Natural Gas Exports Research Articles

Russian Cooperation with BRICS Countries

For a long period foreign trade was one of the major priorities for Russian economic development. Economic contradictions between Russia and Western countries changed international economic order. As a result of the Western sanctions global financial and banking system was ruined, international trade faces serious problems. In current situation Russia has to reload its economic priorities. This article covers the major trends in Russian foreign trade during 2022-2023. In 2022 oil and natural gas export increased and foreign currency reserves were reestablished. But in 2023 Western economic sanctions influence negatively on economic relations, decreasing both import and export. There are some legal and transport barriers to normal trade with European countries and the United States. In the Section 2 the author considers the major problems and possibilities of BRICS countries cooperation. The potential of this group mutual trade is impressive. But the current state of BRICS economic cooperation is still primitive. One of the main impediments to the progress of BRICS is the economic differences among members. Trade barriers are also a significant obstacle to the progress of BRICS. While the member countries have pledged to promote free trade among themselves, there are still significant trade barriers that hinder their trade and economic growth. Infrastructure deficits, such as inadequate transportation networks and port facilities, can also create barriers to trade and investment. To overcome these impediments, the BRICS countries need to work together to promote cooperation and integration. This can be done through negotiations and agreements to reduce tariffs barriers, to improve transportation networks and port facilities.

Natural Gas Exports Legal Regulation under the Foreign Legislation

Natural Gas Exports Legal Regulation under the Foreign Legislation

აშშ-ს ენერგეტიკული დიპლომატია მსოფლიო ენერგეტიკული ბაზრების ტრანსფორმაციის პირობებში (სამხრეთ კავკასიის ვექტორი)

The article considers the key aspects of the US external energy diplomacy in the context of the transformation of the global energy market at the present stage. The features of American energy strategy are revealed. The main strategic documents of the U.S., affecting the problems of energy security and energy strategy, are studied. The features of the concepts of "energy dominance" (Trump) and "energy independence" (Nixon) are presented from the point of view of their implementation in the context of modern political and economic challenges. The structure of the U.S. energy balance is considered, which made it possible to determine the level of dependence on external supplies of hydrocarbon raw materials, especially oil. The priorities of the U.S. in the hydrocarbon market (both natural gas and oil) and renewable energy are studied through the prism of the climate agenda (in particular, the 2015 Paris climate agreement). Special attention is paid to the issues of liquefied natural gas (LNG) export from the U.S., especially towards European markets. The key risks and challenges of US energy diplomacy in the context of the conflict in Ukraine as well as geopolitical confrontation with Russia are identified. The US energy strategy in the South Caucasus is considered. The main features of the U.S. energy cooperation with Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan in the context of geopolitical challenges are revealed.

ОЦЕНКА ОБЪЕМА ЭКСПОРТА СЖИЖЕННОГО ГАЗА РОССИИ

The article presents the structure of export of energy products for 2020-2021 of the Russian Federation. Based on quarterly data for the period from 2016 up to 2021, the volume of liquefied natural gas exports was econometrically analyzed. A multiplicative model has been constructed with the aim to predict the future export volumes of liquefied natural gas for the 1st quarter of 2022. The adequacy and quality of the compiled model have been evaluated.

Brief Synopses of New Arabic-Language Publications

Brief Synopses of New Arabic-Language Publications

International Trade

Values of net oil imports(‐)/exports for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, the United States and Australia. Updated on a monthly basis.Number of imports for Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Republic of Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Other EU‐15 (EU‐15), Norway, Poland, Switzerland, Turkey, and Other Europe (OECD Europe), Canada, Chile, Mexico, and the United States (OECD Western Hemisphere), and Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, (OECD Asia‐Pacific), and Total OECED.Current data for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Other EU‐15 (EU‐15), Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Turkey, and Other Europe (OECD Europe), Canada, Mexico, and the United States (OECD Western Hemisphere), Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, and New Zealand (OECD Asia‐Pacific). Updated on a monthly basis.Current data for principal importers of natural gas and the amount in which they import from United States, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom, France, Japan, Italy, Germany and Spain (Table 19.1).Current data for principal exporters of natural gas and the amount they export to Canada, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Turkmenistan, Qatar, Algeria, Nigeria, Indonesia, Malaysia and Australia (Table 19.2). Updated on a monthly basis.

