NATO Membership Research Articles

IMPLEMENTATION OF EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE IN ORGANIZING A TECHNICAL REGULATION SYSTEM FOR CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT AND CERTIFICATION OF ARMAMENT AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT

The article analyzes the possibilities of implementation of the European experience of the organization of the technical regulation system for the assessment of compliance and certification of Armament and Military Equipment. A step-by-step algorithm for the implementation of the European experience in the organization of the technical regulation system is proposed and the necessary actions at each step of the implementation process are detailed. An analysis of the similarity of European countries was carried out to study the experience of the organization of the technical regulation system. The countries whose experience is the most acceptable and useful for Ukraine in terms of similarities and implementation possibilities have been identified. The experience of organizing the system of technical regulation of NATO member countries - the Republic of Poland and the Czech Republic, as well as the partner country and candidate for NATO membership - the Republic of Serbia, is analyzed. Measures for the implementation of the European experience in the organization of the technical regulation system, as well as the possibility of using separate tools for assessing the conformity of products intended for defense and security needs, are proposed.

The current state of Ukrainian legislation on social protection of military personnel and their family members

The article examines the current state of Ukrainian legislation on social protection of military personnel and their family members. It is noted that to date, Ukraine has developed a system of normative legal acts of various legal force, which regulate the issues of social and legal protection of military personnel, their constitutional rights and freedoms, and guarantees regarding their implementation. At the same time, despite the fact that legislation in this area is constantly developing and improving, many issues still need to be resolved. Since a significant number of normative legal acts do not always indicate the provision of integral and comprehensive social protection. In particular, a conclusion was made about the non-systematic and scattered nature of the norms that define specific types of social protection for servicemen and their family members. That is, there is no single approach to the legal regulation of social protection of servicemen and their family members, there is a lack of a single legislative act, according to which consolidated and mutually agreed standards and principles of building the entire structure of social security in the researched area would be determined. Therefore, the existing system of social protection needs radical reorganization. In particular, it is necessary to create a clear system of guarantees of social (material) support for military personnel and members of their families, to ensure their observance and implementation by the state, thereby stimulating citizens to military service. It was noted that an important direction of state policy, which should become the focus of attention during the war and after its end, should be the social security of servicemen and their families, as well as raising the status of servicemen in the state. Because today there is no more important task in Ukraine than protecting and ensuring the rights of servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations who defend our borders, sovereignty and integrity of our state, who with their courageous struggle effectively protect the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian people. At the same time, it is noted that despite the limited economic opportunities, the state still tries to provide adequate social protection to military personnel and their families, pays out monetary support and rewards, provides medical treatment and rehabilitation. Attention was also drawn to the fact that the regulatory and legal settlement of issues of ensuring social protection of servicemen and their family members should be closer to international standards, in particular, NATO member countries.

UKRAINE’S GEOSTRATEGY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

The article examines the essential features of Ukraine's regional geostrategy in Central and Eastern Europe, reveals the main problems, and defines the prospects of Ukrainian geostrategy. In the conditions of war, Ukraine’s geostrategy regarding the RF should be offensive in nature and envisage the return of the entire geopolitical space of the state through the use, first of all, of military force. Ukraine's geostrategy in Central and Eastern Europe should be developed on the basis of its national interests, first of all, ensuring its own national security and achieving a sufficiently high level of integral potential development. When developing and implementing its regional geostrategy, Ukraine must take into account the interests of the US, other leading Western countries, and neighboring EU and NATO member states, since it needs their help. Ukraine's geostrategy in Central and Eastern Europe should be largely aimed at the formation of the Baltic-Black Sea regional security system, which will consist of two subsystems: the Baltic (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland) and the Black Sea (Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, in cooperation with Turkey). In the formation of the Baltic subsystem, Poland can play a particularly significant role, whose military potential is strengthened thanks to the help from the US and the UK. The development of militarypolitical cooperation between Ukraine and the Baltic states, as well as Finland, is of great importance for the realization of its geostrategic interests. Regarding Belarus, Ukraine's contemporary geostrategy should be “confrontational”, aimed at the maximum weakening of this state as a geopolitical satellite of Russia. The Black Sea subsystem can be formed as a result of joint active efforts of Ukraine and Turkey in the field of military security. The involvement of Romania and, to a lesser extent, Moldova in subregional militarypolitical cooperation should also be important. The potential reintegration of Transnistria by the Republic of Moldova corresponds to the geostrategic interests of Ukraine, as it will eliminate the Russian geopolitical bridgehead. As a result of the implementation of its regional geostrategy, Ukraine is potentially able to become a leading “player” in the new security system in Central and Eastern Europe.

