Moral Entity Research Articles

Simple esteem and the method of commonplaces in Pufendorf

ABSTRACT In his discussion of simple esteem—one of the moral entities meant to regulate human actions—Pufendorf invokes a juridical commonplace: the rule that, before evidence to the contrary, we should presume others to be good. This argumentative strategy is an illuminating example for understanding his method of commonplaces. The present paper has three goals: (1) to analyze how Pufendorf adopted from legal humanism the view that presumptions should be based on considerations of what comes about most easily in nature; (2) to show that Pufendorf’s inclusion of ethical aspects in the juridical presumption of goodness is an application of this view of forming presumptions; (3) to argue that Pufendorf did not regard juridical and philosophical commonplaces as expressions of a particular stage of intellectual history but rather as the result of reflection about human needs and abilities.

Unstable platforms: Uber’s business model and the challenge of organisational legitimacy

ABSTRACT Lauded as the poster child of the sharing economy, the success of Uber’s business model was once viewed as inexorable. However, a disastrous Initial Public Offering and a series of legal rulings since have led some to question whether it has a viable model at all. This changing sentiment raises important questions about how we define a business model and understand the determinants of its success and failure. Rejecting the dominant diagnostic approach, this paper synthesises critical accounting work on business models as narratives with Suchman’s concept of organisational legitimacy. We argue that business models are narratives articulated by firms in order to achieve both pragmatic and moral legitimacy. In contexts where stakeholder interests diverge, this requires careful framing in order to foreground certain economic and moral representations whilst omitting others. Business model narratives are consequently partial, unstable and open to contestation. Applying this formulation to Uber, we argue that its pragmatic legitimacy was contingent upon a particular set of conjunctural conditions and the undisclosed exploitation of legal grey areas in order to grow at scale. We highlight the tensions that emerge when those undisclosed practices become a focal point for social mobilisation and understand Uber's recent problems as emerging from external challenges to the moral legitimacy of its business model narrative. The paper contributes to accounting research on business models and legitimacy and presents a revisionist account which positions platforms as fragile economic and moral entities dependent on conjunctural institutional and capital market arrangements, rather than heroic technological disruptors.

Hume’s liberalism based on Scottish jurisprudence

This study develops a view of Hume’s is/ought distinction as an extension of Scottish jurisprudence that, in turn, was influenced by Pufendorf’s discussion of entia moralia. Further, it investigates the unique role that Hume’s sentimentalism played in the production of elements in the context of liberalism under the rule of law, independently of previous philosophical traditions.First, we observe that Hume’s is/ought distinction corresponds to a distinction between uncivilized and civilized entities, rather than between amoral rationality and moral passions. Next, analyzing Hume’s argument for “moral evidence,” we find that such evidence is necessary for various activities, such as consent or trading, in the field of moral entities as civil societies. Finally, a study of Hume’s stance with respect to civil and common laws shows that his moral sentimentalism, which includes the is/ought distinction and moral evidence, suggests a new possibility for social development that is distinct from previous rational forms of jurisprudence. From this discussion, a unique sprout of modern liberalism can be seen in Hume’s theory of justice.

CROSS-BORDER CYBERCRIME

Electronic piracy is considered one of the electronic crimes sweeping our world today, and it is a crime of a material nature, which is represented in every illegal act or behavior related to any destination or in any way with computers and computer networks, that causes the victim to suffer a loss, and the perpetrator obtains or is able to obtain Any gain. These crimes often aim at stealing information in computer devices, or aim indirectly at the persons and parties concerned with that information. Crime of this kind has several names, including computer and Internet crimes, high-tech crimes, cybercrime, and white-collar crimes. Attacks are often against moral entities related to their strategic value, such as information stores, and this is the most important characteristic that distinguishes cybercrimes from other crimes. It relates to moral entities with material value or purely moral value or both together, and this is its basis without which it is not possible to imagine the existence of an electronic crime, and if it were not for this basis, it would be one of the ordinary crimes that are subject to the criminal law.

Embedding animals within a definition of sustainability

Current definitions of sustainability and sustainable development are problematic. They reinforce the dominant capitalist paradigm of economic growth as a goal—a system which has contributed in no uncertain terms to the current state of the planet—and they exclude animals as moral entities. We propose that sustainability is primarily an ethical issue which connects people, the planet on which we live, and the animals and other organisms which inhabit it. Our definition of sustainability states that in all decisions and actions on any scale, from the individual to the institutional, we should minimise our immediate and future negative impact on humans, other animals, and the planet, while simultaneously maximising our positive impacts on these domains. We take an interdisciplinary approach in discussing trade-offs between these three broad interests, providing a rationale for adopting this more inclusive definition at every level of society. Our definition calls for a normative shift in discussions around sustainability, one of which is more inclusive of the animals and other organisms with which we share the planet. We believe that the paper forms a strong and coherent foundation for policy and communication about sustainability going forward.

