the current debate is different thanks in large part to the views of Barrett Tillman, a prolific writer of military and naval history. He announced the arrival of a new "Post-Naval Era" in the June 2009 issue of theU.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. The venue is significant. The Proceedings is the Navy Department's semi-official venue for institutional dialogue about all things naval. A "post-naval era" would suggest a radically altered maritime environment, one that would have enormous implications for the navy of the future. Tillman touched a nerve. And it did not take long for a firestorm of criticism and commentary to appear in the letters section of the Proceedings. Sea power types have always had an almost neurotic sensitivity to landlubbers' ignorance about the obvious importance and influence of sea power. After all, none other than Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan back at the end of the 19th century had written the gospel of sea power to set the historical record straight once and for all. And now Tillman, like Nietzsche's "mad man," has entered the public square to announce to a stunned audience that "Mahan is dead."1 Or, to put this in naval terms, Tillman is suggesting that the age of the big blue-water fleet that began with Teddy Roosevelt is over. And naval and marine officers need to recognize this and adjust accordingly. Is Tillman right? Are there historically informed ways to think about all this? Is a radical redesign of the United States Navy that Tillman and others are proposing really called for? He certainly has some powerful evidence on his side. First off, he argues that there have been no major fleet actions since the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944. Others have made the same case and have come to a similar conclusion. Historian H.P. Willmott, for example, maintains that "the battle of Leyte Gulf represented fin de siècle in terms of naval warfare as it had come to be represented over thousands of years—fought in a single dimension on the surface of the sea and within line of sight."2 Willmott's judgment, however, does not necessarily imply the end of the big blue-water fleet; rather, it signals that the style and dimensionality of naval warfare has changed in a very significant way. Both Tillman and Willmott use large-scale combat between fleets as their primary criterion. But Willmott is closer to the truth. Naval combat as it had been fought for millennia does appear to have changed after 1945. That said, the uses to which sea power has been put since 1945 are not fundamentally different: protection of the sea lines of communication, power projection, and sending diplomatic messages, to name the most important. These uses are all consistent with the writings of Mahan and his British contemporary, Sir Julian Corbett. Click for larger view View full resolution The launching of the USS Mariano G. Vallejo submarine, Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, California, October 23, 1965. General Collection, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University. Tillman says little about the very real tension, and sometimes conflict, between fleets over the course of the Cold War. This is somewhat curious given the approximately twenty-year anniversary of the end of the Cold...

6.5.2 Human Factors Issues in a Model Based Systems Engineering Perspective

AbstractThe objective of this paper is the description of design results in the application fields of Human Factors Engineering through an innovative model based systems engineering approach.Human Factors analyze the system with a human‐based approach, looking at the system by the users' perspective, designing interaction with the system according to operator profiles. Operator's interaction with the system is performed through the use of Human Machine Interface mechanism by inserting information to setup system capabilities and checking operational results to monitor system behavior.The Model Based System Engineering approach allows to build a design structure of system logics through functional and operational chains, focusing on exchanges among system modules. Human Factors studies include also the operator as active part of the functional chains and can therefore be considered as a “module” of the System Model, where all data catalogue is codified in SysML.This Papers also shows the applications of this concepts in design and modeling of Naval Combat System.

4.2.1 Multi‐scale performance evaluation in Naval Combat Systems domain

AbstractPerformance evaluation of modern and future combat systems in complex operating scenarios is strictly related to modeling and simulation techniques. A “multi‐scale” methodology is employed to evaluate performances of naval combat systems in multi‐platform operating scenarios (e.g. naval fleet, border control, homeland defence and security) through numerical simulation tools, named ICS‐Sim (Integrated Combat Systems Simulation). ICS‐Sim allows integration of software simulations models with high degree of accuracy to analyse and evaluate systems performances for studying innovative algorithms (e.g. asymmetrical threats contrast) integrated in a systems of systems simulation environment.

Adaptive Automation in a Naval Combat Management System

<para xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> There is a continuing trend of letting fewer people deal with larger amounts of information in more complex situations using highly automated systems. In such circumstances, there is a risk that people are overwhelmed by information during intense periods or, on the other hand, do not build sufficient situational awareness during periods of slack to deal with situations where human intervention becomes necessary. A number of studies show encouraging results in increasing the efficiency of human–machine systems by making the automation adapt itself to the human needs. Current literature shows no examples of adaptive automation in real operational settings, however. We introduce a fine-grained adaptation methodology based on well-established concepts that is easy to comprehend and likely to be accepted by the end user. At the same time, we let the machine operate like a virtual team member in that it continuously builds its own view of the situation independent from the human. Working agreements between human and machine provide lower and upper bounds of automation that are in advance determined by the end user so that unwanted appropriation of responsibility by the machine is avoided. The framework is domain neutral and therefore thought to be applicable across a wide range of complex systems, both military and civilian. It gives researchers an architecture that they can use in their own work to get adaptive automation up and running quickly and easily. </para>