The new EU energy security reality and its impact on the wider Black Sea region

This brief in-depth research “The new EU energy security reality and its impact on the wider Black Sea region” on a security Studies was organized by David Aghmashenebeli National Defence Academy of Georgia, Germany. Its goal is to support the security of the Wider Black Sea Region energy supply chains. The purpose of this project is to answer to the main question: Will EU energy security impact the south-eastern flank of the Euro-Atlantic space. Russia's war in Ukraine has created new problems that are not addressed by outdated security programs and old-fashioned traditional defence approaches. That the war in Ukraine is not the cause of a future conflict against the world order is not a new point of view, furthermore, the war in Ukraine is one of the results of the already existing conflict. It is a real possibility that the Kremlin will continue its aggressive foreign policy towards its neighbours and neighbours of neighbours in order to consolidate global power and "legitimacy". The eternal war in the region exposed the EU’s economic weaknesses in energy exports and supply chains. Military professionals believe that whoever controls the east of the Euro-Atlantic space and/or dominates the Black Sea, can easily project power on the European continent, Central Europe, the Mediterranean, the North/South Caucasus and the Middle East. Russia eternal war has shown us more dependence, weaponization, interference and more vulnerability of the EU Countries; Security is no longer based on the previously established rules. In the near future It’s unlikely that relations between the EU and Russia will be based on beneficial energy relations. The European Union is moving beyond the binary dependency that binds international actors, creating a new reality in which the inclusiveness of energy security extends to several different areas, diversification will be critical for the EU. Supply chains are complicated and messy, it’s implausible to make positive changes overnight. Taking into account Russia sharp growth in military spending, its ability to integrate state resources and masses and it’s "great propensity for risk" makes Russia both a “capable and unpredictable actor”. Russia's blackmail to use nuclear weapons indicates that Kremlin is losing the war due to lack of ammunition and low technological capabilities and in the short term wants to take this war into a protracted or frozen conflict phase. According to the analysis of the processes of the recent past, the stability of the region cannot be successful and effective only with the support of NATO member states on EU's eastern flank. NATO, EU and their partners should have an emergency and long-term assistance strategy for the parties. From the lesson learnt in the last 30+ years on international cooperation issues it is vital that in the next 10-30 years the Euro-Atlantic and regional countries (except Russia) in the region, must counter challenges with collective deterrence of cooperation. Actively promoting stability is possible through the existence of the theory of Russian deterrence. Stability should be achieved by promoting collective deterrence and integration of Russia; a strategy of emergency and long-term assistance not only for alliance members, but also for partners, plus collective deterrence equals fixing and integration of Russia. Speeches and workshops used in editing this paper, Organized by the Research and Policy Analysis Department (RPA) project of Strategic Competition Seminar Series-FY23 SCSS of George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) at Workshop I held in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, 20-24 February 2023 entitled “Alternative Ukrainian Future Trajectories: Implications for Russia and the West” and Workshop II held in Berlin, Germany on 16 May 2023“ (A summary of FY23 SCSS#8 hybrid seminar entitled “What if? Russian Variables, Inflection Points and Game Changers?” at SCSS Workshop II) have been very supportive in the preparation of the paper. For the EU and its partners in the region to support the most desirable outcomes and mitigate the worst considering all scenarios discussed in the paper includes following key take-aways: 1. Relationships and cooperation matter 2. Security guarantees matter

Using Linear Regression in the Context of Military Power Enhancement

The article explores the application of linear regression in the context of military power enhancement. Linear regression analysis is employed to identify the key factors that contribute to military strength, such as defense expenditure and military personnel levels. The study utilizes data from 31 NATO member and partner countries and employs open-source data for analysis. The research aims to determine the impact of various independent variables on the dependent variable, the Military Strength Ranking for 2022, and identify which variables can be adjusted to achieve greater military power. The study's hypotheses are tested to establish the significance of each variable. The results indicate that defense expenditure and military personnel are statistically significant factors influencing military power. A higher defense budget and greater military personnel correlate positively with a higher Military Strength Ranking. However, the study acknowledges the challenge of balancing defense spending with civilian priorities, known as the "guns versus butter" dilemma. The importance of efficiently allocating defense funds to maximize military capability is emphasized, as history has shown that mere financial resources do not guarantee security. The study recommends increasing the share of military personnel, reducing administrative costs and optimizing structural units, particularly in supply and administration areas and the civil office's structural units, to enhance military capability within existing defense budgets. Additionally, the role of reserve forces is highlighted as a valuable resource for augmenting combat capabilities. The article underscores the need to strike a proper balance between active and reserve components of military capability.

