From modal fallacies to a new argument for fatalism

Pedro Merlussi

doi:10.1590/0100-6045.2019.v42n3.pm

Abstract

Abstract Do incompatibilist arguments, like some fatalist arguments, rest on modal fallacies? If Westphal (2012) is right, then one popular argument for incompatibilism van Inwagen’s “First Formal Argument” does rest on a modal fallacy. Similarly, Warfield (2000) claims that the standard modal formulation of the master argument for incompatibilism is a modal fallacy. Here, I refute both claims. Contra Westphal, I show that the mistake in van Inwagen’s First Formal Argument is no modal fallacy. After that, I argue that Warfield’s charge of modal fallacy can be easily avoided by using a plausible principle concerning actuality. Then, I show that this allows one to put forward a fairly simple argument for fatalism (the thesis that we aren’t able to do otherwise from what we actually do).

Highlights

Fatalist arguments, if sound, have an incredible consequence
Let’s start with Westphal’s objection to van Inwagen’s first formal argument for incompatibilism, which starts with the following scenario: JUDGE: Let us suppose there was once a judge who had only to raise his right hand at a certain time, T, to prevent the execution of a sentence of death upon a certain criminal, such a hand-raising being the sign, according to the conventions of the judgeâ€TMs country, of a granting of special clemency
It is impossible for P to be true and jâ€TMs hand to be raised. This is the correct argument for the second premise of van Inwagenâ€TMs first formal argument, and it is entirely unproblematic2. (On top of that, in the first sentence of the paper Westphal claims: â€œI believe that the argument given by Peter van Inwagen for the second premiss in his â€~First Formal Argumentâ€TM is invalid, and that the entire â€~First Formal Argumentâ€TM is unsoundâ€ (Westphal 2012: 36)

Summary

Introduction

They try to establish that we are powerless to do anything other than what we do. While the fatalist argues for the claim that we are powerless to do anything other than what we do, the incompatibilist makes a conditional claim; that, necessarily, if determinism is true, there’s no free will (or at least no one has the ability to do otherwise). This claim doesn’t seem as incredible as the. I conclude with some remarks about the modal formulation of the consequence argument, arguing that the best way to avoid the new fatalist argument is to deny that the meaning of “could have rendered false” captures the relevant sense of “free will”

The “First Formal Argument” is no modal fallacy

It is not possible that j have raised his hand at t and P be true

Warfield’s modal fallacy objection

A new argument for fatalism

Conclusion