Real‐Time Realities: The Application of Commercial Information Technology to Combat Control Systems

AbstractThe Navy is steward to the most lethal arsenal of national and combat power ever amassed. The command responsibilities associated with such destructive force require us to always be in complete positive control over these weapons. The Navy, to meet this mission requirement, traditionally developed its systems using special purpose technology to achieve “Deterministic Control.” Control system technologies are fielded in all aspects of shipboard combat systems with specific challenges in timing and safety in the surface anti‐air warfare systems, the submarine launched ballistic missile systems, and air launched missile systems. Today's naval combat system is a highly complex, computer‐based control system that is evolving within the framework of the commercial computer industry. This paper will briefly describe some critical and unique characteristics of a large‐scale digital weapon control system and identify emerging technologies that have the potential to respond to the Navy's warfighting needs.

Acupuncture: A Useful Tool for Health Care in an Operational Medicine Environment

Acupuncture is a form of medical care that originated in China; it has evolved and progressed over thousands of years to become one of the most commonly used forms of health care throughout the world. Allopathic (Western) medicine has begun to seriously investigate and to use this system only in the past three decades. Although acupuncture's mechanisms for healing are not fully understood, it helps many conditions. Using acupuncture reduces or eliminates the need for expensive medications and the potential risk of adverse events resulting from medications, with cost savings and health benefits to patients. During a deployment of naval combat engineers to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, acupuncture was used in the health care of sailors, Marines, and soldiers. It objectively and subjectively improved the health of troops in the field. Troops were able to function while being treated, reducing or avoiding sick in quarters or light limited duty status and saving operational man-days. Acupuncture in the right hands can serve as a health force multiplier (amplifying a provider's clinical impact) and can be integrated into routine health care, whether in garrison or in the field.

Victory of the West: The Story of the Battle of Lepanto (review)

Reviewed by: Victory of the West: The Story of the Battle of Lepanto Gábo Ágoston Victory of the West: The Story of the Battle of Lepanto. By Niccolò Capponi . New York: Pan Macmillan, 2006. ISBN 1-4050-4588-4. Maps. Illustrations. Tables. Glossary. Appendixes. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xxxvi, 411. $27.50. Niccolò Capponi has written an excellent book on the battle of Lepanto, the last major naval combat of rowing fleets in the Mediterranean, fought on October 7, 1571, in the Gulf of Patras between the Ottomans and the alliance of Christian powers, known as the Holy League, who aimed at recapturing Cyprus, conquered by the Ottomans the previous year. The fight–called the battle of Curzolaris by contemporaneous Venetians and Niccolò Capponi, since it took place some forty nautical miles west of Lepanto around the Curzolaris islands—ended with the stunning victory of the Holy League fleet and the almost total destruction of the Ottoman navy. However, it seemed as though Lepanto had altered the balance of power in the Mediterranean little. By the spring of 1572, the Ottomans had built 134 new vessels, complete with artillery, and had a navy of some 250 galleys and several smaller ships at their disposal. They continued to hold Cyprus, and the Holy League collapsed as Venice concluded a treaty with the Ottomans in March 1573 and as Spanish resources were redirected to meet new challenges in the Netherlands. Yet, Niccolò Capponi, following earlier historians (notably Fernand Braudel), is right to underline that the battle stopped further Ottoman expansion in the Mediterranean, and that the Ottomans' "rebuilt fleet was unable to dominate the Mediterranean as before" (p. 320), despite their recapture of Tunis in 1574. The bulk of Capponi's monograph (pp. 1-253, 287-320) deals with the diplomatic and military context of the confrontation, the intricacies of the Christian alliance, the Cyprus war, and the aftermath of the combat, whereas the battle gets only some 30 pages (pp. 253-86). While the strength of this [End Page 223] book is its author's remarkable familiarity with the relevant Italian and Spanish sources, Capponi, unlike some recent studies (e.g., those by Hugh Bicheno and Angus Konstam), also used Ottoman sources and specialized studies by Ottomanist historians, and tried to provide a balanced treatment of the opponents' strategies, tactics, strengths and weaknesses. The most rewarding part for this reader was the splendid examination of the opposing navies' ships, weaponry, crews and recruitment methods (chapter 7). Although Capponi is cautiously skeptical of military technology, he does not deny its role. In his reading, the "reasons for the Christian victory at the Curzolaris include: galleass fire, better tactical use of artillery, harquebuses, body protection and Ottoman overconfidence…[and] that the allies largely succeeded in stopping the Ottomans from exploiting their skill in hand-to-hand fighting" (pp. 320-1). Ottomanists would add that the sultan's fleet was exhausted as a result of the unusually early start (March 16) of the 1571 campaign, and that most Ottoman galleys were undermanned due to the losses in that campaign and to the fact that many of the soldiers aboard the coastal beys' ships had already left for the winter. More extensive use of Ottoman sources will certainly change many details of the narrative. Based on Ottoman imperial orders and "campaign daybooks," for instance, idris Bostan has recently reconstructed the itineraries of the Ottoman navy during the 1570 and 1571 naval campaigns, correcting inaccuracies and clarifying uncertainties repeated by western historians, including Capponi. According to Bostan, the sultan's navy left Istanbul in three groups (in March, April 26, and May 16) led respectively by Murad Reis, Piyale Pasha, and Lala Mustafa Pasha (accompanied by Müezzinzade Ali Pasha); the three fleets of 256 ships of various types (and not 400 vessels as reported by western sources) joined on June 5 at Rhodes; started to land troops near Limassol on July 2, whereas the main army landed two days later near Larnaca. They captured Nicosia on September 9, and took some 20,000 prisoners, of whom 13,719 were listed in a pençyek-register, containing one-fifth of booty belonging to the...