Innováció, etika, felelősség az információ korában. Adalékok az innovációetika fogalmi megalapozásához

Innovation, ethics, responsibility in the information ageTibor Gulyás – Péter Szendrő – Gábor Szécsi Traditional communities can be regarded as moral entities that transform the individual through group pressure. Communal existence allows the individual to transcend himself and find partnership with humanity, and determinates the individual’s moral decisions and judgements. A community is based on dynamic reciprocity and responsibility, and is a fountainhead of social capital, that is, of a common set of shared moral values, norms and expectations that can be described as social trust that facilitates cooperation for mutual benefit. We argue that since this social and cultural process leads to a new conceptualization of responsibility and innovation in the information age, it is an important task to create a general ethical framework, value and norm system of innovation.

When Doctors and AI Interact: on Human Responsibility for Artificial Risks

A discussion concerning whether to conceive Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems as responsible moral entities, also known as “artificial moral agents” (AMAs), has been going on for some time. In this regard, we argue that the notion of “moral agency” is to be attributed only to humans based on their autonomy and sentience, which AI systems lack. We analyze human responsibility in the presence of AI systems in terms of meaningful control and due diligence and argue against fully automated systems in medicine. With this perspective in mind, we focus on the use of AI-based diagnostic systems and shed light on the complex networks of persons, organizations and artifacts that come to be when AI systems are designed, developed, and used in medicine. We then discuss relational criteria of judgment in support of the attribution of responsibility to humans when adverse events are caused or induced by errors in AI systems.

Free will ruled by reason: Pufendorf on moral value and moral estimation

ABSTRACT Pufendorf makes a clear distinction between the physical constitution of human beings and their value as human beings, stressing that the latter is justified exclusively by the regular use of the free will. According to Pufendorf, the regular use of free will requires certain inventions (divine as well as human) imposed on the free will and called moral entities. He claims that these inventions determine the moral quality of a human being as well as the standards according to which human beings and their actions are able to be judged. This article examines the normative aspects of Pufendorf's concepts of moral value and moral estimation in regard to the epistemological question of the accessibility of moral entities for human beings. In the first part, it reconstructs Pufendorf's doctrine of moral entities and the place of moral estimation in this doctrine. In the second part, it presents Pufendorf's account of the moral philosophy as a science in order to explain his theory of moral normativity as imposed, and the role of a person in regard to their own moral status. In the last part, it illustrates some consequences in regard to the problem of slavery in Pufendorf.

Wittgenstein, deflationism and moral entities

This paper discusses the meta-ethical implications of Wittgenstein’s later moral philosophy. According to Lovibond and Brandhorst, Wittgenstein provided a novel conception of moral facts, properties and objects by adopting deflationism. Lovibond argues that Wittgenstein’s seamless conception of language together with his non-foundational epistemology and non-transcendent understanding of rationality involves a change of perspective towards a plausible and non-mystificatory moral realism. Meanwhile, Brandhorst argues that Wittgenstein’s provides a deflationist conception of moral truths from which we obtain a deflationist conception of moral facts. This paper argues, on the contrary, that the attribution of deflationism does not do justice to Wittgenstein’s later work. It is concluded, therefore, that the appeal to deflationism does not afford or substantiate the exegetical claims made by Lovibond and Brandhorst.

The practice of self-nurturing in the concept of the Tyumen philosopher Y. M. Fyodorov

The subject of this research is the philosophy of the Tyumen philosopher Yuri Mikhailovich Fyodorov – a representative of the Tyumen philosophical tradition, who focused on the problems of ethics, namely practical implementation of the ethical in the context of development of the North and establishment of a new society from fundamentally different individuals. Tyumen philosophers were concerned with the question of how to form a single moral essence out of the agonistic society. For solving this problem, Yuri Mikhailovich Fyodorov turned to Neo-Platonism, cosmism, and Russian religious philosophy, as well as paid particular attention to the question of elevation of human to a moral entity. The ways for such subjectification proposed by Fedorov are examined in this article. The scientific novelty consists in the fact that the philosopher is not widely known, as well as in the emphasis on the process of subjectification, epimeleia heautou in interpretation of M. Foucault, or the self-nurturing practices. It is illustrated that creativity, freedom, kindness and love are the key practices of self-nurturing which Y. M. Fyodorov indicated as the procedures of subjectification. From his perspective, these four concepts are the goal and practice for an individual, who seeks to surpass his own foundations. The philosophy of Y. M. Fyodorov aims to substantiate the unity of man with man, man with being; as well as attach meaning, value and vector to human life; contra pose something genuine, profound and eternal to the concepts that deprive an individual of the right to power over himself and the right to the long-term existence.