International Trade

Values of net oil imports(‐)/exports for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, the United States and Australia. Updated on a monthly basis.Number of imports for Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Republic of Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Other EU‐15 (EU‐15), Norway, Poland, Switzerland, Turkey, and Other Europe (OECD Europe), Canada, Chile, Mexico, and the United States (OECD Western Hemisphere), and Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, (OECD Asia‐Pacific), and Total OECED.Current data for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Other EU‐15 (EU‐15), Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Turkey, and Other Europe (OECD Europe), Canada, Mexico, and the United States (OECD Western Hemisphere), Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, and New Zealand (OECD Asia‐Pacific). Updated on a monthly basis.Current data for principal importers of natural gas and the amount in which they import from United States, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom, France, Japan, Italy, Germany and Spain (Table 19.1).Current data for principal exporters of natural gas and the amount they export to Canada, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Turkmenistan, Qatar, Algeria, Nigeria, Indonesia, Malaysia and Australia (Table 19.2). Updated on a monthly basis.

Germany’s stance on the Nord Stream 2 project: Internal and external determinants

In recent years, Germany’s energy policy has been pursuing several long-term goals: not only to ensure energy security, but also to achieve energy transition and to become a major gas hub in the European Union. In that context, cooperation with Russia as a key exporter of natural gas to Germany was of particular importance. At the same time, relations between the two states showed contradictory dynamics. This became especially evident during the political struggle over the project of the new Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. The author traces the evolution of the arguments of the key participants in the discussions sparked by the project in Germany before Russia began its special military operation in Ukraine and after it. The first section examines the positions of the main interest groups, leading political parties and regional authorities. The author shows that representatives from the business community and political forces related to them (SPD, CSU, part of the CDU and FDP) were generally inclined to support the project, albeit under certain conditions. The latter particularly included Russia’s guarantees for preserving gas transit through Ukraine. The human rights (legalist) group and eco-activists, affiliated with the Greens, partly the CDU and the FDP, took a much more critical stand regarding Nord Stream 2. Moreover, the federal government’s policy was greatly affected by a number of external factors. Germany made significant diplomatic efforts not only to coordinate its position with other EU countries, but also to overcome the resistance to the project from the United States and Ukraine. Nevertheless, the German government eventually managed through various compromises to advance the Nord Stream 2 project. The situation has changed dramatically after Russia’s recognition of the Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic. The German government halted the process of certification of Nord Stream 2. All major German political parties supported this decision.

International Trade

Values of net oil imports(‐)/exports for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, the United States and Australia. Updated on a monthly basis.Number of imports for Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Republic of Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Other EU‐15 (EU‐15), Norway, Poland, Switzerland, Turkey, and Other Europe (OECD Europe), Canada, Chile, Mexico, and the United States (OECD Western Hemisphere), and Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, (OECD Asia‐Pacific), and Total OECED.Current data for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Other EU‐15 (EU‐15), Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Turkey, and Other Europe (OECD Europe), Canada, Mexico, and the United States (OECD Western Hemisphere), Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, and New Zealand (OECD Asia‐Pacific). Updated on a monthly basis.Current data for principal importers of natural gas and the amount in which they import from United States, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom, France, Japan, Italy, Germany and Spain (Table 19.1).Current data for principal exporters of natural gas and the amount they export to Canada, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Turkmenistan, Qatar, Algeria, Nigeria, Indonesia, Malaysia and Australia (Table 19.2). Updated on a monthly basis.

