Unification, Realism and Inference

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Previous articleNext article No AccessArticlesUnification, Realism and Inference1MARGARET MORRISONMARGARET MORRISONPhilosophy Department University of Toronto Search for more articles by this author 1 An earlier and substantially shorter version of this paper was presented to the 1988 Philosophy of Science Association Meeting and to the weekly seminar in history and philosophy of science at Stanford. I would like to thank the participants for helpful discussions. Thanks also go to Yemima Ben Mecham, Phillip Catton, Malcolm Forster, Paul Forster and an anonymous referee for valuable comments on an earlier draft.PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Volume 41, Number 3September 1990 Society: The British Society for the Philosophy of Science Views: 9Total views on this site Citations: 5Citations are reported from Crossref Views: 9Total views on this site Citations: 5Citations are reported from Crossref Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/41.3.305 Views: 9Total views on this site Citations: 5Citations are reported from Crossref © 1990 by The Author. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Greg Frost‐Arnold The No‐Miracles Argument for Realism: Inference to an Unacceptable Explanation Greg Frost‐Arnold, Philosophy of Science 77, no.11 (Jul 2015): 35–58.https://doi.org/10.1086/650207 Margaret Morrison Where Have All the Theories Gone? Margaret Morrison, Philosophy of Science 74, no.22 (Jul 2015): 195–228.https://doi.org/10.1086/520778 Robin Findlay Hendry Are Realism and Instrumentalism Methodologically Indifferent?, Philosophy of Science 68, no.S3S3 (Oct 2015): S25–S37.https://doi.org/10.1086/392895André Kukla Scientific Realism, Scientific Practice, and the Natural Ontological Attitude, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45, no.44 (Dec 2020): 955–975.https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/45.4.955ADAM MORTON Mathematical Models: Questions of Trustworthiness, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44, no.44 (Dec 2020): 659–674.https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/44.4.659