Wpływ rosyjskiej agresji na Ukrainę na relacje NATO – Chińska Republika Ludowa. Wyzwania dla strategii bezpieczeństwa

The impact of Russian aggression against Ukraine on NATO-People’s Republic of China relations. Challenges for security strategy The dynamically changing international situation requires international relations actors to be ready to constantly change and adapt their strategies. This article aims to look at the relationship of the People’s Republic of China with the North Atlantic Alliance, taking into account the implications of a full‑scale Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2022. NATO is increasingly actively pursuing its Strategic Concept, with the primary focus now on ensuring the security of allies within the treaty area. One of the different – but extremely important – challenges for the Alliance is the PRC, which is systematically pursuing its policy objectives, building its international position, and taking advantage of the opportunities presented by the Russian‑Ukrainian conflict. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether NATO’s response to current challenges and its capacity for an Allied response can affect the security strategies of both NATO and the PRC. The first part of the paper examines the theoretical approaches of Chinese scholars to the policy of non‑alignment (nonalignment). This will be followed by an analysis of the approach of NATO member states to the challenge posed by the PRC, as well as the significance of the existence and functioning of the alliance from Beijing’s point of view. Before pointing out conclusions, the author will highlight the impact of Russia‑PRC relations in the face of the ongoing war, as well as confront already existing ideas about potential cooperation or coexistence between NATO and the PRC in the region. It will conclude with conclusions on NATO’s actions and policy evolution, along with general recommendations, taking into account the most important challenges.

Polityka Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej wobec Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego – uwarunkowania, stan obecny i perspektywy

The policy of the People’s Republic of China towards the North Atlantic Alliance – determinants, actual state and prospects Despite a possible commonality of interests in several spheres (counter‑terrorism, cyber‑security, maritime piracy, confidence‑building and security issues), there are many indications that there will be no fundamental rapprochement between China and the North Atlantic Alliance in the near future. Potential cooperation is blocked mainly by the politics of China, which sees NATO as a tool for the expansion of the United States and its hegemony both in the transatlantic region and beyond. Despite the efforts of several NATO members to initiate dialogue and even cooperation with China in the area of declared common interests (the operation in Afghanistan), these efforts ultimately failed, and since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine the distance between the potential partners has widened even further. In the near term, the state of relations between China and NATO will be mainly a product of the attitude of the United States toward China, and these have entered a phase of fierce rivalry since the Trump era, as well as China’s expressed views on the US’ instrumental use of the North Atlantic Pact to achieve its own goals in security policy.

Upon entering NATO: explaining defence willingness among Swedes

ABSTRACT In the wake of the new security situation in Europe, Sweden has decided to apply for membership in NATO. After over 200 years without war, the country must now be set to defend not just itself, but its allies as well. Are Swedes ready for this? Previous research has shown a high willingness among Swedes to defend their country. But what actually explains this high defence willingness among Swedes, given their unfamiliarity with the task? To examine the willingness of the country’s population to contribute to the military, we make use of survey data collected before and after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It turns out that the most general explanation for defence willingness, namely threat perception, has little or no explanatory value in the Swedish context. Surprisingly, this was true before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as well as after. Furthermore, context-specific explanations citing the prevalence of emancipatory values among Swedes find no support either. However, this study does find robust support for gender, trust and political orientation as important explanatory factors for defence willingness. Our findings thus underscore some challenges facing Sweden as a newcomer to NATO, as political divides along lines of gender and trust widen.