International Trade

Values of net oil imports(‐)/exports for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, the United States and Australia. Updated on a monthly basis.Number of imports for Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Republic of Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Other EU‐15 (EU‐15), Norway, Poland, Switzerland, Turkey, and Other Europe (OECD Europe), Canada, Chile, Mexico, and the United States (OECD Western Hemisphere), and Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, (OECD Asia‐Pacific), and Total OECED.Current data for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Other EU‐15 (EU‐15), Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Turkey, and Other Europe (OECD Europe), Canada, Mexico, and the United States (OECD Western Hemisphere), Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, and New Zealand (OECD Asia‐Pacific). Updated on a monthly basis.Current data for principal importers of natural gas and the amount in which they import from United States, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom, France, Japan, Italy, Germany and Spain (Table 19.1).Current data for principal exporters of natural gas and the amount they export to Canada, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Turkmenistan, Qatar, Algeria, Nigeria, Indonesia, Malaysia and Australia (Table 19.2). Updated on a monthly basis.

International Trade

Values of net oil imports(‐)/exports for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, the United States and Australia. Updated on a monthly basis.Number of imports for Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Republic of Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Other EU‐15 (EU‐15), Norway, Poland, Switzerland, Turkey, and Other Europe (OECD Europe), Canada, Chile, Mexico, and the United States (OECD Western Hemisphere), and Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, (OECD Asia‐Pacific), and Total OECED.Current data for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Other EU‐15 (EU‐15), Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Turkey, and Other Europe (OECD Europe), Canada, Mexico, and the United States (OECD Western Hemisphere), Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, and New Zealand (OECD Asia‐Pacific). Updated on a monthly basis.Current data for principal importers of natural gas and the amount in which they import from United States, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom, France, Japan, Italy, Germany and Spain (Table 19.1).Current data for principal exporters of natural gas and the amount they export to Canada, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Turkmenistan, Qatar, Algeria, Nigeria, Indonesia, Malaysia and Australia (Table 19.2). Updated on a monthly basis.

International Trade

Values of net oil imports(‐)/exports for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, the United States and Australia. Updated on a monthly basis.Number of imports for Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Republic of Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Other EU‐15 (EU‐15), Norway, Poland, Switzerland, Turkey, and Other Europe (OECD Europe), Canada, Chile, Mexico, and the United States (OECD Western Hemisphere), and Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, (OECD Asia‐Pacific), and Total OECED.Current data for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Other EU‐15 (EU‐15), Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Turkey, and Other Europe (OECD Europe), Canada, Mexico, and the United States (OECD Western Hemisphere), Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, and New Zealand (OECD Asia‐Pacific). Updated on a monthly basis.Current data for principal importers of natural gas and the amount in which they import from United States, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom, France, Japan, Italy, Germany and Spain (Table 19.1).Current data for principal exporters of natural gas and the amount they export to Canada, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Turkmenistan, Qatar, Algeria, Nigeria, Indonesia, Malaysia and Australia (Table 19.2). Updated on a monthly basis.

Concurrent 2. Presentation for: Zero emissions LNG – a credible opportunity for the industry

Presented on Tuesday 17 May: Session 2 Australia is vying with Qatar to be the top global liquefied natural gas (LNG) exporter, with the Australian LNG industry earning around A$17 billion annually and employing over 50 000 people. But where is the LNG industry headed as we move towards a zero emissions global energy economy? This paper presents a credible road map for the industry to transition to a zero emissions industry across the whole value chain. It addresses the steps being taken to reduce fugitive emissions, beneficially use the CO2 extracted from natural gas streams, electrify the operation of liquefaction facilities, use zero emissions fuels for LNG shipping whilst recovering boil-off gas, capture and beneficially use solid inert carbon from the methane at the LNG destination country then distribute, and burn hydrogen making the whole process zero emissions. One of the main benefits of this pathway is that most of the infrastructure required already exists reducing the capital investment required, hence improving the economics. This paper examines the viability and technical maturity of each stage of this road map against other potential zero emissions technologies. Japan is one of Australia’s largest LNG customers and has committed to building a local hydrogen economy so has been used as the basis for the economic comparisons studied. To access the presentation click the link on the right. To read the full paper click here

