Russian Nationalism Research Articles

Orthodox Church and Russian Nationalism in the Second Half of the 19th Century and Early 20th Century

The article is based on the pre-revolutionary journalism. It reveals the attitude of Orthodox church authors of the second half of the 19th century and early 20th century to a number of subjects related to the problems of the Russian nationalism. The traditionally high interest of the Russian society in general and Orthodox Christians in particular in the attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church to nationalism in its various manifestations accounts for the relevance of the publication. Considering the return of the modern church journalism to the same range of problems that concerned representatives of the Orthodox clergy, theologians, missionaries and teachers of theological schools in the pre-revolutionary period, it would seem that an appeal to the historical experience of their understanding is fairly significant and essential. The article examines the ways in which church authors used to understand the nationalism, their ideas about its place in the life of an Orthodox Christian, along with its challenges and threats. It is noted that although the Orthodox Church did not have a single and consistent view of the nationalism, most church authors tried to give this phenomenon a direction that would not contradict the gospel teaching and could become a constructive and creative factor for the Russian life. At the same time, it is noted that, when discussing the nationalism, church authors of the second half of the 19th century and early 20th century often gave this concept a meaning different from that of modern scientists, politicians and journalists. Standing at the Christian viewpoint, church authors rejected the militant, “pagan”, secular kind of the nationalism that involved only the earthly prosperity of the people. They supported another kind of nationalism consisting in the right of peoples to a special spiritual path, cultural and state identity and independence.

The Russian Nationalist Party and Its Ideologist M.O. Menshikov on the Problems of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ways to Overcome Them

The article regards the attitude of party ideologists and leaders of the Duma faction of All-Russian National Union (Russian nationalist party) to the problems of the Russian Orthodox Church at the beginning of the 20th century and its role in the political life of the country. The research aims to reveal the perception of the role and place of the Russian Orthodox Church in the state life of the Russian Empire during the Third of June Monarchy period by nationally-conservative representatives of the All-Russian National Union party. The relevance of this topic is determined both by the lingering ambiguity in the perception of relation between the country and the confession by the modern society, and by a certain degree of newly emerged dominance of the conservative ideology in the political life of the country. The article considers the main problems the Russian Orthodox Church faced in the historical period in question, and the understanding of these problems and ways of solving them by the said party. The reason for such close attention on behalf of the party leaders to the issues of the Church was their consideration of the Orthodox Church primarily as one of the most important components of the spiritual and educational foundations of the country and, consequently, every possible assistance they provided to parliamentary bills in its support. At the same time, they did not turn a blind eye to the negative trends that took place among a certain part of the clergy, which damaged both the Church itself and its reputation in the eyes of the population. Their active support, therefore, was often accompanied by rather active criticism, when the nationalists felt that certain destructive trends in the Church carried negative consequences for the country. Particular emphasis is placed on the lack of unity between representatives of the Duma faction and party ideologists, in particular M.O. Menshikov, on a number of issues related to the Russian Orthodox Church. The attention is drawn to the peculiarity of the party: it had a significant number of active members from among the clergy. Most importantly, one of the leading roles in the Duma activity of the party was played by the Bishop Evlogiy, one of the future leading church figures of emigration, who, until the end of his life, retained the desire to consolidate the Church for the sake of state interests.

Weaponizing History

Abstract This paper deals with Weaponizing History in the Russo-Ukranian War in diachronic perspective focusing on the events of 2014 and 2022. It shall be demonstrated that in 2014 it was medieval narratives that were the main focus: For instance, in the presidential speech addressed to the Federal Assembly on December 4, 2014, the annexation of Crimea was legitimized by the disputed “Korsun Legend”. This firmly established narrative has made it possible to proclaim Crimea to be the cradle of the Russian nation and a sacred place. In the recent war Putin invokes the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945) which has been developed into a central place of remembrance in his regime and according to which Ukraine is to be denazified and delegitimized as a product of Bolshevism. It is significant to note that these narratives synchronize and harmonize rather well with one another in the collective historical consciousness of Russians.