Proportionality, Defensive Alliance Formation, and Mearsheimer on Ukraine

In this article, I consider the permissibility of forming defensive alliances, which is a neglected topic in the contemporary literature on the ethics of war and peace. Drawing on the jus ad bellum criterion of proportionality in just war theory, I argue that if permissible defensive force requires that its expected harms must be counterbalanced by its expected goods, then, permissible defensive alliance formation seems to also require that its expected harms must be counterbalanced by its expected goods, as the latter can result in much the same consequences as the former. Moreover, due to the incommensurability of values in play when making proportionality judgments, I argue for a value pluralist understanding of the criterion. On this view, defensive alliance formation is proportionate if the expected gains in certain values (goods) intuitively justify the expected losses in others (harms) when compared to the alternative expected value trade-offs of not allying. To explore the implications of my theoretical claims I consider them in relation to John Mearsheimer’s influential account of the causes of the Russo-Ukrainian War. On this account, the West’s strategy to assimilate Ukraine and Ukraine’s pursuit of NATO membership post-annexation of Crimea were disproportionate because the expected harms were unjustified when compared to the alternative expected goods and harms of forgoing Ukrainian membership of NATO. This does not imply that Russia’s aggression is just, but it does imply that the West and Ukraine are partially responsible for the war and that they acted impermissibly in attempting to expand/join NATO. Keywords: Proportionality, alliances, just war theory, Ukraine, Mearsheimer

Strategies for improving the protection of weapons and military equipment

Purpose: there are directions strategies for improving the protection of weapons and military equipment.
 Method: for the purpose of the research of development and the primary design features of armored combat vehicles, international technical assistance aimed at ensuring protection against weapons of destruction. The classification of armored combat vehicles by weight and dimensions and the peculiarities of approaches to increasing their level of protection are outlined. The experience of the Republic of South Africa, NATO member states, the Russian Federation, and the defense industry of Ukraine in developing armored combat vehicles with an increased level of protection is examined.
 Findings: the article explores analyze the trends in the development of weaponry and military equipment received as part of international technical assistance, specifically focusing on ways to enhance their protection against means of destruction.
 Papertype: theoretical.

Results of the Finnish parliamentary elections and their possible impact on Russian-Finnish relations

The article examines the results of the next parliamentary elections in Finland, which took place on April 2, 2023. The author assesses the performance of the main political parties in the period since the previous elections and considers the key positions of the election campaigns of the parties that passed to parliament in 2023. In order to identify the dynamics of changes in the political situation, the author conducts a comparative analysis of the results of the leading political parties in Finland in the elections of 2019 and 2023, and characterizes the parties that were represented in the parliament in the period from 2019 to 2023. The author considers the results of the government formed in December 2019 headed by the leader of the Social Democratic Party S.Marin, the possible reasons for the preservation of the high rating of the head of this government among the population and its impact on the course of the election campaign in 2023. Special attention is paid to the position of the Finnish leadership and leading political parties regarding Russia's special military operation in Ukraine. Finland's support of anti-Russian measures and NATO membership has destroyed many years of trade and economic ties between the countries. The forecast for the further development of Russian-Finnish relations cannot be called optimistic: the mutual cooling of recent years is likely to continue. There is a chance to build new ties between Russia and Finland, but it requires certain efforts and counter steps from both countries.

Transcending Two Percent: Toward a Prioritarian Model of NATO Burden-Sharing

This article argues that NATO's current burden-sharing regime, which I term the proportional model of NATO burden-sharing and which obligates each NATO member to allocate at least 2 percent of its GDP to defence, is deeply flawed from a purely ethical standpoint. This is because the proportional model omits from its approach to distributing the burdens of collective defence two morally relevant ally-level characteristics: namely, individual level of economic development and individual level of external threat. The model therefore treats unfairly both those allies characterised by especially low levels of economic development and those allies characterised by especially high levels of external threat, relative in each case to the alliance-wide average. The article argues that the proportional model should be replaced by that I term the prioritarian model of NATO burden-sharing, which is grounded in the normative theory of prioritarianism from the distributive justice literature. The prioritarian model would morally improve upon the proportional model by incorporating the aforementioned two ally-level characteristics (level of economic development and level of external threat) into its burden-sharing system in the form of two action-guiding prescriptions. The prioritarian model is therefore the fairer of the two models and consequently should be adopted by NATO.

Aid in Conflict: Determinants of International Aid Allocation to Ukraine During the 2022 Russian Invasion

Abstract Governments have responded to the 2022 Russian invasion by committing substantial aid to Ukraine. This paper investigates this aid on a cross-national basis utilizing differences in economic, political, and geographic characteristics of donor countries. It advances the comprehension of aid allocation to Ukraine and argues that donors’ interests heavily influence bilateral aid to Ukraine. Empirically, a two-stage approach serves to identify the main determinants of aid allocation, analyzing both the initial decision to donate and the level of aid generosity. The regression analyses show that wealthier, more populous, more democratic countries as well as those who trade with Russia are more likely to support Ukraine while the impact of these factors is more nuanced when determining aid generosity. Ceteris paribus, EU and NATO members are more likely to donate and more generous in their aid efforts. The results also shed light on the complex role of former Soviet republics.

