The National Reconciliation Process in Myanmar

Abstract

Introduction On 6 May 2002, State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) government lifted a restriction on movement of Aung San Suu Kyi, General Secretary of National League for Democracy (NLD) and released her from house arrest. The government stated that release would mark start of a new page for people of Myanmar and international (1) The official statement noted further: shall recommit ourselves to allowing all our citizens to participate freely in life of our political process while giving precedence to national unity, peace and stability of country as well as region. (2) Colonel Hla Min, a government spokesman, said that the era of confrontation is over and era of co-operation has arrived. (3) At press conference held a few hours after her release, Aung San Suu Kyi also stated that the phase of confidence-building [between government and her] was over and [looked] forward to moving ahead, [and that there would] be another phase in dialog ue or national reconciliation process [which] could begin to tackle policy issues. (4) article will provide an overview of national reconciliation process in Myanmar. The Process of National Reconciliation In late 1998, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, appointed Alvaro de Soto, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, as his special envoy to Myanmar to break political deadlock between government and political opposition led by Aung San Suu Kyi. That deadlock had more or less been in place since establishment of State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in September 1988, predecessor of current SPDC. The issue of deadlock became more acute when Myanmar Government failed to install an elected government after general elections in May 1990. The government took harsh measures in restoring law and order in Myanmar, while political opposition, particularly NLD, pursued a policy of confrontation with government. The situation eventually became irreconcilable and completely deadlocked. It was then that United Nations became involved in attempts to resolve issue. When Alvaro de Soto paid his first visit to Yangon in October 1998, ther e was a proposal that United Nations and World Bank would reward Myanmar Government with up to US$1 billion in financial and humanitarian aid if latter would enter into a meaningful dialogue with Aung San Sun Kyi. (5) The Myanmar Government was not happy at all since it viewed such a proposal as an insult. Myanmar Foreign Minister U Win Aung told press: This is like offering a banana to a monkey and asking it to We are not monkeys. We won't dance. (6) Soon after another fruifless visit to Yangon in October 1999, Alvaro de Soto lost his enthusiasm in trying to resolve political deadlock. However, Myanmar Government was to welcome appointment of Razali Ismail as United Nations' special envoy to Myanmar in April 2000, to facilitate national reconciliation process. In late June 2000, Razali went to Yangon to explore situation and to promote political dialogue between SPDC government and Aung San Suu Kyi. By time he paid his second visit in October, Suu Kyi was already under house arrest. During his four-day visit, Razali held a series of discussions with Myanmar authorities, including Senior General Than Shwe, Chairman of SPDC. He also held separate discussions with Suu Kyi. In meetings, Razali underlined necessity for national reconciliation in Myanmar and urged both sides to initiate political dialogue as soon as possible. It appeared that two protagonists took Razali's advice seriously and began to engage in dialogue. When Razali returned to Yangon for a third time in January 2001, Myanmar Government informed him of progress and allowed him to break news of national reconciliation process to international community. …