National League For Democracy Research Articles

Myanmar: the challenges of power

Despite the National League for Democracy's resounding victory in Myanmar's November 2015 general election, the country's political future is far from clear. There remain major obstacles to a peaceful transfer of power from the military-supported government to one led by Aung San Suu Kyi.

Book Review: Gravers, M., & Flemming, Y. (Eds.). (2014). Burma/Myanmar—Where now?

Book Review: Gravers, M., & Flemming, Y. (Eds.). (2014). Burma/Myanmar-Where now? Copenhagen, Denmark: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. ISBN: 978-87-7694-112-3 -XIV. 447 pages.Myanmar has been ruled by an authoritarian military regime for more than half a century. The Southeast Asian country gained sad notoriety through political repression, massive human rights abuses, armed conflicts, socioeconomic decline, and extreme poverty. This began to change only in 2011 when the junta replaced itself with a quasi-civilian government in order to seek ways out of its political and economic isolation. Thereafter, the country embarked on a new political course of opening up and political liberalization. While the international community has euphorically celebrated Myanmar's self-initiated roadmap to democratization, new and old problems endanger the transitional process. In response to this, Mikael Gravers, an anthropologist and Myanmar scholar, and Flemming Ytzen, a journalist with a long-lasting Burma engagement, put together this ambitious volume taking stock of the current political situation with a thematic focus on conflict resolution, peace building, and democratization. Bringing together the perspectives of 21 academics, journalists, and practitioners, the purpose of this book is to address the attainments and prospects of the transitional process so far, as well as the future challenges and threats lying ahead of the conflict-torn country.The book features three parts and a brief conclusive chapter. Part I, entitled Order and Change (pp. 23-139), guides the reader through the most salient events, developments, and changes of the country's ongoing transition from a military dictatorship to a civil government with all its institutional consequences. Ytzen and Gravers draw a lively picture of the controversial elections of 2012 as well as the upcoming polls of 2015. This is followed by an overview of the altering role of the media and newly emerging space for political engagement. This section also looks at the main actors and key political figures, their interests and strategies, most notably Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD), President Thein Sein, the military-affiliated Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), and the various ethnic minority parties, but also societal forces such as the Tatmadaw (military of the union government), the bureaucracy, the Buddhist Sangha, business interests, and (armed) ethnic groups. Michael Lidauer provides detailed insights into the new constitution and the political administrative system enshrined in it. He highlights the need for more decentralization, constitutional amendments, and corresponding changes in the election system on the way towards a new and more democratic state in Myanmar. Charles Petrie and Ashley South briefly sketch the country's civil society landscape and elucidate the potential role NGOs may play for peace building and democratization. More critically, referring to Myanmar's geostrategic position in the region, Bertil Lintner argues that reforms are embedded in and driven by geopolitical power games and interests that do not necessarily serve the democratic transition in the first place. Subsequently, Josine Legene and Flemming Ytzen describe how global and regional players aligned their foreign policy towards Myanmar throughout its turbulent history. Beyond politics, major social issues are addressed by Marie Ditlevsen, who sheds light on current developments in health and education, while Jessica Harriden elaborates on the situation of women who suffered greatly because of decades of armed conflict and violence. Anna Roberts shows that despite recent legal improvements, the human rights situation remains precarious and has even aggravated in the face of flaring anti-Muslim violence.With almost two hundred pages, Part II, entitled Challenges to Unity (pp. 142- 338), represents the analytical heart of this volume. …

A Politician, Not an Icon: Aung San Suu Kyi's Silence on Myanmar's Muslim Rohingya

In Myanmar (also known as Burma), the Rohingya are a persecuted Muslim minority living mainly in northern Rakhine State. Aung San Suu Kyi, the iconic leader of Myanmar's opposition party the National League for Democracy (NLD), is championed as the voice of the people. However, on the matter of the Rohingya's persecution she has been notably silent. This article examines the possible reasons for Suu Kyi's silence and argues that Buddhist–Muslim political relations in Myanmar are central to understanding the reasons behind Suu Kyi's position on the Rohingya. It is suggested that various factors, including the history of the Rohingya in Myanmar, the NLD's attitude towards the Rohingya, Suu Kyi's sense of obligation to her father's political legacy, and Suu Kyi's views on ethnicity, are creating a political environment in which Suu Kyi is presented with pragmatic political reasons for staying silent. Given Suu Kyi has the potential to become a future national leader, an understanding of her behaviours towards a sizeable persecuted Muslim minority is important. This is particularly the case when consideration is given to the contemporary pressures on Muslims to embrace radical politics and the implications this could have for Myanmar and the region.

