Deflationary Metaphysics, Social Constructivism, and the Natural Ontological Attitude

Abstract

Debate in the philosophy of science has recently been much concerned with the controversy over the body of doctrines that goes by the name constructivism. While the school has generated little enthusiasm among philosophers of science, in one form or another it dominates the broader field of science-studies. In spite of its unpopularity among philosophers of science Arthur Fine has argued that an attenuated form of constructivism can be useful within the context of a deflationary approach to science. Fine maintains that the deflationary doctrine, the view that global positions on the realism question ought to be eschewed, can accommodate some constructivist interpretations. In this paper I show that, in most cases, social constructivist interpretations of scientific practice cannot be reconciled with the goals of deflationary philosophy of science. I also demonstrate that to the extent constructivism can be made consistent with deflationary goals it will not resemble Fine's and that it will be far more limited in its applicability than philosophers sympathetic with Fine might think.