Abstract
This paper discusses the meta-ethical implications of Wittgenstein’s later moral philosophy. According to Lovibond and Brandhorst, Wittgenstein provided a novel conception of moral facts, properties and objects by adopting deflationism. Lovibond argues that Wittgenstein’s seamless conception of language together with his non-foundational epistemology and non-transcendent understanding of rationality involves a change of perspective towards a plausible and non-mystificatory moral realism. Meanwhile, Brandhorst argues that Wittgenstein’s provides a deflationist conception of moral truths from which we obtain a deflationist conception of moral facts. This paper argues, on the contrary, that the attribution of deflationism does not do justice to Wittgenstein’s later work. It is concluded, therefore, that the appeal to deflationism does not afford or substantiate the exegetical claims made by Lovibond and Brandhorst.
Highlights
During the past decades, philosophers have shown a growing interest in understanding Wittgenstein’s later moral philosophy and its implications for contemporary meta-ethical debates
Brandhorst and Lovibond have sought to develop a link between Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and deflationism to shed some light on the meta-ethical implications of his later moral philosophy. They suggest that his embrace of fact, property and existence deflationism warrants the postulation of moral entities while avoiding the troubles that have traditionally plagued moral realism
I will refrain from discussing his work in detail here, since the purpose of this paper is to examine the legitimacy of resorting to fact, property and existence deflationism to make sense of Wittgenstein’s later views on moral entities
Summary
Philosophers have shown a growing interest in understanding Wittgenstein’s later moral philosophy and its implications for contemporary meta-ethical debates. Brandhorst and Lovibond have sought to develop a link between Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and deflationism to shed some light on the meta-ethical implications of his later moral philosophy. They suggest that his embrace of fact, property and existence deflationism warrants the postulation of moral entities while avoiding the troubles that have traditionally plagued moral realism. This paper critically examines their proposed interpretations by discussing the adequacy of attributing fact, property and existence deflationism to Wittgenstein. The remainder of the paper discusses the adequacy of invoking Wittgenstein’s so-called fact, property and existence deflationism to postulate the existence of moral entities
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