Understanding Recent Political Changes in Myanmar

On 30 March 2011, Myanmar's ruling junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), handed power to a new government led by President Thein Sein that had come into being in the wake of elections held in November 2010. Because all administrative and legislative bodies--both at the central and local levels--were controlled by members of the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), political activists and Myanmar watchers did not expect more than superficial changes under the new government. Although President Thein Sein mentioned his plan to introduce administrative and economic reforms and to launch an anti-corruption campaign in his inaugural speech doubts remained that the president would actually be able to deliver on his promises. However, on 19 August 2011, to the surprise of many people, President Thein Sein met Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), at his official residence. Two days earlier, the President had invited exiled activists to return to the country. Aung San Suu Kyi publicly stated that she was very encouraged by her meeting with Thein Sein and that she had trust in his determination to bring about positive political change to the country. (1) The United States and some members of the European Union (EU) welcomed the meeting. On the other hand, several exiled activists had reservations about the sincerity of the President, with some going so far as to say that what Thein Sein had done was little more than a publicity stunt and that there was little difference between the new government and its predecessor. This article, drawing on interviews with serving and retired government officials, and political activists including leading NLD members, argues that since the new government has taken office a new era of political openness has begun in Myanmar. It goes on to illustrate that in order to understand recent political changes, one should pay attention to shifts in the internal power structure of the government. However, it is not a given that Myanmar will become a full-fledged democracy any time soon. Indeed this article suggests that the country is at a critical juncture, and that the expansion of political openness in the country will depend on whether liberals within the government and those from the pro-democracy movement can work together to further political changes without prompting the country's armed forces, the tatmadaw, to stage a coup. The Power Structure and Political Change in the SLORC/SPDC Government The military government that ruled Myanmar between late 1988 and early 2011 was formed in response to the nation-wide pro-democracy movement against the military-dominated socialist government led by General Ne Win. Although the junta, which was initially known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and later renamed the SPDC, held multi-party elections in 1990, it refused to transfer power to the NLD even after the latter had won a landslide victory. Instead, the junta convened a decade long National Convention (NC) to adopt guidelines for a new constitution. Although opposition groups and the international community called for the transfer of power to the NLD, the SLORC ignored these calls. In fact, after the 1990 elections Myanmar's military leaders decided to defer political change for as long as possible. Political activists, on the other hand, continued to campaign for swift political change. As Huntington and many others have pointed out, democratization under an authoritarian regime might take place under the following conditions: when the regime is toppled by a social movement or seriously weakened by a crisis; when reformers from within the regime and liberals from the movement find a way to work together; or when the regime feels that it cannot survive without initiating political reform. (2) Some activists had hoped for a split in the government and tried to identify liberal officials they could work with. …

