Modal Fallacy Research Articles

Едвардс про несумісність Божого передзнання і людської свободи волі

In the book “Freedom of the Will”, Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) put forward a strong ar-gument for theological fatalism. This argument, I suppose, can be considered as the universal basis for discussion between Fatalists and Anti-Fatalists in the 20th century, especially in the context of the most powerful argument for fatalism, introduced by Nelson Pike. The argument of Edwards rests upon the following principles: (a) if something has been the case in the past, it has been the case necessarily (Necessity of the past); (b) if God knows something (say A), it is not the case that ~A is possible (Infallibility of God`s knowledge). Hence, Edwards infers that if God had foreknowledge that A, then A is necessary, and it is not the case that someone could voluntarily choose ~A. The article argues that (i) the Edwards` inference Kgp → □p rests upon the modal fallacy; (ii) the inference „God had a knowledge that p will happen, therefore „God had a knowledge that p will happen” is the proposition about the past, and hence, the necessarily true proposition“ is ambiguous; thus, it is not the case that this proposition necessarily entails the impossibility of ~p; (iii) it is not the case that p, being known by God, turns out to be necessary. Thus, we can avoid the inference of Edwards that if Kgp is a fact of the past, then we cannot freely choose ~p. It has also been shown that the main provisions of the argument of Edwards remain significant in the context of contemporary debates about free will and foreknowledge (Theories of soft facts, Anti-Ockhamism, theories of temporal modal asymmetry, „Timeless solution”). Additionally, I introduce a new challenge for fatalism – argument from Brouwerian axiom.

From modal fallacies to a new argument for fatalism

Abstract Do incompatibilist arguments, like some fatalist arguments, rest on modal fallacies? If Westphal (2012) is right, then one popular argument for incompatibilism van Inwagen’s “First Formal Argument” does rest on a modal fallacy. Similarly, Warfield (2000) claims that the standard modal formulation of the master argument for incompatibilism is a modal fallacy. Here, I refute both claims. Contra Westphal, I show that the mistake in van Inwagen’s First Formal Argument is no modal fallacy. After that, I argue that Warfield’s charge of modal fallacy can be easily avoided by using a plausible principle concerning actuality. Then, I show that this allows one to put forward a fairly simple argument for fatalism (the thesis that we aren’t able to do otherwise from what we actually do).

On behalf of the consequence argument: time, modality, and the nature of free action

The consequence argument for the incompatibility of free action and determinism has long been under attack, but two important objections have only recently emerged: Warfield’s modal fallacy objection and Campbell’s no past objection. In this paper, I explain the significance of these objections and defend the consequence argument against them. First, I present a novel formulation of the argument that withstands their force. Next, I argue for the one controversial claim on which this formulation relies: the trans-temporality thesis. This thesis implies that an agent acts freely only if there is one time at which she is able to perform an action and a distinct time at which she actually performs it. I then point out that determinism, too, is a thesis about trans-temporal relations. I conclude that it is precisely because my formulation of the consequence argument emphasizes trans-temporality that it prevails against the modal fallacy and no past objections.

On Strawson On Kantian Apperception

Strawson famously argues that Kant’s argument for the necessary conditions of experience can only be retained once freed from a priori synthesis. Strawson claims that a purely ‘analytical coimexion’ between experience and the object of experience is conceptually inferable from a thoroughly analytic premise concerning the capacity for self-ascription of representations. In this paper, I take issue with the way in which Strawson construes the analyticity of the principle of self-ascription or what Kant calls the principle of transcendental apperception. More particularly, I shall argue that Strawson’s unity argument, viz, his construal of the unity of consciousness, on which the principle of self-ascription depends, suffers from a modal fallacy. Whilst arguing this, I shall suggest that a priori synthesis is required even for analytic unity of consciousness to be possible.

