Modal Realism Research Articles

On the Probability of Plenitude

I examine what the mathematical theory of random structures can teach us about the probability of Plenitude, a thesis closely related to David Lewis's modal realism. Given some natural assumptions, Plenitude is reasonably probable a priori, but in principle it can be (and plausibly it has been) empirically disconfirmed—not by any general qualitative evidence, but rather by our de re evidence.

Историческая реальность в свете конструктивизма

The purpose of the article is to substantiate the thesis «historical reality as a narrative». The relevance of the article determines the place of historical knowledge as the most important ideological tool formalizing the national and civilian identity. The originality of the article lies in an attempt to find a middle ground between radical constructivism and realism whilst explaining the phenomenon of «historical reality». Research methodology — constructivism. This methodology leads to following results: 1. Historical reality is always a construct that has an author with his political, moral, religious or other beliefs. Based on this, it should be taken into consideration that other researchers establish different and even alternative historical realities. Therefore, the story will remain as a multitude of competing stories. 2. The reference to historical facts as a proof meaning the correspondence of the narrative to the described event is not a valid argument. There are the following reasons for this: a) any story originated in the past is limited to a certain number of facts. Meanwhile, there are always some unknown facts that can significantly change the picture of historical reality; b) historical reality made of fact selection depends on the researcher and the goals he pursues; c) falsification of facts is often used in historical sources. 3. Every honest researcher creates his own narrative out of real-life events and characters, which makes it possible to assert his objectivity and the incorrectness of the radical constructivism methodology. But even the most honest researcher has personality traits that can be reflected on his work, which gives grounds to claim that realism is wrong. Therefore, the truth still lies somewhere in the middle and being represented by moderate constructivism or constructive realism.

Pusey and Transubstantiation: An Exploration of His Thinking and Ecumenical Implications

AbstractThis article seeks to explore the thinking of Edward Bouverie Pusey on the doctrine of transubstantiation. It begins by looking at the conflicted way Pusey is considered and goes on to examine Pusey's writings on transubstantiation. The article points out that Pusey's early writing on transubstantiation wrongly believed that the doctrine implied a carnal view of Christ's presence in the Eucharist, but that in his mature thinking this caricature was abandoned and he came to understand that transubstantiation is a form of moderate realism. Some detailed examination of Pusey's mature thinking is undertaken, including a very important set of correspondence between Edward Pusey and John Newman in 1867 which addressed the doctrine of transubstantiation. Pusey's thinking reveals that he is prepared to accept the word transubstantiation as long as it does not imply a change in the substance of the bread and wine of the Eucharist. The article concludes with discussion on the term transubstantiation itself and controversially cites evidence from both Anglican and Roman Catholic sources which suggest that the dependence on a particular scholastic philosophical analysis which attempts to explain the ‘how’ of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist may be less useful than an approach of ‘what’. Pusey's mature thinking on transubstantiation is seen as useful for ecumenical dialogue between the Anglican and Roman Catholic Churches.

Everettian theory as pure wave mechanics plus a no-collapse probability postulate

Proposed derivations of the Born rule for Everettian theory are controversial. I argue that they are unnecessary but may provide justification for a simplified version of the Principal Principle. It’s also unnecessary to replace Everett’s idea that a subject splits in measurement contexts with the idea that subjects have linear histories which partition (Deutsch in Int J Theor Phys 24:1–41, 1985; The Beginning of Infinity. Allen Lane, London, 2011; Saunders and Wallace in Br J Philos Sci 59:293–305, 2008; Saunders, in: Saunders, Barrett, Kent, Wallace (eds) Many worlds? Everett, quantum theory, and reality, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 181–205, 2010; Wallace in The emergent multiverse, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, Chapter 7; Wilson in Br J Philos Sci 64:709–737, 2013; The nature of contingency: quantum physics as modal realism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, forthcoming). Linear histories were introduced to provide a concept of pre-measurement uncertainty and I explain why pre-measurement uncertainty for splitting subjects is after all coherent, though not necessary because Everett’s original fission interpretation of branching can arguably be rendered coherent without it, via reference to Vaidman (Int Stud Philos Sci 12:245–66, 1998), Tappenden (Br J Philos Sci 62:99–123, 2011), Sebens and Carroll (Br J Philos Sci 69:25–74, 2018) and McQueen and Vaidman (Stud Hist Philos Mod Phys 66:14–23, 2019). A deterministic and probabilistic quantum mechanics can be made intelligible by replacing the standard collapse postulate with a no-collapse postulate which identifies objective probability with relative branch weight, supplemented by the simplified Principal Principle and some revisionary metaphysics.