United States-Myanmar Relations: On the Threshold of Rapprochement? A Response

Priscilla Clapp's article very clearly describes the pragmatic new US policy approach to Myanmar adopted by the Obama administration, and the very deep-seated obstacles in both countries that stand in the way of genuine rapprochement. The paper accurately concludes that there is realistically no chance of this happening in the near future, even after the elections scheduled for 7 November 2010. The deep-seated obstacles include the fact that, for the past twenty years, the focus of US policy has almost exclusively been on the personal leadership of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi framed in terms of democracy and human rights. The objective of US policy was to remove the military dictatorship and replace it with the parliament elected in 1990 under the leadership of Suu Kyi. While this policy focus has shifted slightly under Obama, Suu Kyi is still central to US policy on Myanmar. As recently as 24 September 2010, the US government reiterated that the elections could not be seen as credible as long as Daw Aung San Suu Kyi remained under house arrest. (1) For Myanmar's ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), this validates their claim that Suu Kyi is being used by colonial forces (British) and neocolonial forces (US) to subjugate Myanmar: Suu Kyi was not allowed to compete in the 1990 elections; she was under house arrest; political prisoners were not released; the election campaign was not free and fair by any standards; and the media were as restricted then as now. Yet the US and the international community hailed the 1990 elections as credible. From the military's point of view, what has changed to make the 2010 elections illegitimate? Was it because Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) won in 1990 and has no chance of winning in 2010? The regime will certainly not release Suu Kyi before the elections, let alone allow her to compete. This means that Washington will not be able to improve relations with Myanmar as long as she remains the focus of US policy. Suu Kyi remains a crucial figure, and she may be the only person able to hold Myanmar together in any future transition to a democracy; but if the US is serious about improving relations with Myanmar, it needs to take into account other factors that may be equally important. As described in Ms Clapp's paper, the SPDC's primary goal is to maintain power. Improving ties with the United States, or any other country or organization including the United Nations, is secondary. Therefore, no matter what pressure Washington or other external actors bring to bear on Nyapyidaw, it will not release Suu Kyi because she is perceived as a threat to regime survival. Myanmar's military (the Tatmadaw) refuses to entertain the possibility of her assuming a leadership role. To the generals, it would be tantamount to surrendering the country's sovereignty to the colonialists and neocolonialists. The regime simply cannot, and will not, accept the premise that they are the villains and she is the saviour of Myanmar. Neither will the regime risk losing the elections by allowing them to be genuinely free and fair. Nor will it release political prisoners and allow unfettered media coverage. All these factors impinge on the security of the regime and nothing will be allowed to challenge its supremacy. The only hope the article holds out for a possible opening for better relations is if the new government is composed of different faces and the parliament produces a significant number of independent opposition figures including non-Burman ethnic leaders. And if the government adopts more open policies--such as the release of political prisoners and the introduction of economic reform--the process of rapprochement might inch forward. Yet as the author points out, this is extremely unlikely, given the SPDC's approach towards the elections. Does this then mean that the Obama administration's new Myanmar policy is destined to fail? …

The United States and Myanmar: a ‘boutique issue’?

Myanmar has been one of a number of countries that the new American Executive branch selected for policy reconsideration. The Obama administration's review of relations with Myanmar, characterized as a ‘boutique issue’ during the presidential campaign, has received considerable attention in 2009, and in part was prompted by quiet signals sent by both sides that improved relations were desirable. Begun as an intense policy review by various agencies, it has been supplemented by the first visits in 15 years to the country by senior US officials. The policy conclusion, that sanctions must remain in place but will be supplemented by dialogue, is a politically realistic compromise given the strong congressional and public antipathy to the military regime and the admiration for Aung San Suu Kyi, whose purported views have shaped US policies. US claims of the importance of Myanmar as a security and foreign policy concern have also been a product of internal US considerations as well as regional realities. US—Burmese relations since independence have been strongly influenced by the Cold War and China, whose strategic interests in Myanmar have been ignored in the public dialogue on policy until recently, with US policy focused on political and human rights concerns. Attention is now concentrated on parliamentary and local elections to be held in 2010, after which the new constitution will come into effect and provide the military with a taut reign on critical national policies while allowing opposition voices. Future relations will be strongly influenced by the transparency and freedom both of the campaigning and vote counting, and the role—if any—of the opposition National League for Democracy. Strong scepticism exists in the US on prospects unless the Burmese institute extensive reforms. The Burmese military, presently controlling all avenues of social mobility, will have a major role in society for decades. The article initially evaluates US policies towards Myanmar prior to 1988, when a military coup marked a negative shift in US—Myanmar relations, from cooperation to a US sanctions regime. It looks at the influence China's involvement in Myanmar and the role Aung San Suu Kyi have had on the formulation of US policy towards the country and assesses the prospects for the US-Myanmar relationship under the Obama administration.