Global liquefied natural gas expansion exceeds demand for coal-to-gas switching in paris compliant pathways

The shift from coal to natural gas in the power sector has led to significant reductions in carbon emissions. The shale revolution that led to this shift is now fueling a global expansion in liquefied natural gas (LNG) export infrastructure. In this work, we assess the viability of global LNG expansion to reduce global carbon emissions through coal-to-gas switching in the power sector under three temperature targets—Paris compliant 1.5 °C and 2 °C, and business-as-usual 3 °C. In the near to medium term (pre-2035), LNG-derived coal-to-gas substitution reduces global carbon emissions across all temperature targets as there is significantly more coal power generation than the LNG required to substitute it. However, we find that long-term planned LNG expansion is not compatible with the Paris climate targets of 1.5 °C and 2 °C—here, the potential for emissions reductions from LNG through coal-to-gas switching is limited by the availability of coal-based generation. In a 3 °C scenario, high levels of coal-based generation through mid-century make LNG an attractive option to reduce emissions. Thus, expanding LNG infrastructure can be considered as insurance against the potential lack of global climate action to limit temperatures to 1.5 °C or 2 °C. In all scenarios analyzed, low upstream methane leakage and high coal-to-gas substitution are critical to realize near-term climate benefits. Large-scale availability of carbon capture technology could significantly extend the climate viability of LNG. Investors and governments should consider stranded risk assets associated with potentially shorter lifetimes of LNG infrastructure in a Paris-compatible world.

International Trade

Values of net oil imports(‐)/exports for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, the United States and Australia. Updated on a monthly basis.Number of imports for Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Republic of Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Other EU‐15 (EU‐15), Norway, Poland, Switzerland, Turkey, and Other Europe (OECD Europe), Canada, Chile, Mexico, and the United States (OECD Western Hemisphere), and Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, (OECD Asia‐Pacific), and Total OECED.Current data for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Other EU‐15 (EU‐15), Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Turkey, and Other Europe (OECD Europe), Canada, Mexico, and the United States (OECD Western Hemisphere), Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, and New Zealand (OECD Asia‐Pacific). Updated on a monthly basis.Current data for principal importers of natural gas and the amount in which they import from United States, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom, France, Japan, Italy, Germany and Spain (Table 19.1).Current data for principal exporters of natural gas and the amount they export to Canada, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Turkmenistan, Qatar, Algeria, Nigeria, Indonesia, Malaysia and Australia (Table 19.2). Updated on a monthly basis.

Economic Policy Uncertainty and Energy Prices: Empirical Evidence from Multivariate DCC-GARCH Models

Crude oil and natural gas are crucial to the Russian economy. Therefore, this study examined the interconnections between crude oil price, natural gas price, and Russian economic policy uncertainty (EPU) over the period 1994–2019 using multivariate DCC-MGARCH models. The findings show that there are strong interconnections (co-movement) between the energy prices and EPU in Russia, and that it might be misleading to assume independence or neutrality between the variables. Although Russia is also a crucial player in both the natural gas and the crude oil markets, this study reveals that there is a stronger co-movement of the EPU with gas price than with the oil price. Russia is the largest exporter of natural gas and the second-largest producer; it is plausible that the natural gas price correlates with EPU more than the crude oil price. Further, the correlation between gas price and EPU and the correlation between crude oil price and EPU have similar patterns. Each declines almost in the same period and, equally, increases concurrently. In addition, the results revealed that significant global shocks and crises, such as the 2008 global financial crisis, the 2014–2017 Russian financial crisis, the 9/11 terrorist attack, and the Russo–Ukrainian conflicts, influence the interconnections between the energy prices and Russian EPU.