Extended Modal Realism \u2014 a New Solution to the Problem of Intentional Inexistence

Kriegel described the problem of intentional inexistence as one of the ‘perennial problems of philosophy’ (Kriegel Philosophical Perspectives 21(1), 307–340, 2007: 307). In the same paper, Kriegel alluded to a modal realist solution to the problem of intentional inexistence. However, Kriegel does not state by name who defends the kind of modal realist solution he has in mind. Kriegel also points out that even what he believes to be the strongest version of modal realism does not pass the ‘principle of representation’ and thus modal realism is not an adequate solution to the problem of intentional inexistence. In this paper, I respond to Kriegel by defending a modal realist solution that he did not consider in 2007, called ‘extended modal realism’ (EMR). EMR is a version of modal realism where possible worlds are not completely isolated as they are under the Lewisian model. Rather, under EMR worlds are, in a way, spatiotemporally related. The fact EMR worlds are related allows EMR to sufficiently pass the principle of representation and thus can be deemed a legitimate solution to the problem of intentional inexistence. I conclude that either EMR can pass the principle of representation in some cases or, and I think the more sensible option, we give up on the principle of representation altogether.

Can Hardcore Actualism Validate S5?

AbstractHardcore actualism (HA) grounds all modal truths in the concrete constituents of the actual world (see, e.g., Borghini and Williams (2008), Jacobs (2010), Vetter (2015)). I bolster HA, and elucidate the very nature of possibility (and necessity) according to HA, by considering if it can validate S5 modal logic. Interestingly, different considerations pull in different directions on this issue. To resolve the tension, we are forced to think hard about the nature of the hardcore actualist’s modal reality and how radically this departs from possible worlds orthodoxy. Once we achieve this departure, the prospects of a hardcore actualist validation of S5 look considerably brighter. This paper thus strengthens hardcore actualism by arguing that it can indeed validate S5–arguably the most popular logic of metaphysical modality–and, in the process, it elucidates the very nature of modality according to this revisionary, but very attractive, modal metaphysics.

Almeida, Michael, Cosmological Arguments (Elements of the Philosophy of Religion), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, 104pp

As part of the successful series “Elements of the Philosophy of Religion” edited by Yujin Nagasawa, Michael Almeida discusses the structure, content, evaluation of traditional cosmological arguments. Almeida offers us a formulation and evaluation of traditional Kalam, Thomistic and Leibnizian cosmological arguments, though he also introduces us to the approach of modal realism, in which the explananda of such arguments is the totality of actualia and possibilia.

Presentism and Modal Realism

David Lewis sells modal realism as a package that includes an eternalist view of time. There is, of course, nothing that ties together the thesis that modality should be analyzed in terms of concrete possibilia with the view that non-present things exist. In this paper I develop a theory I call modal realist presentism that is a combination of modal realism and presentism, and argue that is has compelling answers to some of the main objections to presentism, including the arguments from (i) singular propositions, (ii) cross-temporal relations, and (iii) truthmaking. Toward the end, I compare modal realist presentism favorably to some similar theories, including Bigelow's modal theory of time, Williamson's theory of the ex-concrete, and Dainton's theory of many-worlds presentism.

Why Reduction is Underrated

The key idea behind reduction is a simple and familiar one: it’s that there’s more to things than meets the eye. Surprisingly, this simple idea provides the resources to block a number of notable anti-reductionist arguments: Mackie’s argument from queerness against objective moral values, Kripke’s Humphrey objection and its recent variants, and Jubien’s objection from irrelevance against Lewisian modal realism. What is wrong with each of these arguments is that they suppose that what is to be reduced must not be dissimilar to what it is to be reduced to. This supposition is shown to be misguided and that the success or otherwise of a reduction turns on quite different considerations.

