Multilateral Security Research Articles

Joint Declaration of Korea-Japan Partnership and Security Cooperation

1998년 성립된 김대중 정부의 새로운 대일 정책은 김대중 대통령 자신의 대일 인식과 북한 핵위기로 촉발된 한반도 정세의 변화, 그리고 탈냉전 이후 미국의 동북아 안보정책의 변화가 종합적으로 반영된 결과물이다. 특히 탈냉전 이후에도 국민 감정상 일본과의 안보협력이 어려웠던 상황에서 북한 위협은 한일 양국의 안보 관련 정책결정자 및 전문가들에게 한일 안보협력의 필요성을 느끼게 만들었다. 1998년 김대중 정부 출범 이후 한일 안보협력의 필요성을 전략적인 관점에서 바라보고 있던 김대중 대통령은 ‘한일 파트너십 공동선언’에 한일 안보협력 분야를 포함시켰다. 한일 파트너십 공동선언에서 안보협력 분야에서 나타난 가장 큰 특징은 한일 간 안보협력을 위한 ‘신뢰’ 구축과 이에 기반한 한일 협력의 ‘제도화’ 추구였다. 또한 한일 간 안보분야에서의 다자주의와 비전통 안보, 국제협력은 한일 양국 간에 한국의 대일감정과 일본의 평화헌법이라는 국내제약 요인을 감안하여 실질적으로 진행 가능한 분야를 선택했다는 점에서 의의를 찾을 수 있다. 향후 한국의 대일 안보 협력은 ‘한일 파트너십 공동선언’의 정신을 계승하면서 다음과 같은 방향으로 진행되어야 한다. 첫째, 한일 안보협력의 신뢰 구축과 제도화가 필요하다. 둘째, 다자주의 안보 협력을 추구해야 한다. 셋째, 비전통 안보 분야 등 국제협력에 중점을 둬야 한다.The Kim Dae-Jung government’s policy towards Japan, inaugurated in 1998, reflected collectively his perception of Japan, and changes both in the political situation on the Korean peninsula triggered by North Korea’s nuclear crisis and in U.S. security policy towards Northeast Asia after the Cold War. In a situation where security cooperation with Japan was difficult because of strong resentment, the North’s threat made security-related decision-makers and experts feel the urgent need for security cooperation between South korea and Japan. Since the inauguration of Kim Dae-Jung, he has sought security cooperation between Korea and Japan from a strategic perspective to cover security cooperation in the Joint Declaration of a New Korea-Japan Partnership for the 21st Century. The key features for security cooperation in the partnership are ‘trust-building’ between Korea and Japan and the ‘institutionalization’ of bilateral cooperation based on trust. Considering Korea’s resentment towards Japan and the constraints of Japan’s pacifist Constitution, it is worthwhile that the partnership has been focused on the practically applicable fields of multilateralism, non-traditional security and international cooperation. The Korean government should pursue security cooperation with Japan while upholding the partnership as follows. First, it is necessary to build trust and institutionalize for security cooperation between Korea and Japan. Second, multilateral security cooperation should be pursued. Third, international cooperation such as non-traditional security should be focused on.

The evolution of post-war China–US relations and the Asia–Pacific security order

The paper seeks to explore the special impact of the evolution of China–US relations on the Asia–Pacific security order after the Second World War. The Asia–Pacific security order includes three levels: China–US strategic relations, the US-led military alliance system, and multilateral and bilateral security mechanisms. The evolution of the Asia–Pacific security order, with the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and the US as a landmark event, has gone through two historical stages. The first stage was characterized by confrontation and the second stage is characterized by a shift from confrontation to cooperation. The most crucial factor in the second stage is the China–US relationship, the establishment of which has brought 4 decades of peace and stability to the Asia–Pacific region. The China–US relationship has constantly seen disputes, even bitter ones, as well as historical opportunities for cooperation. The two countries are never short of reasons for either confrontation or cooperation. The key to the choice between confrontation and cooperation lies in the hands of the elites of the two countries. Whether the political elites can gain insights and steer the direction of the relationship is decided by their conscious effort, foresight, sensitivity to opportunities, and capacity to shape the strategic environment.

