Natural Ontological Attitude Research Articles

How Expertise is Enabled: Why Epistemic Cycles Matter to us All

ABSTRACT Rather than ask if expertise is under threat, this paper uses case studies to show how expertise is enabled. Its appearance can be traced to how the already known evokes sensibility, judging, thinking and languaging. As defined below, it draws on epistemic cycles. Using Secchi and Cowley’s (2021) 3M model, this posits a second cut between the micro and the macro. In the mesosphere, people create temporary domains or what William James (1991) calls ‘little worlds’. Within these corpora popularia, the new is made possible – expertise sets off unimagined outcomes. Thus, many concerns cannot be solved by scientific correlates of a natural ontological attitude: indeed, the truism clarifies many social challenges. We lack social institutions that dedicate expertise to goals like ecosocial justice and life-sustaining relations. Once the necessary expertise is traced to epistemic cycles, we can demand of institutions that they create bodies that seek to bring a rich future to evolution.

Natural Historical Attitude: Objectivity Before Truth Book Review: Turner D. Making Prehistory: Historical Science and the Scientific Realism Debate. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Derek Turner believes that a proper interpretation of Arthur Fine’s natural ontological attitude can help to reveal the nature of the difference between «historical» (geology, archeology, forensics) and «empirical» (physics, chemistry) sciences. From his point of view, the apparent asymmetry between these sciences is a consequence of different understanding of the possibilities to «manipulate» the objects of study and the role played by background theories. In our opinion, Turner’s concept is a good example of how profound and inviting the instrumentalistic concept of science could be. First, it is «reflexive» in the sense that it constrained other instrumentalist theories (B. Fraassen’s constructive empiricism deeply flawed). And secondly, it is «constructive» – the emphasis that «the strength of arguments for or against scientific realism can vary depending on the scientific context» quite unexpectedly leads to the fact that «ideographic / nomothetic division is not very helpful», and to the fact that «epistemic disadvantage, but the same epistemic status». Reflections on the book: Turner D. Making Prehistory: Historical Science and the Scientific Realism Debate. Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Making coherent senses of success in scientific modeling

Making sense of why something succeeded or failed is central to scientific practice: it provides an interpretation of what happened, i.e. an hypothesized explanation for the results, that informs scientists’ deliberations over their next steps. In philosophy, the realism debate has dominated the project of making sense of scientists’ success and failure claims, restricting its focus to whether truth or reliability best explain science’s most secure successes. Our aim, in contrast, will be to expand and advance the practice-oriented project sketched by Arthur Fine in his work on the Natural Ontological Attitude. An important obstacle to articulating a positive program, we suggest, has been overlooking how scientists adopt standardized rules and procedures in order to define and operationalize meanings for success and failure relative to their situated goals. To help fill this gap, we introduce two new ideas, design specifications and track records, and show how they advance our ability to make sense of scientific modeling practices while maintaining a deflationary stance toward the realism debate.

Qual o argumento para a Atitude Ontológica Natural?

Arthur Fine presented the Natural Ontological Attitude (NOA) as a third alternative between scientific realism and anti-realism by identifying a core position contained in both and rejecting any philosophical addition to this core. At first, Fine’s proposal was understood as offering a doxastic middle ground between believing in the truth of a theory and believing in its empirical adequacy. In this reading, NOA was widely disregarded after Alan Musgrave’s criticisms of it, which characterized Fine’s proposal as a form of realism. After that, NOA was reinterpreted as a local variety of realism focused in changing the attitude used to settle the scientific realism debate, by rejecting global philosophies with an approach external to science, and by considering only the scientific evidence with a contextualist mood. Although this reading clarifies how to understand NOA, there is still no consensus about what is Fine’s argument to support it. I organize the four main interpretations of Fine’s defense and point their main flaws. Finally, I develop some clarifications about NOA in order to solve the flaws of the preceding interpretations, defending that NOA is based upon a prevalence of the epistemic values actually used in scientific practice.

The Natural Ontological Attitude in a Hermeneutic Context

My aim in this paper is to re-examine Arthur Fine’s concept of the natural ontological attitude. Whereas earlier critical interpretations focus on the compatibility of NOA with scientific realism, I argue that Fine’s conception is to be recast in terms of an interpretative theory of scientific research. Specifically, I make the case that the hermeneutic reformulation of NOA is unavoidable when at stake are the issues of the structural, conceptual, and experimental articulation of scientific domain. The paper concludes by considering the formation of local epistemological positions in the research process.

Is Pickering's ”Pragmatic Realism” Viable?

