Moral Propositions Research Articles

Toward a Core Understanding of Morality

ABSTRACT The meaning of morality lies in the coordination of private interests for the good of individuals and of society. Morally positive actions are those that affirm and contribute to the good of another. The generalized experience of these actions is reflected in values: non-harm, recognition, solidarity, care. An individual’s sensitivity to these values and willingness to practice them is expressed in virtues and in the pursuit of perfection, which, as ideas, are also presented as values. Moral values are imperative and are often perceived primarily as imperatives. This article analyzes the specific features of moral propositions in their valuative and imperative modality; in particular, it seeks to rethink characteristics of moral propositions such as absoluteness and universality.

Considering the Fetus as Messenger

The author characterizes the Pope's position on the sanctity of fetal life as less a moral proposition than an observation about the unborn child's function as an essential messenger, through the mother's pregnancy to the child's birth and to the child's role in defining the family. He considers the Pope's suggestion as a means of lowering the heat surrounding the abortion issue by distancing that dialogue from ingrained dogma. However, in proposing this point to a friend who is a firm pro-choice partisan, the author finds her skeptical of the Pope's frankness in thus framing the issue, and that she views the Pope's apparent concessions as merely tactical.

Realidade, linguagem e não-cognitivismo em Wittgenstein

Este artigo analisa de que modo, a partir da posição de Wittgenstein em relação à ética, não é possível derivar uma postura não-cognitivista como pretende, por exemplo, o quase-realismo de Simon Blackburn. Primeiramente, reconstruímos as consequências da interpretação a respeito da existência de proposições morais para, posteriormente, sustentar que há um equívoco no modo de compreender a dicotomia entre fatos e valores. E, por último, mostramos que o filósofo vienense recusa, por um lado, uma visão platônica sobre as regras e, por outro, a tese de que não há regras objetivas. As regras são expressão intersubjetiva compartilhada pela forma de vida, argumento diametralmente oposto ao não-cognitivismo quase-realista de Blackburn.

Effective altruism for the poor

Abstract The aim of the paper is to contribute to the debate on effective altruism. It is an attempt to present it as a universal moral proposition – not only a new charity model for the richest citizens of the world. The article starts with a definition of a hypothetical group of relatively-poor effective altruists. Their hypothetical living conditions and opportunities are juxtaposed with the theory of effective altruism developed by Peter Singer and William MacAskill and with career guides proposed by 80000hours.org – one of the websites gathering effective altruists. In the last part, selected practices for relatively poor effective altruists are described. The conclusion of the paper is, that although most of the reflections behind the concept of effective altruism are developed for the richest people in the world, it is a universal ethical position that can be applied into lives of relatively poor people, whose contribution should not be underestimated.

Moral Fixed Points, Rationality and the ‘Why Be Moral?’ Question

Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (Philos Stud 171:399–443, 2014) have argued that there are moral conceptual truths that are substantive and non-vacuous in content, what they called ‘moral fixed points’. If the moral proposition ‘torturing kids for fun is pro tanto wrong’ is such a conceptual truth, it is because the essence of ‘wrong’ necessarily satisfies and applies to the substantive content of ‘torturing kids for fun’. In critique, Killoren (Anal Philos 57(2):165–173, 2016) has revisited the old skeptical ‘why be moral?’ question and argued that the moral fixed points give us no reason to care about morality (and the right thing to do) and, therefore, they are normatively irrelevant. He concluded that this is a counterintuitive implication that undermines the proposal. In this paper, I develop a rejoinder to Killoren’s (2016) argument that explains why, at least from the perspective of the moral fixed points framework, if the moral fixed points exist, they are necessarily normatively relevant for rational agents. I supplement this explanation with an explanation of why it might prima facie appear that moral fixed points are not normatively relevant, although ultima facie they are relevant. The supplementary explanation explains prima facie normative irrelevance as the upshot of failures of rational agency (of various aetiologies). I conclude that the moral fixed points, can, in principle, offer an interesting response to the skeptical ‘why be moral?’ question’.