Consecuencia lógica: modelos conjuntistas y aspectos modales

According to Etchemendy, in attempting to offer an analysis of the modal features of the intuitive concept of logical consequence, Tarski has committed a modal fallacy. In this paper, I consider the thesis according to it is posible to analyze the modals properties of concept of logical consequence through of a generalization on set-theoretical interpretations. As is known, some philosophers have tried to argue for the transit from the general to the modal by showing that there are enough settheoretic interpretations so as to be able to represent the modal features of the intuitive concept of consequence. As is also known, those people have encountered a lot of difficulties. In the present paper, I will try to show that those problems are related not with the specific possibility of accounting for the modal features by means of a set-theoretic notion of model but with the possibility of coming up with a precise mathematical theory for the concept of interpretation, and, as such, they can be solved by way of appealing to the usual solutions to this problem.

Temporal Necessity and Logical Fatalism

I begin by briefly mentioning two different logical fatalistic argument types: one from temporal necessity, and one from antecedent truth value. It is commonly thought that the latter of these involves a simple modal fallacy and is easily refuted, and that the former poses the real threat to an open future. I question the conventional wisdom regarding these argument types, and present an analysis of temporal necessity that suggests the anti-fatalist might be better off shifting her argumentative strategy. Specifically, two points of interest emerge from my analysis: first, temporal necessity turns out to be an inappropriate and ineffective tool for the fatalist to make use of; and, second, the dismissal of the argument from antecedent truth value turns out to be an over-hasty one.

Idealism and Williams's Semantic Paradox

AbstractBernard Williams's essay ‘Wittgenstein and Idealism’ argues that that the conventionality of language entails the dependence of the truth of sentences and ultimately of corresponding states of affairs as truth‐makers on the existence of thinking subjects. Peter Winch and Colin Lyas try to avoid William's paradox by distinguishing between the existence conditions of a sentence and its assertion. The Winch‐Lyas solution is criticized and a stronger Winch‐Lays resistant version of Williams's paradox is proposed. A more satisfactory countercriticism is given, involving an ineliminable modal fallacy occurring in the paradox inference, that arises because of the argument's invalid combination of categorical and counterfactual assumptions and conclusions.

Warfield's new argument for incompatibilism

Warfield (2000) has noticed that this argument commits a modal fallacy. For the most that one could hope to show by means of the argument is that there is no freedom if determinism is true. But the thesis of incompatibilism is not this (weak) claim, but rather its necessitation. And, as everyone accepts, from the fact that a proposition is true it does not follow that it is necessary. Warfield acknowledges that there might be ways to shore up the Consequence argument to avoid this objection, but proposes to sidestep the issue by offering an entirely new argument for incompatibilism. Despite its ingenuity, our purpose in this paper is to establish that Warfield's argument does not succeed. Let us begin by adopting some standard abbreviations, beginning with the use of 'D' for the material conditional:

Three fallacies

Three fallacies in the rationality debate obscure the possibility for reconciling the opposed camps. I focus on how these fallacies arise in the view that subjects interpret their task differently from the experimenters (owing to the influence of conversational expectations). The themes are: first, critical assessment must start from subjects' understanding; second, a modal fallacy; and third, fallacies of distribution.

Compatibilism—A Reply to Locke

I wish here to discuss some criticisms made by Don Locke in a recent issue of Mind' of a paper, also in this journal,2 by Stewart Candlish and myself. In our paper, Candlish and I expressed puzzlement at the fact that in the debate over the compatibility or otherwise of determinism with our being able on some occasions to act otherwise than as we in fact do on those occasions, it seems generally to be taken that the onus of proof is on those asserting this compatibility rather than on those denying it. Although it is clear enough why determinism should be thought to entail that on any particular occasion I will not act otherwise than I in fact do, it is much less clear, we suggested, why it should be thought to entail that on any particular occasion I will be unable to act otherwise than I in fact do. We suggested that the explanation of incompatibilism's seeming initially more plausible to many than its denial can be traced to the seductiveness of a familiar modal fallacy, and concluded that the onus of proof in the debate lies with incompatibilists rather than with their opponents. I would like to comment first on Locke's remarks concerning an alleged mis-statement by Candlish and myself of what we wish to say at one point (p. 4I7) in our paper, where we speak of an incompatibility between determinism and 'one's doing otherwise than one in fact does'. Locke's reason for thinking this must be a mis-statement is th'at 'it is of course a tautology that no-one will ever do other than they in fact do' (p. 88). Now we had anticipated this possible misunderstanding of our remarks (to which, incidentally, certain of Locke's formulations are equally open-for example, his claim (p. 88) that 'determinism means that no one can ever do anything other than what they do'); and as Locke in fact notes, we had tried to forestall it by distinguishing between doing otherwise than one does as well as doing as one does, and doing otherwise than one does instead of doing as one does. The former is indeed logically impossible, whether or not determinism is true, but we pointed out that it was, of course, the latter which we suggested to be ruled out by determinism (p. 4I7, n.). However, Locke asserts (p. 88) that 'it is equally impossible to do something else instead of what you do', and suggests that there is therefore 'some irony' in our suggestion that the distinction we drew can dispel the appearance of contradiction or tautology in much that is said about doing otherwise than one does. Now Locke gives no reason at all for his assertion that it is impossible to do something else instead of what you do, perhaps because this seems obvious to him. However, it should be