Myanmar in 2007: Growing Pressure for Change but the Regime Remains Obdurate

As Myanmar entered its twentieth year of direct military rule, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) once more spurned its critics and opponents at home and abroad. Facing in September the largest organized anti-government demonstrations in nearly two decades, ensconced in their new capital, Naypyitaw, the generals appeared outwardly unperturbed by the huge pressure generated. Perhaps anticipating minor protests in August by political activists following draconian petrol and gas price increases, the regime appeared initially unprepared for the much larger protests by Buddhist monks who took to the streets of Yangon and other cities to protest at rising food prices and the general decrepitude of the urban life, as well as continued military rule. At the conclusion of the first step, the National Convention, in the regime's lengthy seven-step road map to a new power-sharing constitutional order, many inside and outside Myanmar thought an opportunity had arisen to weaken the army's grip and open political options anew. A role was sought for the National League for Democracy (NLD) General-Secretary Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in the future political order, as well as consideration of federalist demands by some ethnic minority leaders, plus a reduction in the power of the army as foreseen in the principles agreed at the constitutional convention. However, at year's end, the closure implied by the completion of the National Convention remained unaltered and the power of the ruling generals appeared undiminished. From January onwards, Myanmar was increasingly in the world's news. Foreign politicians and civil servants who had largely ignored two decades of

BURMA'S ETHNIC MINORITIES

The nearly 60-year-long fight by Burma's ethnic minorities for autonomy and ethnic rights lies at the root of the country's broader political and humanitarian crisis. Yet, in the outside world, this issue is often subsumed under the better-known struggle for democracy, led by Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy. The present article seeks to redress this imbalance by directing attention to the numerous groups representing ethnic minority interests, the grievances and aspirations that motivate their struggle, and their own strategies for peace. It argues that in Burma's deeply divided society peace and democracy are two distinct challenges, even if in the long term they must go together, and it calls for the international community to help the country's ethnic groups prepare for future peace negotiations and overcome the debilitating legacy of war.

The 1990 Elections in Myanmar: Broken Promises or a Failure of Communication?

Whoever is elected will first have to draw up a constitution that will have to be adopted before the transfer of power. They haven't said how the constitution will be adopted. It could be through a referendum, but that could be months and months, if not years. --Daw Aung San Suu Kyi interview with Dominic Faulder, AsiaWeek, 21 July 1989 Burma, redesignated Myanmar in 1989, was a somewhat fractious, though vibrant democracy from independence in 1948 until 1962 when General Ne Win, the head of the Armed Forces, seized power and ruled through a Revolutionary Council, which proclaimed the Burmese Way to Socialism. In 1974 a new constitution, similar to the People's Democracies of Eastern Europe, was approved in a national referendum and a new Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma established under the guidance of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). However, popular dissatisfaction with one-party rule, with the socialist regime, and with growing economic problems resulted in some rioting in mid-1987, anti-government demonstrations in March 1988 led primarily by students, culminating in the bloody suppression by the military of widespread but peaceful protests on 8 August 1988. On 18 September 1988, fearful of still mounting chaos, the military seized power again, cracked down hard on rioters and dissidents, but nonetheless promised that multiparty democratic elections could be held and political parties set up. In the ensuing general elections held in Myanmar (Burma) on 27 May 1990, the National League for Democracy (NLD), whose founding Secretary-General Nobel Peace Prize laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (1) had been placed under house arrest on 20 July 1989 along with other leading members of the NLD, won a resounding victory, fielding 447 candidates and securing 392 of the 485 seats to the Pyithu Hluttaw or National Assembly. The NLD secured 80.82 per cent of the seats with 59.87 per cent of valid votes cast, 52.44 per cent of all votes cast (valid and invalid) and 38.11 per cent of all eligible votes that could have been cast. The NLD's nearest rivals in terms of valid votes cast were the National Unity Party (NUP), the successor to the BSPP, which had dominated political life in the one-party state. The NUP, which most observers expected to do well, polled only 21.16 per cent of valid votes cast and secured only ten seats although fielding 413 candidates. They failed to capture a single seat in the capital Rangoon, even in districts with military cantonments. The remaining seats were won by other parties and independent candidates who were either in electoral alliance with the NLD or generally supported their aims. If anything, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's enforced absence from the electoral campaign enhanced the success of the NLD. She had become the national symbol of democratic opposition to military rule. The statistical record (2) was as shown on the next page. No. of constituencies 492 No. of elections held 485 (7 constituencies suspended for security reasons) No. of eligible voters 20,818,313 No. of votes cast 15,112,524 (3) No. of valid votes cast 13,253,606 No. of party candidates 2,209, of whom 479 were elected No. of independent candidates 87, of whom 6 were elected No. of registered political parties 235 No. of parties presenting candidates 93 % of No. of Valid No. of % of 485 Valid Votes Seats Contested Votes Cast National League for Democracy 392 80.82 7,934,622 59.87 Shan Nationalities League for 23 4.74 222,821 1.68 Democracy Arakan League for Democracy 11 2. …