Is ASEAN Finally Getting Multilateralism Right? From ARF to ADMM+

ABSTRACTASEAN-led security multilateralism in the contemporary Asia–Pacific has been described as a frustrating enterprise. While many ASEAN-led regional arrangements have been perceived as mostly ineffective, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in particular has been singled out as the poster child for what is wrong with Asia–Pacific multilateralism. In contrast, the progress in security cooperation achieved by the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM+) has been surprising. Comparing the ARF and the ADMM+, this article addresses whether the ADMM+, to the extent it has learned from the mistakes of the ARF, is an indication that Asia–Pacific countries are finally developing a security multilateralism that works. In this respect, the ADMM+ has hitherto surpassed expectations. But it faces significant challenges that, if unmanaged, could hinder its progress.

How to challenge an international order: Russian diplomatic practices in multilateral security organisations

Many policy and academic debates focus on the extent to which Russia is a revisionist power challenging the ‘liberal world order’. However, there is little agreement on the primary motives explaining the behaviour of Russia, some pointing to her unsatisfied great power ambitions and neo-imperial ideologies, and others to genuine security concerns. Adjudicating those claims is important because of their policy implications for engagement and/or deterrence towards Russia. This article contributes to this debate through a theoretical contribution to practice-based approaches to International Relations. Using De Certeau’s understanding of practices, it analyses Russian diplomatic practices in multilateral security organisations and illustrates how this helps infer foreign policy motives, contrary to the field-specific relationalism of Bourdieu-inspired practice approaches. Empirically, it builds on 126 interviews and participant observation in three multilateral security organisations (the United Nations, the NATO–Russia Council and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe). The article shows that at least since 2014, Russian diplomats in the three organisations consistently defend policies and use narratives that reveal more interest in status recognition, sometimes at the expense of security concerns.

Australia’s American Alliance and the networking of forces in East Asia

As the region’s security order is becoming unsettled, Australia has begun to adjust aspects of its strategic policy in response to these changes. This paper examines the evolution of Australian defence and security policy so as to assess the extent to which Australia’s experience sheds light on changes to the structure of East Asia’s security order. In response to the PRC’s selective contestation of US hegemony, Australia has tightened its relationship with the USA, developed new strategic partnerships, committed to increasing its military capabilities while also actively engaging with security multilateralism. Through this, it is helping American regional hegemony develop an emerging networked quality. Its experience also shows the ongoing the dependence of the medium powers on the USA. Their operational and strategic limitations mean that while it has been restructured somewhat through diversification and networking, the East Asian hegemonic order remains organised around the USA.

Japan, South Korea and the rise of a networked security architecture in East Asia

This article explains Japan’s and South Korea’s role in the transition from the hub-and-spokes alliance system to a networked security architecture in East Asia. It is argued that China’s contestation of the rules-based international order in East Asia has been confronted by East Asian states through a mixture of resistance and accommodation. From a Japanese point of view, Beijing’s ascendency is considered particularly disruptive for the regional order. Consequently, Japan has become a central hub in the development of the networked security architecture enacting two complementary strategies: the consolidation of the alliance with the United States and the creation of new and less binding forms of bilateral, minilateral and multilateral security partnerships with Asian allies. By contrast, since Seoul considers China as an essential partner for the stabilisation of the Korean Peninsula, it has played a more peripheral role in the development of this regional networking dynamic.

Linking peace with reconciliation

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explain Japan’s role in the peace process on the Korean Peninsula that began in early 2018. Design/methodology/approach This paper emphasizes the historical context of international politics in Northeast Asia, rather than power politics or geopolitics. The paper reaffirms the significance of the ongoing peace process on the Korean Peninsula by considering a synthesis of three joint declarations published in 1998, 2000 and 2002 between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, the ROK and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and between the DPRK and Japan. Findings The normalization of diplomatic relations between DPRK and Japan, along with reaffirmation of the joint declaration between the ROK and Japan, and the Panmunjeom Declaration, would be a base for denuclearizing Northeast Asia. Originality/value In Northeast Asia, historical reconciliation among the two Koreas and Japan and peace-building between the two parties on the Peninsula are closely linked. Moreover, the three bilateral relationships among these three parties are also the basis for creating a new multilateral security order in Northeast Asia.