Engagement of European Countries in the Implementation of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy (Part 1)

Globalization has contributed to the development of economic relations between Europe and the Indo-Pacific. However, after 2011 they were influenced by the American “pivot to Asia” and the shift of US attention from countering international terrorism to rivalry with the “revisionist” powers — Russia and China. In 2019, with the adoption of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, China became their main regional rival. The rivalry with him provided for the Americans to unite their Asian allies in a network of managed formal alliances, as well as to connect Great Britain and France to solving strategic tasks. On February 11, 2022, a new Indo-Pacific strategy of the United States appeared. This document emphasized the strategic value and increasing role of Great Britain, France, the EU and NATO in Indo-Pacific and set the task of building bridges between the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions. The main role in its solution was assigned to AUKUS, a trilateral military alliance of the United States, Great Britain and Australia, created on September 15, 2021. At about the same time, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the European Union approved their own strategies in Indo-Pacific. They had in common an unwillingness to see China as the main opponent in the context of the US-Chinese rivalry. At the same time, the documents did not indicate that Europe was equidistant from global rivals. On the one hand, being part of the collective West, the EU demonstrated its support to America, on the other, being the most important economic partner of the Celestial Empire, it refused to see it as an existential threat to its security. Against this background, a similar British document published in March 2021 stood out, characterized by a hostile attitude towards China. However, significant differences in the strategies of European countries were offset by their membership in NATO. At the Alliance summit in Madrid in June 2022 the Europeans, together with other allies, proclaimed a strategic course for “systemic rivalry” with the PRC in the context of the interconnection of the security of the Euro-Atlantic and the development of the situation in the Indo-Pacific. With the signing of the NATO-EU joint declaration in Brussels on January 10, 2023, there was a further rapprochement of the two Western structures on an anti-Chinese basis, as well as the complete subordination of Europe to the interests of American global policy.

Influence of Russian and Nato Rivalry on Ukrainian National Security during Volodymyr Zelensky's Presidential Term

Since before the Cold War and until the fall of the Soviet Union, there have been tense relationsbetween Russia and NATO. Russia, which succeeded the Soviet Union as its heir, inherited a fewprivileges due to its downfall. Russia grew to be the most prominent, prosperous, and richest nationamong the CIS nations, having a significant political impact on Eastern and Central Europe. AsNATO, a security agreement, increases its influence, Russia feels threatened and does not want tocease to exist. The rivalry between the two actors affects neighboring Russia, including Ukraine.Zelensky's decision to speed up the integration process of the NATO security pact provoked Russianoutrage because it was articulated as a challenge, and practically, the actions taken by Zelensky couldnot accelerate his membership in NATO. Russia launched a military invasion of Ukraine that hadimplications for the neighboring country's national security crisis. In analyzing this thesis, the authorsused the concept of rivalry to analyze the relationship between Russia and NATO and the idea ofnational security to analyze the status quo of Ukraine due to Russian-NATO influence. The researchmethod was descriptive, using data from books, journals, and several other references. This studyfound a Ukrainian national security crisis in the Zelensky era due to the influence of Russian andNATO rivalries.

The mirror principle in assessing hybrid threats emanating from Russia and Belarus

In this article, the author describes how the mirror principle used in psychology, which is based on finding in other people traits that an individual tries to suppress, can be used to identify potential threats from Russia and Belarus. She puts forward the hypothesis that by analysing the greatest threats mentioned by these countries, e.g. in strategic documents, it is possible to deduce, according to the principle of the mirror, in which spheres they will most actively conduct hostile actions against NATO members. Among other things, the hybrid actions that Russia and cooperating Belarus may take against Western states are indicated, but without an in-depth analysis of these issues. Thus, the article does not exhaust the topic, but merely attempts to signal one method of analysing the threats emanating from Russia and Belarus.