A Pragmatic Reconstruction of Law’s Claim to Authority

AbstractRaz holds thatnecessarilyall legal authorities, evende factoauthorities, make a claim to legitimate authority. He does not say that legitimacy is a necessary property of law. This view, which I call theclaim view, constitutes my focal point in this paper. Many commentators have criticized this view. I discuss and dismiss three critiques of the claim view: theverification critique(the claim view is not empirically confirmed), thelegalistic critique(law claims legal authority, not moral authority), and thesemantic critique(legal obligations are semantically distinct from moral obligations).I submit that Raz equates the meaning of legal duties with that of moral duties and yet denies that legal statements entail moral propositions. In other words, I distinguish thesemantic identity thesisfrom thesemantic entailment thesis. Instead of a semantic interpretation of the claim view, I defend a presuppositional ascription of a general claim to moral authority to authoritative duty‐imposing and normatively committed uses of legal language by official spokesmen. I show that law’s claim to authority does not prove the truth of the sources thesis, because conceptual confusion or insincerity can affect the epistemic reliability of the propositions embodied in the claim, and because blatant immorality can altogether cancel law’s pragmatically presupposed claim to moral authority. I also argue that the claim view can only warrant two qualified versions of exclusive legal positivism, one of which is almost tautological, the other self‐contradictory. Finally, I suggest that exclusive legal positivism cannot be defended on conceptual grounds.

Moral foundations are not moral propositions.

Joshua May responds to skepticism about moral knowledge via appeal to empirical work on moral foundations. I demonstrate that the moral foundations literature is not able to do the work May needs. It demonstrates shared moral cognition, not shared moral judgment, and therefore, May's attempt to defeat general skepticism fails.

Consumption Morality of the Locavorism Reflected in the Advertising of the Organic Fairs in Rio de Janeiro: Is the Belonging Password on the Desk?

The purpose of this essay is to investigate the connections that surround the morality of green consumption and locavorism from the logic of “having” to “being” under the aegis of the productilization of nature in the context of a new strand of rhizomatic capitalism that is diligently interspersed by the production of “subjectivity kits”, whose theoretical bases are inspired by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. The hypothesis is related to the possibility of making desires from “subjectivity kits” based on symbolic, immaterial and intangible aspects with a moral identity proposition that promotes the relations of consumption, subjectivity, capital, “green feeding” and nature in the contemporary world. There is the possibility that a “liquefaction” of green food consumption, which is reflected by the conceptions of rhizomatic capitalism, may have been contingent upon articulations from a capilalistic culture co-opted by pret-a-porter identities that empower themselves from the fabrication of new desires captured by social control devices. These devices can bypass their social actors, referring to the idea of Ecopower. There are indications that all this process reached the table of the Brazilian consumer in the context of locavorism from the publicity and the production of liquefied “green foods” as a brand patented by the market and aesthetized with a garment of moral consumption. In order to investigate these relationships in the field of locavore feeding, this qualitative, empirical-theoretical exploratory study was based on bibliographical-documentary research techniques based on the analysis of eight online advertising pieces of organic fairs in Rio de Janeiro. This study will promote an understanding of the linkages of possible intentions inserted in the advertising pieces analyzed and the expectation of a new social control device acting in the light of rhizomatic capitalism as a manufacturer of “subjectivities kits” agitated by moral food consumption.

Faultless Disagreement, Realism and Moral Objectivity

The argument from faultless disagreement against moral realism is based on the alleged possibility of cognitively faultless moral disagreement, CFD. This possibility contradicts the pre-theoretic intuition that moral truth is knowable, in principle, the so-called epistemic constraint on moral truth, EC. In this paper, I discuss the realist’s two options to cope with this argument. First of all, I point out the realist’s strategies to explain the possibility of cognitively faultless error, which is implied by CFD. Then I discuss one promising option to respond to the argument from faultless disagreement: accepting both CFD and EC but blocking the ensuing contradiction by invoking an equivocation as regards the notion of knowability. After pointing out the drawbacks of this solution I discuss the other promising option: rejecting CFD by drawing on an agnostic stance on the part of cognitively blameless thinkers as regards moral propositions they cannot agree on. Yet this option faces the problem that EC has to be denied. In concluding the paper, I outline the prospects of an attractive objectivist shape of moral antirealism, which is also affected by the argument from faultless disagreement.