The EU Promotion of Security Cooperation in the Non-European World: The Case of ASEAN and Myanmar

This article explores the EU’s attempts at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to encourage Myanmar directly, or indirectly via the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to connect with security cooperation. It argues that both ASEAN’s assumption of responsibility and Myanmar’s taking on of multilateral security options were linked to the EU’s policy at ARF. In order to demonstrate this, the article provides an historical insight into the EEC/EU’s relations with ASEAN, in 1980, leading to the EU’s participation in the ARF in 1993. It focuses on the EU’s messages at the Forum when the EU and ASEAN co-chaired the ARF meetings. Meetings co-chaired by both were held between 2004 and 2008. The investigation relates to the ARF as to a framework where interactions develop, and uses Cyclone Nargis that ravaged Myanmar in 2008 to assess Myanmar and ASEAN’s conduct. In evaluating Yangon and the Association’s behaviour, the article is helped by explanations provided by social mechanisms, an appropriateness logic and observations derived from interviews conducted in Southeast Asia and Brussels. The article covers the interaction between the EU and Myanmar before the outbreak of the Rohingya crisis, which gave EU policies towards Myanmar a new dimension.

High expectations. Interregional agendas on global security challenges: East Asia, Europe and Latin America

Abstract Interregionalism has been increasingly used to advance cooperation on regional and global security challenges. This study examines three interregional dialogues comprising East Asia, Europe, and Latin America. Each interregional security agenda reflects specific concerns and different evolving paths. Insights from ‘multilateral security governance’ approaches can reinforce the analysis of how security agendas emerge and change, and how their related norms and practices evolve.

'AFRICOM: Neo-colonialism Impacts the Class Struggle of Africans?'

In this paper, the objectives and mission of AFRICOM will be examined in comparison to its actual practices to assess the true nature of its presence in Africa and its impact on the class struggle of Africans. To fully understand the interest of the United States in Africa; US foreign policy, and the establishment of United States’ Africa Command (AFRICOM), one must examine these concepts for understanding. Discussing the history of the United States capabilities, intentions and motivations is necessary for insight for interpreting the past, present, and future of Africa and its’ relationship with the US. This research will help examine if AFRICOM is an instrument of US foreign policy in the form of neo-colonialism or diplomacy and the impact to the class struggle to Africans. Kwame Nkrumah stated that neo-colonialism: “…is a greater danger to independent countries than is colonialism. …In neo-colonialism, however, the people are divided from their leaders and, instead of providing true leadership and guidance which is informed at every point by the ideal of the general welfare, leaders come to neglect the very people who put them in power and incautiously become instruments of suppression on behalf of the neo-colonialism.” Also, this paper will offer insight on if the interests of Africans and African Americans are really served by Africans. Peter Pham’s research concluded that AFRICOM has been viewed by some policymakers and commentators as a US foreign policy used to colonize Africa. Tsenay Serequeberhan concluded that the United States is plays apart in neo-colonialism. He stated: “Today, in the last decade of the twentieth century, the United States is the dominant superpower and the harbinger of a new ‘new world order’ dominated by the West (i.e., NATO). In fact, paraphrasing Lenin and Nkrumah, one could describe this ‘new world order’ as the latest, if not the highest, stage of neocolonialism in which the United States, under the guise of the United Nations, rules the world, and smart bombs enforce ‘international law’.” AFRICOM should be examined and analyzed to see if the mission of AFRICOM is meeting its objectives. Concluded by Peter Pham, AFRICOM was established to “bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote US common goals of development, health, education, democracy and economic growth in Africa by strengthening bilateral and multilateral security of cooperation with African states and creating new opportunities to uplift their capabilities.” From Pham’s research, there are concerns from the people of Africa and within the United States that the interest of Africa is not the same under AFRICOM. To know if AFRICOM is an instrument of US foreign policy, one must analyze the US foreign policies of post-colonial United States administration with Africa and the interest in Africa to find patterns, trends, and underlying economic interests. The theoretical framework of which this research will be analyze through is the theories of power elite and dependency. The power elite theory is used as a lens to examine the interactions between Africa and its’ people and individuals of business, government, and military who are powerful and influential to make decisions concerning Africa’s cultural, economic and social well-being. The dependency theory will help explain the how developing nations, such as Africa are economically exploited by advanced nations, such as the United States. The theories will help gain insight into AFRICOM, to understand its’ true intentions and motives with Africa and its’ people. In order to understand the purpose of class struggle, and its’ connection to Africa, the history and intent must be analyzed and examined. The class struggle will be viewed through the lens of Karl Marx, Pierre Bourdieu, Kwame Nkrumah, W. E. B. Du Bois, Jacob Carruthers, Julius Nyerere, Frantz Fanon, Ali Mazrui, Claude Ake, and Chairman Mao Tsetung.