The Agrarian Development of Siberia in the Second Half of the 19th and Early 20th Centuries

The post-frontier is the least studied stage of the Siberian frontier. The aim of the paper is to analyze the functioning of Siberia within the framework of the post-frontier and identify the mechanisms and consequences of the region's going beyond its borders. The study also provides a brief description of the features of the early and active frontier. The agrarian development of Siberia, which largely determined the frontier processes, provides a basis for the subject area of the paper.
 As a result of the study, it was concluded that the zone of the active frontier in Siberia was constantly shifting. Its most developed territory entered the post-frontier stage. One of the features of the Siberian post-frontier was the formation of a sub-ethnos of the Great Russian ethnos on its territory, namely, the Siberian old-timers. The agrarian system of Siberia at this stage of development also had qualitative features. The specificity of the region was determined by its logistical isolation from the main territory of Russia. The Trans-Siberian Railway put an end to it and allowed the start of mass agrarian migration. One of its consequences, among others, was the beginning of the process of de-ethnicization which ended in the Soviet period. The ethno-social result of collectivization, industrialization, urbanization, and the Cultural Revolution was the transformation of the Siberians from a sub-ethnos of the Russian nation into its geographical group. The agrarian system of the region also lost its qualitative differences. As a result, Western Siberia and a significant part of Eastern Siberia became parts of the Russian heartland.

1837: Russia’s Quiet Revolution, by Paul W. Werth

In this book, Paul Werth makes a compelling argument for why the 1830s—for his study really takes on the entire decade, and not just the single year featured in his title—should be accorded more serious attention by scholars of Imperial Russia. In this slender but comprehensive volume, he examines the ‘drama and dynamism’ of a series of interconnected developments that resulted in ‘the country’s enhanced integration, the increased unification of its people through diverse institutions and practices, and the promotion of shared experience across vast spaces’. All of this, he asserts in his well-reasoned introduction, contributed to the emergence of ‘a Russian nation … within the empire’. A fine archival researcher and author of numerous scholarly works on Russian religious history, Werth largely steps outside of his area of expertise in this volume to take a more comprehensive view of events in the fields of art, literature, philosophy, religion, industry, statecraft and empire-building that took place in or around the year 1837. In a series of concise and well-written sketches, he demonstrates the breadth and depth of his familiarity with the secondary literature and his great skill at integrating these in a thoughtful, provocative manner. He also reveals a more playful side, as demonstrated by the humour peppered throughout this monograph.

Peddling and Politics: Russian Itinerant Traders in the Russo-Finnish Conflict, 1899–1900

Abstract This article explores the ways in which Russian itinerant traders in the Grand Duchy of Finland became involved in the Russo-Finnish political conflict that followed the issuing of the February Manifesto in 1899. Building on portrayals of the peddlers in Russian and Finnish newspapers and political pamphlets, including the underground press that emerged in the late summer of 1900, it traces the creation of an enemy image of mobile Russians, the role that the Finnish Constitutionalists’ strategy of passive resistance ascribed to the “peddling question,” and the reactions to this strategy in Russian nationalist circles. The analysis contributes new knowledge on the position of Russian peddlers in Finland and on the use of political propaganda in the Russo-Finnish conflict, and more generally on the mechanisms through which mobile groups of people can become utilized as political tools in times of political tension. The article also shows that the Russian peddlers did not remain passive in the conflict but exploited the turmoil by filing petitions with the Governor General's Office that aimed at strengthening their legal position in the grand duchy.

THE NARRATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE AS PART OF THE RUSSIAN IMPERIAL HUBRIS

The article is devoted to the question of how the russian language is combined with russian imperialism. The concept of imperial hybris is proposed, which means the nation's opinion about itself that it is "one level higher" than Others (nations); an opinion based on a sense of pride. Thus, imperialism in its sources is divided into two components: an irrational sense of pride and a rational episteme that should support this sense. The latter is often built around the binary opposition "civilization-barbarism". The self-understanding of the russian language as best language is revealed, which is best expressed in the myth of the "great and mighty". The self-understanding of a language refers to what methods of description and myths a language has for describing itself; or what methods of description and myths the native speaker uses to describe it. Several such myths are analyzed, in particular, Florensky's theory about the word "truth". It is shown how exactly the Russian language is combined with the russian imperial hybris. In particular, the russian language is woven into a more general narrative about the "Rotting West" (the rational component), in which the russian language is superior to the languages of the Western civilization. Also, myths about the russian language, the purpose of which is to form an opinion about its superiority and a feeling of pride for it (irrational component), thanks to the trope of synecdoche (according to White), convey this pride to representatives of the russian nation (ie, they feed the irrational component). The history of the expansion of the russian language in the russian state is briefly described. It is shown how the perception of the russian language as better leads to the policy of its protection, why this protection is considered especially necessary outside of the russian state, and how the russian language is used to endow the object of intervention with the status of a barbarian.