Zero emissions LNG – a credible opportunity for the industry

Australia is vying with Qatar to be the top global liquefied natural gas (LNG) exporter, with the Australian LNG industry earning around A$17 billion annually and employing over 50 000 people. But where is the LNG industry headed as we move towards a zero emissions global energy economy? This paper presents a credible road map for the industry to transition to a zero emissions industry across the whole value chain. It addresses the steps being taken to reduce fugitive emissions, beneficially use the CO2 extracted from natural gas streams, electrify the operation of liquefaction facilities, use zero emissions fuels for LNG shipping whilst recovering boil-off gas, capture and beneficially use solid inert carbon from the methane at the LNG destination country then distribute, and burn hydrogen making the whole process zero emissions. One of the main benefits of this pathway is that most of the infrastructure required already exists reducing the capital investment required, hence improving the economics. This paper examines the viability and technical maturity of each stage of this road map against other potential zero emissions technologies. Japan is one of Australia’s largest LNG customers and has committed to building a local hydrogen economy so has been used as the basis for the economic comparisons studied.

International Trade

Values of net oil imports(‐)/exports for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, the United States and Australia. Updated on a monthly basis.Number of imports for Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Republic of Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Other EU‐15 (EU‐15), Norway, Poland, Switzerland, Turkey, and Other Europe (OECD Europe), Canada, Chile, Mexico, and the United States (OECD Western Hemisphere), and Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, (OECD Asia‐Pacific), and Total OECED.Current data for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Other EU‐15 (EU‐15), Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Turkey, and Other Europe (OECD Europe), Canada, Mexico, and the United States (OECD Western Hemisphere), Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, and New Zealand (OECD Asia‐Pacific). Updated on a monthly basis.Current data for principal importers of natural gas and the amount in which they import from United States, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom, France, Japan, Italy, Germany and Spain (Table 19.1).Current data for principal exporters of natural gas and the amount they export to Canada, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Turkmenistan, Qatar, Algeria, Nigeria, Indonesia, Malaysia and Australia (Table 19.2). Updated on a monthly basis.

Evaluating the utilisation of clean fuels in maritime applications: A techno-economic supply chain optimization

Interest in reducing the environmental impact of maritime shipping operations has recently been induced by the International Maritime Organization’s latest set of regulations. Consequently, this study involves a macro-level view of the entire supply chain, emphasizing how liquefied natural gas exporters can reduce the environmental impact of shipping activities of energy commodities (LNG, hydrogen, ammonia and their blends) through greater uptake of cleaner fuel alternatives. This study tests the notion that demand for alternative fuels will continue to increase as the transportation sector integrates cleaner fuels to comply with increasing environmental regulations. Using Qatar as a case study, linear programming was used to develop a mathematical model where several scenarios are assessed, and the optimal combination of fuels sold, and bunker fuel consumed is determined. Firstly, by looking for maximum profit given the constraints imposed; secondly, by looking for minimal greenhouse gas emissions under the same constraints; and thirdly, by looking for maximum profit and minimum environmental impact. Results demonstrate that cleaner fuels can reduce emissions of maritime industry. While solving for minimal emissions regardless of profit, outcomes suggest that LNG is the most favourable fuel to sell due to the high demand and high production capacity, whereas NH3 is the most favourable for fuelling ships. This solution yielded a significant reduction of CO2 emissions as opposed to that expected from HFO.

New concerns join old at petrochemical event

After a 2-year hiatus because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the IHS Markit World Petrochemical Conference came back in person in Houston late last month. Just as in meetings before the pandemic, sustainability was high on the agenda. The heads of several of the world’s largest chemical companies outlined their plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine made the conference largely about a new crisis, one that is roiling vital oil and gas markets. Despite strict vaccine and COVID-19 testing requirements, more than 1,450 delegates made the trip to Houston, comparable to the 1,500 who attended when the event was held in 2019. The war in Ukraine loomed large over the proceedings. Russia, a major exporter of oil and natural gas, is the subject of possibly the toughest economic sanctions against a country in history. “This is a global commodity shock, the likes we haven’t seen since