Myanmar: The Future Takes Form — But Little Change in Sight

The military regime, headed by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), in 2006 further consolidated its ranks, relocated to a new capital, and at year's end looked poised to wrap up the long-running constitutional assembly and retire control to a loyal successor regime, possibly by 2008. The National League for Democracy (NLD) made a last-ditch effort to gain a role in the transition by offering to recognize the SPDC as the lawful government in return for convening of the elected parliament, while democracy activists abroad celebrated another campaign victory as the UN Security Council adopted Myanmar on its formal agenda. But neither conciliatory gestures nor threats had any apparent effect on the military leaders who seemingly remain supremely confident in their own judgement. With competition for Myanmar 's rich energy resources intensifying, any notion that economic failure could force the military to accommodate demands for reform also appears increasingly implausible. While the regime may change, the prospects for substantive changes in power or policy in the near term look slim.

Japan and the Myanmar Stalemate: Regional Power and Resolution of a Regional Problem

For years Myanmar has been caught in a political stalemate generated both by deadlock between the military government and the democratic opposition, and by polar differences between China and the United States. In searching for ways forward, analysts might therefore want to look beyond these dominant actors. This article considers the contribution that a regional power, Japan, could make to political change. It examines first political stalemate in Myanmar, second Japan as a regional power, third Japanese engagement with Myanmar, fourth Japan and resolution of the Myanmar problem, and fifth future possibilities. The argument is that strong historical ties and good relations inside and outside Myanmar put Japan in a pivotal position. As part of its reassurance diplomacy in East Asia, Japan should take the lead in tackling this regional problem.Since a May 1990 general election that saw the National League for Democracy (NLD) secure a landslide victory and the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) respond by reinforcing its dictatorship, Myanmar has been in political stasis. Although progress has been made on some fronts, notably in relations between the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), as the military junta is now known, and the insurgent rebel armies with which it long fought civil wars, the uneasy political deadlock that settled on the country some 15 years ago has not been broken. Furthermore, within a complex internal context, the standoff between the two major protagonists from 1990 remains critical. Now, as then, the NLD, brandishing democratic legitimacy, charismatic leader Aung San Suu Kyi and latent popular support, confronts the military junta, wielding guns, power, and fear.

The Essential Tension

The attempts by Myanmar's military rulers to manage political reform since the late 1980s have been at odds with the aspirations of some of the major ethnic groups within Myanmar, as well as the leadership of the National League for Democracy (NLD). Particular issues of intense contention between the military and its detractors have been the nature of the state, and the distribution of power in the (future) democratic state. These in turn revolve around the problem of national unity in a multi-ethnic state, a problem that has been perceived and interpreted differently by the various protagonists. In essence, the non-Bamar groups' perception of the majority Bamar dominance in ethnic relations has been a highly contentious political issue, with far-reaching implications for building a democratic state, premised upon national unity. This paper explores the tension between democratization, control and legitimacy in Myanmar's multi-ethnic state where minority groups have agitated – often violently – for greater self-determination and autonomy even since independence.

MYANMAR IN 2003: Frustration and Despair?

Abstract The diminished prospect for reconciliation between the government, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), and the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), at the year's outset led to frustration and despair for the people of Myanmar (Burma) in 2003. Throughout the year, Myanmar was beset with political impasse and economic difficulties triggered by a violent clash between NLD members and government supporters, as well as by the government's third detention of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and U.S. economic sanctions. Myanmar's political future remains precarious; those anticipating democracy and prosperity were left feeling frustrated and desolate.