About the unity of the Russian nation

The article discusses one of the most important areas of the political course of the President of the Russian Federation — strengthening the unity of the Russian nation. Its main organizational and legal aspects are presented. In the past few years, Russia has experienced large-scale socio-political and economic transformations that are reflected in the way of life of Russian society. The clearly outlined real life prospects contributed to the processes of consolidation of the multinational people of Russia into the Russian nation, which jointly began to solve the ambitious tasks of long-term development. In modern geopolitical conditions, Russia’s participation in the NWO is becoming increasingly important civil solidarity based on the commonality of spiritual and moral values and historical memory, as well as the role of the head of state in the integration of modern Russian society.

Mental and historical rationale for principal differences between the Ukrainian and Russian nations – introduction

Mental and historical rationale for principal differences between the Ukrainian and Russian nations – introduction

Historical politics as a tool of the ideological justification of Russian neo-imperialism

A number of modern Russian political discourse provisions which consist of tendentious interpretations of Russian and Ukrainian history and which result in frank and systematic manipulation of historical memory have been analyzed. Their goals are to justify Russia’s aggressive policy towards Ukraine to prove and legalize the right to decide the fate of the Ukrainian people and to determine the vectors of the Ukrainian foreign policy. At the same time, they are aimed at discrediting the Ukrainian government and delegitimizing Ukrainian statehood as well as ultimately distorting and leveling Ukrainian national identity. The outdated concept of Ancient Rus as the cradle of “three brotherly peoples”, i.e. Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians, or its more archaic version about the existence of a single Russian nation, whose branches are actually Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians, is used. A component of this concept is the idea of Russia being the direct and sole legal heir of Ancient Rus, whose historical mission was and remains the gathering of ancient Russian lands, which include the lands of Ukraine and Belarus. Accordingly, the separate existence of the Ukrainian people, and hence their right to state independence, is either denied altogether or conditionally recognized, if they maintain inseparable ties with Russia and renounce the Western vector of foreign policy. Modern Ukraine is considered by the Russian authorities and the political establishment as “anti-Russia”, which has no right to exist.
 Attempts to apply the tools of the historical politics of the Russian Federation. In particular, it concerns historical education and memorial practices in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of the Donbas, where the territory temporarily is not controlled by Ukraine. These territories are also considered a model for similar measures used on temporarily occupied territories during the 2022 war.

Book Review: Russian Nationalism: Imaginaries, Doctrines, and Political Battlefields

Book Review: Russian Nationalism: Imaginaries, Doctrines, and Political Battlefields

Emigration to the internet: “Samizdat” and the genesis of contemporary Russian nationalism

During the mid-1990s the Pro-European concept of the Russian nation was formed in the post-Soviet ideological space, contrary to the prevailing traditionalist, soil-based forms of Russian nationalism, mainly focused on the search for a “special way”. The former is based on the values of democracy and individualism while the main emphasis of the ideology is the leadership of intellectuals in political life. This article studies the genesis of aforementioned trend in contemporary Russian nationalism in the context of two historical circumstances: the ideological and social status of post-Soviet intellectuals and the Russian-language Internet at the stage of transition to social networks. A key element of the transition period is the emergence of mass online communication, anticipating the beginning of social networks era. Combination of elitism and emphasis on the text were combined with increasing popularity and anonymity, where all these qualities were embodied in guest books. Thus, we will try to show how the communicative environment of the early Runet was arranged and how it influenced rhetorical strategies, styles of public behavior and ideology of contemporary Russian nationalists. As an example in our work, we will consider Dmitry Galkovsky’s Internet resource “Samizdat”, which was functioning in the late 1990s.

The Importance of National Interests in the Transport Sphere for Russia's National Security

The article attempts to analyze the legal provision of the state of national security in the sphere of transport in the Russian Federation from the point of view of covering national interests, challenges and threats. The authors show that the transport and logistics interests of the Russian Federation internationally have not always been reflected in full and in accordance with national interests in sectoral strategic planning documents. The importance of the new Maritime Doctrine adopted in July 2022, which sets priorities for the development of maritime activities over the next few years, including in the transport direction, is highlighted. Using statistical data on the state of Russia's transport sector, the authors examine what changes have taken place due to the COVID-19 restrictions and the latest geopolitical challenges. It is emphasized, that the implementation of the objectives of the Transport Strategy-2021 in the short term will proceed with negative dynamics.