In his book The Mangle of Practice and in other writings, Andrew Pickering purports to resolve the question of scientific realism by recasting the debate in terms of his own view “pragmatic” or “performative” realism. This view is informed by a constructivist view of scientific practice. Therefore it is characterised by Pickering as a species of anti-realism that claims to take due account of the both the objective and pragmatic aspects of certain versions of scientific realism. This paper analyses Pickering's claims to have resolved the debate and examines the merits and limitations of his proposed replacement. I show that insofar as Pickering conceives scientific practice as eschewing any position concerning the correspondence of theoretical concepts with nature (either for or against), his position can be compared in several respects to Fine's much discussed alternative to realism, NOA (the Natural Ontological Attitude). I contend that Pickering's proposed “performative realism” is no more successful at resolving the scientific realism question in than is NOA.

Toward Pragmatic Realism in Human Geography

Classical realism describes the notion that the world we inhabit is completely mind-independent, that there is one unique account of the world and that truths about the world are a matter of the absolute correspondence between linguistic terms and their referents in the world. Human geographers have recently employed a form of transcendental realism inspired by the works of R. Bhaskar, A. Giddens and A. Sayer. This form of realism is anti-positivist and based on the dual notions of ontological stratification and emergent powers materialism. Reactions in geography have been both positive and negative indicating that neither classical realism, nor transcendental realism nor anti-realism seem acceptable. As a way of solving this dilemma, pragmatic (or internal) realism proposes the adoption of a natural ontological attitude toward the objects of geographical inquiry.

A pragmatic critique of three kinds of religious naturalism

AbstractThis paper takes a critical look at a number of recent attempts to reconcile religious and scientifi c ways of thinking. Three basic programs of what I call "religious naturalism" are discussed: (1) attempts to synthesize science and religion by defending a combination of (Christian) theism and naturalism by means of the concept of emergence; (2) "demythologized" interpretations of religious statements, allegedly rendering them compatible with science (for example, in John Dewey's pragmatic naturalism or in the religious naturalism inherited from the Chicago School of liberal theology); and (3) a form of naturalism analogous to Arthur Fine's "natural ontological attitude" (NOA), debated in the philosophy of science over the past two decades. I suggest that (1) amounts to a nonreductively naturalist metaphysics, whereas (2) is a nonmetaphysical and (3) a postmetaphysical program in the philosophy of religion. It is argued, among other things, that while the concept of emergence has become increasingly relevant in the philosophy of mind and science, its place in the philosophy of religion remains obscure. Similarly, nonmetaphysical discussions of religious experiences or "the religious" à la Dewey and his followers are difficult to combine with genuinely religious views. Further, it is hard to see how postmetaphysical naturalism (NOA) could be part of a philosophically responsible program at all, because of its diffi culties in accounting for the normativity of ontological commitments. It is proposed that, instead of elaborating on these pseudo-solutions, the problem of the relation between science and religion should be subordinated to a pragmatist re-evaluation.

Deflationary Metaphysics, Social Constructivism, and the Natural Ontological Attitude

Debate in the philosophy of science has recently been much concerned with the controversy over the body of doctrines that goes by the name constructivism. While the school has generated little enthusiasm among philosophers of science, in one form or another it dominates the broader field of science-studies. In spite of its unpopularity among philosophers of science Arthur Fine has argued that an attenuated form of constructivism can be useful within the context of a deflationary approach to science. Fine maintains that the deflationary doctrine, the view that global positions on the realism question ought to be eschewed, can accommodate some constructivist interpretations. In this paper I show that, in most cases, social constructivist interpretations of scientific practice cannot be reconciled with the goals of deflationary philosophy of science. I also demonstrate that to the extent constructivism can be made consistent with deflationary goals it will not resemble Fine's and that it will be far more limited in its applicability than philosophers sympathetic with Fine might think.

The NOAer's Dilemma: Constructive Empiricism and the Natural Ontological Attitude

Faced with interminable combat over some piece of philosophical terrain, someone will inevitably suggest that the contested ground is nothing more than a philosophically manufactured mirage that is therefore not worth fighting for. Arthur Fine has long advocated such a response — the ‘Natural Ontological Attitude,’ or NOA — to the realism debate in the philosophy of science. Notwithstanding theprima facieincompatibility between the realist's and anti-realist's positions, Fine suggests that there is in fact enough common ground for NOA to stand on its own as a minimal alternative, one that enjoys the advantage of being free of the philosophical burdens of its overweight contenders.Notwithstanding Fine's claim to have identified a position that is neither realist nor anti-realist, critics charge that NOA, as Fine describes it, is a realist position. I endorse this criticism below, with attention to the relation between NOA and Bas van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism (CE). I show that Fine's repudiation of the globalism he identifies in realism (and in anti-realism) does not insulate him from that charge.