Myanmar: Reconciliation — Progress in the Process?

year's end. These two events were the release from house-arrest of one important figure and the effective imposition of such arrest on another, and his later death from natural causes. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), was freed, and former General (also former President and Chairman of the Burma Socialist Programme Party until 1988) Ne Win and his influential daughter Sanda Win were placed under effective house-arrest.2 General Ne Win died on 5 December 2002. In a sense his death

Burma's civil war: A case of societal security

In this article, Burma's civil war is explained with reference to societal security. It is argued that at the heart of the civil war lies the nation‐building approach of the dominant Burman ethnic group, which has sought to assimilate Burma's ethnic minorities. The minorities have resisted this assimilation, or Burmanisation, because they wish to protect their identities. A solution to the civil war is therefore dependent upon Burma's multiethnic composition being safeguarded in a multiethnic nation‐ building approach. Although in 2000 a peace dialogue began between the military regime and the opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), these talks have not only stalled, but also the Burmanisation approach has continued. The civil war, although reduced in its intensity, remains.

Beyond Rangoon: An Interview with Wendy Law-Yone

Wendy Law-Yone is the critically acclaimed author of the novels, The Coffin Tree (1983) and Irrawaddy Tango (1993). Born in 1947 in Burma (now Myanmar), she began writing after a career in music was derailed by the politically-motivated arrest and detention of her father, dissident journalist Edward Law-Yone. After escaping from Burma in the late 1960s to join her first husband, journalist Sterling Seagrave, she immigrated to the United States in 1973 and finished a college degree. Law-Yone raised a family in Washington, D.C. and has only recently begun to write full-time. She works as a freelance journalist and book reviewer for the Washington Post and is currently in residence at the University of East Anglia, Norwich on a David TK Wong Fellowship. Her novel, Wanting, and memoir, The OM Burma Road, are forthcoming from Ecco/Harper. Law-Yone's fiction is well-known by Asian Americanists who have looked to her work to shed light not only on the Southeast Asian experience, but on the underside of immigration and acculturation. Yet her writing also testifies to the post-independence struggles that attend the processes of decolonization. This interview was conducted over two separate periods in 1996 and 2001. In part, it details how the political upheavals surrounding the end of British colonial role in Burma are reflected in her own writing. Having lived under a military regime and now witnessing the current state of politics in Myanmar from a position of voluntary exile in the US, Law-Yone discusses her feelings about Nobel Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, the conflicts between the State Law and Order Council (now the State Peace and Development Council) and the National League for Democracy, the struggles of ethnic armies on the Myanmar-Thai border, and the possibilities of her own return. LB: Could you talk a little bit about how your family background influenced your career as a writer? WL: My father, Edward Law-Yone, was a journalist, and later a publisher, so he was very much involved with language and expression. He had an innate kind of preoccupation with language. A product of his generation, he wrote and spoke well. Burma had only recently won independence from British rule in 1948 and intellectuals still wrote in the kind of colonial English of the time. My father, for example, leaned toward the J.B. Priestly style. His own natural style was biting. He was a very forceful communicator and that I know made an impression on me. He was always the center of attention because he told stories so well, he wrote so well. LB: Would you say that he was a political writer or that he saw himself more as a journalist, as an unbiased reporter? WL: He occupied a very unusual position vis-a-vis his journalism and his political standing. He was a sort of Walter Lippmann figure. We don't have really figures like that anymore in modern journalism. He called himself a journalist, but it seems as if no sooner was he a journalist than he became a publisher, and a very influential one at that. As a publisher, I think it was his editorials, his opinion pieces, that he was known for. He was not a politician, although, he was a politician. His standing in the circles that mattered, and the nature of Burmese political life made that inevitable. LB: Did his imprisonment for five years affect your decision to become a writer? WL: Not directly. But it probably set in motion a kind of direction that my life took, and those things led to other things. It's fair to say, though, that until his arrest in 1963, my intellect, such as it was, was adrift. I always liked telling stories; I was not a particularly great reader or anything. But just about the time he was arrested, it happened that I began to love the idea of learning, of being good at things. At the time I was really set on a whole different course: I was studying music. But when my father was arrested and my plans to study abroad were thwarted, all of that was short-circuited. …