Self-Regulation and Performance in High-Fidelity Simulations: An Extension of Ego-Depletion Research

This article extends the research literature related to “ego-depletion.” Although numerous studies have focused on the self-regulatory failure associated with ego-depletion, the extant literature is generally characterized by relatively simple behavioral manipulations and dependent measures. Two studies are described that extend previous ego-depletion findings by employing a high-fidelity, customer service simulation as an ego-depleting manipulation (Study 1) and by using performance on a cognitively demanding naval combat simulator as a dependent measure (Study 2). Results of both studies show the generalizability of the effects of ego-depletion; the implications for self-regulatory failure in more naturalistic settings are discussed.

Decision at sea: five naval battles that shaped American history

From thunderous broadsides traded between wooden sailing ships on Lake Erie, to the carrier battles of World War II, to the devastating high-tech action in the Persian Gulf, here is a gripping history of five key battles that defined the evolution of naval warfare - and the course of the American nation. Acclaimed military historian Craig Symonds offers spellbinding narratives of crucial engagements, showing how each battle reveals the transformation of technology and weaponry from one war to the next; how these in turn transformed naval combat; and how each event marked a milestone in American history. These battles include: Oliver Hazard Perry's heroic victory at Lake Erie, one of the last great battles of the Age of Sail, which secured the Northwestern frontier for the United States; the brutal Civil War duel between the ironclads Monitor and Virginia, which sounded the death knell for wooden-hulled warships and doomed the Confederacy's hope of besting the Union navy; Commodore Dewey's stunning triumph at Manila Bay in 1898, where the U.S. displayed its navy of steel-hulled ships firing explosive shells and wrested an empire from a fading European power; the hairsbreadth American victory at Midway, where aircraft carriers launched planes against enemies 200 miles away - and where the tide of World War II turned in the space of a few furious minutes; and Operation Praying Mantis in the Persian Gulf, where computers, ship-fired missiles, and smart bombs not only changed the nature of warfare at sea, but also marked a new era, and a new responsibility, for the United States. Symonds records these encounters in detail so vivid that readers can hear the wind in the rigging and feel the pounding of the guns. Yet he places every battle in a wide perspective, revealing their significance to America's development as it grew from a new Republic on the edge of a threatening frontier to a global superpower. Decision at Sea is a powerful and illuminating look at pivotal moments in the history of the Navy and of the United States. It is also a compelling study of the unchanging demands of leadership at sea, where commanders must make rapid decisions in the heat of battle with lives - and the fate of nations - hanging in the balance.

Miscalculating One’s Enemies: Russian Military Intelligence before the Russo-Japanese War

On the basis of archival and printed sources, this article examines the role that Russian military intelligence played in miscalculating the Japanese threat before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05. The treatment focuses on three general problem areas: assessments of Japanese military and naval strength and combat readiness; perceptions of war imminence and the related possibility of surprise; and Japanese intentions. Evidence indicates that the overall quality of intelligence was uneven, although reasonably accurate with regard to the Japanese navy. However, genuine situational and structural constraints clouded perceptions of the Japanese ground forces. Still other constraints obscured Russian perceptions of war imminence and Japanese intentions. The cumulative result was that Russia would enter far eastern conflict at a substantial disadvantage.