Postgraduate education methodology for foreign language teachers' assessment competence development in higher military educational institutions

Ukraine's tendency to achieve compatibility with the standards of NATO member states, in particular as a result of Russian aggression against Ukraine, raises the issue of developing the diagnostic competence of foreign language teachers in higher military educational institutions. After all, the ability of foreign language teachers in higher military educational institutions to effectively assess the levels of foreign language communicative competence of military personnel allows them to respond promptly to problematic issues in their language training and change training strategies following the needs of the Armed Forces. Therefore, the study aims to reveal the essence of the methodology of adaptive development of foreign language teachers' diagnostic competence in the system of postgraduate education. To achieve this goal, several theoretical (analysis, synthesis, systematisation of scientific psychological, pedagogical, methodological literature) and empirical (observation, comparison, description) methods were used. Adaptive learning technologies are proposed, which allow studying the educational material with the help of adaptive algorithms for each student, according to knowledge, skills, and personal learning needs, i.e., through the adaptive presentation of the educational material of the author's remote special course. The stages of implementation of the author's methodology for adaptive development of diagnostic competence of foreign language teachers in higher military educational institutions are highlighted. The specifics of the methodology of adaptive development of diagnostic competence of foreign language teachers are revealed, considering their diagnostic activities in the system of military education. The authors' developed methodology for the adaptive development of diagnostic competence of foreign language teachers in higher military educational institutions contributes to the actualisation, systematisation and deepening of their theoretical diagnostic knowledge, and improvement of practical diagnostic skills and abilities that form the basis for the development of their diagnostic competence. The practical significance of the study lies in the possibility of applying its results to improve the qualifications of foreign language teachers at higher military educational institutions

PRIVATE-PUBLIC PARTNERSHIPS IN CYBER SPACE AS DETERRENCE TOOLS. THE TRANS-ATLANTIC VIEW

Nowadays technological development has brought new threats and risks that states need to face in cyberspace. Given the multitude of actors, reasons, strategies, various types of attacks, the classical way of viewing the state as the sole security provider no longer functions. In this framework, private companies gain more and more competencies and responsibilities, especially in the areas of critical infrastructure. The present article explores the role of public-private partnerships in the national cybersecurity strategies of each NATO member state as tools of deterrence. The paper starts by analysing the concepts of deterrence and resilience. Secondly, it emphasizes the view of NATO regarding the topic, this aspect being followed by each of the 31 NATO member states’ most recent national cybersecurity strategies, highlighting the objectives, measures, and examples of PPPs that each state has in order to highlight the status-quo at empirical level.

NATO in the Global Commons: Defending Outer Space Against Threats from China

In this article, we analyse the deterrence relationship between NATO and China in the space domain. As the alliance's newest operational domain, NATO remains heavily dependent upon its nation states’ space assets. At the same time, China is developing advanced counterspace capabilities designed to exploit this dependency by holding NATO members’ space assets at risk. We argue that NATO deterrence in the space domain is hampered by internal reliance on US patronage in space. This is evident in the lack of intra-alliance burden sharing in space, as well as the lack of clear transatlantic unity in how to approach space at a strategic level. We propose steps to strengthen NATO deterrence in space vis-à-vis China. Particularly, increased burden sharing in space through inter-operable capabilities and strategic coherency between Europe and North America on defence in the space domain would bolster both capability and resolve for NATO's deterrent in space.

PECULIARITIES OF REPLENISHMENT OF SUPPLIES OF MATERIAL AND TECHNICAL MEANS IN TROOPS (FORCES), IN OPERATIONS IN THE ARMIES OF NATO MEMBER COUNTRIES AND THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE

The task of replenishing troops (forces) with material and technical means instead of spent and lost ones due to increasing the efficiency of the use of forces and means of material and technical support (supply of material and technical means) in the modern conditions of the russian federation – the Ukrainian war is becoming more and more acute. It was determined that not all problematic issues regarding the effective use of forces and means of logistical support in the process of equipping troops (forces) with material and technical means have been sufficiently resolved.
 The main features of equipping material and technical means in troops (forces) in operations in the armies of NATO member countries are analyzed based on the experience of local wars and armed conflicts, and the relevance of this problem in partner countries is determined.
 In order to solve these problems, the main shortcomings in the process of replenishment of troops (forces) with material and technical means instead of those spent and lost in the conditions of combat operations in the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been identified.
 It has been investigated that the insufficient effectiveness of the use of forces and means of logistical support (providing with material and technical means) and their great vulnerability to the enemy’s firepower due to the unsuccessful choice of deployment areas (places) requires an immediate solution based on the construction of an effective system of material and technical support, which is capable of timely fully satisfy the needs of troops (forces) in spent material and technical means and provide for the creation of an extensive system of protected bases for their storage to ensure their survivability, taking into account the influence of modern means of reconnaissance and defeating the enemy.
 On the basis of the analysis of the peculiarities of the process of replenishment of troops (forces) with material and technical means instead of spent and lost ones, a conclusion was made regarding the need to substantiate the basic standards of the use of forces and means of logistical support (provision with material and technical means) and to determine the areas of their deployment (location) in further studies.