Alfred Ayer y la teoría emotivista de los enunciados morales

El objetivo de este trabajo es presentar y examinar la teoría emotivista de los enunciados morales, según la versión de Alfred Ayer. En primer lugar, se estudian los antecedentes de esta teoría (el Círculo de Viena, Wittgenstein) y se describe el ambiente positivista en el que surge. La teoría se expone prestando particular atención a los aspectos metaéticos y sus principales consecuencias. Finalmente, se propone que la teoría emotivista puede mantenerse con independencia y al margen del positivismo.

An Overview of the Application of Maqasid Al-Shariah into Cartilage Tissue Engineering

Tissue engineering, being part of regenerative medicine approaches has been researched and applied to treat the articular cartilage diseases. It offers benefit to humankind by improving healthcare economics, better treatment options and quality of life among the osteoarthritic patients. It is felt that this promising field requires Islamic essences to be addressed to its concepts and practices. The paper begins with the discussion of the potential of cartilage tissue engineering in overcoming the harms that may impact the healthcare stakeholders (patients, providers, medical professionals, researchers and healthcare authorities). This will be followed by deliberations based on the Maqasid al-Shariah (five higher objectives of Islamic Law), namely, safeguarding of faith, soul, wealth, mind, and offspring. The deliberations illustrate a general idea of cartilage tissue engineering concept and practices in relation to what Islam champions. Islamic Law is comprehensive and incorporates the moral propositions to the medical discipline. It is presented that every legal ruling in Islam has a function to achieve the benefit to human beings or to protect against harm. The application of Maqasid al-Shariah can serve as a practical framework in healthcare setting especially cartilage tissue engineering. It is hoped that this paper will open further discourses to facilitate for a decree by the relevant authority pertaining to the experimentation and practice of tissue engineering, particularly cartilage tissue engineering.

The Law in Plato’s Laws: A Reading of the ‘Classical Thesis’

Abstract Plato’s Laws include what H.L.A. Hart called the ‘classical thesis’ about the nature and role of law: the law exists to see that one leads a morally good life. This paper develops Hart’s brief remarks by providing a panorama of the classical thesis in Laws. This is done by considering two themes: (1) the extent to which Laws is paternalistic, and (2) the extent to which Laws is naturalistic. These themes are significant for a number of reasons, including because they show how Laws might be viewed as a sophisticated forerunner of natural law theory. The upshot is that Plato’s metaphysical commitments about legal ontology allow him to base the truth of legal propositions on the way they relate to the truth of corresponding moral propositions.

Imaginative resistance as imagistic resistance

AbstractWhen we are invited to imagine an unacceptable moral proposition to be true in fiction, we feel resistance when we try to imagine it. Despite this, it is nonetheless possible to suppose that the proposition is true. In this paper, I argue that existing accounts of imaginative resistance are unable to explain why only attempts to imagine (rather than to suppose) the truth of moral propositions cause resistance. My suggestion is that imagination, unlike supposition, involves mental imagery and imaginative resistance arises when imagery that one has formed does not match unacceptable propositions.

