Abstract
To understand Aristotle’s conception of form, we have to see clearly the relationship between his account and Plato’s Theory of Forms. I offer a novel interpretation of Aristotle’s Moderate Realism, in which forms are simple particulars that ground the character and mutual similarity of the entities they inform. Such an account has advantages in three areas: explaining (1) the similarity of particulars, (2) the synchronic unity of composite particulars, and (3) the diachronic unity or persistence of intrinsically changing particulars.
Highlights
As Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Geach observed, Aristotle’s notions of matter and form are quite elusive, especially to the modern mind
In this paper I offer a new account of the two notions, drawing on some recent work on metaphysical grounding by Kit Fine (2012), Jonathan Schaffer (2016), Gideon Rosen (2010), and others and recent work on tropes by Michael Loux (2006) and Robert Garcia (2015)
I am primarily interested in metaphysics, and I offer an account of form and matter that is defensible in its own terms
Summary
As Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Geach observed (in their Three Philosophers, Anscombe and Geach 1961), Aristotle’s notions of matter (hule) and form (eidos or morphe) are quite elusive, especially to the modern mind. They have been interpreted in many different ways over the centuries. I am primarily interested in metaphysics, and I offer an account of form and matter that is defensible in its own terms. It’s critically important to discuss the concept of form within the context of Aristotle’s answer to Plato’s problem of the one over the many. (in section III) I will present three arguments for the thesis that forms ground internal structure
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