다자간 안보협력과 군비통제의 모색: 이론과 유럽의 경험을 중심으로

다자간 안보협력과 군비통제의 모색: 이론과 유럽의 경험을 중심으로

Constructing Regional Security Community in East Asia from Difficult Conditions: From Community of Commerce to Community of Nations

This paper explores why is there no regional, multilateral, collective security community like NATO in East Asia and how to construct regional security community from difficult conditions. East Asian regional community originated from two divergent paths of international system: the regional community of commerce called East Asian Mediterranean and Chinese tributary system of hub-and-spokes. These divergent systems reappeared in the post-World War II. The USA constructed a hub-and-spokes system that suffocated the regional multilateral security community while a community of commerce resurrected in the post-Cold War spilled over into security community. I explore the opportunities and constraints that East Asia has faced in constructing a regional security community. Then I will investigate what is needed for East Asia to construct regional security organization, shared values and identities, and the assurance of balanced multi-polarity by core states that are the core conditions in constructing regional security community.

Exploiting Sino-US Geostrategic Competition: The View from Seoul and Singapore

ABSTRACTThe mainstream literature on weak status quo states’ diplomacy tends to identify their regional security roles in terms of dealing with non-traditional security issues. This article argues that such a limited approach is not sufficient to explain the current security dynamics in the Asia-Pacific. This article reviews the literature on weak status quo states’ influence on regional order. It then identifies a security environment in which they are more likely to exert some impact on maintaining and building a regional order. After contextualising these discussions in the Asia-Pacific setting, the article examines the experience of South Korea and Singapore as secondary powers in the East Asian region. Although both countries enjoy high levels of security cooperation with the US, both have also been able to exercise a certain amount of influence in advancing their own geostrategic interests amidst the growing Sino-US geostrategic competition. Yet their exploitation of Sino-US geostrategic competition is neither a simple balancing strategy against China nor a simple bandwagoning with the US, since both South Korea and Singapore have been increasing bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with China.

Los desafíos de seguridad para Chile: definiciones para escenarios múltiples

This article analyses the evolution of the security concept used by Chile. This piece studies the different security dimensions in which Chile operates such as domestic and regional. In this sense, the article also focuses on Chile’s relation towards Latin America and its vocation to be an active actor in peacekeeping operations. Likewise, this article also pays attention to Chile’s involvement in multilateral security organizations such as the current state of the South American Union (UNASUR).

Asia’s Security Triangles: Maritime Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific

Since the early years of the twenty-first century, a number of key regional governments have consciously chosen to alter the way they talk about the region, and have now largely shifted from using the ‘Asia-Pacific’ to the ‘Indo-Pacific’ construct. But after three decades of utilising the ‘Asia-Pacific’ concept, why has this been the case and how might this shift in geographical conceptualisation alter the strategic framework of the region? This paper argues that the ‘Indo-Pacific’ is a regional reconceptualisation utilised by Japan, Australia, India and the USA to address deficiencies in Asia’s maritime security and institutional architecture, which are being simultaneously influenced by a more assertive Chinese posture and waning U.S. influence. Additionally, the Indo-Pacific concept has developed in tandem with a transformation in the regional security architecture. The utilisation of maritime minilateralism between Japan, India, Australia and the USA supplements Asia’s bilateral American alliances, with an array of trilateral security dialogues or ‘security triangles’. The Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific shift is really an instance of an emerging minilateral security regionalism, rather than the predominant forms of bilateral and multilateral security and economic regionalism that have dominated Asia in recent decades.

German Crisis Management Efforts in the Ukraine–Russia Conflict from Kyiv’s Perspective

This article analyses the role of Germany in resolving the conflict between Ukraine and Russia from Kyiv’s perspective. After the Russian aggression, Ukrainian decision-makers appeared to be suffering dramatically challenging conditions, no longer able to rely on international law, and with all the multilateral security frameworks invalidated. Germany became a crucial mediator between the Ukrainian and Russian leaderships during the conflict, demonstrating decisive efforts to maintain unity among the European partners in supporting Ukraine after the Russian intervention. Germany sought to defend the normative power of the European Union as an alliance of states based not only on interests but on values. However, there is also a prevailing view in the public discourse about Ukraine which questions whether Germany used its full potential. One may argue that Germany became an occasional leader in Europe and was forced to react to the situation in Ukraine due to obstacles and external conditions, but not with strategic willingness. At the same time, there are enormous expectations in Ukraine with regard to the German role in the transformative processes in Ukraine.