Sinnott-Armstrong\u2019s Empirical Challenge to Moral Intuitionism: a Novel Critique

This paper provides a novel critique of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s influential argument against epistemological moral intuitionism, the view that some people are non-inferentially justified in believing some moral propositions. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, this view experienced a revival, which coincided with an increasing interest in empirical research on intuitions. The results of that research are seen by some as casting serious doubt on the reliability of our moral intuitions. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, empirical evidence shows that our moral beliefs have a high error rate in general, which creates a need for inferential confirmation for every single moral belief. His argument involves the problematic assumption that it is reasonable for informed moral believers to ascribe a high probability of error to every particular moral belief unless the believer has some special evidence that this particular moral belief belongs to a class that has a lower probability of error than the class of moral beliefs (ERROR). Focussing on the non-moral example that Sinnott-Armstrong uses in the latest reformulation of his argument, the “Californian wine example”, I argue that (i) apart from exceptional circumstances, the description of moral agents as ascribing correctness probabilities to their moral beliefs is odd, (ii) ERROR reveals an awkward picture of how agents relate to their moral beliefs and (iii) ERROR is problematic from the perspective of moral competence. This critique goes deeper than the worries raised by other critics to earlier versions of the argument, and part of it applies to moral intuitionism as well.

Self-Evidence and Disagreement in Ethics

Moral epistemology, like general epistemology, faces a regress problem. Suppose someone demands to know why I am justified in holding a moral belief. In a typical case, I will respond by citing a further moral belief that justifies it. A regress arises because, in order for this further belief to justify anything, it too must be justified. According to a traditional position in moral epistemology, moral foundationalism, the regress comes to an end with some moral beliefs. Moral foundationalism is an attractive position because it promises to answer the regress problem. However, it inherits the burden of explaining why some moral beliefs have a particular privileged epistemic position – that is, why these beliefs are justified without requiring inferential support from other beliefs. The standard answer to this question is to insist that some moral beliefs have as their content propositions that are self-evident.
 A common way of resisting moral foundationalism is to argue from the fact of moral disagreement to the claim that no moral proposition is self-evident. I argue that while a simple version of this argument fails, this argument can be developed in such a way that it poses serious difficulties for moral foundationalism. I develop this argument by drawing on recent work in epistemology on the nature of our epistemic burdens in the face of peer disagreement. I then suggest that even if this argument does show that moral foundationalism fails, it need not have skeptical implications so long as coherentism remains a viable option in moral epistemology. Finally, I claim that this argument has implications for normative ethics. Namely, it rules out a position advocated by Peter Singer in his early work and indirectly supports the method of reflective equilibrium.

Criticize of George Moore's Theory on Moral Non-Naturalism

Background and Aim: One of the most important ideas about the analysis of moral concepts and propositions is Non-naturalistic theory. This study aimed to analysis and criticize of the George Moore's Theory on Moral Non-Naturalism. Materials and Methods: In this analytical research, after analyzing the basic concepts, the George Moore's Theory on Moral Non-Naturalism is interpreted and criticized. Findings: Based on this theory, moral terms are signs and indications of the characteristics of objects, but it is not acceptable that the terms which referred to by words such as good and must can be defined based on immoral terms. According to this view moral terms can only be understood by rational intuition, not through empirical observation or metaphysical reasoning. These issues can form the theoretical foundations of bioethics. Problems such as: indefinability of simple qualities, the type of abnormal characteristics, non-experiential (a priori) and intuition led to the emergence of emotivism, in spite of two centuries of loneliness of the Non-naturalistic theory. As the main result, the birth of the emotivism could be searched in the structural and internal problems of Non-naturalistic theory. So that, in spite of presenting a new plan in the field of analyzing concepts and moral propositions, Non-naturalistic theory due to numerous epistemological and ontological problems failed to meet expectations. Conclusion: The findings showed that both of Non-naturalistic theory and the emotivism caused the readiness to develop other theories in the field of bioethics. Please cite this article as: Abdullahi MA, Shiravand M. Criticize of George Moore's Theory on Moral Non-Naturalism. Bioethics Journal 2017; 7(26): 31-41.