From behind stall doors

Animal husbandry, a major part of the contemporary German economy, is the subject of politically and morally charged discourses about the effects of the industry on the nation’s landscape and its role in economic globalization. German politicians and activists often discuss industrialized animal husbandry practices as abusive and polluting. This article analyzes how these debates are imbricated in forms of concern about nonhuman animals that tend to be differentiated geographically by urban-rural boundaries. I argue the privileging of animals as moral entities causes interpersonal friction between those who rely on animals for a living and those who do not, and expresses fundamental tensions about the rural landscape as a space of industrialized agricultural production, as opposed to a space dedicated to the conservation of the natural environment.

Reasons for justification and contraindications to criminal liability

A crime is a physical entity, and a moral entity, so the criminal behavior carried out by the perpetrator represents the physical entity, and results in a criminal act that is punishable by law, according to the legal texts regulating that, and in the absence of a text that criminalizes an act, this act is permissible based on the legal rule. There is no crime or punishment except by a text.” In addition, the criminal characteristic is removed from it, and this act is justified, which is called the reasons for justification. Thus, the reasons for justification are material circumstances that occur to the criminal act at the time of its commission, removing the criminal character from it, and making it a “permissible” lawful act.

Self-preservation and sociology’s modern moral personality: Dual structure in Durkheim’sSuicide

According to Durkheim, suicide means a conscious choice of death. The only opposite of death is being, and there is no middle ground in between. Therefore, when Durkheim discusses suicide, he certainly touches on the issue of living, or a choice of self-preservation, in a cryptical way, as well. This veiled discussion has been unacknowledged by Chinese mainland sociology because the widely adopted Chinese version of Durkheim’s Suicide loses most of the textual evidence of this clue in its translation. This paper offers a textual analysis of Durkheim’s Suicide based on that textual evidence. Durkheim treats different types of suicide as extreme forms of different types of morals, and, in many places, he asks under what kind of moral condition one can achieve self-preservation. This paper argues that there is an inner connection between Durkheim’s definitions of three types of suicide and his definition of sociology. As a social scientist who studies morality, he sees sociology as the expression of a particular modern morality, the same kind of moral condition that he calls for in his book. This paper shows that for Durkheim, this moral entity signifies for self-preservation both for the modern individual and for sociology.

Alumbrando el principio de lo mejor: derecho natural, necesidad moral y justicia divina en el joven Leibniz (1663-1671)

El joven Leibniz abordó, primeramente, la cuestión de la justicia divina desde un enfoque iusnaturalista, basándose en la doctrina de los entes morales de Erhard Weigel. De tal doctrina tomó el concepto de necesidad moral, que emplea en este período (1663-1671) para definir la noción de obligación. Sin embargo, este enfoque jurisprudencial le resulta inadecuado para explicar la justicia divina, porque Leibniz entiende que Dios está exento de toda obligación jurídico-moral. Por ello, busca en la doctrina de la armonía universal una razón que pueda explicar la equidad o piedad divina. Y esta búsqueda parece conducirlo a esbozar, hacia 1671, el principio de lo mejor, como principio que rige las acciones divinas, basado en una concepción intelectualista de la libertad.

ETHICA EX MACHINA. Exploring artificial moral agency or the possibility of computable ethics

Since the automation revolution of our technological era, diverse machines or robots have gradually begun to reconfigure our lives. With this expansion, it seems that those machines are now faced with a new challenge: more autonomous decision-making involving life or death consequences. This paper explores the philosophical possibility of artificial moral agency through the following question: could a machine obtain the cognitive capacities needed to be a moral agent? In this regard, I propose to expose, under a normative-cognitive perspective, the minimum criteria through which we could recognize an artificial entity as a genuine moral entity. Although my proposal should be considered from a reasonable level of abstraction, I will critically analyze and identify how an artificial agent could integrate those cognitive features. Finally, I intend to discuss their limitations or possibilities.