Incarnation, Divine Timelessness, and Modality

A central part of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation is that the Son of God ‘becomes’ incarnate. Furthermore, according to classical theism, God is timeless: He exists ‘outside’ of time, and His life has no temporal stages. A consequence of this ‘atemporalist’ view is that a timeless being cannot undergo intrinsic change—for this requires the being to be one way at one time, and a different way at a later time. How, then, can we understand the central Christian claim that the Son of God ‘becomes’ human? This paper examines one such explanation, drawn from a brief remark by Brian Leftow: the Word takes on flesh by exhibiting modal variation with regards to the incarnation. On this account, a timeless God ‘becomes’ incarnate simply due to variation across logical space: at some possible worlds He is incarnate and at others He is not. Modal variation need not, therefore, require temporality: it only requires variation across (static) possible worlds. I draw out the problems with Leftow’s modal claim under the heads of Ersatzism and Genuine Modal Realism about possible worlds, respectively. I argue that in both instances, Leftow’s desired cross–worldly variation of the Son’s incarnation cannot be achieved.

Survey of clinician and student impressions of a synthetic canine model for gastrointestinal surgery training.

To evaluate the perceived efficacy of a high-fidelity synthetic canine model for simulating common gastrointestinal surgical procedures. Survey of students and experienced clinicians. Twelve clinicians with >2 years of postgraduate experience in the field of small animal surgery and 102 senior year veterinary students. The model was subjectively evaluated by 12 clinicians with >2 years of postgraduate experience in the field of small animal surgery. Senior year veterinary students (n = 102) were asked to complete questionnaires before and after a laboratory on common gastrointestinal surgical procedures that included rating of perceived proficiency, anatomical knowledge, and the use of synthetic models compared with live animals. Clinicians assessed most aspects of the model as moderately realistic and unanimously agreed that it would be helpful for students to train on this model prior to live surgery. Student survey response rates were 91% and 99% before and after the laboratory, respectively. The proportion of students that felt moderately-to-highly proficient with the procedures increased from 8% prior to the laboratories to 59% after the laboratories (P < .001). The proportion of students that felt that they had superior-to-excellent knowledge of abdominal surgical anatomy increased from 16% prior to the laboratories to 44% after the laboratories (P < .001). The proportion of students that were satisfied with synthetic models instead of live animals increased from 52% prior to the laboratories to 74% after the laboratories (P = .014). Experienced clinicians considered the model to have moderate realism. A positive shift in the students' self-perceived proficiency with gastrointestinal surgery was evident after the use of the model. This synthetic model should be considered for training of veterinary gastrointestinal surgery. However, comparison studies are recommended to ascertain the relative educational value of this model.

Универсальность, модальный реализм и Парфит

This article explores relations between moral philosophy and metaphysics in one particular issue: I examine how arguments for universality in morality may contradict with modal realism. This contradistinction is used not because modal realism is a fact or necessarily true but as a part of conceptual analysis of moral terms. And I try to figure out what does this conflict mean for moral philosophy. At first, I present Derek Parfit’s argument for the existence of universality in morality from “Reasons and Persons”. Then I explain why moral philosopher can be interested in modal realism. I present to main motives to it. One motive is based on Kantian ethics. Another is grounded on problems in the interpretation of R.M. Hare’s notion of “supervenience”. Then I prove, using R. Adams’ an argument from indifference, that universality in morality thesis contradicts modal realism. I analyze David Lewis’s response to this argument and some ways to improve Adams’ argument. Finally, I try to dissolve this contradiction by putting some restriction on universality in morality. As a result, it becomes clear what a significant, but rarely emphasized feature is inherent to universality in morality: it should be restricted to one causal closure world.

How Lewis Can Meet the Integration Challenge

We show that Lewis’s modal realism, and his serviceability-based argument for it, cohere with his epistemological contextualism. Modal realism explains why serviceability-based reasoning in metaphysics might be reliable, while Lewis’s contextualism explains why Lewis can properly ignore the possibility that serviceability isn’t reliable, at least when doing metaphysics. This is because Lewis’s contextualism includes a commitment to a kind of pragmatic encroachment, so that whether a subject knows can depend on how much is at stake with respect to whether the belief is true or false. Accordingly, we suggest that Lewis can count as knowing that serviceability is a reliable guide to truth in metaphysics, since the stakes are generally low there, and so can be justified in believing that modal realism is true based on its serviceability.

The Reality of Modes in Spinoza’s Philosophy

In the history of philosophy, two standard critiques of the reality of modes in Spinoza’s philosophy come from Pierre Bayle and Georg Wilhelm Hegel. Both philosophers in some way assume that attributes and relations among modes constitute a shared reality in which modes participate. As a result, they assert that Spinoza’s monism leads either to an over-identification of God with contingent modes or to a limited God. In this paper, I will show how attributes and relations among modes in Spinoza’s work simply explain an active modal reality; modes do not depend upon or participate in ideal relations and attributes for their existence. The result is that in Spinoza’s philosophy attributes must be seen as unreal and modal reality must be understood as primary.