Dispositivo da antecipação da alfabetização: condições de emergência e contornos atuais

Resumo Este artigo discute as condições de emergência e os efeitos do dispositivo da antecipação da alfabetização, que muda a idade em que a alfabetização deve ser consolidada para o primeiro ano do ensino fundamental. Argumenta-se que historicamente foi engendrado um dispositivo que articulou diferentes discursos, enunciados científicos, leis, proposições filosóficas, jurídicas e morais que têm como efeito nas escolas a exigência de que as crianças sejam alfabetizadas no primeiro ano. A discussão sobre a maturidade, os estudos sobre a psicogênese da escrita e sobre letramento são aqui analisados como práticas discursivas que deram as condições de emergência de um dispositivo que antecipa não somente a entrada no ensino fundamental, mas também a exigência da alfabetização plena dessas crianças.

Can Animals Be Moral?, by Mark Rowlands

Can animals be moral? In his book of that title, Mark Rowlands argues that they can be, in the sense that they can act for moral reasons. In Rowlands terminology, they can be ‘moral subjects’. Whether animals can act for moral reasons hinges on two questions: what capacities does acting for moral reasons require and do any animals have those capacities? The first addresses how high the bar is for moral subjecthood; the second whether any animals clear that bar. A defence of animals’ moral subjecthood is bar-clearing to the extent that it argues that animals possess capacities more robust than sceptics admit. A defence is bar-lowering to the extent that it argues that subjecthood does not require capacities as robust as sceptics allege. Rowlands defence is primarily bar-lowering. Acting for moral reasons does not require possessing the same concepts as we do (it’s enough if our concepts appropriately track theirs) or possessing moral concepts at all (it’s enough if they experience emotions the appropriateness of which presupposes the truth of a moral proposition) (Chapter 2). Nor does it require moral responsibility, acting for the sake of Aristotelian virtue, Kantian consciousness of the principles underlying one’s acts, or the Korsgaardian ability to ask whether one should obey the dictates of one’s inclinations (Chapter 3).

MACKIE’S ERROR THEORY: A WITTGENSTEINIAN CRITIQUE

I start by arguing that Mackie’s claim that there are no objective values is a nonsensical one. I do this by ‘assembling reminders’ of the correct use of the term ‘values’ and by examining the grammar of moral propositions à la Wittgenstein. I also examine Hare’s thought experiment which is used to demonstrate “that no real issue can be built around the objectivity or otherwise of moral values” before briefly looking at Mackie’s ‘argument from queerness’. In the final section I propose that Robert Arrington’s ‘conceptual relativism’, inspired by Wittgenstein, helps to make our use of moral language more perspicuous and avoids the problems faced by Mackie.

“Love” as the Key Word: New Sexual Morality and New Literature in the Late Qing and Early Republican Years (1900-1920)

Courtesy of translation, the word “love” (lian’ai 恋爱) entered the modern Chinese language in the early 20th century, leading to changes in the mode, experience, meaning and evaluation of “feelings between men and women” by virtue of this new nomenclature. The word entered public discourse and became the point of entry for new Chinese ethical construction, spawning a series of new moral propositions from the late Qing to the May Fourth Movement together with corresponding works of new literature. The “free marriage” advocated in the late Qing confirmed the modern consciousness of marriage premised on love and determined primarily by the will of the parties themselves, initiating a new style of civilized marriage. In the early Republican period, the word “love” was temporarily stigmatized in the course of sinicization, with the result that it was generally avoided in romance fiction. However, the widespread cult of the “spiritual character of love” in novels of tragic love laid the foundation for the emergence of “the sanctity of love” in the May Fourth period. The theory of love constructed at this time under the influence of Western theories made a subtle distinction between the “freedom of love” and “free love,” reflecting the ideological divergence within the New Culture community. In terms of spatial imagery and descriptions of love, the pioneering creation of romantic literature during the May Fourth period deconstructed the patriarchal authority that suppressed individual freedom, undermining traditional morality and opening up new fields for literary expression. But since the one-dimensional pursuit of individual freedom also led to weaknesses such as superficial emotionalism, May Fourth romantic literature could not take the experiences and expression of love to a deeper level.