The National Reconciliation Process in Myanmar

Introduction On 6 May 2002, State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) government lifted a restriction on movement of Aung San Suu Kyi, General Secretary of National League for Democracy (NLD) and released her from house arrest. The government stated that release would mark start of a new page for people of Myanmar and international (1) The official statement noted further: shall recommit ourselves to allowing all our citizens to participate freely in life of our political process while giving precedence to national unity, peace and stability of country as well as region. (2) Colonel Hla Min, a government spokesman, said that the era of confrontation is over and era of co-operation has arrived. (3) At press conference held a few hours after her release, Aung San Suu Kyi also stated that the phase of confidence-building [between government and her] was over and [looked] forward to moving ahead, [and that there would] be another phase in dialog ue or national reconciliation process [which] could begin to tackle policy issues. (4) article will provide an overview of national reconciliation process in Myanmar. The Process of National Reconciliation In late 1998, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, appointed Alvaro de Soto, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, as his special envoy to Myanmar to break political deadlock between government and political opposition led by Aung San Suu Kyi. That deadlock had more or less been in place since establishment of State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in September 1988, predecessor of current SPDC. The issue of deadlock became more acute when Myanmar Government failed to install an elected government after general elections in May 1990. The government took harsh measures in restoring law and order in Myanmar, while political opposition, particularly NLD, pursued a policy of confrontation with government. The situation eventually became irreconcilable and completely deadlocked. It was then that United Nations became involved in attempts to resolve issue. When Alvaro de Soto paid his first visit to Yangon in October 1998, ther e was a proposal that United Nations and World Bank would reward Myanmar Government with up to US$1 billion in financial and humanitarian aid if latter would enter into a meaningful dialogue with Aung San Sun Kyi. (5) The Myanmar Government was not happy at all since it viewed such a proposal as an insult. Myanmar Foreign Minister U Win Aung told press: This is like offering a banana to a monkey and asking it to We are not monkeys. We won't dance. (6) Soon after another fruifless visit to Yangon in October 1999, Alvaro de Soto lost his enthusiasm in trying to resolve political deadlock. However, Myanmar Government was to welcome appointment of Razali Ismail as United Nations' special envoy to Myanmar in April 2000, to facilitate national reconciliation process. In late June 2000, Razali went to Yangon to explore situation and to promote political dialogue between SPDC government and Aung San Suu Kyi. By time he paid his second visit in October, Suu Kyi was already under house arrest. During his four-day visit, Razali held a series of discussions with Myanmar authorities, including Senior General Than Shwe, Chairman of SPDC. He also held separate discussions with Suu Kyi. In meetings, Razali underlined necessity for national reconciliation in Myanmar and urged both sides to initiate political dialogue as soon as possible. It appeared that two protagonists took Razali's advice seriously and began to engage in dialogue. When Razali returned to Yangon for a third time in January 2001, Myanmar Government informed him of progress and allowed him to break news of national reconciliation process to international community. …

Nostalgic Dreams of Pagan

Ma Thida, Burmese writer and doctor, was born in 1966. She worked with Nobel Peace Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi (Daw Suu) during the democracy demonstrations in 1988 and on the campaign trail before the military put Daw Suu and other leaders of her political party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), under house arrest in 1989. The NLD won the elections overwhelmingly, but the military never let the elected parliament sit and rules to this day in Burma without legitimacy. It is under these circumstances of duress that Dr. Ma Thida has persevered in her occupation as a medical care provider and as a writer for those without a voice.

Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics: Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy. By Gustaaf Houtman. Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 1999. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa Monograph Series No. 33. Pp. 392.

Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics: Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy. By Gustaaf Houtman. Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 1999. ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa Monograph Series No. 33. Pp. 392. - Volume 31 Issue 2

Myanmar: Political Stasis and a Precarious Economy

By most accounts, 1999 had not been a good year for Myanmar. Politically, the country remained in stasis. The ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), had yet to finish drafting a new constitution and continued to rule by decree. Meanwhile, repression of the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) intensified and there were no indica tions that the two sides were closer to dialogue. Several international initiatives that aimed to end the stalemate also failed to bear fruit. While the country's politics remained in limbo, the economy deteriorated. The boom of the mid 1990s turned to bust and there were few signs of an imminent upturn. The day-to-day life of the majority of the country's population continued to de cline, with the World Bank warning of a silent emergency in child malnutri tion. The crisis in education and health services continued. Internationally, Myanmar remained isolated and sanctions were renewed by the United States and the European Union (EU). Myanmar's relations with its immediate neigh bour, Thailand, also deteriorated.