Is mathematical knowledge a precedent for modal knowledge?: A novel objection to Lewis’s modal epistemology

Abstract The goal of this paper is to raise a novel objection to Lewis’s modal realist epistemology. After reformulating his modal epistemology, I shall argue that his view that we have necessary knowledge of the existence of counterparts ends up with an absurdity. Specifically, his analogy between mathematical knowledge and modal knowledge leads to an unpleasant conclusion that one’s counterpart exists in all possible worlds. My argument shows that if Lewis’s modal realism is true, we cannot know what is possible. Conversely, if we can know what is possible, his modal realism is false. In the remainder of the paper, I shall consider and block possible objections to my argument.

Developing Metalogic to Formalize Ontological Disputes of the Systems in Metaphysics by Introducing the Notion of Functionally Isomorphic Quantifiers

A general meta-logical theory is developed by considering ontological disputes in the systems of metaphysics. The usefulness of this general meta-logical theory is demonstrated by considering the case of the ontological dispute between the metaphysical systems of Lewis’ Modal Realism and Terence Parsons’ Meinongianism. Using Quine’s criterion of ontological commitments and his views on ontological disagreement, three principles of metalogic is formulated. Based on the three principles of metalogic, the notions of independent variable and dependent variable are introduced. Then, the ontological dispute between Lewis’ Modal Realism and Terence Parsons’ Meinongianism are restated in the light of the principles of metalogic. After the restatement, Independent variable and dependent variables are fixed in both Lewis’ Modal Realism and Terence Parsons’ Meinongianism to resolve the dispute. Subsequently, a new variety of quantifiers are introduced which is known as functionally isomorphic quantifiers to provide a formal representation of the resolution of the dispute. The specific functionally isomorphic quantifier which is developed in this work is known as st-quantifier. It is indicated that how st-quantifier which is one of the functionally isomorphic quantifiers can function like existential quantifier. It is also shown that there is some kind of inconsistency which is unavoidable in stating the ontological disagreement and therefore, paraconsistent logic is a requirement in stating the ontological disputes.

The Tenseless Theory of Time and the Moodless Theory of Modality

AbstractThis paper develops a moodless theory of modality, intended to be as closely analogous to the tenseless theory of time as possible. It is argued that the new theory is distinct from David Lewis' modal realism and that it solves certain problems better than modal realism does, namely, the problem of advanced modalizing, the problem of necessitism, and the problem of conflict with common opinion.

God\u2019s Necessity on Anselmian Theistic Genuine Modal Realism

On Anselmian theism (AT), God is, amongst other things, a necessary being. On genuine modal realism (GMR), possible worlds are maximal mereological sums of spatiotemporally connected individuals. I argue in this paper that AT and GMR are either incompatible or their conjunction leads to—amongst other things—modal collapse. Specifically, I argue: regardless of whether God is concrete or abstract, His necessary existence either is inconsistent with AT-GMR or it leads to, amongst other things, modal collapse for AT-GMR. I conclude the paper by contending that, if I am correct, the ATist will have an argument against the truth of GMR, and the GMRist will have an argument against the truth of AT.

The best possible option of impossible worlds: Hybrid Modal Realism

&#x0D; In this paper I reconstruct the merits and drawbacks of the concretist and abstractionist theories of possible worlds and face them with the challenge of impossible worlds. I show how these two types of theories deal with the problem of impossibilities, and argue that the best option is two advance the so-called hybrid modal realism, namely concret possible worlds and abstract impossible worlds. Finally, as a conclusion, I highlight some of the disadvantages of this view as well and note the possibility of a Carnap-like solution.&#x0D;

Forms as Simple and Individual Grounds of Things’ Natures

To understand Aristotle’s conception of form, we have to see clearly the relationship between his account and Plato’s Theory of Forms. I offer a novel interpretation of Aristotle’s Moderate Realism, in which forms are simple particulars that ground the character and mutual similarity of the entities they inform. Such an account has advantages in three areas: explaining (1) the similarity of particulars, (2) the synchronic unity of composite particulars, and (3) the diachronic unity or persistence of intrinsically changing particulars.