Compatibilism—A Reply to Locke

Abstract

I wish here to discuss some criticisms made by Don Locke in a recent issue of Mind' of a paper, also in this journal,2 by Stewart Candlish and myself. In our paper, Candlish and I expressed puzzlement at the fact that in the debate over the compatibility or otherwise of determinism with our being able on some occasions to act otherwise than as we in fact do on those occasions, it seems generally to be taken that the onus of proof is on those asserting this compatibility rather than on those denying it. Although it is clear enough why determinism should be thought to entail that on any particular occasion I will not act otherwise than I in fact do, it is much less clear, we suggested, why it should be thought to entail that on any particular occasion I will be unable to act otherwise than I in fact do. We suggested that the explanation of incompatibilism's seeming initially more plausible to many than its denial can be traced to the seductiveness of a familiar modal fallacy, and concluded that the onus of proof in the debate lies with incompatibilists rather than with their opponents. I would like to comment first on Locke's remarks concerning an alleged mis-statement by Candlish and myself of what we wish to say at one point (p. 4I7) in our paper, where we speak of an incompatibility between determinism and 'one's doing otherwise than one in fact does'. Locke's reason for thinking this must be a mis-statement is th'at 'it is of course a tautology that no-one will ever do other than they in fact do' (p. 88). Now we had anticipated this possible misunderstanding of our remarks (to which, incidentally, certain of Locke's formulations are equally open-for example, his claim (p. 88) that 'determinism means that no one can ever do anything other than what they do'); and as Locke in fact notes, we had tried to forestall it by distinguishing between doing otherwise than one does as well as doing as one does, and doing otherwise than one does instead of doing as one does. The former is indeed logically impossible, whether or not determinism is true, but we pointed out that it was, of course, the latter which we suggested to be ruled out by determinism (p. 4I7, n.). However, Locke asserts (p. 88) that 'it is equally impossible to do something else instead of what you do', and suggests that there is therefore 'some irony' in our suggestion that the distinction we drew can dispel the appearance of contradiction or tautology in much that is said about doing otherwise than one does. Now Locke gives no reason at all for his assertion that it is impossible to do something else instead of what you do, perhaps because this seems obvious to him. However, it should be