Realism: Deconstructing the Debate

In this paper I try to give an assessment of a three-cornered fight over the issue of scientific realism. On the one hand there are Putnam-Boyd realists, who believe that there are things about science that realism alone explains well. There is the constructive empiricist, notably Bas van Fraassen. And then there is the natural ontological attitude of Arthur Fine. I try to show that the issue has not been clearly posed, but that when it is a surprising 'quietism' or pessimism about a metatheoretical position begins to seem attractive.

Naturalism, Transcendental Conditions, and the Self-Discipline of Philosophical Reason

Naturalism has been the received metaphilosophical view within epis temology and the of science since the 1980s. In brief, it urges that science (and our knowledge acquisition in general) is an ele ment of the world along with everything else. There is no priv ileged, aprioristic point of view of first philosophy over and above our empirical science itself, although such a standpoint is still assumed, in different ways, by old-fashioned empiricists, epistemological foun dationalists, Popperian critical rationalists, and many contemporary sci entific realists?in short, by most traditional analytic philosophers.2 Instead, science must be investigated scientifically; a scientific theory of science should be our aim. This kind of naturalistic program has been defended by, among others, Ronald Giere (1988) and Richard Boyd (1992). We may also classify Arthur Fine's (1996) nonrealistic or postrealistic and postphilosophical natural ontological attitude (NOA) as a species of naturalism in this sense. According to Fine, all attempts to interpret and justify science philosophically, from a higher perspective lying outside science, are in vain.3

The present state of the scientific realism debate

Once upon a time there was a feeling in the philosophy of science community that the scientific realism debate had run out of steam. Arthur Fine went as far as to declare that ‘realism is well and truly dead’ (1986a, 112) and to compose the obituary of the debate, aka the Natural Ontological Attitude. Fortunately, the allegations of premature death failed to persuade many philosophers, for whom the scientific realism debate has had a glorious past and a very promising future. In the last dozen of years only there have been a number of books which cast a fresh eye over the issue of scientific realism, such as those by Suppe (1989), Putnam (1990), Almeder (1992), Wright (1992), Kitcher (1993a), Aronson, Harre & Way (1994), Brown (1994), Laudan (1996), Leplin (1997), Kukla (1998), Trout (1998), Cartwright (1999), Giere (1999), Niiniluoto (1999) and Psillos (1999). Although these books differ vastly in their approaches and in their substantive theses, they can all be seen as participating in a common project: to characterise carefully the main features of the realism debate and to offer new ways of either exploring old arguments or thinking in novel terms about the debate itself.

How Natural Can Ontology Be?

Arthur Fine's Natural Ontological Attitude (NOA) is intended to provide an alternative to both realism and antirealism. I argue that the most plausible meaning of “natural” in NOA is “nonphilosophical,” but that Fine comes to NOA through a particular conception of philosophy. I suggest that instead of a natural attitude we should adopt a philosophical attitude. This is one that is self-conscious, pragmatic, pluralistic, and sensitive to context. I conclude that when scientific realism and antirealism are viewed with a philosophical attitude there are still legitimate philosophical questions to address.

California Unnatural: On Fine's Natural Ontological Attitude

Abela accepts Fine’s account of realism and instrumentalism, but thinks that we can reject the Natural Ontological Attitude by distinguishing the theoretical attempt to make sense of scientific practice from choosing the attitude we bring to the debate, or to science itself. But Abela’s attitudes are vulnerable to Fine’s criticisms of the philosophical positions. However, if we take attitude as contrastive and as full-blooded enough to lead to different behaviour we can see a gap in Fine’s position. He cannot tell us why it is science that he trusts. When we look more widely, the philosophical positions might be seen as ways of justifying that trust.

Getting ontologically natural

Abstract It is argued that Arthur Fine's “natural ontological attitude” (NOA), i.e., the view that science should not be philosophically (either realistically or anti‐realistically) interpreted at all but should rather be allowed to “speak for itself”, is seriously problematic, even though it contains deep insights which philosophers of science should take into account. In particular, Fine succeeds in showing that no non‐question‐begging, conclusive demonstration of scientific realism (e.g., on “explanationist” grounds) is possible. But this is not a threat to scientific realism, if realism is subordinated to pragmatism. From the pragmatic point of view, the demand for a non‐circular proof of scientific realism is mistaken. Rather, realism can be seen as our natural attitude, based on our practices, scientific and otherwise. Fine's NOA turns out to be, on a charitable reading, quite close to a version of pragmatic realism. The paper concludes by briefly examining the idea of regarding realism as a “narrat...