Ideological guidelines for the development of Ukrainian legislation in the legal regime of martial law

Analysis of the causes and preconditions of the russian invasion allows us to assert the important ideological component in the russian-ukrainian war, which once prepared the ground for the popularization of the ideas of racist ideology. Russia’s aggressive policy and active military invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 led to a change in the worldview of Ukrainian society, which was reflected in the legislative activity of Parliament. After all, it is clear that only Ukrainian studies knowledge and self-knowledge of one’s identity will create conditions for building an independent state and forming a political nation. The article analyzes the main directions of development of national legislation in the context of the russian invasion of Ukraine and its further improvement by recognizing the term “rashism”. The adoption of the Law of Ukraine “On De-Sovietization of the Legislation of Ukraine” during the martial law in Ukraine is most likely to satisfy the demand of civil society for the need for a final break with the Soviet past. Analysis of the content of the Law shows that its adoption is aimed at systematizing domestic legislation, bringing it in line with European standards and the need for codification in the light of modern realities. In the conditions of russian aggression, when a significant part of russian society is set on the total destruction of the bearers of Ukrainian identity, the Ukrainian Parliament faces the task of resisting the new - rashism ideology. Currently, the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy calls on civil society to promote and recognize the term “rashism” at the national and international levels. Therefore, the term “rashism” and the prohibition of rashism ideology, which has led to catastrophic consequences, must be enshrined in national law. Rashism is a form of totalitarian political ideology based on the violation of the principles of international law aimed at violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of independent states by occupying and annexing their territories, committing war crimes and crimes against humanity based on the promotion of hatred, the cult of the national leader, the uniqueness and greatness of the russian nation. Key words: ideology, legislation, decommunization, de-Sovietization, rashism.

Imperialism and nationalism

AbstractIs Russia a neoimperial or postimperial state? In this paper, I compare two interpretations proposed by political commentators Marcel Van Herpen and Dmitri Trenin. Van Herpen holds that the Russian empire is literally being rebuilt, whereas Trenin believes that Russia is just ceasing to be an empire. I argue that, contrary to popular belief, the current war against Ukraine cannot be interpreted as an attempt to restore the Russian empire. This is because being an empire requires a universalistic ideology that can be accepted by other nations. Meanwhile, the ideological foundation of the current war is an obviously nationalistic conception of the “Russian world.” Polish historians Andrzej Nowak and Włodzimierz Marciniak brilliantly argued that it was Russian nationalism that had previously led to the collapse of both Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. Under this interpretation the current war in Ukraine can be seen not as the rebirth but rather as the dramatic end of Russian imperialism.

Biological Laboratories in the Caucasus Region as Sources of Threats to Russia's National Security

Currently, dozens of biological laboratories controlled by the US Department of Defense are deployed along the perimeter of the Russian Federation. They are operating in a closed regime and completely excluded from the jurisdiction of the states on whose territory they are located. The purpose of this work is to summarize the available information on the activities of these biolabs, controlled by the US Department of Defense in the Caucasus region. The deployment of these biolabs under the US control in the Caucasus region is due to its favorable geographical position – in the north it borders the Russian Federation, and in the south – Iran. In addition, people of various ethnic groups (about 50) live compactly in the Caucasus region in various climatic conditions and in diverse areas. These circumstances make it possible to develop bioagents of various ethnic orientations. All these biolabs are «dual-use» facilities that are part of the US-controlled biosecurity system. They allow the US Department of Defense to solve the following tasks: to create and test a new generation of biological weapons; to collect information on endemic biopathogens, ways of distribution and means of combating them in the Russian Federation; to control the biological situation on the territory of the Russian Federation; to carry out military biological research without fear of protests from the American public; to create dangerous pathogens and genetic weapons; to conduct tests of biological agents on humans, tracking their virulence, delivery routes, probable mortality of the population and livestock; to circumvent international agreements and conventions on the control of bioweapons; to carry out biosabotage aimed at destroying the personnel of the Armed Forces and the population of Russia, causing damage to the economy of our country by destroying livestock, infecting grain crops and discrediting Russian agricultural products on world markets. These US-controlled biolabs deployed along the perimeter of the Russian Federation threaten the national security of Russia and the countries in which they are located. Serious diplomatic efforts are needed to curtail their activities in the Caucasus region.