On Colonial Self-Perceptions: The European Union, Turkey and the “bad” leader

This essay explores the impact of Europe’s colonial past on the nature of the European Union’s engagement with Turkey as a candidate country, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. It begins by arguing the European Union’s role as a normative power replicates a colonial trope of external engagement that assumes the world beyond the metropole is violent, barbaric and uncivil. Yet this perception is also self-referential whereby the “badness” of the colonized is meant to underline the metropole’s moral and material superiority. A similar assumption about the world that exceeds its territorial limits informs the “logic” of the European Union’s accession process as candidate countries like Turkey are expected to pursue and eventually embody European (“good”) values. In this regard, responding to Erdoğan’s severe crackdown on political dissent and civil liberties following a failed coup attempt in 2016, the European Union’s censorious rhetoric towards his “bad” conduct is expected and warranted. Yet, drawing on public statements made by the European Union justifying the eventual suspension of negotiations and accession talks with Turkey, this essay argues Erdoğan, as a “bad” leader, also helps furbish the European Union’s self-perception as a moral and ethical entity. That is to say, the “bad” Turkish leader serves as a contrasting background against which the European Union is able to present itself as a force for good.

The Moral Disillusionment Model of Organizational Transgressions: Ethical Transgressions Trigger More Negative Reactions from Consumers When Committed by Nonprofits

We tested whether the impact of an organizational transgression on consumer sentiment differs depending on whether the organization is a nonprofit. Competing hypotheses were tested: (1) that people expect higher ethical standards from a nonprofit than a commercial organization, and so having this expectation violated generates a harsher response (the moral disillusionment hypothesis) and (2) that a nonprofit’s reputation as a moral entity buffers it against the negative consequences of transgressions (the moral insurance hypothesis). In three experiments (collective N = 1372) participants were told that an organization had engaged in fraud (Study 1), exploitation of women (Study 2), or unethical labor practices (Study 3). Consistent with the moral disillusionment hypothesis, decreases in consumer trust post-transgression were greater when the organization was described as nonprofit (compared to a commercial entity), an effect that was mediated by expectancy violations. This drop in trust then flowed through to consumer intentions (Study 1) and consumer word of mouth intentions (Studies 2 and 3). No support was found for the moral insurance hypothesis. Results confirm that nonprofits are penalized more harshly than commercial organizations when they breach consumer trust.

Social movements and international relations: a relational framework

Social movements are increasingly recognised as significant features of contemporary world politics, yet to date their treatment in international relations theory has tended to obfuscate the considerable diversity of these social formations, and the variegated interactions they may establish with state actors and different structures of world order. Highlighting the difficulties conventional liberal and critical approaches have in transcending conceptions of movements as moral entities, the article draws from two underexploited literatures in the study of social movements in international relations, the English School and social systems theory, to specify a wider range of analytical interactions between different categories of social movements and of world political structures. Moreover, by casting social movement phenomena as communications, the article opens international relations to consideration of the increasingly diverse trajectories and second order effects produced by social movements as they interact with states, intergovernmental institutions, and transnational actors.

Just relationships: A third way communication ethic

ABSTRACTThis essay explores and expands themes presented initially in Just Relationships, Part One, Imagining Just Relationships: Perspectives. I begin by situating the idea of justice within the assertion that relationships are moral entities. As such, communication scholars, through a focus on mindful dialogue, have a unique opportunity to recognize relationships as moral (i.e., that which makes us human). From there I make the conceptual move that “just” relationships can only be achieved through love, not by trying to exact justice. Through love “a third way” emerges from classic human tensions, such as cognition-emotion and law-mercy, transforming relational perspectives. The final section of the essay focuses on advocacy as love in action, an extension of third way principles that depict advocacy in personal relationships as creating spaces where if good things can happen, they will. That is, love in action creates safe spaces where individuals find their own voices and their full humanity.

Collective rights and democratic states: a new framework for addressing global socio-economic inequality

This article will present the argument for treating democratic states as moral and not only legal collective entities; that is, it will apply the theory of collective rights of cultural groups in a (closed) domestic political setting to democratic states in international relations. Numerous experiences by self-identifying cultural groups bear witness to the fact that morally important objectives are not always reached by merely treating individuals as the sole bearers of moral status. In order to prevent latent cultural imperialism, many countries around the world have adopted various models of collective rights protection and policies of preferential treatment for these groups. This article will examine whether it is possible to make a parallel between cultural groups and democratic states; in particular, whether it is feasible to think of democratic states as moral entities and what the normative implications of such a view for contemporary international relations and trade would be.