중국의 지역 다자 안보기구에서의 활동 분석 - ARF와 SCO를 중심으로 -

중국의 지역 다자 안보기구에서의 활동 분석 - ARF와 SCO를 중심으로 -

중국의 지역 다자 안보기구에서의 활동 분석 - ARF와 SCO를 중심으로 -

중국이 1990년대 중반 이후 다자외교에 적극적으로 참여하기 시작하면서 중국 다자외교에 관한 연구들도 끊임없이 발표되고 있다. 이러한 기존 연구들 중 중국 다자외교의 특징으로 영역별 참여의 불균형‧비대칭성을 주장하는 내용들이 많이 있다. 즉 경제 영역에서는 다자외교에 매우 적극적이지만 안보와 정치 영역에서의 다자외교에는 중국이 그동안 소극적인 자세로 임해왔다는 것이다. 이에 본 논문은 중국이 지역 다자 기구들에 참여할 때에 안보‧정치 영역에서 선택적이고 소극적인 참여를 해왔는지에 대해 살펴본다. 이를 위해 지역 안보 다자기구의 대표격이라 볼 수 있는 아세안안보포럼(ASEAN Regional Forum/ARF)과 상하이협력기구(Shanghai Cooperation Organization/SCO) 두 기구에서의 중국의 참여 활동과 태도에 대해 분석하고 다음과 같은 주장을 하고자 한다. 중국은 지역 안보 다자기구인 ARF와 SCO에 모두 적극적으로 참여를 해왔다. 하지만, 두 기구 모두 아시아 지역 다자 안보 기구라는 큰 틀 안에 속해있고 유사한 의제를 다룸에도 불구하고 중국이 ARF와 SCO의 각각의 제도화 과정에서 보여준 참여 태도가 매우 상이하다. 이렇게 참여 태도에 차이가 나는 원인으로는 “중국 자신의 영향력이 잘 미칠 수 있는 범위의 조직인지” 즉 미국으로 대표되는 기존 강대국들이 참여하고 있는 조직인지 아닌지가 있다. 이밖에도 ‘핵심이익’이 결부되어 있는 전통적 안보 영역의 의제가 다루어지는지의 여부도 중국이 같은 안보 영역에서이지만 기구마다 다른 활동 모습을 보이는 데 영향을 미치는 원인 중 하나이다.

New directions in Japan's security: non-US centric evolution, introduction to a special issue

ABSTRACTDuring the cold war the United States was overwhelmingly central in Japan's security policy. Japan hosted US bases and the Self-Defense Forces held joint exercises with the US military, even while shunning contacts with other militaries. Japan essentially refused even to discuss security with its neighbors. Special exceptions were made for the United States in otherwise sweeping policies, such as the exception for the United States in Tokyo's ban on weapons exports and co-development. Since the end of the cold war, Japan's security policy has undergone a little noticed transformation: it has steadily moved away from being centered on the United States as its sole security partner. Tokyo has initiated bilateral security dialogues with its Asian neighbors and assumed a leadership role in promoting regional multilateral security cooperation as a supplement to the US alliance. Japan has begun building bilateral security partnerships with a range of countries and actors, from Australia and India to the European Union. Paradoxically these changes have occurred even as the US–Japan alliance has strengthened. The articles in this special issue examine these new security ties with states and multilateral organizations, and other changes in policy that have made the United States less ‘special,’ such as by allowing arms exports to other actors.

«М’ЯКА СИЛА» ЯК ХАРАКТЕРНА ОЗНАКА ПОЛІТИЧНОГО ВПЛИВУ ВЕЛИКОЇ ДЕРЖАВИ ЗАУМОВ БАГАТОПОЛЯРНОГО СВІТУ В ЛАТИНОАМЕРИКАНСЬКОМУ РЕГІОНІ

«М’ЯКА СИЛА» ЯК ХАРАКТЕРНА ОЗНАКА ПОЛІТИЧНОГО ВПЛИВУ ВЕЛИКОЇ ДЕРЖАВИ ЗАУМОВ БАГАТОПОЛЯРНОГО СВІТУ В ЛАТИНОАМЕРИКАНСЬКОМУ РЕГІОНІ