Digging Deeper into Determinism

Arguments for the incompatibility of free will and determinism commonly depend on the claim that if all events are caused then, for every action, the agent could not have acted otherwise than he did. But as Winston Nesbitt and Stewart Candlish have recently pointed out ('Determinism and the Ability to do Otherwise', Mind, I978, pp. 415420), this claim is far from obvious, even ignoring the many and sophisticated attempts to avoid it by an appropriate analysis of causation, or of 'could have', or both. 'For while it is clear why it should be thought that if it is determined that one will do something on a given occasion then one will not in fact do anything else on that occasion, it is much less clear why it should be thought that if it is determined that one will do something on a given occasion, then one will be incapable of doing anything else on that occasion' (p. 415). Surely determinism does not have 'the peculiar consequence that on any particular occasion, one's abilities are restricted in number to just one, namely the ability to do precisely as one does' (p. 4I7)! What has happened, Nesbitt and Candlish suggest, is that incompatibilists have committed the familiar modal fallacy of arguing from LCpq to CpLq, by arguing from 'Necessarily, if determinism is true, then one will not do otherwise than one does on any particular occasion' (which Nesbitt and Candlish are themselves prepared to accept) to 'If determinism is true, then one cannot do other than one does on any particular occasion' (which is what the incompatibilist's argument requires). Now first of all it is worth being clear that, in claiming that the agent could not have acted differently, the incompatibilist need not be claiming that his abilities are restricted to just one. Take an example where it is as clear as it ever can be that I cannot do other than what I am doing: where I fall over a cliff and, lacking any parachutes, jet thrusters or efficacious magic, plummet towards the ground at an acceleration of 9-8 metres per second per second. Yet even then I do not lose my ability to type or drive a car-at least not until I hit the ground-any more than I lose my ability to drive when I am in my study and my car is safely locked in my garage. What is the case, rather, is that I am not, in those circumstances, in a position to exercise those abilities. It is for this reason that I have elsewhere distinguished the 'can' of ability from the 'can' of being able (see 'The Can of Being Able', Philosophia, I976, sec. i). The question at issue in the free will debate is not whether determinism deprives me of my abilities, but whether it means that I am, on any particular occasion, unable to exercise any such abilities except those which, at the time, I happen to be exercising. Nevertheless, however we interpret the 'can' it remains true, as Nesbitt and Candlish insist, that what follows from determinism is not that the

R. W. Ashby. Entailment and modality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s. vol. 63 (1962–1963), pp. 203–216. - John O. Nelson. A question of entailment. The review of metaphysics, vol. 18 (1964–1965), pp. 364–377. - John Bacon. Entailment and the modal fallacy. The review of metaphysics, vol. 18 (1964–1965), pp. 566–571.

R. W. Ashby. Entailment and modality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s. vol. 63 (1962–1963), pp. 203–216. - John O. Nelson. A question of entailment. The review of metaphysics, vol. 18 (1964–1965), pp. 364–377. - John Bacon. Entailment and the modal fallacy. The review of metaphysics, vol. 18 (1964–1965), pp. 566–571. - Volume 38 Issue 4