Scientific Realism, Scientific Practice, and the Natural Ontological Attitude

Both sides in the debate about scientific realism have argued that their view provides a better account of actual scientific practice. For example, it has been claimed that the practice of theory conjunction presupposes realism, and that scientists' use of multiple and incompatible models presupposes some form of instrumentalism. Assuming that the practices of science are rational, these conclusions cannot both be right. I argue that neither of them is right, and that, in fact, all scientific practices are compatible with both realism and instrumentalism. I also repudiate van Fraassen's argument to the effect that the instrumentalist account of scientific practice is logically weaker, hence better, than the realist account. In the end, there are no scientific practice arguments on the table that support either side of the debate. It is also noted that the deficiencies of van Fraassen's argument are recapitulated in Putnam's miracle argument for realism. My pessimistic assessment of the state of the debate is reminiscent of Arthur Fine's. However, Fine's argument for the ‘natural ontological attitude’ once again repeats the problems of van Fraassen's and Putnam's arguments.

The Politics of Postmodern Philosophy of Science

Modernism in the philosophy of science demands a unified story about what makes an inquiry scientific (or a successful science). Fine's “natural ontological attitude” (NOA) is “postmodern” in joining trust in local scientific practice with suspicion toward any global interpretation of science to legitimate or undercut that trust. I consider four readings of this combination of trust and suspicion and their consequences for the autonomy and cultural credibility of the sciences. Three readings take respectively Fine's trusting attitude, his emphasis upon local practice, and his antiessentialism about science as most fundamental to NOA. A fourth, more adequate reading, prompted by recent feminist interpretations of science, offers less restrictive readings of both Fine's trust and his suspicion toward approaching science with “ready-made philosophical engines” (Fine 1986b, 177).

Fine's “Shaky Game” (And Why Noa is no Ark for Science)

The primary title of this essay is derived from Arthur Fine's recent book, The Shaky Game (1986), which is a rephrasing of “risky game”, a term Einstein applied to the defenders of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, claiming that “‘most of them simply do not see what sort of risky game they are playing with reality‘” (Fine 1986, 2). Just as Einstein's term indicates his disagreement with this standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, Fine's term is being used to express disapproval of his interpretation of the philosophy of physics of Einstein and Bohr. The subtitle forecasts my evaluation of Fine's attempt in NOA (the “Natural Ontological Attitude”) to provide a satisfactory ontological basis of scientific inquiry.

Unification, Realism and Inference

Previous articleNext article No AccessArticlesUnification, Realism and Inference1MARGARET MORRISONMARGARET MORRISONPhilosophy Department University of Toronto Search for more articles by this author 1 An earlier and substantially shorter version of this paper was presented to the 1988 Philosophy of Science Association Meeting and to the weekly seminar in history and philosophy of science at Stanford. I would like to thank the participants for helpful discussions. Thanks also go to Yemima Ben Mecham, Phillip Catton, Malcolm Forster, Paul Forster and an anonymous referee for valuable comments on an earlier draft.PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Volume 41, Number 3September 1990 Society: The British Society for the Philosophy of Science Views: 9Total views on this site Citations: 5Citations are reported from Crossref Views: 9Total views on this site Citations: 5Citations are reported from Crossref Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/41.3.305 Views: 9Total views on this site Citations: 5Citations are reported from Crossref © 1990 by The Author. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Greg Frost‐Arnold The No‐Miracles Argument for Realism: Inference to an Unacceptable Explanation Greg Frost‐Arnold, Philosophy of Science 77, no.11 (Jul 2015): 35–58.https://doi.org/10.1086/650207 Margaret Morrison Where Have All the Theories Gone? Margaret Morrison, Philosophy of Science 74, no.22 (Jul 2015): 195–228.https://doi.org/10.1086/520778 Robin Findlay Hendry Are Realism and Instrumentalism Methodologically Indifferent?, Philosophy of Science 68, no.S3S3 (Oct 2015): S25–S37.https://doi.org/10.1086/392895André Kukla Scientific Realism, Scientific Practice, and the Natural Ontological Attitude, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45, no.44 (Dec 2020): 955–975.https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/45.4.955ADAM MORTON Mathematical Models: Questions of Trustworthiness, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44, no.44 (Dec 2020): 659–674.https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/44.4.659