Imperial nationalism as the driver behind Russia's invasion of Ukraine

AbstractThe roots of Russia's invasion of Ukraine are to be found in two areas. The first is the revival of Tsarist imperial nationalist and White Russian émigré nationalist denials of the existence of Ukraine and Ukrainians. Russian imperial nationalists believe the eastern Slavs constitute a pan Russian nation of Great Russians, Little Russians and White Russian branches of one Russian nation. The second is the cult of the Great Patriotic War and Joseph Stalin and the revival of Soviet era discourse on Ukrainian Nazis (i.e., nationalists). A Ukrainian nationalist in the Soviet Union and Vladimir Putin's Russia is any Ukrainian who seeks a future for his/her country outside the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Russian World and who upholds an ethnic Ukrainian (rather than a Little Russian) identity. The Russian World is the new core of the Eurasian Economic Union, Russian President Vladimir Putin's alternative to the EU's Eastern Partnership. In the contemporary domain, Ukrainian nationalists are Nazi's irrespective of their language preference or political beliefs and if they do not accept they are Little Russians. Putin's invasion goal of denazification is a genocidal goal to eradicate the ‘anti‐Russia’ that has allegedly been nurtured by Ukrainian nationalists and the West.

Family responsibilities as the moral basis of marriage

In this article, on the basis of historical, comparative legal structural-functional and dialectical methods of research, the author examines the institution of marriage and family in the spiritual and moral dimension. The sources of Byzantine law have influenced the modern understanding of the family and its consolidation in the legislation of the Russian Federation. Particular attention in this article is given to the duties of spouses. After analyzing the family legislation of a number of Slavic states (Bulgaria, Serbia, etc.), the author found that little attention was paid to the duties of spouses in these documents. The duties of spouses are considered in the context of property relations, which emphasizes the modern influence of Western European liberal concepts of law. The author comes to the conclusion that the institution of the family cannot be measured by any material values in their utilitarian perception. That is why, when society perceives the moral essence of a family union based on obligation, having passed the path of «knowledge testing», such institutions for regulating property relations as a marriage contract will become unclaimed, which even today carries destructive properties for people who are not only married, but also on the way to it, a priori laying the motives of doubt and distrust between spouses (future spouses). Modern family legislation of the Russian Federation requires consistent and progressive ethization and implementation of a wider «catalog of duties» of spouses, based on the sources of Russian law (church law) and theological sources, which will gradually free the Family Code of the Russian Federation from neo-liberal tendencies that significantly impede the development of native Russian family tradition, family policy, which must be protected from vulgar positivism and ideological labels.

2022년 여론조사로 본 우크라이나 동·남부의 내셔널 아이덴티티(National Identity)

The Russia-Ukraine conflict over territory is rekindled by the Russia’s military invasion into Ukraine in February 2022. Russia takes it as the pretext of this invasion to protect the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine which accounts for about one-third of the Ukraine population. Russia has insisted that Ukraine does not have a separate and independent national identity distinct from Russia. Russia further insists that Ukraine was historic allyl a part of Russia and should be incorporated into the Russian civilization world. Radical Russian nationalists believe that it is their duty to reclaim the Eastern Ukraine which rightfully belongs to Russia but is mistakenly given to Ukraine. Ukrainian politicians and scholars deny any of these claims made by Russian nationalists. This debate between Russia and Ukraine over Ukraine’s identity largely depends on the definition of national identity. national identity can be defined as ethnical or civic one. Ethnically, Ukraine has a national identity close to Russia’s. However, in terms of civic identity, Ukraine has a distinct identity from Russia’s. Ukrainian scholars emphasize that most residents in Ukraine have Ukraine civic identity and have fortified it in the wake of the Crimean Peninsula annexation and the Donbass war in 2014. On the other hand, Russian nationalists deny this argument. To answer the questions, this article conducts a nationally representative telephone survey in Ukraine in February, 2022. The survey shows that about 70% of the respondents identify themselves as entirely Ukrainian citizen. Even in the East Ukraine, over 50% of the respondents do so. Thus, the Russian nationalists claim that the Russian-speaking people in the East feel Russian national identity is not empirically supported by our survey. However, the Ukrainization of Russian-speaking people in the East has not occurred as widely as some scholars assert although there is clear evidence for the phenomenon.

Педагогическая риторика в обучении учителя и ученика

The article describes the experience of teaching pedagogical rhetoric as part of the subject of the culture of native Russian speech. The problem of the professional competence of the teacher of preschool and primary education in the field of speech activity is raised. The author briefly characterizes the history of the development of pedagogical rhetoric. A significant difference is emphasized in the quality of the language training of a teacher, educator and children, as well as ways to overcome this gap in the process of joint speech work. The styles and genres of speech inherent in the teacher as a carrier of the speech profession are characterized, methods and algorithms for their development are proposed. Additional sources of knowledge about listening and speaking as oral forms of speech of a teacher and a child, as well as speech samples from works of children's literature are named.